[1] Whether "amount of the accepted bribery" under Article 2 (1) of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes should be based on the aggregate amount of all accomplices (affirmative)

[2] Whether employees who are not executive officers of government-managed enterprises under Article 4(2) of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes and Article 3 subparag. 1 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act can also become joint principal offenders of the crime of acceptance of bribe with other

[3] Purport of Article 4 (1) of the Aggravated Punishment Act

[1] In a case where several accomplices jointly commit the crime of acceptance of bribe, the accomplice cannot be exempted from the liability for the crime as well as his amount of the acceptance of bribe by other accomplices. Thus, in determining whether Article 2(1) of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes is applicable, the sum of the amount of the acceptance of bribe by all accomplices should be the basis for determining the amount of the acceptance of bribe, and it shall not be based on the amount actually acquired or distributed by each accomplice

[2] Employees who are not officers of government-managed enterprises under Article 4(2) of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes and Article 3 subparag. 1 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act may also become joint principal offenders of the crime of acceptance of bribe with other officers

[3] In applying Articles 129 through 132 of the Criminal Act, Article 4(1) of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes, the scope of the application of the crime of bribery shall be extended to the executive officers of government-managed enterprises who are not originally public officials. In the event the executive officers of government-managed enterprises have committed the crimes under Articles 129 through 132 of the Criminal Act with respect to their duties, it is evident that the crime is established, and that the Act on the Aggravated Punishment,

[1] Article 2 (1) of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes / [2] Articles 30 and 129 of the Criminal Act, Article 4 (2) of the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes Act, Article 3 subparagraph 1 of the Enforcement Decree of the Aggravated Punishment

[1] Supreme Court Decision 91Do1911 delivered on October 8, 1991 (Gong1991, 2757), Supreme Court Decision 93Do1341 delivered on July 13, 1993 (Gong1993Ha, 233) / [2] Supreme Court Decision 91Do3191 delivered on August 14, 1992 (Gong1992, 2706) / [3] Supreme Court Decision 71Do1786 delivered on November 23, 1971 (Gong19-3, 56) (Gong1984, 1568), Supreme Court Decision 84Do1139 delivered on August 14, 198 (Gong1984, 1568), Supreme Court Decision 209Do2909 delivered on September 28, 190 (Gong19909)

Defendant 1 and three others

Defendants

Attorney Jin-jin

Seoul High Court Decision 98No2499 delivered on April 6, 1999

All appeals are dismissed.

Each of the grounds of appeal by the Defendants and the public defender are examined together.

1. In a case where several accomplices jointly commit the crime of acceptance of bribe, the accomplice cannot be exempted from the liability for the crime as well as his amount of the acceptance of bribe by other accomplices. Thus, in determining whether Article 2(1) of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes is applicable, the sum of the amount of the acceptance of bribe by all accomplices should be the basis, and it shall not be based on the amount actually acquired or distributed by each accomplice.

In light of the records after examining the evidence set forth in the judgment of the court of first instance maintained by the court below in light of the records, the court below acknowledged that Defendant 1, 2, and 3 conspired to receive a bribe of KRW 10,00,000 from Defendant 4, and it cannot be deemed that there is no violation of law as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal, which maintained the judgment of first instance applying Article 2 (1) 2 of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes. Furthermore, the Supreme Court's judgment pointed out in the ground of appeal by

2. We examine the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the records. It is proper that the court below determined that Defendant 1 is an executive officer of a government-managed enterprise under Article 4(2) of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes and Article 3 subparag. 1 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act, since the court below is a director or higher in charge of the

Meanwhile, employee who is not an executive officer as above can also become joint principal offenders of the crime of acceptance of bribe with other executive officers (see Supreme Court Decision 91Do3191, Aug. 14, 1992). Thus, the court below is justified in maintaining the judgment of the court of first instance, which was sentenced to the violation of Article 2 (1) 2 of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes by applying the main sentence of Article 33 and Article 30 of the Criminal Act, on the ground that Defendant 2 and 3, who is an employee of the Farmland Improvement Association, were not the above executive officers but committed a crime jointly with Defendant 1, who is the said executive officer. It is not erroneous in the misapprehension of the legal principles of the status offender and joint principal offenders, as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal.

3. In applying Articles 129 through 132 of the Criminal Act, Article 4(1) of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes, the scope of the application of the crime of bribery shall be extended to the executive officers of government-managed enterprises who are not originally public officials. When the executive officers of government-managed enterprises have committed a crime under Articles 129 through 132 of the Criminal Act in connection with their duties, the crime is established, and it is obvious that the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes is applicable (see Supreme Court Decision 90Do1092, Sept. 28, 1990). Accordingly, the judgment of the court below to the same purport is just and there is no violation of law as otherwise alleged in the

4. Where an executive officer of a government-managed enterprise subject to the application of the crime of bribery is indicted for the crime of bribery under Article 4 of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes, the court may apply the above Article 4 to the crime of bribery without modification of a bill of indictment even if the statement under the above Article 4 was omitted. Thus, the argument in the grounds of appeal to the contrary purport

5. Therefore, all appeals are dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges.

Justices Cho Cho-Un (Presiding Justice)