[2] The meaning of the duty in the crime of bribery

[3] Whether the act of mediating a case by a police officer who is not an attorney-at-law or an employee of the court or the prosecutor's office as a counsel and receiving money and other valuables in return constitutes an arrangement under the latter part of Article 90 subparagraph 2 of the former Attorney-at-law Act (affirmative), and whether the defendant, who is an attorney-at-law, knowingly received referral of the number of legal cases from a non-legal practitioner, constitutes a violation of Article 90 subparagraph 3, Article 27 (2), and Article 90 subparagraph 2 of the same Act (affirmative

[2] The duties referred to in the crime of bribery include not only the duties under the control of the law, but also the acts closely related to the duties or the acts of actual involvement in the custom or practice.

[3] [Majority Opinion] Mediation under the latter part of Article 90 subparagraph 2 of the former Attorney-at-Law Act (amended by Act No. 6207 of Jan. 28, 2000) refers to the act of mediating or facilitating the conclusion of delegation contracts, etc. on legal cases or legal affairs between the parties to a legal case and the other party dealing with legal affairs such as representation, etc. As such, the act of mediating or arranging the conclusion of delegation contracts, etc. concerning legal affairs between the parties to the case and the other party. Therefore, the act of arranging or receiving the fees from not only the person who requested the referral of the fees, but also the case where the non-legal counsel receives the fees from the other party or both parties, as well as the case where the non-legal counsel mediates or mediates the other party to the legal case as well as the case where the non-legal counsel mediates the other party to the legal case, and thus, the act of arranging or receiving the fees from the defendant from the latter part of Article 90 subparagraph 2 of the same Act constitutes an act of arranging or receiving the fees from the attorney-at-law.

[Supplementary Opinion to Majority Opinion] Even if Article 27(1) is newly established under the former Attorney-at-Law Act (amended by Act No. 6207 of Jan. 28, 200) amended by Act No. 4544 of Mar. 10, 1993 and separate punishment is imposed under Article 90 subparag. 3 of the same Act, considering the meaning of mediation as stated in the latter part of Article 90 subparag. 2 of the same Act differently from the previous one, only referral of non-legal cases is applicable to referral of legal cases to attorneys, and there is no ground for interpreting Article 27 subparag. 1 of the same Act as to referral of legal cases to attorneys-at-law. In full view of the legislative purport of Article 90 subparag. 2 of the former Attorney-at-Law Act and Article 27(1) of the same Act, it is unreasonable to interpret the latter part of Article 90 subparag. 2 of the same Act as not providing for legal assistance or assistance to attorneys-at-law who are in conflict with the latter.

[Dissenting Opinion] It is difficult to agree to include an attorney-at-law in the object of mediation under the latter part of Article 90 Item 2 of the former Attorney-at-Law Act (amended by Act No. 6207 of Jan. 28, 200). The reason is that first, in light of the language of the law or the arrangement and form of the provision, the provision prohibiting referral of legal cases, which are unique to the attorney-at-law, is prohibited under Article 27 Paragraph 1 of the same Act and the latter part of Article 90 Item 2 of the former Attorney-at-law Act, while the former prohibits referral of legal cases to a person who is not an attorney-at-law, the latter seems to prohibit referral of legal relations to a person who is not an attorney-at-law. In other words, it is unreasonable to interpret that the latter is in violation of Article 90 Item 2 and Article 27 Paragraph 1 of the former Attorney-at-law Act, and it is questionable whether there is a new provision that is a violation of the law or a new provision of the law.

[Supplementary Opinion to the Dissenting Opinion] The phrase "a person who mediates such act" under Article 90 subparagraph 2 of the former Attorney-at-law Act (amended by Act No. 6207 of Jan. 28, 200) means that an attorney is provided with good offices prior to the referral of the crime of this case, and "such act" means "an act in favor of a person other than an attorney-at-law who is provided with good offices or offices" under Article 90 subparagraph 2 of the same Act, unlike the expression "an act in this case or office", "an act in favor of a person other than an attorney-at-law who is provided with good offices or offices" means "an act in favor of a person other than an attorney-at-law who is provided with good offices or offices for dealing with the legal affairs in favor of a person who is provided with good offices or offices." Furthermore, Article 27 (2) of the same Act provides that "an act in favor of the person who is provided with good offices or offices by a person who is provided with good offices."

1. As to the Defendant’s ground of appeal (to the extent of supplement in case of supplemental appellate briefs not timely filed)

Whether a public official’s profit constitutes a bribe as an unfair profit in a quid pro quo relationship, shall be determined by taking into account all the circumstances, such as the content of the official’s duty, the relationship between the provider and the beneficiary, whether there exists a special relationship between both parties, the degree of interest, and the circumstances and timing of the receipt of the benefit. In light of the fact that the legal interest is the fairness of performing the duty and the trust of the society, the issue of whether a public official’s receiving the benefit is doubtful of fairness in performing the duty from the general public should also be the basis for determining the sexuality of the crime of bribery (see Supreme Court Decision 97Do3113, Mar. 10, 1998). The duties referred to in the crime of bribery include not only acts closely related to the duties under the law, but also acts related to the duties under the jurisdiction of the public official, or acts of custom or actual involvement in the duties (see Supreme Court Decision 96Do378, Apr. 17, 197, etc.).

According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court below and the judgment of the court of first instance maintained by the court below, the defendant requested the police officers of the Namyang-ju Police Station through Nonindicted D, who are the chief of the case's office, to arrange for the investigation cases in which they are in charge, and accordingly, the police officers so that the defendant is appointed as defense counsel. The defendant provided convenience to the suspects of the investigation cases in which they are in charge, such as informing them of the contents of the case, and the defendant paid 30% of the appointment fee to the police officers in return for mediation and provision of convenience after he accepted the investigation cases in accordance with the above arrangement. Thus, if the facts are found, the police officers' act of mediating the suspect under investigation as defense counsel and providing convenience to the suspect under their investigation upon the request of the defendant, is closely related to their duties as investigators. Accordingly, the crime of offering a bribe cannot be established unless the defendant provided money and valuables to the police officers in charge of investigation as a consideration for arranging and providing convenience.

The judgment of the court below to the same purport is just, and there is no error of law such as misunderstanding of facts or misunderstanding of legal principles concerning bribe.

2. As to the Prosecutor’s Grounds of Appeal

The court below held that: (a) the defendant conspireds to attract the case in such a way that he would pay 30% of the commission for an investigation from the police officer of the Namyang Police Station who is the chief of the case, (b) paid 8,8140,000 won to 62 times from April 1997 to October 13 of the same year; and (c) the defendant was urged to attract the case in such a way that he would receive 20% of the commission for the case from the court employees of the prosecutor's office and the certified judicial scrivener of the prosecutor's office; and (b) the defendant conspired to offer the case in such way that he would not arrange the case in accordance with Article 90 subparagraph 3, 2, and 27 of the Attorney-at-Law Act for the reason that he did not offer the case to the attorney-at-law who is not the chief of the case, and provided the case in accordance with Article 90 subparagraph 2 of the Attorney-at-Law Act for the reason that he would not be punished by the attorney-at-law.

In general, the duties of an attorney-at-law are to conduct legal affairs widely with the mission of protecting fundamental human rights and realizing social justice. Thus, the Attorney-at-law Act takes measures to strictly limit the qualification of an attorney-at-law and to ensure that the attorney-at-law complies with the regulations necessary for the good faith and proper performance of such duties. If a person who does not comply with such regulations does not intervene in another person's legal cases for money, goods, or other benefits from the beginning, it would prejudice the interests of the parties or other interested persons, interfere with the fairness of legal life, smooth operation of legal affairs, and further disrupt the legal order, Article 90 subparagraph 2 of the Attorney-at-law Act prohibiting non-law from handling legal affairs shall be deemed to be the purport of prohibiting such concern by maintaining the attorney-at-law system (see Supreme Court Decision 96Do2340, Aug. 21, 199); and Article 27 (2) of the Attorney-at-law Act prohibits an attorney-at-law from performing legal affairs under the name of an attorney-at-law or in violation of title.

In light of the legislative intent and Article 90 subparagraph 2 of the Attorney-at-Law Act, the term "mediation" in the latter part of Article 90 subparagraph 2 of the Attorney-at-Law Act means the act of mediating or facilitating the conclusion of delegation contracts, etc. on legal cases or legal affairs between the parties to a legal case and the other party dealing with legal affairs, such as representation, in reality, between the parties to the case and the other party. Therefore, it does not include not only the person who requested the referral of remuneration, but also the case in which the non-legal person receives the payment from the other party or both parties, and it also constitutes not only the case in which the non-legal person mediates the other non-legal person to act as an agent for the legal case, but also the case in which the non-legal person mediates the attorney-at-law to act as an attorney-at-law (see Supreme Court Decisions 81Do2597, Apr. 27, 198; 86Do1720, Dec. 23, 199; 9Do291).

Therefore, the act of mediating a case by a police officer who is not an attorney-at-law or an employee of the court or the prosecutor's office and receiving money and valuables in return for the case constitutes an arrangement under the latter part of Article 90 (2) of the Attorney-at-law Act, and therefore, the act of the defendant, who is an attorney-at-law, knowingly receives referral of the number of legal cases from a non-legal practitioner, constitutes a violation of Article 90 (3), Article 27 (2) and Article 90 (2) of the Attorney-at-law Act.

Nevertheless, the court below's decision that this part of the facts charged did not constitute a violation of the Attorney-at-Law Act on the grounds as stated in its holding is erroneous in the misapprehension of the legal principles as to Articles 27 (2) and 90 (2) of the Attorney-at-Law Act, which affected its interpretation. The ground of

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the prosecutor's appeal on the part concerning the violation of the Attorney-at-Law Act among the judgment below is with merit, and there is no ground for appeal by the defendant on the part concerning the offering of a bribe. However, since the violation of the Attorney-at-Law Act and the part concerning the offering of a bribe by the defendant are indivisible in accordance with the former part of Article 37 of the Criminal Act or Article 40 of the Criminal Act, the whole judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below for a new trial and determination. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices except for the case of paragraph (2) with respect to the judgment of this case and the concurrence with the majority opinion of Justice Song Jin-hun, Justice Cho Jae-hun, and Justice Cho

4. Concurrence with the Majority by Justice Song Jin-hun as follows.

Article 90 (2) of the Attorney-at-Law Act (hereinafter referred to as the "Law") has been amended by Act No. 4544 on March 10, 1993, and Article 27 (1) of the Attorney-at-Law Act has been enacted in addition to Article 27 (2) of the Attorney-at-Law Act until the Act was newly established. In addition, it has performed a normative role in preventing the handling of legal affairs by regulating the handling of legal affairs by non-legal attorneys and arranging legal affairs for profit-making by non-legal attorneys and attorneys-at-law, and prohibiting the entrustment of legal affairs by non-legal attorneys-at-law with such non-legal attorneys-at-law.

However, with the amendment of the Attorney-at-Law Act on March 10, 1993, Article 90 No. 2 which prohibits non-legal practitioners from receiving or promising to receive money, valuables, entertainment or other benefits, or allowing or promising to provide it to a third party, which is not an attorney-at-law, shall be expanded the scope of legal affairs prohibited by amending Article 90 No. 2 which is not an attorney-at-law, to "a person who deals with or mediates other legal affairs concerning litigation cases or other general legal affairs", and "a person newly establishes Article 27 (1) shall introduce, arrange or induce parties and other interested persons to receive legal cases or legal affairs to a specific attorney-at-law, and shall not receive or demand money, valuables, entertainment or other benefits in return for it." Article 27 (2) which prohibits attorneys-at-law from handling legal affairs in a comprehensive manner, and Article 27 (1) of the Act provides that "the legislative intent of the Act shall be punished under Article 130 (1) 3 of the Legislation and Judiciary Committee.

As such, Article 27 (1) seems to have been newly established for the purpose of eradicating irregularities around the legal profession by comprehensively regulating the referral of legal cases to an attorney-at-law. However, in comparison with the latter part of Article 90 (2), if the scope of its application is to be compared with the latter part of Article 90 (2), an attorney-at-law includes also an attorney-at-law in the form of the act, adding introduction and inducement in addition to the referral of the act, and including the request act in lieu of excluding the promise of profits in relation to the consideration, which is limited to the referral of an attorney-at-law in a legal case, the scope of application as a whole is extended, i.e., the scope of punishment is limited to the extension of the scope of the scope of application, while the scope of application is not included in the case where a non-legal practitioner receives money and valuables from a person who falls under Article 27 (2) and mediates a legal case to a lawyer, there is a question as to which the scope of application should be applied.

However, even if Article 27 (1) of the Attorney-at-Law Act is newly established and the act of violation is punished separately in Article 90 (3) of the Attorney-at-Law Act, the meaning of mediation under the latter part of Article 90 (2) of the Attorney-at-Law Act shall be viewed differently from the previous one, and it shall not be deemed as a basis for interpreting that mediation of legal cases against non-legal practitioners shall be limited, and that Article 27 (1) of the Attorney-at-Law shall be applicable to mediation of legal cases against attorneys-at-law, and it shall not be viewed as a basis for interpreting Article

First, considering the scope of the application of both parties in terms of the form of action, it falls under the latter part of Article 90, but does not fall under Article 27, Paragraph (1) of the same Article, while there is an opposite act (the request for money and goods after good offices). In light of the subject of action, Article 27, Paragraph (1) of the same Article does not limit it, while Article 90, Paragraph 2 of the same Article can be viewed as a special provision, it is difficult to readily conclude that any of them should be applied first as a special provision.

In addition, the latter part of Article 90 subparagraph 2 is a provision punishing a person who is not an attorney-at-law to act as a broker, and Article 27 (2) prohibits an attorney-at-law to act as a broker for a legal case from the person referred to in the latter part of Article 90 subparagraph 2. Thus, the relationship between a person who mediates the case and a person who mediates the case without an attorney-at-law referred to in the latter part of Article 90 subparagraph 2 can be established. However, if the meaning of "a person who mediates such act" in the latter part of Article 90 subparagraph 2 is limited to a person who is not an attorney-at-law, and it is logically impossible that an attorney-at-law receives a referral for a legal case from a person other than an attorney-at-law in the latter part of Article 90 subparagraph 2 and Article 27 (2) cannot be interpreted uniformly.

In addition, if the latter part of Article 90 subparagraph 2 of the Attorney-at-law is deemed to prohibit only the act of arranging a legal case against a person who is not an attorney-at-law, the scope of application of Article 90 subparagraph 2 of the Attorney-at-law shall be extended in order to eradicate a person who committed corruption in the vicinity of the law, as a result, and the establishment of Article 27 (1) of the Act which comprehensively prohibits the referral of a legal case by an attorney-at-law, unlike the previous one, the so-called illegal attorney-at-law (the term "unlawful attorney-at-law" and this term were enacted by Act No. 751 of Oct. 17, 1961 and were enacted by Act No. 2452 of Jan. 25, 1973) shall not be punished, which is contrary to the purport of the amendment of the Attorney-at-law Act, and shall not be accepted by freely maintaining social order and realizing social justice as an independent lawyer system (see Article 2 of the Attorney-at-Law Act).

As seen earlier, considering the language and intent of Articles 90 subparag. 2 and 27(2) and the purport of newly establishing Article 27(1), the latter part of Article 90 subparag. 2 refers to the act of mediating or promoting the conclusion of delegation contracts, etc. on legal cases or legal affairs between the parties to a legal case and the other party handling the legal affairs such as the representation, etc., as well as the act of mediating or facilitating the conclusion of delegation contracts, etc. on legal affairs or legal affairs between the parties to the legal case and the other party. Thus, it is not unreasonable to interpret that the case constitutes not only the case where a non-legal counsel mediates other non-legal persons to act as an attorney, but also the case where

Ultimately, Article 90 subparag. 2, Article 90 subparag. 3, and Article 27(1) of the same Act concurrently applies to the act of receiving money and other valuables and mediating a legal case to an attorney-at-law. It is thought that the same act does not constitute a special relationship or commercial competition relationship with respect to the legal advisory agreement, and it does not necessarily lead to an inappropriate legislation that does not take into account even if part of the applicable scope overlaps with the latter part of Article 90 subparag. 2 of the former Act (this point seems to have been corrected by the amendment of the Attorney-at-Law Act of Jan. 28, 200).

5. Dissenting Opinion by Justice Lee In-hee, Justice Cho Cho-Un, and Justice Yoon Jae-sik as to the violation of the Attorney-at-Law Act is as follows.

The meaning of "a person who mediates such act" under the latter part of Article 90 (2) of the Attorney-at-Law Act (amended by Act No. 6207 of Jan. 28, 200; hereinafter the same shall apply) is that if a simple interpretation is made without considering the relationship with Article 27 (1) and Article 90 (3) of the Attorney-at-Law Act, it seems that a non-legal practitioner acts as a representative for other non-legal attorneys as stated in the majority opinion, as well as the case where a non-legal practitioner acts as a representative for other non-legal attorneys, and the case where a lawyer acts as a representative for an attorney-at-law is also seen to fall under the case where the attorney-at-law acts as an attorney-at-law, and it is understood that the previous Supreme Court precedents of the Republic of Korea have been amended by Act No. 454

However, inasmuch as the Attorney-at-Law Act was amended by Act No. 4544 on March 10, 1993, and Article 27(1) is newly established, and a penal provision for a person who violates the provisions of Articles 90(3) through 26 or 27 is separately imposed, it is difficult to agree with the following reasons to include an attorney-at-law in the object of good offices under the latter part of Article 90(2) for the following reasons.

First, in light of the language, structure, etc. of the provision of the law, the provision prohibiting the referral of legal cases, etc., which are the unique duties of a lawyer, is stipulated in Article 27 (1) and the latter part of Article 90 (2) of the Attorney-at-Law Act, but the former prohibits the referral of a regular lawyer, while the latter prevents the referral of a person who is not a lawyer.

If it is interpreted that the concept of "reconciliation" in the latter part of Article 90 subparagraph 2 is included in the concept of "reconciliation", it would be in violation of Article 90 subparagraph 2 and Article 27 (1) in case of arranging a case to an attorney-at-law, and the penal provision is in violation of Article 90 subparagraph 2 and Article 27 (1) and in this case, the relationship between the above two penal provisions is a problem (whether it is a commercial competition relationship, a special relationship, or if it is a match). In this case, the relationship is not a proper explanation by any opinion, and therefore, it is doubtful that it may be caused by actual or inappropriate legislation. This is because it has been established in the Supreme Court precedent that included the other party of the "reconciliation" in the latter part of Article 90 subparagraph 2 of the Act in the past, and it is not possible to think that it has not been prepared again as a new penal provision.

Second, as long as the attorney-at-law law is amended regardless of the purpose of legislation and new provisions such as Paragraph 1 of Article 27 are newly established, it is natural to newly interpret the relationship of each of the above provisions.

First, rather than interpreting that there are two or more penal provisions, and that the relationship cannot be clearly explained, the other party to the mediation in the latter part of Article 90 (2) refers only to an attorney-at-law and in the case of Article 27 (1), the other party to the mediation in the latter part of Article 90 (2) refers to an attorney-at-law, and it is more appropriate to interpret both the two Articles in the meaning of lawful interpretation, which is the principle of statutory interpretation.

Next, even in light of the principle of no punishment without law or the principle of strict interpretation in criminal justice, it is reasonable to interpret that the other party to the "mediation" under Article 90 (2) does not include the "Attorney".

As long as the interpretation prior to the amendment of the above law has to be interpreted, the other party to the above law has not been included in the attorney-at-law, and as long as it is possible to interpret Article 27(1) as being applicable to the attorney-at-law, it shall be deemed only Article 27(1) that can be applied without any doubt in the case of mediating to the attorney-at-law under the general principles of the criminal law, which is the interest of the defendant in doubt, and it shall be deemed as falling under Article 90 subparag. 2 and Article 27(2) is contrary to the principle of strict interpretation in the criminal law and the spirit of the principle of no punishment without law.

In the case of similar cases in lower courts after the amendment of the Attorney-at-Law Act, it is also necessary to prove that two or more interpretation of the above provision is possible, if there is a difference in the interpretation of the above provision.

(However, in such interpretation, there is a problem that the meaning of the provision is unclear, even though there is a difference in the interpretation that the provision provided in Article 27, Paragraph 2, Article 90, Paragraph 2, and Article 90, Paragraph 2, in the case of such interpretation, it would be reasonable to interpret that there is a double penal provision prior to such interpretation.

Third, if such interpretation is made, it goes against the legislative intent of regulating acts that directly or indirectly encourage attorney-at-law to commit acts in violation of the Attorney-at-law Act, but it is not possible to punish it by unreasonably interpreting the law solely on the basis of the necessity. And this problem is already resolved through the provisions of Articles 109 and 34 of the Attorney-at-law Act as of January 28, 200, which was wholly revised by Act No. 6207 of January 28, 200, and it points out the problems of the interpretation of the Attorney-at-law Act before the amendment as of the end of the legislative measure.

Therefore, the judgment of the court below to the same purport should be maintained, even if there are some inappropriate points in its reasoning.

6. Opinion concurring with the Dissenting Opinion by Justice Cho Jong-young is as follows.

A. Penal provisions should be interpreted strictly in accordance with the fundamental spirit of the principle of no punishment without law.

In accordance with the majority opinion, pursuant to Article 27 (2) of the Attorney-at-Law Act (referred to as "the Act") above, a person who is not an attorney-at-law may be punished for an attorney-at-law who has been assisted in legal cases or legal affairs by all persons other than an attorney-at-law. Thus, the conclusion cannot be separated from the question as to whether such a conclusion can be interpreted as an interpretation.

B. Paragraph 2 of Article 27 shall be punished by the act of receiving legal cases, etc. from "any person provided in subparagraph 1 or 2 of Article 90 or subparagraph 1 of Article 91".

In order to assist the convenience of understanding, the case of acceptance of case by the person provided in Article 90 subparagraph 1 and Article 91 subparagraph 1 of the same Act is first, the "person who has received the case of acceptance of case from an attorney-at-law" is a summary consortium, "a person who has paid the case of acceptance of case by a public official" (Article 90 subparagraph 1 of the same Act), "a person who has engaged in the business of execution of right by means of acquisition of right, etc. (Article 91 subparagraph 1 of the same Act)" and "a person who has done such act without asking whether he is an attorney-at-law", and "a person who has received the case of acceptance of case from a specified person" is a person who has received the case of acceptance of case from such person.

Now, if only the part concerning this case in Article 27 (2) is detached, it is clear that "the person provided in Article 90 (2), " knowingly", and "an attorney-at-law who accepted the case" should be punished.

Here, it is noted that the phrase "persons who are not attorneys-at-law" is written without being called "persons who are not attorneys-at-law"(Article 90, No. 1, No. 91, No. 1, and Article 90, No. 2) and therefore, the scope of persons provided for in Article 90, No. 2 is a problem.

The text of subparagraph 2 is ① a person other than an attorney-at-law, ② a person who receives or promises to receive money, valuables, entertainment or other benefits, or a person who provides or promises to provide them to a third party, ③ a litigation case, non-contentious case, family conciliation or a request for adjudication, an administrative appeal or a request for review or an objection to other administrative agencies, an appeal case against an investigation case handled by an investigation agency or an investigation case handled by an investigation agency established by Acts and subordinate statutes, or other general legal cases, or ④ a person who handles or arranges such acts.

For convenience, the part ① is the part ① of the above-mentioned clause in 'non-Attorney'. ② The part ② is the part ② the part ② the part ③ is the part of the fee-fixing clause in 'legal affairs'. ④ The part is the part ④ The part is the part which is the part which is the part which is the part which is the part which is the part which is the part which is the part which is the part which is the part which is the part which is the part which is the part which is the part of the mediation. ④ The part which is the part which is the part which is the part which is the part which is the part which is the part which is the part which is the part of the mediation, is divided into the part which is the part which is the part which is the part which is the part which is the part which is the part which is the part which is the part which is the part which is the part which is the part which is the part which is the part which the part

Therefore, Article 27 (2) provides that the case is accepted by an attorney-at-law who is not an attorney-at-law or an attorney-at-law who is not an attorney-at-law with the knowledge of the fact that the case is mediated by a person who is not an attorney-at-law.

In this regard, the part that should not be neglected is that it is not expressed as ‘a person who deals with legal affairs' or ‘a person who mediates such acts'. In other words, for a person to be defined as ‘a person who is not an attorney-at-law' or ‘a person who mediates such acts', not ‘a person who is not an attorney-at-law'. In other words, for a person to be defined as ‘a person who is not an attorney-at-law' or ‘a person who mediates

In this sense, a person provided in the first sentence and the second sentence of Article 90(2) should be a person with the power (electric power) that has provided or arranged legal services more than once or that has provided or arranged services.

For example, a person, who is not an attorney-at-law, has been engaged in legal affairs or has arranged for a person who is not an attorney-at-law, but has not been engaged in such activities, and has been expected by the parties to the case that he/she actually dealt with to enforce legal responsibilities for the purpose of dealing with the situation, and the person who has arranged the case to arrange the case to the attorney-at-law as in the case where he/she has accepted the case to the attorney-at-law, such as in the case where he/she has provided the case to the attorney-at-law, shall be a person who has already been engaged in the act prescribed in the first sentence or the second sentence of Article 90 subparagraph 2

C. Among the above explanations, only the main part of the discussion in this case is summarized as the number of cases from "a person who mediates this act" and "an act is arranged as the number of cases from "a person who mediates this act" and "an act is arranged as the number of cases from a person who mediates the act of arranging the act of arranging the act of arranging the act of arranging the act of arranging the act of arranging the act of arranging the act of arranging the act of arranging the act of arranging the act of arranging the act of arranging the act of arranging the act of arranging the act of arranging the act of arranging the act of arranging the act of arranging the act of arranging the act of arranging the act of arranging the act of arranging the act of arranging the act of arranging the act of arranging the act of arranging the act of arranging the act of arranging the act of arranging it

Therefore, if the majority opinion does not so, the provision of Article 27 (2) is contrary to the requirement that "the attorney shall receive good offices from a person who is not an attorney-at-law while knowing the fact that he is aware of the fact that he is to receive good offices from a person who is not an attorney-at-law." This result refers to "the person who is to receive good offices from a person provided in Article 27 (2) 1 and Article 91 (1) regardless of whether he is an attorney-at-law or not." In comparison with the meaning of "the person who is to receive good offices from a person who is to act as a business of acquiring rights by means of a public official's solicitation, such as "the person who is to act as a lawyer," and "the person who is to act as a broker for the acquisition of rights," it can be seen that it is due to a wrong interpretation. Accordingly, it is not proper to ask that the person who is not an attorney-at-law or an attorney-at-law is divided into two kinds of actors through the full text and the latter part.

In addition, Article 27 (2) provides that the case shall be established in a case where an attorney-at-law who is arranged to act as a broker with the knowledge of the fact that he is a person who directly handles the legal affairs of a medical specialist or acts as a broker to act as a broker to a person who is not an attorney-at-law with the knowledge of the fact that he is a person who is not an attorney-at-law.

D. However, in the instant case, there is no assertion or proof as to the fact that D et al., the mediator of the instant case, etc., was a person who performed the above handling of affairs or the act of arranging such handling of affairs, or that the Defendant was aware of such fact.

Ultimately, the judgment of the court below, which concluded the same conclusion, is correct and it is not possible to accept the prosecutor's ground of appeal.

The final judgment of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (Presiding Justice) is that the use of the Jin-hee Kim Jong-J Kim Chang-Jon Shoon Shoon Shoon Shoon Shoon Shoon Shoon (Presiding Justice) is carried out