Whether the act of spreading about about 1m in order to drive again a vehicle parked on another alleyway with a view to parking again constitutes driving under the Road Traffic Act (affirmative)

According to subparagraphs 1 and 19 of Article 2 of the Road Traffic Act, the term “driving” in this Act means the use of a vehicle on the road in accordance with its original purpose and use method, and the term “road” in this Act means all places used for the road under the Road Act, the toll road under the Toll Road Act, and other general traffic. The term “all places used for general traffic” refers to an open area for the purpose of maintaining traffic order and order, where there is a public nature of general traffic police authority for the purpose of maintaining traffic order. Thus, a specific person or a person who has a specific building related thereto can only use it and is not a place for independent management. If a person moves along the trial of a vehicle at this place, it constitutes a road as referred to in the Act, such as a dead endway of a house, and it constitutes “driving” under the Act, even if it is intended to immediately display the vehicle that was parked or parked, and it constitutes “driving according to its original purpose and it constitutes a “driving” as referred to in the Act.

Subparagraph 1 of Article 2 and subparagraph 19 of Article 2 of the Road Traffic Act

[Plaintiff-Appellant] Plaintiff 1 and 1 other (Law Firm Domin, Attorneys Park Jong-soo and 1 other, Counsel for plaintiff-appellant-appellant-appellant-appellant-appellant-appellant-appellant-Appellee)

Defendant

Prosecutor

Suwon District Court Decision 92No1415 delivered on February 23, 1993

The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to Suwon District Court Panel Division.

We examine the prosecutor's grounds of appeal.

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below recognized the fact that the instant house on which another vehicle can use only one-way parking, and that the Defendant, in preparation for the passage and parking of other vehicles on the alleyway, has moved to a level of about 1m for the immediate display and parking, once again, of his own vehicle parked on a large scale, and determined that the mere driving of a vehicle for the purpose of parking is not the case of driving prohibited under Article 107-2 subparag. 1 and Article 41(1) of the Road Traffic Act, regardless of whether it is provided for the passage of a general vehicle in the parking lot or not.

However, according to Article 2 subparag. 1 and subparag. 19 of the Road Traffic Act, the term “driving” in the above Act means the use of a vehicle on the road according to its original purpose and use method, and the term “road” in the above Act refers to all places used for the road under the Road Act, the toll road under the Toll Road Act, and other general traffic. The term “all places used for general traffic” in this Act refers to an open area for the purpose of maintaining traffic order, where there is a public nature in which general traffic rights have been infringed upon for the purpose of maintaining traffic order. Thus, if only a specific person or a person with a specific building related thereto can use it and it is not an independent management place, it refers to a place where a vehicle is parked in the end of the end of the above term of the road, and it can be seen that it is connected to the above road for the purpose of maintaining traffic order, and it constitutes a vehicle parking at the end of the end of the above term of the road, as stated in the above Act, and it constitutes a “road parking at the end of the above.”

Nevertheless, the court below determined that the act of the defendant's moving-in or moving-out of a vehicle in this case cannot be deemed as an act of driving under the prohibition of the above provision of the Act, which affected the conclusion of the judgment by misapprehending the legal principles on driving or driving under the Road Traffic Act, which affected the conclusion of the judgment. Therefore, the ground for appeal assigning

Therefore, the judgment of the court below is reversed and the case is remanded to the court below. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Chocheon-sung (Presiding Justice)