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(영문) 수원지방법원 2017. 04. 18. 선고 2016구합62154 판결

원고가 제공한 용역이 면세대상인지 여부[국승]

Title

Whether the services provided by the Plaintiff are eligible for tax exemption

Summary

Article 12 (1) 5 of the former Value-Added Tax Act and Article 29 (1) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Value-Added Tax Act cannot be deemed eligible for the exemption of value-added tax.

Related statutes

Article 12 of the Value-Added Tax Act

Cases

Suwon District Court 2016Guhap62154 Revocation of Disposition imposing Value-Added Tax

Plaintiff

AA

Defendant

BB Director of the Tax Office

Conclusion of Pleadings

Mar. 28, 2017

Imposition of Judgment

April 18, 2017

Text

1. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.

2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

Reasons

1. Details of the disposition;

A. On July 25, 2006, the Plaintiff was incorporated with the business purpose of working environment measurement and health management agency, and was designated as the "health management agency" under Article 16 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act on September 14, 2009.

B. As between July 1, 2009 and December 31, 2013, the Plaintiff entrusted the duties of a health manager by a business owner under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, and provided workers belonging to the workplace with health consultation, health management education, etc. (hereinafter “instant services”), but did not file a value-added tax return regarding the instant services as subject to value-added tax exemption.

C. As a result, the Defendant conducted an investigation of value-added tax (hereinafter “tax investigation of this case”) on the Plaintiff from August 20, 2014 to October 26, 2014, the Defendant confirmed that the Plaintiff failed to file a value-added tax return, since the instant services were not listed as medical health services exempt from value-added tax under Article 12(1)5 of the former Value-Added Tax Act (wholly amended by Act No. 11873, Jun. 7, 2013; hereinafter the same shall apply) and Article 29(1) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Value-Added Tax Act (wholly amended by Presidential Decree No. 24638, Jun. 28, 2013; hereinafter the same shall apply).

라. 피고는 이 사건 세무조사 결과에 따라 2015. 1. 5. 원고에 대하여 별지 1 목록 기재와 같이 2009년 제2기분 내지 2013년 제2기분 부가가치세 합계 201,213,760원(각 가산세 포함)을 각 경정��고지(이하 '이 사건 각 처분'이라 한다)하였다.

E. On July 21, 2015, the Plaintiff, who is dissatisfied with the foregoing, filed an objection on March 20, 2015 with the Tax Tribunal.

However, the Tax Tribunal dismissed the claim on December 23, 2015.

Facts that there is no dispute for recognition, Gap evidence 1 through 5, Eul evidence 1, 2, and 4 (including paper numbers)

Each entry, the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Whether each of the dispositions of this case is legitimate

A. The plaintiff's assertion

(i) argument on medical health services subject to a value-added tax exemption;

Article 33(1)5 of the Medical Service Act provides legitimate health care services to the entrusted director through his/her medical doctors and nurses pursuant to Article 33(1)5 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Value-Added Tax Act; Article 35 subparag. 1-2 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Value-Added Tax Act does not limit medical care services provided by medical personnel to medical services established and provided by a medical institution. In the case of medical services provided by a medical corporation, the overall title part of the above provision is merely a provision confirming that the above provision is subject to value-added tax exemption. The value-added tax exemption system aims to mitigate the final consumer's burden of using or consuming goods or services. As such, the nature of the service of this case must be exempted from value-added tax; the working environment measurement service is deemed included in the medical health service from a policy perspective even if it is not a medical practice; the service of this case is subject to value-added tax exemption; the premise that the service of this case is obviously subject to value-added tax exemption under the Industrial Safety and Health Act and the Value-Added Tax Act; and the premise that the service of this case is unlawful.

(ii) argument on the establishment of non-taxable practices

Since the Plaintiff was designated as a specialized health management institution in September 2006, there was no value-added tax imposed prior to each of the instant dispositions in the process of providing the instant services until now, and the Defendant rendered each of the instant dispositions after about six years from the date when the National Tax Service established the regulations by which the instant services were not subject to value-added tax exemption. As such, each of the instant dispositions made by the Defendant against the Plaintiff, in violation of such non-taxable practices, was explicitly established, since the non-taxable practice was established that: (a) if a non-medical person employed a medical person and provided a lawful medical service without establishing a medical institution; and (b) the non-taxable practice that would be subject to value-added tax exemption for the Plaintiff

B. Relevant statutes

Attached Form 2 is as shown in the relevant statutes.

C. Determination

1) Determination on the first argument

A) Article 12 (1) 5 of the former Value-Added Tax Act provides that "medical and health services (including veterinarian's services) prescribed by Presidential Decree" as one of the objects eligible for value-added tax exemption, and Article 29 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Value-Added Tax Act provides that "medical and health services under Article 12 (1) 5 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Value-Added Tax Act (including those provided by a person who has established a medical institution or a veterinary hospital under the Medical Service Act or the Veterinarians Act) shall be as follows (including those provided by a person who has established a medical institution or a veterinary hospital under the Veterinarians Act)." Article 12 (1) 1 provides that "services provided by a doctor, etc. under the Medical Service Act" under Article 12 (2) of the former Value-Added Tax Act, and Article

In light of the language, purport, system, etc. of the statutory provisions, it is reasonable to view that medical and health services exempt from value-added tax pursuant to Article 12(1)5 of the former Value-Added Tax Act and Article 29 subparag. 1 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Value-Added Tax Act refer to medical and health services provided pursuant to the Medical Service Act by a doctor, etc. (including a person who establishes a medical institution under the Medical Service Act) as the subject of supply (see Supreme Court Decision 2011Du5834, May 9, 2013).

Judgment

[Reference]

B) The Plaintiff is a stock company with business purposes such as working environment measurement and health management business designated as the "health management institution" under Article 16 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, and the Plaintiff was entrusted by the business owner during the period from July 1, 2009 to December 31, 2013 with the duties of the health manager and provided the instant services, which are health management services, such as health consultation and health management, to workers belonging to the workplace.

Examining the above facts in light of the legal principles as seen earlier, insofar as the Plaintiff is not a doctor, etc. under the Medical Service Act (including a person who establishes a medical institution under the Medical Service Act), the instant services provided by the Plaintiff at the entrusted business site cannot be deemed to be subject to value-added tax exemption under Article 12(1)5 of the former Value-Added Tax Act and Article 29 subparag. 1 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Value-Added Tax Act, even if the Plaintiff provided the services by employing a doctor and nurse, it is difficult to view such doctor and nurse as the subject of the supply. Therefore, the Plaintiff

2) Judgment on the second argument

Article 18(3) of the Framework Act on National Taxes provides that "the interpretation of tax-related Acts or practices in tax administration, which have been generally accepted by taxpayers" means, even if erroneous interpretation or practices, it reaches the extent that it is not unreasonable for taxpayers to trust such interpretation or practices by accepting it as just by an unspecified general taxpayer, who is not a specific taxpayer. In order to establish such non-taxable practices, there is an objective fact that has not been imposed over a considerable period of time, and the tax authority must have an intention not to impose tax due to any special circumstance even though it knows that it can impose tax on the matter. The burden of proof for such interpretation or practice exists on the taxpayer (see Supreme Court Decisions 81Nu266, Dec. 26, 1984; 200Du1652, Feb. 8, 2002; 200Du1652, etc.).

Court Decision 2001Du7855 delivered on September 5, 2003

Therefore, as to whether the Plaintiff’s non-taxable practice, which is subject to value-added tax exemption, has been established when a non-medical person employed a medical person and provided a lawful medical act, there is insufficient evidence to acknowledge it. Rather, there is no other evidence to acknowledge it. Rather, according to the overall purport of the entries and arguments in the evidence Nos. 9, 7, and 7, the Defendant is a Korean Environment Corporation within its jurisdiction on December 5, 2014.

The following facts are acknowledged: (a) value-added tax was imposed on health management services provided; (b) the National Tax Service rendered authoritative interpretation that health care services provided by health management institutions on March 31, 2009 are not subject to value-added tax exemption; and (c) even if the Defendant rendered each of the instant dispositions after the lapse of the extended period of time after the above authoritative interpretation, it is difficult to deem that there was an intention not to impose value-added tax due to any special circumstance despite being aware that such services could be imposed, and the Plaintiff’s above assertion is without merit.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, all of the plaintiff's claims are dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition.