[1] The meaning of "land access" under Article 185 of the Criminal Code

[2] The case holding that although the old road was established adjacent to the old road, including the land owned by the defendant, it still constitutes "land" under Article 185 of the Criminal Code

[1] The crime of interference with general traffic under Article 185 of the Criminal Code is an offense, the legal interest of which is the protection of the traffic safety of the general public. The term "land passage" refers to the land passage widely used for the traffic of the general public. It does not go through the ownership relation of the site, the traffic right relation, or the passage relation, or the passage of the person.

[2] The case holding that although the old road was established adjacent to the old road, including the land owned by the defendant, it still constitutes "land" under Article 185 of the Criminal Code

[1] Article 185 of the Criminal Act / [2] Article 185 of the Criminal Act

[1] Supreme Court Decision 88Do18 delivered on April 25, 198 (Gong1988, 929), Supreme Court Decision 88Do262 delivered on May 10, 198 (Gong1988, 970), Supreme Court Decision 88Do2264 delivered on June 27, 198 (Gong1989, 1192), Supreme Court Decision 91Do2550 delivered on December 10, 1991 (Gong192, 559), Supreme Court Decision 94Do2112 delivered on November 4, 1994 (Gong194Ha, 3308), Supreme Court Decision 9Do401 delivered on April 27, 1999

Defendant

Defendant

Attorney Park Im-hwan

Seoul District Court Decision 98No10520 delivered on April 7, 1999

The appeal is dismissed.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

1. The crime of interference with general traffic under Article 185 of the Criminal Act is an offense, the legal interest of which is the protection of the traffic safety of the general public. The term "land passage" refers to the land passage widely used for the traffic of the general public. It does not go through the ownership of the site, the traffic right relationship, or the large and hostile manner of traffic users (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 94Do2112, Nov. 4, 1994).

2. According to the records, the defendant's own land was owned by him and installed a fence of about 1.5 meters in height and about 70 meters in length, and since 1968, the land located in Pyeong-si (hereinafter "the land of this case") was de facto turned into a road. Since from around 1968, the truck used for the transportation of aggregate was up to the asphalt packing in the 1980s and became a part of two-lanes across which no distinction between India and the roadway is possible. On September 21, 1995, the land of this case, including the land of this case, opened a new road of 20 meters wide adjacent to the above new road of this case, and the land of this case remains in the form of land remaining behind the new road, but even after the new road was opened, it is difficult to view the new road of this case as the new road of this case where the new road of this case was located between the buildings constructed as the new road and the new road of this case, and the new road of this case still remains in the new road of this case and new road of this case.

However, according to the records, the old Ri market was based on Article 63 of the Road Traffic Act, Articles 34 and 35 of the Building Act, Article 185 of the Criminal Act, and Article 219 of the Civil Act, since the old Ri market had been offered for the passage of various vehicles from February 22, 1973 to the neighboring residents and the neighboring residents and it was in fact a road under the Road Traffic Act, the administrative agency that may issue a corrective or removal order under the Road Traffic Act is not the chief of the competent police station, and there is no evidence to regard the land as a road under the Building Act, and Article 185 of the Criminal Act, Article 219 of the Civil Act cannot be a ground provision for the cancellation of the above disposition, and thus, the old Ri market did not actually seek the transfer registration of ownership against the owner of the land of this case, which is the land of this case, since the Seoul High Court recognized the land of this case as a road under the Road Traffic Act since it was offered for the passage of various vehicles.

Therefore, even after the above new roads have occurred, the part of the land in this case shall be deemed to be the land passage to and from the general public, and in the same purport, the recognition and decision of the court below that the act of installing a fence by the defendant constitutes a crime of interference with general traffic is just, and there is no error of law by misunderstanding the legal principles as to the "land access" under Article 185 of the Criminal Act, or by mistake of facts due to

3. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Shin Sung-sung (Presiding Justice)