[1] The case holding that there is a proximate causal relation between the negligence in managing firearms and ball cartridges and the victim's damage caused by the criminal act in the event that the leaked firearms and ball cartridges were used in criminal acts

[2] Whether the amount of compensation under the Honorable Treatment of the Deceased and wounded Persons Act can be deducted from the amount of compensation under the State Compensation Act (negative)

[3] The nature of money that the victim received as agreed money from the perpetrator in the course of investigation or criminal trial

[4] The case affirming the court below's decision that the criminal agreement was paid as consolation money

[1] The case holding that there is a proximate causal relationship between the negligence in the management of firearms and ball cartridges and the victim's damage caused by the criminal act in the event that the leaked firearms and ball cartridges were used for criminal acts

[2] The system that pays compensation, etc. to the bereaved family members of a deceased noble person or a deceased noble person has the character of social security to promote the stability of life and the improvement of welfare of the bereaved family members of the deceased noble person and the deceased noble person, as well as the system that provides national honorable treatment for their contributions and sacrifices for the State and society, and is not implemented to compensate for losses or losses by different purposes or purposes, etc. Therefore, the benefit such as compensation, medical care, and educational protection, etc. paid or to be paid under the Act on Honorable Treatment of Persons of Distinguished Service for Public Good, shall not be deducted from the amount of damage to be

[3] In the course of the investigation or criminal trial against the perpetrator of the illegal act, where the victim agreed that the perpetrator would not be punished against the perpetrator, it shall be deemed that the amount was paid as part of the compensation for damages (property damage) unless there are circumstances such as clearly stating that the amount received at the time of the agreement is paid as consolation money.

[4] The case affirming the court below's decision that the criminal agreement was paid as consolation money

[1] Article 2 of the State Compensation Act, Article 750 of the Civil Act / [2] Articles 1, 7, 9, 10, 11, and 12 of the Act on Honorable Treatment of Persons who Died or who Died for Public Good, Article 2 of the State Compensation Act / [3] Articles 393 and 763 of the Civil Act / [4] Articles 393 and 763 of the Civil Act

[1] Supreme Court Decision 76Da260 delivered on April 13, 1976 (Gong1976, 9107), Supreme Court Decision 84Da115 delivered on July 9, 1985 (Gong1985, 1106), Supreme Court Decision 97Da49534 delivered on February 10, 198 (Gong1998Sang, 891) / [2] Supreme Court Decision 95Da6991 delivered on July 22, 1997 (Gong197Ha, 2602 delivered on February 10, 198 (Gong1998, 689) and Supreme Court Decision 97Da499199 delivered on September 24, 1995 (Gong1997Da939497 delivered on September 19, 199) / [2] Supreme Court Decision 97Da199497 delivered on September 24, 1997

Plaintiff 1 and one other (Law Office General Law Office, Attorney Lee Lee-soo, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Korea

Daegu District Court Decision 99Na23923 delivered on July 12, 2000

All appeals are dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.

On the first ground for appeal

A person responsible for managing firearms, ammunition, explosives, etc. can sufficiently anticipate that if firearms, etc. are leaked to the outside of the military due to their storage and management negligence, it may be used in criminal acts and may result in infringing on the lives and bodies of each citizen (see Supreme Court Decision 97Da49534, Feb. 10, 1998).

In comparison with the evidence indicated in the record, the court below accepted the judgment of the court of first instance and recognized the facts as to the circumstances leading to the accident of this case. The non-party 1 neglected to have the shot fever for 2 days or more under the defendant's control, and the non-party 1 neglected to have it held for the non-party 2 days or for the non-party 1, and the shotleg management should always be checked at the same time so that the shot scrap might not be lost. However, the non-party 1 did not properly confirm the shot powder settlement prepared by the non-party 1. The key to the shot belt storage was also kept in the state of non-party 1's failure to correct it, and the non-party 1 did not err in the misapprehension of the legal principle as to the act of theft and management of the gun in proximate causal relation with the result and the damage caused by the non-party 1's negligence in the management of the gun of this case. The non-party 1 did not err in the misapprehension of evidence and the legal principle.

The Supreme Court precedents cited in the grounds of appeal are inappropriate to be invoked in this case as they differ from this case.

We cannot accept the allegation of this point in the grounds of appeal.

On the second ground for appeal

Contributory negligence in tort is set in consideration of the victim's fault in determining the amount of compensation in accordance with the principle of equity or good faith. The scope of compensation is set in consideration of all the circumstances such as the tortfeasor's intent and negligence, degree of the victim's intentional act, occurrence of the illegal act, and expansion of damages. However, fact-finding or its ratio on the ground of comparative negligence is within the exclusive authority of a fact-finding court unless it is recognized that it is considerably unreasonable in light of the principle of equity (see Supreme Court Decision 98Da54397, Jun. 9, 200).

In comparison with the evidence indicated in the record, the court below's finding of facts about the grounds for offsetting negligence by admitting the judgment of the court of first instance is justified, and even considering the circumstances asserted by the appellant, the court below's citing the judgment of the court of first instance seems to be appropriate to assess the degree of negligence by citing the judgment of the court of first instance, and there is no error of law by misapprehending

We cannot accept the allegation of this point in the grounds of appeal.

On the third ground for appeal

The purpose of this Act is to contribute to the realization of social justice by providing necessary national honorable treatment for the injured and his family members and the bereaved family members of the deceased and wounded (Article 1). The State only provides for medical protection, education protection, employment protection, and funeral protection (Articles 7, 9 through 12), and does not provide for exemption from the duty to pay benefits. In light of the purpose and purpose of the Act on the Honorable Treatment of Persons of Distinguished Service for the wounded and wounded, the system to pay and pay compensation to the bereaved family members of the deceased and wounded is not only the social security character of promoting the stability of life and the improvement of welfare of their bereaved family members, but also the system to compensate for losses or losses, including the purpose or purpose of compensating for losses and losses.

Therefore, the benefits such as compensation, medical care, and educational care which are paid or payable by the deceased and wounded noble person law can not be deducted from the amount of damages that should be compensated by the State Compensation Act.

The judgment of the court below to the same purport is just, and there is no error of law as to the deduction of profit and loss.

Among the grounds of appeal, the argument of this point is not accepted.

Concerning No. 4

In a case where the victim agreed that he would not be punished against the perpetrator in the course of investigation or criminal trial against the perpetrator of the tort, unless there are circumstances such as clearly stating that the amount received at the time of the agreement is paid as consolation money, it shall be reasonable to deem that the amount was paid as part of the compensation (property damage) for damages (see Supreme Court Decision 95Da53942 delivered on September 20, 1996).

However, the court below accepted the judgment of the court of first instance and recognized the fact that the agreement that the plaintiffs received 15 million won from the non-party 1's family members as criminal agreement, stated that the plaintiffs' compensation for damages of this case against the State is separate, and that the above amount should be paid to the non-party 1's parents and relatives as the crime of de facto crime. The above amount was paid to relieve the criminal liability against the non-party 1, but it was not paid as part of the civil damage compensation (property damage) under the civil law. Thus, it is acceptable to consider the above amount in calculating the amount of consolation money without deducting the above amount from the property damage compensation, and there is no error of law as to the legal nature of the criminal agreement.

We cannot accept the allegation of this point in the grounds of appeal.

Concerning the fifth point

The amount of consolation money for emotional distress suffered by a tort may be determined by the fact-finding court at its discretion, taking into account all the circumstances (see Supreme Court Decision 98Da41377, Apr. 23, 199).

By citing the judgment of the court of first instance, the court below shall determine the amount of consolation money in consideration of all the circumstances indicated in the instant case, such as the circumstance and result of the instant accident, the amount of consolation money, and the receipt of the amount of consolation money. Under such circumstances, the amount of consolation money calculated by the court below is reasonable, and there is no error

Of the grounds of appeal, the argument of this point cannot be accepted.

Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all Justices who reviewed the appeal.

Justices Shin Shin-chul (Presiding Justice)