[1] Legislative purport of Article 137(1)1 of the Copyright Act / Whether a crime under the above provision is established in a case where a work is made public by indicating a person who is not the author as an author, and whether such publication is the same even if the actual author consentss to such publication (affirmative in principle)

[2] Meaning of “disclosure” under the Copyright Act, and whether a crime under Article 137(1)1 of the Copyright Act is established even if the work previously made public is already made public (affirmative)

[1] Article 137(1)1 of the Copyright Act provides that a person who makes a work public under the real name or pseudonym of a person other than the author shall be subject to criminal punishment. The aforementioned provision contrary to his/her own intent, aims to protect not only the actual author’s personal right indicated as the author, but also the social credibility in the name of the author, in his/her work against the person other than the author’s own will. Considering such legislative intent, unless a person other than the author is indicated as the author, the crime under the above provision is established, and unless there are special circumstances where it is deemed that the public trust in the society is not undermined in light of social norms, such publication does not change even if the actual author’s consent is obtained from the person other than the author.

[2] Publication under the Copyright Act refers to disclosing a work to the public by means of public performance, public transmission or display and by other means (Article 2 subparag. 25 of the Copyright Act). In light of the literal meaning of such publication and the legislative intent of Article 137(1)1 of the Copyright Act, even if a work which falsely expresses an author is previously made public, the establishment of a crime under the above provision does not affect the establishment of a crime.

[1] Article 137 (1) 1 of the Copyright Act / [2] Article 2 subparagraph 25 of the Copyright Act and Article 137 (1) 1 of the Copyright Act

Defendant 1 and two others

Defendants

Law Firm Cheong-tae et al.

Suwon District Court Decision 2016No1620 decided September 8, 2016

All appeals are dismissed.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. As to the ground of appeal on the violation of the Copyright Act

A. Article 137(1)1 of the Copyright Act provides that a person who makes a work public under the real name or pseudonym of a person other than the author shall be subject to criminal punishment. The aforementioned provision contrary to his/her own intent is to protect not only the actual author’s personal right indicated as the author, but also the social credibility in the name of the author, in his/her work against his/her own will and against his/her will. Considering such legislative intent, unless a person other than the author is indicated as the author, the crime under the above provision is established, and unless the work is made public in light of social norms, unless there are special circumstances where it is deemed that the public trust in the society is not undermined, it does not change even if there was the consent of the person other than the author and the actual author.

In addition, publication under the Copyright Act refers to the disclosure of a work to the public by means of public performance, public transmission, display or other means, and the publication of a work (Article 2 subparag. 25 of the Copyright Act). In light of the literal meaning of such publication and the legislative intent of Article 137(1)1 of the Copyright Act as seen earlier, even if a work which falsely expresses an author has previously been made public, the establishment of a crime under the said provision does not affect the establishment of a crime.

B. The lower court did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the violation of the Copyright Act and thereby adversely affecting the conclusion of the judgment, contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal.

On the other hand, Defendant 1 and Defendant 3’s ground of appeal disputing the public offering are without merit, as it alleged in the ground of appeal to the effect that it erred by selecting evidence and finding facts belonging to the exclusive jurisdiction of the lower court.

2. As to the ground of appeal on the crime of interference with business

The lower court determined that Defendant 1’s act of interference with business by deceptive means is not different even if Defendant 1’s base points for teachers’ re-contract were exceeded monthlyly, and Defendant 1 did not change even if the base points for teachers’ re-contract were to exceed the standard points. In so doing, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the part of Defendant 1.

In addition, the lower court determined that interference with the faculty evaluation of ○ University cannot be deemed as attributable to insufficient examination by the side of the ○ University in light of the fact that it seems practically impossible for ○ University to clarify the violation of the Copyright Act in the course of normal performance of duties, considering the fact that serious data have been submitted in relation to the faculty evaluation.

Examining the relevant legal principles and the evidence duly admitted by the lower court, the lower court did not err in its judgment by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding the establishment of the crime of interference with business, or by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of logical and empirical rules.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, all appeals are dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Jo Hee-de (Presiding Justice)