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(영문) 대법원 1998. 12. 22. 선고 98다35730 판결

[보험금][공1999.2.1.(75),190]

Main Issues

[1] The validity of a drinking exemption clause in the damage of self-owned vehicles under the comprehensive automobile insurance clause (effective)

[2] The validity of the exemption clause for drunk driving in damage caused by one's own physical accident under the comprehensive automobile insurance clause (negative)

Summary of Judgment

[1] Although a non-life insurance contract belongs to a non-life insurance contract as an article insurance, it is not likely that the insurance money will ultimately belong to the policyholder or the insured, so there is no concern that the protection of a third party (victim) is neglected, such as personal and personal damage insurance. In addition, even if the policyholder or the insured cannot be protected according to whether the driver or the driver of a motor vehicle is under the control and management of the insured, the upper limit of compensation for his/her own motor vehicle is limited and it may be acceptable for the policyholder or the insured to accept it. In light of the above, if the loss of his/her own motor vehicle caused by the policyholder or the insured falls under the damage caused by the driver of a motor vehicle, such as drinking-free clause under the General Rules of Automobile Insurance, such exemption clause shall be interpreted as exempted without any restriction, and it shall not be construed as an interpretation contrary to the provisions of Article 6 (1) and (2), Article 7 (2) and 3 of the Regulation of Standardized Contracts

[2] The self-physical accident insurance (self-accident insurance) is liable for the insurer to pay the insurance proceeds stipulated by the insurance contract in the event the insured's life or body is an accident. The nature of the insurance policy is a kind of life insurance. Therefore, if the clause of non-driving exemption in the life insurance includes not only the case of an accident caused by an intentional act, but also the case caused by an act assessed by negligence (including gross negligence) as a whole, it shall be deemed null and void.

[Reference Provisions]

[1] Articles 659(1) and 663 of the Commercial Act, Articles 6 and 7 of the Regulation of Standardized Contracts Act / [2] Articles 659(1), 663, 732-2 and 739 of the Commercial Act

Reference Cases

[1] Supreme Court Decision 89Meu32965 delivered on June 22, 1990 (Gong1990, 1541) / [2] Supreme Court Decision 96Da4909 delivered on April 26, 1996 (Gong1996Sang, 1719), Supreme Court Decision 97Da27039 delivered on March 27, 1998 (Gong198Sang, 1173 delivered on March 27, 1998), Supreme Court Decision 97Da48753 delivered on April 28, 1998 (Gong198Sang, 1185), Supreme Court Decision 98Da430 delivered on April 28, 1998 (Gong1998Sang, 1493), Supreme Court Decision 97Da39897 delivered on April 298, 198 (Gong1998Da3989798 delivered on April 298, 1998).

Plaintiff, Appellee

Plaintiff 1 and one other

Defendant, Appellant

Samsung Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. (Attorney So-young, Counsel for defendant-appellant)

Judgment of the lower court

Ulsan District Court Decision 98Na239 delivered on June 24, 1998

Text

The part concerning Plaintiff 1 among the judgment below is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the Ulsan District Court Panel Division. The remaining appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal regarding the dismissed appeal are assessed against the Defendant.

Reasons

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. As to the exemption clause for driving under influence of the insurance money for self-vehicle damage (Plaintiff 1-related parts)

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below rejected the defendant's waiver on the ground that the exemption clause is null and void in light of the provisions of Article 6 (1), (2), Article 7 (2), subparagraph 2, subparagraph 3, etc. of the Regulation of Standardized Contracts Act, which are the provision that "the company does not pay insurance money in the following cases" and Article 45 of the Clause that applies to the insurance contract for self-motor vehicle damage of this case includes "the company shall not pay insurance money in the following cases." In the case of this case, the exemption clause is a provision that has lost fairness in violation of the principle of trust and good faith and thus, it shall be deemed null and void in light of the provisions of Article 6 (1), (2), and Article 7 (2), subparagraph 2, and 3, etc. of the Regulation of Standardized Contracts Act, on the premise that the act of drinking by the driver of a motor vehicle or the insured is applicable only when it was done under the explicit or implied approval of the policyholder or the insured.

However, according to the records, Article 45 of the Clause of the defendant's business automobile insurance applicable to the insurance contract for self-vehicle damage of this case provides that "the company shall not pay insurance money in the following cases", and Paragraph 15 of this Article provides that "the policyholder, his legal representative, relatives who live or live together with the insured, and their employees (including drivers) related to the insured automobile as one of its own reasons list "the insured" as one of its reasons, and Paragraph 2 of Article 46 provides that "the insured shall mean the insured". This self-vehicle accident insurance belongs to non-life insurance as an article insurance, but it is not likely that the insurance money will ultimately belong to the policyholder or the insured, such as the policyholder or the insured, and it is not likely that he will neglect the protection of the third party (victim) as well as that of the insurer or the driver of a motor vehicle who is not controlled by the insured, even if it is not protected by the insurer or the insured, it can be interpreted that it is against the provision of Paragraph 1 of the above Article 7 of the Act.

Nevertheless, the court below's rejection of the defendant's letter of exemption from liability in different opinions is erroneous in the misunderstanding of legal principles as to the drinking exemption clause of self-motor vehicle non-life insurance, which affected the judgment.

The argument pointing this out is with merit.

2. As to the exemption clause from driving insurance proceeds of a self-physical accident (Plaintiff 2-related parts)

In light of the records, the judgment of the court below is that the automobile insurance of this case is liable to pay the insurance money stipulated in the insurance contract of the defendant, the insurer, in the event of the occurrence of the accident on the life or body of the plaintiff 2, and its nature is a kind of personal insurance. Thus, if the clause of exemption from drinking driving in a life insurance includes not only the occurrence of the accident caused by an intentional act, but also the act caused by an act evaluated as a negligence (including gross negligence) as a whole, it shall be deemed null and void (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 97Da48753, Mar. 27, 1998; 98Da430, Apr. 28, 1998). Under the premise that the accident of this case occurred while driving under the influence of alcohol, even if the accident of this case occurred while the plaintiff 2 was under the influence of alcohol, it is just to reject the defendant's letter of exemption on the ground that there was no intentional act or intentional act, and there is no violation of law as alleged in the grounds for appeal.

3. Therefore, the part concerning plaintiff 1 among the judgment below is reversed, and remanded to the court below for a new trial and determination. The remaining appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal regarding the dismissed appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee Yong-hun (Presiding Justice)

심급 사건
-울산지방법원 1998.6.24.선고 98나239
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