(a) Where the presumption of possession with respect to prescriptive acquisition is reversed;

(b) The case holding that the presumption of possession with respect to prescriptive acquisition has been reversed

A. The presumption of intention to own under Article 197(1) of the Civil Act is broken when it is proven that the possessor had no intention to own by nature, or that the possessor had no intention to own the land in light of the nature of the possession. In other words, if it is proven that the possessor had no intention to own the land in the title, or that the possessor had no intention to own the land in accordance with the rule of experience, such as where the possessor did not normally take any action if the possessor was in possession or would have been in the possession, and where it was objectively proven that the possessor had not had no intention to own the land in the possession.

(b) The case holding that the presumption of possession with respect to prescriptive acquisition has been reversed

Articles 197(1) and 245 of the Civil Act

[Plaintiff-Appellant-Appellee] Plaintiff 1 and 1 other (Law Firm Gyeong, Attorneys Park Jong-soo et al., Counsel for plaintiff-appellant-appellant-appellee)

Plaintiff

Defendant 1 and five Defendants, et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant-appellee and one other

Daegu District Court Decision 90Na4394 delivered on October 31, 1990

After destroying the original judgment, the case shall be remanded to the Daegu District Court Panel Division.

As to the Grounds of Appeal

The presumption of intention to own under Article 197(1) of the Civil Act is broken when it is proved that the possessor did not have the intention to own by nature of the possession, or that the possessor did not have the intention to own it in accordance with the rule of experience. In other words, if it is proved that the possessor did not normally take the position when the possessor was in possession, or did not act when the possessor would have taken it as a matter of course, it would be objectively deemed that the possessor did not have the intention to possess by rejecting the right to admit another person’s lawsuit.

In this case, the court below rejected the plaintiff's primary claim that the deceased non-party 1 died on March 5, 1964 when the plaintiff purchased 300,000 won from the deceased non-party 1, the deceased non-party 1, the deceased non-party 1, the deceased non-party 1, the deceased non-party 1, who purchased 300,000 won the real estate of this case from the deceased non-party 1, the deceased non-party 1, but did not complete the transfer registration, and thus, the defendants were not admitted to purchase the plaintiff's primary claim that the defendant seeks to implement the procedure for the transfer registration of ownership of this case. The deceased non-party 1, the owner of the real estate of this case, the deceased non-party 1, the deceased non-party 2, the deceased non-party 1, the deceased non-party 1, the deceased non-party 1, the deceased non-party 1, the deceased non-party 1, and the deceased non-party 1, the deceased's share in this case was held 986.

However, even though the court below stated that the phrase "I am above" means the donation of ownership, not South and North Korea, and if such donation contract has been established between the number of persons who are not South and the time of their death, the donor's survival and the date of the registration of inheritance in his name is clear by Gap evidence No. 1 and No. 2, and since October 10, 1981, the defendants' filing of a claim for the registration of ownership transfer for reasons of their donation from their fleets without any reasonable ground, but without any other reasons, the plaintiff and the deceased non-party 1's claim for the registration of ownership transfer was presented as the main claim, and even if the fence of the real estate of this case was removed from the wind of 1984, it cannot be viewed that the plaintiff was the possessor of the building site of this case without any reason to prove that the plaintiff was the possessor of the building site of this case, the non-party 1 was the possessor of the building site of this case, and it cannot be viewed that the plaintiff was the possessor of the building site of this case.

Nevertheless, the original judgment determined as above cannot be erroneous in the misapprehension of the legal principle on the possession with an intention to hold the prescriptive acquisition, and there is a good reason to criticize this.

Therefore, the original judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below for a new trial. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Yoon Young-young (Presiding Justice)