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과실비율 30:70
red_flag_2(영문) 서울고등법원 2013.2.8.선고 2012나2189 판결

손해배상등

Cases

2012Na2189 Damage, etc.

Appellant Saryary Appellant

1. A;

2. B

Defendant Appellant and Deputy Evacuation appellant

Korean Investment Securities Corporation

The first instance judgment

Seoul Southern District Court Decision 201Gahap13570 Decided December 9, 2011

Conclusion of Pleadings

December 14, 2012

Imposition of Judgment

February 8, 2013

Text

1. The amendments to paragraphs 1 and 2 of the judgment of the first instance, including the plaintiffs' claims expanded in the trial to the following:

A. The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff A 57,76,51 won with 5% interest per annum from April 16, 2011 to February 8, 2013, and 20% interest per annum from the next day to the day of complete payment. The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff B 28,886,75 won with 5% interest per annum from May 14, 201 to February 8, 2013, and 20% interest per annum from the next day to the day of complete payment.

B. The plaintiffs' remaining claims are dismissed.

2. The plaintiffs' incidental appeal is dismissed.

3. Of the total litigation costs, 70% shall be borne by the Plaintiffs, and the remainder 30% shall be borne by the Defendant.

4. The part on which no provisional execution has been declared by the first instance court among the provisions of subparagraph 1 (a) may be provisionally executed;

Purport of appeal and incidental appeal

1. Purport of claim

From April 16, 2011 to the delivery date of a copy of the complaint of this case ( August 18, 2011), the Defendant paid to the Plaintiff 200,000,000 won and the amount calculated at the rate of 5% per annum and 20% per annum from the next day to the day of complete payment (the delivery date of a copy of the complaint of this case). The Defendant filed an appeal against the Plaintiff 10,000,000 won and the amount calculated at the rate of 5% per annum from May 14, 2011 to the delivery date of a copy of the complaint of this case (the Plaintiff initially filed an appeal against the delayed payment date), and the amount calculated at the rate of 20% per annum per annum from the next day to the day of complete payment (the Plaintiff filed an appeal against delay damages).

2. Purport of appeal

The part against the defendant in the judgment of the court of first instance is revoked, and all of the plaintiffs' claims corresponding to the above revocation are dismissed.

3. Purport of incidental appeal;

The part against the plaintiffs in the judgment of the first instance shall be revoked. The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff A 5% interest per annum from April 16, 201 to the delivery date of a copy of the complaint of this case ( August 18, 201) and 20% interest per annum from the next day to the day of complete payment, and shall pay to the plaintiff B 40 million interest per annum from May 14, 201 to the delivery date of a copy of the complaint of this case ( August 18, 201) and 5% interest per annum from the next day to the day of complete payment, and 20% interest per annum from the next day to the day of complete payment.

Reasons

1. Basic facts

A. Status of the parties

The defendant is a company running financial investment business, such as trust business, and the plaintiffs are investors of the defendant who entered into a specified money trust contract with the defendant as follows:

B. Each of the instant trust deeds

(1) On October 15, 2010, C entered into a specified money trust agreement with the Defendant to operate corporate commercial paper (hereinafter “corporate commercial paper”) with the face value of KRW 200,000,000 issued by LIG Construction Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “LIG construction”) on behalf of the Plaintiff A (A is the co-borns of the Plaintiff D branch E branch, and paid KRW 200,000,000 to the Defendant on the same day.

(2) On November 12, 2010, C entered into a specific money trust agreement with the Defendant on behalf of the Plaintiff B (B is the wife of the Party C), which provides that the money trusted by the Plaintiff B between the Defendant and the Defendant shall be operated on corporate commercial paper with the face value of KRW 100,000,000 issued by LIG construction, and the maturity of May 13, 2011 (hereinafter referred to as the above two contracts are referred to as each of the instant trust agreements, and the Defendant paid KRW 100,000,000 to the Defendant on the same day.

(3) According to each of the instant trust contracts, the trust period is from the date of each contract to the due date, the return rate is 8.4% per annum, and the beneficiaries of trust principal and trust interest are the Plaintiffs.

(4) Meanwhile, according to each of the instant trust deeds, the Plaintiffs, investors, invest only the amount obtained by deducting profits from the face value of the instant corporate commercial paper, and receive the face value of the instant corporate commercial paper at maturity. As such, the amount obtained by deducting profits from the face value of the instant corporate commercial paper is the purchase amount of the instant corporate commercial paper. Therefore, not the entire amount paid by the Plaintiffs to the Defendant is not the trust amount, but the sum of the amount actually paid by the Defendant to purchase the instant corporate commercial paper and the trust fees paid by the Defendant is the trust amount. Accordingly, Plaintiff A’s actual investment amount (trust amount) is 192,58,504 won, and Plaintiff B’s actual investment amount (trust amount) is 96,289,252 won (a trust amount) (a trust amount) is 96,289,252 won (A evidence 2-1, 504 won, 96, 289, 2529, 259.

(1) On March 21, 2011, LIG construction applied for the commencement of rehabilitation proceedings for the construction of LIG at the Seoul Central District Court 2011hap34, and the decision on commencement of rehabilitation proceedings was made on April 1, 2011.

(2) On May 27, 2011, the Defendant notified the Plaintiffs that each of the instant corporate bills could not be repaid from the construction of LIG according to the order of commencement of the rehabilitation procedure, and that the payment of maturity interest and interest to the Plaintiffs would be postponed until the rehabilitation procedure is approved.

(3) Meanwhile, on September 30, 2011, a decision to authorize the rehabilitation plan for the construction of LIG was rendered, and 20% of the principal shall be converted into equity and 30% of the principal shall be paid in cash with respect to corporate bills, and the amount to be paid in cash shall be paid in equal annual installments during the nine-year period from the second year (2013) to the tenth year (2021), and the remainder shall be 50% of the corporate bonds issued in the year 201 and substituted for the repayment.

[Ground of recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence 1, Gap evidence 2-1, Gap evidence 2-2, Gap evidence 13, witness E of the first instance court, Eul's testimony, and the purport of whole pleadings

2. The parties' assertion

A. The plaintiff's assertion

The plaintiffs choose the following arguments:

(1) In recommending investment to C, an agent of the Plaintiffs, the Defendant violated Article 46 of the Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act (hereinafter “Capital Markets Act”) by soliciting the Plaintiffs to invest in the purchase of corporate papers highly dangerous than the Plaintiffs’ investment purpose. Accordingly, the Defendant is liable to compensate for damages under Article 64 of the same Act.

(2) The Defendant did not explain the risk of investment, such as the financial risk of the construction of LIG in recommending investment to C, who is an agent of the Plaintiffs, and violated Article 47 of the Capital Markets Act by providing distorted explanation about the possibility of subsidization by the LIG Group. As such, the Defendant is liable to compensate for damages under Article 48 of the same Act.

(3) The Defendant violated Article 49 of the Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act by providing a conclusive judgment on uncertain matters, such as the possibility of supporting the LIG Group, in recommending investment to C, an agent of the Plaintiffs, or by informing the details that may mislead or mislead the Plaintiffs to be certain, and thus, is liable to compensate for damages under Article 64 of the said Act.

B. Defendant’s assertion

In this regard, the defendant asserts that the plaintiffs' assertion is as follows.

(1) Considering C’s investment experience, investment tendency, etc., investment in LIG construction commercial papers suitable for C’s investment purpose was recommended, and thus, did not violate the suitability principle.

(2) The Defendant, only a company selling commercial papers, does not have a separate duty to investigate the credit standing and asset soundness of the issuing company, and the Defendant does not have a duty to explain them. In selling each trust product of this case, the Defendant provided C with investment explanation data as well as the credit rating statement of the credit rating company in addition to investment explanation data, and did not violate the duty to explain. The Defendant did not notify that it either provided a conclusive judgment on the possibility of support of the LIG Group or made it possible to mislead it as certain.

3. Determination

A. Determination on whether the principle of suitability is violated

(1) Relevant legal principles

No financial investment business entity shall recommend an ordinary investor to make an investment, if the investment is deemed unsuitable for the investor in light of the investment purpose, status of property, experience in investment, etc. of the investor (see Article 46 (1) of the Capital Markets Act).

A financial institution that manages a customer’s assets is obligated to perform the duty of due care as a good manager. As such, a financial institution must grasp in advance the purpose of investment, degree of risk of investment experience, scheduled investment period, etc. of the customer, and encourage the investor to make an investment by selecting an appropriate investment method. In light of the purpose of investment as examined, it is liable to compensate for any loss incurred to the customer’s property by inducing the customer to engage in transactions that cause excessive risk to the customer. However, it cannot be readily concluded that a financial institution uniformly solicits an unfair investment in violation of the suitability principle solely on the ground that the investor’s investment in a certain product upon the recommendation of a financial institution or in adopting a certain investment strategy is with a high risk. An investor may not be readily concluded to have made an unfair investment in violation of the said principle. An investor may not expect that a high yield should be realized at the same time while avoiding any anticipated all risks, and an association of risk and an earning rate should not be selected by itself in light of the purpose of investment (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision

(2) In the case of this case, the following facts are not revealed in light of the following facts and the plaintiffs' evidence Nos. 6-1, 2, 2- Eul evidence Nos. 6-1, 10, 1, 2-2, 15-1, 2, 54-1 through 5, 16-1, 2, 3, 17-1 through 6, 18-2, 19-1 through 20-20, 21-1, 2, 2- Eul evidence Nos. 22-1 through 4, 23-1, 2, 52-2, 53-1 through 5, 54-1 through 8-8, 16-1, 17-2, 19-2, 19-1 through 4, 20-2, and 3-2, 3-1, 54-1 through 5, and 16-3.

① Korea Development Bank and the Korea Assets Management Corporation, the telegraphic body of Korea Asset Management Corporation, have been working for more than 30 years, and there was a 84 years of age at the time of entering into each of the instant trust contracts, and are ordinary investors under the Capital Markets Act.

Before entering into each of the instant trust contracts, C has invested not only 5% of the assets it owns (C refers to KRW 2-300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,00

③ Prior to the conclusion of each of the instant trust contracts, the investor information confirmation form in C and the Plaintiffs’ names (see, e.g., evidence Nos. 4-1, 2, and 3) (see, e.g., evidence Nos. 4-1, 2, and 3): investment experience; ELW; futures option; stock-type fund pursuing profits above market profit ratio; e.g., stock-backed fund; and stock credit transaction items; e., “high (e., to the extent that most of the financial investment instruments that can make an investment)” items of “high (e.g., understanding the difference of investment risks),” and “high (e., investment risks)” items of “high (e., stocks or derivatives)” items of “high (e., investment risks),” are identified as being “high (e., investment risks) and identified as “high (e., stocks or derivatives).”

④ E listens to the words “as much low market interest rate from C,” which would be changed to recommendation of goods that can be operated for a short-term period, and as a result, C recommended the corporate commercial paper of this case. The rate of return on the corporate commercial paper of this case is 8.4% per annum, and the said rate of return exceeds twice the rate of return on the national treasury bond, savings bank deposit, and bank deposit at the time.

⑤ It appears that C had considerable knowledge and experience in financial products, and sought products in such a way as to make high profit in a short period than stability, and “A3, the credit rating of corporate commercial paper of this case, seems to be within the scope of recommending investment to ordinary investors.

B. Determination as to whether the duty to explain has been violated

(1) Relevant legal principles

The Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act provides that "a financial investment business entity shall explain to an ordinary investor the details of the financial investment instrument, the risks associated with the investment, and other matters prescribed by Presidential Decree so that the investor can understand such information, and shall not explain such information by falsity or distortion (referring to providing a conclusive judgment or information that may mislead or mislead any person to misunderstand that person is likely to mislead him/her as certain) about the reasonable judgment of the investor or the value of the relevant financial investment instrument" (see Article 47(1) and (3) of the Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act).

and, if any officer or employee of a financial institution solicits customers to purchase investment goods, such investment

The duty of care to protect the customer by clearly explaining the characteristics and major contents of the investment product, including risks associated with the investor, so that the customer may make a reasonable investment decision based on the information. In relation to the risks associated with the investment, the investor’s investment must explain the existence of all risks associated with the investment and the possibility of original loss. However, a certain degree of explanation to the customer should be comprehensively taken into account the characteristics and risk level of the product subject to the investment, customer’s experience and ability to experience and ability, and whether the investor is an institutional investor (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2008Da52369, Nov. 11, 2010; 2001Da11802, Jul. 11, 2003; 201Da1802, etc.).

On the other hand, the principle of investor's own responsibility to be observed in financial investment is premised on the provision of sufficient and balanced investment information to investors from financial institutions that encourage investors to make reasonable investment decisions.

(2) In the instant case:

In light of the above legal principles in this case, as to whether the defendant provided sufficient and balanced investment information to C, the following major issues will be examined.

(A) Whether a separate investigation may be conducted on the credit standing and asset soundness of LIG construction and whether the Defendant can be granted the obligation to explain it.

Article 183(1) of the Enforcement Decree of the Capital Markets Act provides that an investment trader or investment broker may sell, arrange, arrange, or arrange commercial paper only for corporate commercial paper that received credit assessment from two or more credit rating companies (see Article 183(1) of the Enforcement Decree of the Capital Markets Act). The purport of the provision is to protect investors and enhance public confidence in commercial paper and facilitate the financing of companies by classifying it in a professional, objective, and fair manner to make it possible for a credit rating company to investigate the credit standing and asset soundness of the company issuing commercial paper and to easily recognize the outcome of the provision.

In full view of the purport of the aforementioned relevant provisions and the fact that even if the Defendant investigates the credit condition and asset soundness of the company issuing corporate commercial paper securities, it seems impossible to conduct a more detailed investigation than the credit rating company, and rather, it appears that only transaction expenses would increase, the Defendant, which is a broker or seller of corporate commercial paper, is not obligated to separately investigate the credit condition and asset soundness of the construction of LIG construction.

(B) Whether the Defendant can be held liable to remove uncertainty on the possibility of LIG Group support

As seen above, the Defendant cannot be obliged to separately investigate the credit standing and asset soundness of the LIG construction, and the Defendant appears to be unable to request the LIG Construction to provide objective data on the possibility of subsidization by the LIG Group, etc. In light of the fact that, although the Defendant issued corporate bills of total amount of KRW 180 billion issued by the LIG Construction and it is possible to recognize the fact that the Defendant recruited investors on the corporate bills of total amount of KRW 129 billion, which is about 70% of the corporate bills issued by the Defendant (the corporate bills of KRW 129 billion, which are about 70% of the total amount of KRW, were the purpose of the trust agreement concluded with the Defendant with the customer), the support by the LIG Group cannot be deemed to have been the obligation of the Defendant to remove the uncertainty of the efficacy, the Plaintiffs’ assertion based on this premise is without merit.

(C) Whether the obligation to protect vulnerable investors can be recognized to the Defendant

The plaintiffs claim that the plaintiff above 65 years of age should be protected as vulnerable investors in accordance with the plan to improve the investor solicitation system strengthening the protection of vulnerable investors of the Financial Supervisory Service, but it cannot be deemed that the above improvement plan specifically causes any legal obligation to the defendant separately from the various legal obligations imposed on the defendant. Therefore, the above plaintiffs' assertion is without merit.

(D) Comprehensively taking into account the following facts: (a) whether the Defendant had distorted the possibility of funding to LIG Group 1 and the purport of the entire pleadings by witnesses E and C of the first instance trial; (b) “LIG construction as an investment point in the upper part of the investment explanation data (Evidence B) provided to C; (c) LIG Group was accepted for 06 years in the previous LIG Group’s LIG Group’s large shareholder and LIG Group’s large shareholder (LIG Group’s holding 10% shares) to the effect that it is difficult for the 3G Group to view that it was difficult for 3G Group to obtain an investment risk; and (d) it is difficult for 3G Group to obtain an investment risk from the KIG Group to take account of the financial structure of the Group 1 and the financial structure of the Group 1; and (d) it is also difficult for the 3G Group to accept the 3G Group’s investment risk analysis that it is difficult for the 1G Group to directly consider the financial structure and the possibility of the other companies.

The plaintiffs asserted that the defendant provided a conclusive judgment on the possibility of LIG construction support by the LIG Group on the ground of the statements in Gap evidence Nos. 4 and 7, etc., but they did not have any evidence to prove that Eul recommended Eul to conclude each of the instant trust contracts by using evidence Nos. 4 and 7, and therefore, it appears that the above evidence was prepared after the conclusion of each of the instant trust contracts (the above evidence appears to have been prepared after February 201 in light of the overall purport of testimony and argument of witness I in the trial). Accordingly, the above evidence alone cannot acknowledge the facts of the plaintiffs' assertion.

The plaintiffs' above assertion is without merit.

(E) Whether the duty to explain can be deemed to have been fulfilled only by notifying the credit rating of LIG construction.

The Defendant alleged to the effect that C had known the fact that the credit rating of LIG construction corresponds to A3-, and therefore, the Defendant fulfilled his duty to explain. Thus, it is clear that the credit rating in the transaction of CPs constitutes an important information that greatly affects the value of the CPs (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2005Da49799, Jun. 29, 2006). However, even if the customer had already known the meaning of credit rating or has given proper notice of the meaning of credit rating, barring special circumstances such as where the customer had already been investing in the commercial paper, it cannot be deemed that the relevant credit rating was a certain degree in the entire credit rating system, whether the credit rating is a certain degree, and whether the credit status and asset soundness within the pertinent credit rating are a certain degree, and that the distributor fulfilled his duty to explain in selling corporate commercial paper without adding a specific explanation on the degree of credit rating.

It is true that E has notified C of the fact that the credit rating of LIG construction corresponds to 'A3', there is no dispute between the parties, and there is no evidence to acknowledge that E has specifically explained the meaning of 'A3-' grade. However, in light of the above, C has been working in a financial institution for at least 30 years and has been engaged in the company's investment in the company's bonds (the grade at the time of the central news agent invested by C was 'BB-, 'BBB', 'BBB', etc.), it is reasonable to deem that C has been aware of the meaning of 'A3' (it is reasonable to deem that it has understood that the credit rating of corporate bonds and corporate bills are equal, even if the credit rating of corporate bonds is not the same, it is an investment experience to understand the credit rating of corporate bonds, if it is an investment experience to the extent to understand that the credit rating of corporate bonds is not the same). In this regard,

(F) Whether the credit rating company can be deemed to have fulfilled its duty to explain only with the provision of the evaluation report by the credit rating company

The Defendant asserts to the effect that, at the time of entering into each of the instant trust contracts, C explained the instant commercial papers, the two credit rating companies issued a credit rating statement assessed by the two credit rating companies.

In light of the following facts, E is expected to maintain the financial structure of 1, 2, and witness E and C of the first instance trial, based on the investment explanation data at the time of soliciting the conclusion of each of the instant trust contracts, Korea Credit Rating Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "Korea Credit Rating Co., Ltd.") and Korea New Finance Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "New Finance Co., Ltd.") provided credit assessment reports on the instant commercial papers on June 30, 2010; each of the instant trust products is likely to cause principal loss; the short-term credit rating for the construction of 3G as of June 30, 2010 is expected to be 'A3-,' and thus, it is expected that the new financial structure of 2,000,000 won increased by 0,000 won, and the new financial structure of 2,000,0000 won increased by 3G construction projects based on new overseas investment risk analysis data.

However, the IE only provided a credit rating statement of the above two credit rating companies to C, and it does not provide any specific explanation about the financial situation or asset soundness of the LIG construction. ② Even if C has received a credit rating statement at the time of 84 years of age, it is not easy for C to expect detailed consideration of the contents of the credit rating statement, E is obligated to explain the contents of the above credit rating statement so that C can understand them, and it is difficult to deem E to have fulfilled its duty to explain only by issuing a credit rating statement. ③ As seen above, in the credit rating statement for the LIG construction prepared by the two credit rating companies, it refers to the possibility of direct and indirect support by the affiliates of the LIG companies. However, it is sufficient that the above two credit rating companies provide the above two credit rating statements to C, but it is sufficiently and sufficiently recognized the negative factors such as expansion of business risk due to business delay due to the scheduled place of business, the aggravation of business burden due to the burden of PF preferential liability, etc., and it is difficult for the Defendant to enter into the investment trading statement into the above.

However, at the time of entering into each of the instant trust contracts, the Plaintiffs asserted that E explained that each of the instant trust products was a bond, and explained to E that there is no likelihood of absolute safe and absolute default. However, in light of the social career, investment experience, and evidence No. 10 (as stated in the first instance trial record, the evidence shows that C had clearly known that the goods it invested are commercial papers) of C and the witness E of the first instance trial, it is difficult to believe it, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge it. Thus, the Plaintiffs’ above assertion is rejected.

(3) Sub-determination

Thus, at the time of entering into each of the instant trust contracts, the defendant clearly explained balanced information on the risks (such as the financial situation or asset soundness, etc. of LIG construction) arising from its investment, thereby failing to perform the duty of care to protect the customer so that the plaintiffs who are customers may make a reasonable investment decision based on such information. The defendant's violation of the duty of explanation constitutes tort against the plaintiffs, and even if the defendant did not provide a balanced explanation to C, there is no evidence to prove that C would have entered into each of the instant trust contracts. Thus, the defendant is liable to compensate for damages suffered by the plaintiffs (as long as liability for damages is acknowledged on the ground of violation of the duty of explanation, the plaintiffs' assertion on the violation of the prohibition of unfair solicitation is not judged separately).In conclusion (Scope of and limitation on

(1) In compensation for damages caused by breach of the duty to explain the amount of damages, the amount of damages shall be estimated by subtracting the amount of money, etc. collected or recoverable by the ordinary investor by disposing of the financial investment instruments or by any other means (Article 48(2) of the Capital Markets Act). The following circumstances are as follows: ① 192,58,504 won for the Plaintiff, out of the amount remitted by the Plaintiff to the Defendant; ② 96,289,252 won for the Plaintiff B, which was actually used as a trust amount; ② The payment of the trust principal and interest to the Plaintiffs as of the date of the closing of argument in the trial of this case after the expiration of each trust contract of this case; ③ Under each of the trust contracts of this case, the Defendant is unable to liquidate trust property due to corporate commercial paper or due to other causes, or at the time of delivery to the beneficiary of new assets, and ④ The presumption that the amount of damages can not be deemed to have been recovered by the Plaintiff’s explanation to the Defendant pursuant to Article 58(2) of the Capital Markets Act.

(2) Limitation of liability

However, in full view of all the facts acknowledged above, the following circumstances, namely, ① the Plaintiff should have carefully examined and invested the contents of the instant commercial paper and the risks associated with investment under the principle of self-responsibility. ② Since C representing the Plaintiff has a high level of knowledge of financial investment instruments and an investment experience in the so-called aggressive investment-type product, it seems that the Plaintiff had been aware of the essential risks of commercial papers, etc., ③ the Defendant’s liability is limited to 30%, taking into account the fact that the degree of violation of the duty to explain is relatively minor.

(3) Amount of award;

Therefore, the defendant is obligated to pay to the plaintiff A 57,76,51 won (i.e., KRW 192,58,504 x KRW 30% x KRW 30% ; hereinafter the same shall apply) and damages for delay calculated on April 16, 201 that the defendant raised from April 16, 201 to February 8, 2013, which is the date when the judgment of the court of first instance is rendered, to the extent of the existence or scope of the defendant's obligation, 5% per annum as stipulated in the Civil Act, and 20% per annum as stipulated in the Act on Special Cases concerning Expedition, etc. of Legal Proceedings from the following day to the date of full payment. The defendant is obligated to pay to the plaintiff B 28,86,75 won (=96,289,252 won x 30% per annum) and damages for delay calculated on May 14, 2011 to the date of the defendant's tort.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiffs' claims of this case shall be accepted within the above scope of recognition, and the remainder shall be dismissed for reasons. Since the judgment of the court of first instance which has different conclusions is unfair, the part of the defendant's appeal shall be accepted, and the decision of the court of first instance shall be modified in accordance with the disposition No. 1 and No. 2 of the judgment of the court of first instance, including the claims extended in the trial of the plaintiffs, and the plaintiff's incidental appeal shall be dismissed for reasons, and it shall be dismissed as

Judges

The presiding judge, judge and senior judge;

Judges Kim Gung-ho

Judges Egradification

Note tin

1) Article 183 of the Enforcement Decree of the Capital Markets Act (Over-the-counter trading for corporate commercial paper)

(1) Pursuant to Article 166 of the Act, an investment trader or investment broker shall trade corporate commercial paper or act as a broker, intermediary, or agent for such trade:

The following standards shall be observed: < Amended by Presidential Decree No. 21765, Oct. 1, 2009>

1. It shall be corporate commercial paper that has received credit assessment from two or more credit rating companies;

2. It shall not guarantee, directly or indirectly, payment for the corporate commercial paper.

Necessary matters concerning methods of trading, etc. of corporate commercial paper and credit assessment methods shall be prescribed and publicly notified by the Financial Services Commission.

2) After the closing of argument, the Defendant: (a) at the LIG Group level, compensates individual investors for damage caused by the corporate commercial paper of this case.

further hearing is required to examine whether the plaintiffs received the actual compensation in the above proceedings and whether there is a future plan to receive the compensation.

Although filing an application for resumption of argument, the plaintiffs clearly indicate that they do not intend to receive compensation in the above procedure.

Ro (see Plaintiff’s written opinion dated February 6, 2013) (see Plaintiff’s written opinion)’s motion for resumption of argument is rejected.