[2] In a case where the property used and managed by A due to C's care due to C's negligence when A leased dump truck from B by a designated mid-term rental business operator who is the named insured, as a driver, and had C drive it concurrently under the direction and supervision of A, whether the exemption clause in the automobile insurance clause against B is applied (negative)

[Dissenting Opinion] The automobile insurance clause refers to that the insurer of a motor vehicle insurance contract becomes the content of a contract prepared in advance in order to conclude a contract with the other party. Thus, as long as it does not go against the Regulation of Standardized Contracts Act or the Commercial Act, the content thereof can be separately determined by distinguishing between the personal compensation and the personal compensation for each insurer. Although personal compensation and the personal compensation are the same as that of protecting the insured or a third party’s damages, the former is a property for the personal life or body, the degree of the protection or legal regulation can be treated differently, and it is clear even when examining the Automobile Accident Compensation Act. In light of the fact that the extent of the protection or the legal regulation of the insured and the victim are different in terms of physical compensation and the personal compensation, and the content and method of the exemption clause are different, the issue of whether to apply the exemption clause of the insurance clause separately can be interpreted differently from the personal compensation in accordance with the individual provisions.

[2] In the case where the property owned by a third party, which was used and managed by Gap due to negligence while driving dump truck from Eul, a registered insured person Eul, concurrently leased a dump truck from Eul, a rental business operator Eul, and had Byung drive it under the direction and supervision of Gap, Byung, Eul, Eul, Eul, Eul, Eul, Eul, Eul, the insured under Article 22 (3) of the Business Automobile Insurance Clause, Byung, Eul, the insured under Article 22 (5) of the above Clause, and Byung, who is liable for damages to the victim, shall be construed as the "insured related to the reasons for exemption" of each of the above terms and conditions. Thus, according to the above legal principles, the "insured" of the above terms and conditions is interpreted to mean "the property used or managed by the insured" under Article 21 (2) 1, which is the exemption provision of the above terms and conditions, is not the "property of the insured" under Article 21 (2) 2 of the above terms and conditions, and it is not the "the insured's property damage or damage to Gap's property exemption clause 21.

1. In the case of an automobile insurance, where multiple insured persons are liable for damages to the victims due to the same automobile accident, the insured profits also exist independently for each insured person, and as such, in principle, the existence of liability for compensation should be determined by individually taking into account the requirements for the occurrence of liability for damages and the application of the exemption clause to each insured person. Thus, in determining the application of the exemption clause to each insured person under the automobile insurance policy, barring any special circumstance, the determination of the application of the exemption clause to each insured person should be made by considering the application of the exemption clause to each insured person, even if the individual exemption clause under the automobile insurance policy is not separately provided for in the insurance policy, and the application of the exemption clause to each insured person is not interpreted to exempt the insurer from liability for compensation to all the insured persons.

Therefore, the Supreme Court has already expressed its opinion that in the case where multiple insured persons are liable for damages to the victim due to the same motor vehicle accident, barring any special circumstance, the insurer should decide whether to grant the insurer's exemption by examining the application of the exemption clause to each insured person, even though the individual application provision of the insured is not separately provided in the insurance policy (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 87Meu2276, Jun. 14, 198; 96Da4305, May 14, 1996). Such a legal principle should be applied to the substitute compensation as shown below, and there is no reason to treat it differently.

Therefore, the Supreme Court Decision 91Da31784 delivered on December 27, 1991, which has taken a different view as above with respect to property compensation, is to be modified.

Under the terms and conditions of automobile liability insurance, the insurer's exemption clauses are as follows: ① the insured or his/her parents, spouse, and children have property owned, used, or managed by the insured, ② the insured's property damages arising from the property owned, used, or managed by the insured when the insured is engaged in his/her business. In such a case, in relation to the insured's actual offender or a person who directs and supervises the perpetrator, the insured is at the same time the victim of the property, and at the same time the insured is the victim of the property, and the obligation to compensate for the damage and the right to compensate for the damage is at the same time the insured is the perpetrator of the property. In other words, the insurance interest to be protected by liability insurance is significantly reduced due to the occurrence of a similar phenomenon, which is similar to the extinguishment of the right, and if the compensation is permitted in such relation, it is to prevent the insured's moral hazard to be excessively compensated for the damage.

Therefore, if multiple insured persons exist, such as the named insured, the consented insured, and the driver insured, among those insured persons, the insured may be distinguished from those of the insured who do not have such relations as above in relation to the damaged property, and allowing the insurer to be exempted from liability not to receive compensation to the insured who do not have such relations is contrary to the purport of granting exemption clause. In such a case, the insured is liable to the third party who is the victim, and its indirect damage may result in an unfair phenomenon that is contrary to the significance of the existence of the insurance, which is the loss division.

Therefore, such insured workers should be deemed to have the insurable interest to be protected as it is, and the insurer's exemption should be determined individually for each insured person.

2. In the case of this case, according to the facts established by the court below, the non-party Korea Industrial Development Co., Ltd. (hereinafter only referred to as the "Cump truck") leased dump truck of this case from the plaintiff, the non-party designated as the named insured, with the permission of the named insured under Article 22 (3), and let him operate the dump truck of this case under the direction and supervision of the above consideration industry. The above dump truck of this case around 01:00 on September 20, 1995, when the operation of the dump truck of this case was done with due care, and the above dump truck of this case was damaged by the negligence that the above industry was managed by the care industry, the non-party Korea Industrial Development Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the "Cump Industrial Development Co., Ltd."), and the terms of the business insurance of this case provide that the "the person who uses or manages the insured's dump truck of this case" or "the insured's spouse's 21.

In light of the above circumstances, the plaintiff's registered insured, the above consideration industry is the insured under Article 22 (3) of the above terms and conditions, the insured under Article 22 (5) of the above terms and conditions, and the above Ansan detention is a multiple insured under several circumstances. Thus, according to the above legal principles, the "insured" under each of the above exemption clauses refers to "the insured in relation to the reason for exemption." In relation to the above consideration industry, the "property used or managed by the insured" under Article 21 (2) 1 of the above terms and conditions and the "damage from property used or managed by the insured when the insured is engaged in his business" under Article 21 (2) 2 of the above terms and conditions. Thus, in relation to the above Ansan detention, the plaintiff's exemption exists to the defendant, who is the insurer, and in relation to the plaintiff, the plaintiff is not a person who owns, uses, or manages the above ready-mixed plants, but it does not constitute the insurer's exemption from liability under Article 21 (2) 2 (1) of the above terms and conditions.

In the same purport, the court below's rejection of the defendant's assertion that the defendant's liability to pay insurance proceeds is exempted pursuant to the exemption clause of the above terms and conditions is just, and there is no error of law as alleged in the

The ground of appeal cannot be accepted.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices, except for a dissenting opinion by Justice Jeong-ho and Justice Kim Jong-soo.

3. Dissenting Opinion by Justice Jeong-ho and Justice Kim Jong-soo is as follows.

A. The automobile insurance clause refers to that the insurer of a motor vehicle insurance contract becomes a content of a contract prepared in advance in order for the insurer to enter into the contract with the other party. As such, the content may be separately determined by distinguishing between personal and personal and property damages for each insurer in principle, unless it is contrary to the Regulation of Standardized Contracts Act or the Commercial Act. Nevertheless, the Majority Opinion’s interpretation that disregards diversity of the exemption clause and uniformly interpret it is difficult. The reasons are as follows.

(1) In light of the personal compensation and substitute compensation of the instant automobile insurance clause, the insured is the insured (registered person), a person who uses or manages the insured motor vehicle, a person who is in charge of using or managing the insured motor vehicle with the consent of the registered insured (insured person), a user of the registered insured (insured person), and a person who is operating the insured motor vehicle for each of the above insured persons (insured person), and a person who is operating the insured motor vehicle for the above insured (insured person) as stated in the insurance policy (see Articles 11 and 22 of the instant Business Automobile Insurance Clause).

Meanwhile, even if an insured event occurs, the above automobile insurance clause also provides that the insurer shall be exempted from liability for compensation if there is a certain reason (Article 10 and Article 21 of the same clause). In other words, in case of personal compensation, ① the insured who is liable for compensation, or his parents, spouse, and children, ② the insured who is liable for compensation under the Labor Standards Act, ② the insured’s employer who is eligible for accident compensation under the Labor Standards Act, ③ the insured’s employee who is engaged in his business and who is eligible for accident compensation under the Labor Standards Act, and ③ the insured’s employee is dead or injured (Article 10(2)3 through 5 of the same clause). Meanwhile, in case of personal compensation, ① the insured’s or his parents, spouse, and children’s property owned or managed by the insured’s employer, ② the insured’s damages arising from the insured’s property, ③ the insured’s damages arising from the ground subsidence or other damage to the insured’s underground or underground structures(Article 10(2)2) of the same clause).

In contrast to the fact that multiple insured workers are aimed at protecting the insured and the third party who is the victim, it is concluded that the exemption clause does not provide compensation for damages suffered by ‘insured' or ‘insured' in a special personal relationship with ‘insured' or ‘insured' or ‘specified property of the Insured' is for the benefit of the insurer. On the other hand, in insurance contracts, the principle of private autonomy is applied to insurance contracts unless there are special circumstances. Therefore, in light of such principle of private autonomy, it is natural that the so-called individual application that determines whether to apply the above exemption clause individually can be determined by the terms and conditions in the case of multiple insured workers who are liable for damages.

The automobile insurance clause was revised on August 1, 1996, which was after the occurrence of the insurance accident in this case, stipulated that the individual application clause should be established in relation to personal injury and individually applied to each of the insured parties (Article 11 (2) 6 of the automobile insurance clause for personal use). Since the insurance contract is concluded after the enforcement of the above revised clause does not have such provision, the exemption clause shall be separately applied to personal injury, and the liability clause shall not be interpreted as above in relation to personal injury which does not have individual application clause.

If the above individual application of the insurance terms and conditions are clearly determined, it shall be determined by reasonably interpreting the contents of the terms and conditions in accordance with the principles of general legal act interpretation, unless otherwise expressly prescribed.

(2) However, the Supreme Court, in the case where the provisions on individual application of the pertinent specific terms and conditions are not stipulated in the previous provisions, determined as follows. In other words, in the case of personal compensation, where multiple insured persons who are liable for damages to the victim due to the same automobile accident exist, the insured benefit exists individually, and barring any special circumstance, barring any special circumstance, the individual application of the aforementioned provisions is recognized on the basis that the existence of liability for compensation should be determined individually by considering the existence of the exemption clause per each insured person (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 87Da2276, Jun. 14, 198; 96Da4305, May 14, 1996; 97Da10512, Jun. 27, 1997; 95Da56859, Jul. 11, 197; 197Da19719, Jul. 19, 197). 197

This attitude of the Supreme Court seems to be in conflict with one another, but for the following reasons, it is not in conflict with one another, and there is a reasonable reason.

The purpose of automobile insurance contract is to compensate for damage caused by an accident that occurred while the insured owns, uses, or manages an automobile (Article 726-2 of the Commercial Act). If the damage caused by the accident is against the life or body of a person, it shall be regulated as personal liability insurance, and if the damage is against the property, it shall be regulated as personal liability insurance. Although personal liability and property liability are the same as in the case of protecting the insured or a third person's damage, the former is property, and the former is the latter is the property, so it is clear that the degree of the protection or legal regulation can be treated differently. This is also clear even if examining the Automobile Accident Compensation Guarantee Act. Under the same law, it is difficult to say that the victim can prove the fault of the perpetrator in accordance with the principle of negligence so that it is difficult to protect the victim as a result of a rapid increase in the number of days due to the occurrence of the accident, and thus, it shall be limited to the law that guarantees the victim's liability to compensate for damage, as well as the law that guarantees the victim's liability to compensate for damage.

For this reason, the above insurance clauses clearly distinguish between personal compensation and personal compensation as seen above, and define the contents and methods differently.

In light of the difference between the extent of the protection of the insured and the victim and the insurance clauses, and the content and method of the exemption clause are different in the insurance clauses, it is reasonable to interpret the exemption clause separately in accordance with the individual clauses, and even if it is so interpreted, the problem of conflict between the personal compensation and the personal compensation may not arise. As seen earlier, the Supreme Court has interpreted the exemption clause differently from the personal compensation and the personal compensation.

(3) If so, as the majority opinion states, the previous Supreme Court precedents (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 87Meu2276, Jun. 14, 198; 96Da4305, May 14, 1996) as to the exemption clause of the personal compensation which are different from the personal compensation clause as seen in the previous Supreme Court precedents (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 91Da31784, Dec. 27, 1991) do not need to be changed.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court has already expressed that the principle of individual application is not applicable to the interpretation of the exemption clause of the substitute compensation clause which is already stipulated in the specific insurance clause, and that there is no basis for understanding the interpretation, it is reasonable to maintain the previous opinion, and it is not necessary to modify the interpretation of the exemption clause that can separately determine the contents of each insurance company's automobile insurance clause.

In addition, it is not easy to conclude that it is reasonable to interpret different terms and conditions in accordance with the principle of private autonomy and in view of the maintenance of legal stability of legal relations based on the previous opinion.

(4) The majority opinion argues that in the instant automobile insurance clause, the insurer's exemption clause as referred to in paragraph (1) (1) is against the purport of the indemnity clause in the case of a large number of insured workers, and that in the case of a person who actually commits or directs and supervises the perpetrator, the insured is at the same time the victim of the property is the victim of the property and at the same time the perpetrator of the property is the obligation to compensate for the damage, and that in the case of a person who is liable to compensate for the damage, the insured interest to be protected by the liability insurance is significantly decreased due to a similar phenomenon as the so-called confusion of the right, and that in such a relationship, the insured's exemption from the insurer is aimed at preventing moral hazard that the insured would suffer excessive damage, and thus, granting the insurer's exemption from the insurer's liability is contrary to the purport of the indemnity clause, and in such a case, the insured is only liable to the third party who is the victim, and its indirect damage caused by the insurance accident and the existence of the insurance policy is unfair.

However, if an employee of the registered insured under the direction and supervision of the tenant by lending the insured weight owned by the registered insured to the lessee, thereby causing damage to the property owned, used, or managed by the insured while the insured was in operation of the above insured weight, the registered insured, a mid-term lessee, is in an abstract and indirect command and supervision relationship with the above employee, and as such, it is reasonable that the insured is responsible for the damage. Therefore, the registered insured shall bear the liability of the insured, and as such, it is reasonable that the registered insured shall prevent the loss caused to the insured by specifying the liability relationship at the time of the lease contract with the lessee in preparation for the case where the insured person compensates the damage to the victim due to the above accident. As such, it is not necessary to separately apply the above exemption clause to the insured, and as such, it is not reasonable to have the insurer receive the payment of the insurance money from the registered insured by individually applying the above exemption clause to the insured person, and as a result, it is not reasonable to have the insurer's approval or exemption from the insurance contract as mentioned above.

B. In this case, according to the facts established by the court below, the non-party special company for the development of Korea Industries (hereinafter referred to as "Kump Truck") is a registered insured worker, who is the non-party 2, operated the dump truck of this case under the direction and supervision of the above industry under the direction and supervision of the non-party 2, who is the non-party 2, who used and managed the above Kump Truck of this case by negligence after the operation of the dump truck of this case, and the above Kump Truck of this case, which was used and managed by the above dump truck of this case, damaged the board of directors of the non-party 2, who is the non-party 2, who is the non-party 2, who used or managed the above dump truck of this case with the consent of the above dump insured (the above dump truck of this case's dump truck of this case's dump industry, and therefore, the court below did not consider the "the plaintiff's or the defendant's spouse's 21 or h.

For the foregoing reasons, we dissent from the Majority Opinion.

1. As to the ground of appeal pointing this out, the ground of appeal pointing this out is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench who reviewed the appeal pointing this out.