[1] The standard for determining whether “when a sufficient period of time has elapsed” under Article 613(2) of the Civil Act constitutes a ground for termination of a loan for use

[2] In a case where Gap corporation entered into a loan agreement with the Yongsan-gu Office for the use of the land in question and used the land in a school site free of charge, and the Korea Asset Management Corporation entrusted with the affairs concerning the management and disposal of the above land imposed indemnity pursuant to Article 72 of the former State Property Act, etc. on Gap corporation on the ground that the head of Yongsan-gu Office, who was the management authority of the above land, withdraws his/her intent of free use by imposing and notifying indemnity in 192, the case holding that the judgment below holding that Gap corporation cannot be deemed to have passed the period sufficient to use and profit from the above land on the ground that the head of Yongsan-gu Office, at the time of imposing previous indemnity, had a considerable time after entering into a loan agreement for use, and that the disposition imposing indemnity

[1] Article 613(2) of the Civil Act provides that a sufficient period of time has elapsed as the grounds for termination of a loan for use, which is the grounds for termination of a loan for use. Whether this is applicable ought to be determined based on whether it is reasonable to recognize the termination right against the lender from the standpoint of fairness, comprehensively taking into account the circumstances at the time of the loan for use contract, the borrower’

[2] Where Gap corporation imposed indemnity pursuant to Article 72 of the former State Property Act (amended by Act No. 11548, Dec. 18, 2012) on Gap corporation on the ground that the Korea Asset Management Corporation entrusted with the affairs concerning the management and disposal of the above land imposed and notified the indemnity in 192 by the head of Yongsan-gu Office, who was the management authority of the above land, to withdraw his/her intent of free use, the case held that the judgment of the court below was justifiable in holding that Gap corporation's use of the above land could not be deemed unlawful on the ground that the circumstance leading up to loan for use was caused to the loan agreement, the old Gwanak Property Management Act (repealed by Article 14 of the Addenda to the former Yellow Property Management Act, Act No. 339, Sept. 23, 1954), the old Yellow Property Management Corporation's establishment and amendment of Cultural Heritage Protection Act, the term of use of the above land was not determined separately by the head of Yongsan-gu Office and the head of Yongsan-gu Industrial Property Management Corporation's Corporation's use of the above land.

[1] Article 613(2) of the Civil Act / [2] Article 613(2) of the Civil Act; Article 72 of the former State Property Act (Amended by Act No. 11548, Dec. 18, 2012); Article 71 of the Enforcement Decree of the State Property Act; Article 4 of the former king Property Disposal Act (Amended by Act No. 339, Sep. 23, 1954); Articles 2 and 4(3) of the former Yellow Property Preservation Act (repealed by Article 2(1) of the Addenda to the Cultural Heritage Protection Act (Amended by Act No. 1265, Feb. 9, 1963); Articles 2 and 4(3) of the former Yellow Property Preservation Act (wholly amended by Act No. 3644, Feb. 31, 1963); Article 3 and Article 5(1)3 of the former Cultural Heritage Protection Act (wholly amended by Act No. 3644, Feb. 9, 1963)

[1] Supreme Court Decision 2001Da23669 decided Jul. 24, 2001 (Gong2001Ha, 1923)

Advanced Institute of Education (Law Firm Sejong and 3 others, Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Korea Asset Management Corporation (Law Firm Sejong, Attorneys Park Byung-il et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Seoul High Court Decision 2014Nu2531 decided October 15, 2014

The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. Whether the loan contract of this case is null and void by a bilateral representation (ground of appeal No. 4)

A. Article 108 of the Medical Service Act (amended by Act No. 471 of Feb. 22, 1958 and enforced on Jan. 1, 1960; hereinafter the same) provides that the same legal act cannot be a representative of both parties, but it does not apply to the act for which the principal first consented in advance.

B. On May 18, 1938, the lower court acknowledged that the Plaintiff applied for permission to use the instant land as a school site for free to the Minister of Lee king (the Minister of king), who managed the property of the Yellow Dust, and that the Lee king’s consent to use the said land on May 20, 1938, and concluded a loan agreement for use under Article 593 of the Yongsan Civil Act between the Plaintiff and the Yellow Room on the same day (hereinafter “instant loan agreement”). At the time, the lower court acknowledged the fact that the Nonparty, while holding concurrently office with the president of the Plaintiff and the king’s employees representing the Yellow Room, entered into the said loan agreement by both agents.

Based on such factual basis, the lower court determined that the above loan agreement was valid, on the following grounds, on the grounds that both the Nonparty and the Nonparty’s act of bilateral representation can be deemed to have been based on the prior permission of both the Plaintiff and the

① The Plaintiff is a foundation established based on the contribution act in the old Yellow Room, which was seeking school establishment.

② At the time of the conclusion of the instant loan for use, the Young-gu, which represents the Yellow Dust, sold a separate land of the old Yellow Dust to the Plaintiff.

③ After the conclusion of the loan agreement of this case, the Plaintiff operated the school on the land of this case so that it would conform to the original purpose of establishment by leaving school buildings on the land of this case, and did not perform any act or express intent in opposition thereto.

C. Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of relevant statutes and legal principles, the lower court’s determination is justifiable, and contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal, there were no errors by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the validity of both parties’ representation

2. Whether the loan agreement of this case expired or terminated pursuant to the new provision of the Addenda to the former Cultural Heritage Protection Act (Ground of appeal No. 3)

A. Since the Cultural Heritage Protection Act enacted on January 10, 1962, the provisions of Article 2 (1) 3 of the Addenda of the above Act (amended on February 9, 1963) stipulate that the amount of the miscellaneous property among the miscellaneous property shall be transferred to the special account for the management of cultural properties after disposal by the literature delivery minister, and Article 5 stipulates that the literature delivery minister may demand the person who possesses miscellaneous property to purchase the miscellaneous property for a fixed period of one month, and the person who fails to comply with the request for purchase shall specify the miscellaneous property within one month from the date of such request.

B. However, pursuant to Article 2 of the former Yellow Dust Property Act (amended by Act No. 1265, Feb. 9, 1963; hereinafter the same), the State acquired the ownership of the instant land in a state where it succeeded to the obligation under the instant loan agreement, which was borne by the Yellow Dust, to the Plaintiff, and it cannot be deemed that the Plaintiff’s status under the loan agreement is naturally extinguished due to the new provision of each of the above supplementary provisions or the proposal for the purchase by the Director General of Cultural Properties Management Bureau. As long as it cannot be deemed that the Plaintiff was liable to deliver the instant land to the State in accordance with the enactment of each of the above supplementary provisions or the proposal for the purchase by the Director General of Cultural Properties Management Bureau, the allegation in the grounds of appeal on different premise

C. In the same purport, the lower court’s rejection of the Defendant’s assertion is justifiable, and it did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the Addenda of the former Cultural Heritage Protection

3. Whether the instant loan contract was terminated due to the notice of imposition of indemnity on February 27, 1992 (ground of appeal Nos. 1 and 2)

A. Article 613(2) of the Civil Act provides that a sufficient period of time has elapsed as the grounds for termination of a loan for use, which is the grounds for termination of a contract for loan for use. Whether this falls under the foregoing, shall be determined based on whether it is reasonable to recognize the termination right against the lender from an equitable standpoint by comprehensively taking into account the circumstances at the time of the loan for use contract, the period of use and utilization of the borrower, and the circumstances where the lender needs to return (see Supreme Court Decision 2001Da23669, Jul.

B. On February 27, 1992, the court below acknowledged that the head of Yongsan-gu Seoul Metropolitan Government (hereinafter “the head of Yongsan-gu”) who was delegated the authority to manage and dispose of the instant land by the Minister of Finance and Economy (hereinafter “the head of Yongsan-gu”) imposed indemnity against the Plaintiff on the ground of the unauthorized occupation and use of the instant land, etc. (hereinafter “previous imposition of indemnity”). Furthermore, on the grounds delineated below, the court below determined that the Plaintiff could not be deemed to have lapsed due to the circumstance that the Defendant’s imposition of indemnity for the reason that a considerable time has elapsed after entering into a loan agreement for use at the time of issuing the previous imposition of indemnity

(1) The reasons leading to the consent of May 20, 1938

① In 1906, the establishment of a new life-sustaining school, a telegraphic body, was made up of the entire life-sustaining school by investing the property owned by an individual in possession of the property, and based on the property in 1912, the Plaintiff Foundation was established.

② On December 25, 1936, the Plaintiff held a deliberation council to promote the establishment of a school specializing in the prestigious female, and established a committee for the establishment of a specialized school specializing in the prestigious female, and developed a fund-raising campaign. He also went to the Plaintiff at the time of his consent to use on May 20, 1938, at the time of his consent to use the prestigary land located in the prestigious father, which was located in the prestigary land located in the prestigious mother.

③ After securing the instant land with the consent to use on May 20, 1938, the Plaintiff newly constructed a teacher on the ground and obtained the authorization for the establishment of a professional boarding school from the Korea Shipbuilding on December 21, 1938.

(2) the enactment and amendment of the king Property Disposal Act, the Yellow Dust Property Management Act, and the Cultural Heritage Protection Act.

① After the establishment of the Government of the Republic of Korea on April 12, 1949, the President Lee Jong-man ordered the Minister of literature delivery to submit the government policy concerning the foundation of the school for the purpose of maintaining the foundation of the school at the time. On April 13, 1949, the National Assembly passed a resolution to divide part of the property owned by the Gu king's own property into the Plaintiff's basic property so that it does not interfere with the management of the prestigious and prestigious and prestigious middle school.

② Article 4(2) of the former Act on the Disposal of Making Property (amended by Act No. 339 of Sep. 23, 1954) provides that “The property necessary for the maintenance and management of an educational institution established by the act of contribution of the king shall be transferred to another person,” and Article 4(3) of the former Yellow Dust Property Act and the Addenda of the former Cultural Heritage Protection Act (wholly amended by Act No. 3644 of Dec. 31, 1982) (wholly amended by Act No. 3644 of Feb. 9, 1963) also provide that the part of the property may be transferred to an educational institution established by the act of contribution of the Yking, if necessary.

(3) On November 1957, the Secretary General of the Gwanak-gu Property Affairs, who had managed the instant land at the time, prepared and delivered a written consent to the effect that “The above real estate, as ownership of its own country, has been granted the right to use the pertinent land from the time of the establishment of the school, and has been granted the right to use the said land continuously after the establishment of the school,” and has been allowing the use of the said land on several occasions without separately setting the period of use.

(4) The Plaintiff had been operating a university for skilled Women normally, and currently there are buildings on the instant land, such as a faculty hall, a university headquarters, a student hall, a graduate school hall, etc.

C. Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the relevant statutes, the legal doctrine as seen earlier, and the record, the lower court’s determination is justifiable, and contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal, there were no errors by misapprehending the legal doctrine as to

D. As above, insofar as the grounds for termination of the instant loan agreement are not acknowledged, the instant disposition on a different premise is unlawful without having to determine the remaining grounds of appeal.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Kim So-young (Presiding Justice)