(a) Agreement on divorce and end-of-law agreement;

B. The case holding that it is reasonable to view that there was an obvious agreement between the complainant and the defendant when the complainant stated that the defendant's attorney would respond to the request for divorce on the date of trial of divorce brought by the complainant against the defendant on the ground of the adultery prior to the instant case, and that it constitutes a paper for the future adultery

A. In a case where the parties to a marriage have no intention to continue the marriage and there is an obvious agreement with the intention of divorce, even if the marital relationship remains legally, the declaration of intention on the paper, which is the prior consent to the adultery, shall be deemed to be included in the agreement. In the absence of such an obvious agreement, the provisional, temporary, and conditionally, the intention of divorce is expressed by both parties, but shall not be considered as a case of the adultery.

B. In a case where the complainant filed a complaint against the Defendant and the Defendant, the husband, on the grounds of the adultery conduct prior to the instant divorce action, and the Defendant received a final judgment of conviction, and at the same time, the Defendant’s attorney acknowledged the adultery and responded to the divorce on the trial date of the lawsuit claiming divorce and consolation money, which was brought against the Defendant on this ground, and the Defendant and the complainant was declared to have been divorced by the Supreme Court in the first instance, and the judgment became final and conclusive in the first instance court, and the two persons’ legal relationship was terminated due to the Defendant’s judgment became final and conclusive, and the complainant committed the instant inter-party conduct after the Defendant stated at the trial date to accept the divorce, and the complainant made a statement that the Defendant would comply with the above divorce claim, it is reasonable to deem that the two persons were the same as the Defendant’s legal representative did not have any intention to continue the marriage, which constitutes a case

The proviso of Article 241(2) of the Criminal Act

Supreme Court Decision 77Do2701 Decided January 31, 1972 Decided 68Do859 Decided February 25, 1969

Defendant 1 and one other

Defendants

Attorney Kim Jong-chul

Seoul Criminal Court Decision 89No5579 delivered on May 4, 1990

The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Panel Division of the Seoul Criminal Court.

Of the grounds of appeal, we examine the misapprehension of legal principles as to adultery use.

The judgment of the court below reversed and remanded the judgment of the court of first instance which held that the complaint against the adultery after the above statement was filed by the non-indicted 1, the spouse of the defendant 1, on the ground that the defendant 1 made a statement to the defendant 1's attorney to attend the trial date and to respond to the claim for divorce on the ground that the defendant 1's non-indicted 1 was the defendant 1 as the defendant 1's spouse, but in the case of judicial divorce, even if such statement was made, it is difficult to view that the defendant 1 had an intention to accept the claim for divorce because it could not be the same as the case where a complete divorce agreement was made in the case where the agreement was reached

However, in a case where the parties to a marriage have no intention to continue a matrimonial relationship and there is an obvious agreement with the intention to divorce, even if the marital relationship remains legally, it shall be deemed that the expression of intent to end, which is the prior consent to the adultery, is included in the agreement (see Supreme Court Decision 68Do859, Feb. 25, 1969; Supreme Court Decision 71Do2259, Oct. 11, 1977; Supreme Court Decision 77Do2701, Oct. 11, 197; Supreme Court Decision 77Do2701, Oct. 11, 197).

According to the records, Defendant 1 and the complainant continued to be separated from the legal couple who reported on December 15, 1979 or on April 1980, and Defendant 1 filed an appeal for divorce against the Nonindicted Party. On July 1983, the court of first instance, the second instance, and the Supreme Court decided against Defendant 1, but thereafter, the Nonindicted Party appeared on October 31, 1986 and 2 respectively on November 1, 1986 (on the day prior to the instant intermodal action), and it was reasonable for the Nonindicted Party 1 to file a complaint to have his conviction final and conclusive, and the Nonindicted Party 1 appeared on November 13, 1986, and brought a lawsuit for divorce and claim against the Nonindicted Party 1 on the ground of the above inter-Korean marital relation. On March 27, 1987, the aforementioned legal representative was present on the date of the trial of divorce, and the judgment of the Supreme Court became final and conclusive as to the amount of divorce between the Defendant and the Defendant 1 and the Defendant 2 stated on the divorce.

The court below erred in the misapprehension of the legal principles as to the use of adultery, and there are reasonable grounds to point this out.

Therefore, without determining other grounds of appeal, the judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Panel Division of the Seoul Criminal Court. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Lee Woo-soo (Presiding Justice)