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orange_flag(영문) 수원지방법원 2014. 12. 11. 선고 2012구합3973 판결

이 사건 분양권이 재산적 가치가 있는 권리로서 거래되었다고 볼 수 없음[일부패소]

Title

The sales right of this case cannot be deemed to have been traded as a right of property value.

Summary

It is difficult to see that the right of sale is traded as a right with property value, and it is also consistent with the intent of the parties. Therefore, the imposition of value-added tax and additional tax on the premise that it falls under the value

Cases

2012 disposition of revocation of imposition of value-added tax, etc.

2012 disposition of revocation of the imposition of value-added tax (combined)

Plaintiff

1. A. 2. LB 3. WhiteCC 4. HandD

Defendant

1.*** the head of the tax office of △△, 2. 3. △△

4. The head of △△ Tax Office;

Conclusion of Pleadings

October 30, 2014

Imposition of Judgment

December 11, 2014

Text

1. Defendant **** The head of the tax office revokes the imposition of each global income tax and additional tax listed in [Attachment 1] No. 1 B, against Plaintiff ChoA.

2. The imposition of each value-added tax and additional tax listed in the [Attachment 1 Do table No. 6] by Defendant 1 head of △△ Tax Office against the Plaintiffs shall be revoked.

3. The plaintiff ParkB's claim against the head of Si/Gun/Dong Tax Office, the plaintiff 0CC's claim against the head of △△△ District Tax Office, the plaintiff DooD's claim against the defendant DooD Tax Office, and the claim in attached Table 1do No. 5 against the defendant △△△ Tax Office is dismissed, respectively.

4. Of litigation costs;

A. The portion arising between the plaintiff ChoA and the defendant****the director of the tax office bears **** the director of the tax office;

B. The part arising between the Plaintiff ParkB and the head of the Si/Gun/Gu Tax Office shall be borne by Plaintiff ParkB;

C. The part arising between Plaintiff 0CC and Defendant 100 is borne by Plaintiff 0CC.

D. The part arising between the Plaintiff’s Dood and the Defendant’s director of the tax office is borne by the Plaintiff’s Dood.

E. The part arising between the Plaintiff ChoA, ParkB, 00 and the head of the tax office shall be borne by the head of the Defendant △△ Tax Office, and 1/3 of the part arising between the Plaintiff DooD and the Defendant △△ Tax Office shall be borne by the Plaintiff DooD, and the remainder shall be borne by the head of the

Cheong-gu Office

The imposition of each global income tax and value-added tax stated in the separate sheet No. 1 for each individual on the date of each disposition indicated in the separate sheet No. 1 for the Defendants and the separate sheet No. 1 for each disposition in the separate sheet No. 1 for each disposition.

Reasons

1. Details of the disposition;

(a) Promotion, etc. of charnel projects of the EE;

1) Along with May 16, 1991, FOE created FOE in the name of FOE, an incorporated foundation for FO2, FO2-3, U.S. 22-16 square meters in the name of OO2, U.S. 22-16 square meters in the name of FO2-3, U.S. 22-16 square meters in the name of FO2-16 square meters in the name of FO2, EO2-16 square meters in the name of FO2-16 square, after which the FOE created FOE established a private charnel (hereinafter referred to as the “the instant charnel”). Around June 26, 1996, the COE changed the size of the charnel, which is the establishment of a charnel, into 5,318 square meters in size, 250 square meters in size, 205 square meters in the name of an individual.

2) Due to the shortage of construction funds, the Switzerland delivered the certificate of the establishment of a charnel for the period of 21,833 of the instant charnel to the public corporation, etc. on several occasions as the payment for the construction cost, and repeated the discontinuance and resumption of the construction work. However, on February 2, 2005, the method of raising the construction funds has no longer been available and the said business has been virtually discontinued.

3) Meanwhile, around February 2005, bothGG, Han H, and Park II constituted the Jinmo Park Promotion Committee (hereinafter referred to as the “Promotion Committee”) with the members of the instant charnel project companies around February 2005.

B. The plaintiffs' project participation and establishment of the FFF Foundation

1) The Plaintiff’s DodD, EK, and Song L (the Happ L L was withdrawn from human means) constitutes a so-called “means” after becoming aware of Doddd, EK, LH, and Park II. Around February 22, 2005, the agreement was concluded between Dod, E, and the Dod and E, under which the Plaintiff would receive all the permit and the project site of the instant charnel project from OO won, and paid OOOO won to Dod and E, as a down payment.

2) Since the lack of the acquisition fund of the instant charnel project, the Plaintiff Dohdddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddd

3) Accordingly, Park PP, in connection with the instant charnel project, received loans from the MM Savings Bank and combined with Plaintiff 0CC.

4) Around March 22, 2005, the members of the means of seal (the members of the means at the time of withdrawal by SongL had been Plaintiff DoD, EK, Plaintiff 0CC, and Park PP) made an agreement that “E transferred all of the rights to permit the instant charnel project and the project site to the human means by Switzerland to the OOO, and the human means will take over the obligations for the construction cost, etc. borne by E by March 22, 2005 (see subparagraph 2 (a)), and on the same day, the said agreement that “E will take over the obligation for the construction cost, etc. borne by E before March 22, 2005” (hereinafter referred to as “the Agreement”).

5) 인수단은 2005. 3. 30.경 이 사건 납골당사업을 추진 ・ 운영하기 위하여 손DD를 대표로 하고, 서EE, 이KK, 원고 손DD, 박PP, 원고 백CC, 이QQ을 이사로 한 FF사재단(이하 'FF사재단'이라 한다)을 설립하였고, 위 재단의 대표인 손RR는 2005. 4. 4.경 시흥시청으로부터 부동산등기법상의 부동산등기용 등록번호 등록증명서를 발급받고, 2005. 4. 11.경 시흥세무서에 법인으로 보는 단체의 승인 신청을 한 후 수익사업개시신고를 하였다.

6) The human means (the members of the means at the time of ParkP withdrawal from the human means and the members of the means at the time of the withdrawal from the human means were Plaintiff DoD, KR, Plaintiff 0CC, and Plaintiff GabB. The shares in the shares in the internal revenue of the human means at the time were 33% of Plaintiff Dodd's internal revenue, 30% of Plaintiff KabB participating in the human means on behalf of GabP, 22% of Plaintiff 00, and 15% of this KK) were the FF Foundation around April 2005, 'the means was acquired 35,00 won from the FF Foundation for the allotment of the Fund, and the FF Foundation was in charge of extending the business status of the FF CF Foundation to 80,000,000 won for the Fund, and the FF CF Foundation was in charge of the business status of the CFE Foundation, and the transfer of the status of the CFFE Foundation was in charge of the CF.

7) In addition to the payment of down payment OOO won on February 22, 2005, and part payments around March 22, 2005, in accordance with the above agreement, in addition to the payment of part payments to the FF foundation from June 28, 2005 to July 20, 2005, additional OOO won was paid to the FF foundation. Around December 9, 2005, it paid OOO won to the FF foundation on or around November 22, 2006, by paying OOO won to the FF Foundation, human means were combined OOO won in relation to the instant charnel project.

8) On the other hand, around July 2005, Switzerland changed "KK", "PP from among the contracting parties to the agreement on March 22, 2005, to "Plaintiff ChoA", and "Plaintiff ParkB" respectively, and the agreed date entered into a new agreement retrospectively (the main contents are as the entry of the agreement on March 22, 2005). The agreement entered into around April 2005 between the means of human beings and the FF Foundation, and the subsequent agreement entered into on June 13, 2005 between the means of human beings and SS as seen above and the date of the agreement were changed to the contracting parties, but the new agreement entered into on June 13, 2005.

(c) Financial support, etc. for the MMF Savings Bank;

1) Along with the status as a major shareholder of the MM Savings Bank, Park Savings Bank demanded the MM Savings Bank to provide loans for the instant charnel business, and accordingly, the MM2 Savings Bank management, KimU, etc. decided to provide loans with the MM2 Savings Bank, the subsidiary company, the Central MM Savings Bank, and the Korea MM Savings Bank (hereinafter “MM Savings Bank, etc.”) to provide loans for the instant charnel house business.

2) The management of the MM Savings Bank (hereinafter referred to as “SS”), a special purpose company that is a disguised affiliated company controlled through a borrowed-name shareholder (hereinafter referred to as “VV development”), a limited liability company, V development (hereinafter referred to as “VV development”), and WW Investment (hereinafter referred to as “WW Investment”) (hereinafter referred to as “SS, V development, and WW Investment”), decided to provide funding in the instant charnel project in a way in which the MV, V development, and WW Investment participates in the instant charnel project.

3) Accordingly, SS between the human means on June 13, 2005 and SS shall purchase 35,000 won per salary unit allocated by human means to the OOO(OO). ② POO's first of all, the remaining OO's won out of the purchase price O's KRW 80,000 shall be paid when the total amount of charnel house installed exceeds 80,000,000 won. ③ PO's KRW 80,000 (80,000 - The actual extension has been approved by the competent government office) x 200,000 won x 20,000 won ; ④ The remainder of the amount to be deducted from 20,000 won - 20,000 won - 30,000,000 won - 5,000 won - 20,000 won - 3,000,000 won - 2,00

D. Collection, sale, etc. of the certificates of charnel issued by the promotion committee and the plaintiff DooD

1) Around March 31, 2005, in order to smoothly carry out the instant charnel project with the Promotion Committee, the means of authorization were given 30,000 sales right per salary to the Promotion Committee, which is the representative of the existing public corporation, etc., and the promotional council agreed to collect 21,833 of the certificate of the establishment of a charnel already issued by the E to the public corporation in exchange for payment in connection with the instant charnel construction.

2) Around June 1, 2005, the FF Management Foundation and the means of human beings agreed to purchase WW-based C-OOOs for each W-based C-OOstain’s C-OOstain, which was recovered from the construction company by the Promotion Committee.

3) Accordingly, WW Investment paid OOO(OOOOx 3,715) for COO(OOOO) for COO(OOO) certificates collected by the committee of promoters. In addition, from July 28, 2005 to November 7, 2005, Plaintiff WOOO(OOOOx 3,715) was recovered from the public corporation several times during COOs and sold WOs to WOs Investment. WOs Investment paid WOOs (OOOsx 3,715) for that amount.

E. The plaintiffs' withdrawal from the charnel project of this case

1) On two occasions on August 10, 2006 and February 8, 2007, the FFS Foundation and the Human Means reported the establishment (revision) of a religious charnel with the purport to extend the total floor area of the instant charnel to 7,007 square meters and 105,125 square meters, which is the competent administrative agency, to 7,007 square meters of the instant charnel, but the Singu City reported the said report on October 4, 2005, respectively. < Amended by Act No. 8578, Mar. 15, 2007>

2) Since the human means of human beings failed to perform the business of expanding the installation of a charnel house as agreed upon, around September 20, 2007, SS has terminated the validity of the agreement between the human means and the FF Foundation on June 13, 2005, and the remainder of the agreement shall be replaced by this agreement. ② The 35,000 won of the voting party allocated to the human means shall be reduced by 18,000 won of the voting party (including the OOOO which was already received) and the 2000 won of the instant charnel house project, as well as the right to purchase the charnel house project of this case, and the 2000 won of the instant charnel house project of this case shall be withdrawn from the CF Foundation, ④ SF Foundation shall dispatch the 200th of the instant agreement to secure the designation and supervision of the FF Foundation and the 200th of the instant foundation, and the 200th of the instant agreement shall not be established.

3) On the ground that SS and FF Foundation made an increase in the real value of the right to sell a bill of lading between the human means around August 2008, it agreed to increase the price from "OOOOO" to "OOOO" on September 20, 207 of the instant case. On or around August 27, 2008, the latter agreed to increase the price from "OOOOO" to "OOOO" under the condition that the latter does not assert any right or interest in the instant charnel project," and paid an additional amount of OOO to "OOOO" to "OOOO" on the condition that the latter would not assert any right or interest in the instant charnel project.

4) As seen earlier, from July 18, 2005 to November 22, 2006, the figure out out out of the FFOO in total, as stated in the FOOOOO in relation to the instant charnel project, and as described in the SS from July 18, 2005 to August 27, 2008, as stated in the SOOOOO(hereinafter referred to as the “first issue cost”), as stated in the “OOOOOO(hereinafter referred to as the “instant first issue cost”),” the sum of the KRW OOOOO(++ + the KRW OOOO) received the income of the instant case and received the income of the OOO(hereinafter referred to as the “instant first issue”).

(f) Progress the progress of the instant charnel project after the aforementioned arrangement (unauthorized to permit the extension of charnel houses);

1) On May 21, 2008, the FFS Foundation reported on the establishment (revision) of a religious charnel house to the effect that it will extend the total floor area of the instant charnel house to 7,007 square meters, and 105,125 square meters, to 105,05, and 500 square meters. However, the Sinung City Mayor reported on the ground that the person who intends to establish and manage a private charnel house to install and manage the charnel house for the purpose of installing and managing the charnel house in accordance with the Civil Act shall establish an incorporated foundation for the purpose of installation and management of the charnel house, and even if the exception provisions on religious organizations are applied, it shall be limited to 5,00 square meters or less for the pathal.

2) The FFF foundation filed an administrative appeal with the Gyeonggi-do Administrative Appeals Commission on September 11, 2008, but dismissed the said administrative appeals commission on November 7, 2008. On February 13, 2009, the said administrative appeals commission filed a lawsuit seeking the revocation of the said return disposition against the Suwon District Court 2009Guhap1243 on the ground that on August 19, 2009, the said court dismissed the FF foundation’s claim on the ground that the FFF Foundation does not belong to a religious organization. The appeal was dismissed on August 19, 2009, and the FF Foundation appealed appealed as Seoul High Court 2009Nu28065, Supreme Court 2010Du1498, but the appeal was dismissed on April 29, 2010, and the appeal was dismissed on September 30, 2010.

3) Since then, the FFF Foundation has not made any effort or measure to increase the storage of a charnel house.

G. The Defendants’ tax imposition disposition etc.

1) After conducting a tax investigation with respect to the plaintiffs, the director of Central District Tax Office deemed that the plaintiffs did not file a return of the value-added tax and the comprehensive income tax on the 18,00 purchase rights for each salary year and the 3,715 purchase of the charnel house collected by the plaintiffs Sod and notified the defendants of the taxation data. Accordingly, the defendants imposed the global income tax and the principal tax (hereinafter collectively referred to as "tax imposition disposition of global income tax in this case", and "value-added tax imposition disposition of this case") and additional tax (hereinafter referred to as "existing imposition disposition of additional tax") on the global income tax for the year 205 in attached Table 1 Do table (hereinafter referred to as "additional income tax on the 2005 global income tax on the plaintiff Sod"), but the remainder of the additional tax as stated in the attached Table 1 Do table was revoked ex officio.

2) On December 21, 2010, the Plaintiffs filed an appeal with the Tax Tribunal on the grounds that they were dissatisfied therewith, but the said appeal was dismissed on December 30, 201.

3) After the filing of the instant lawsuit, the Defendants ex officio cancelled the previous imposition of penalty tax (except for the Plaintiff’s global income tax in 2005) on the ground that there was a defect in the grounds of calculation of penalty tax in the notice of tax payment, etc., on the grounds that “after the filing of the instant lawsuit, there was a defect in the grounds of calculation of penalty tax, etc.,” and re-assessment of the additional tax as to the Plaintiffs in the notice of tax payment on the date of each disposition indicated in the separate sheet No. 1, stating the grounds of calculation of penalty tax, etc. in the separate sheet of the same Do (hereinafter “instant imposition of penalty tax”).

[Reasons for Recognition] The purport of the whole or part of pleadings, each of Gap's facts without dispute, Gap's evidence 1 through 17, 25, 26, 27, 33, 34, 38, 47, 48, 49, Eul's evidence 1 through 8, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22, 23, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, Eul's evidence 1 through 12 (including a serial number; hereinafter the same shall apply)

2. Determination on this safety defense

A. Main Safety Defenses by the Defendants

Article 22(1) and (2) of the Administrative Litigation Act provides that the plaintiff may apply for permission to change the purport or cause of the claim to the court within 60 days from the date when the administrative agency becomes aware of the change of the disposition, in case where the plaintiff was changed after the action subject to the action was instituted. While the lawsuit in this case is pending, the defendants cancel ex officio the imposition of additional tax (except for additional tax on global income tax of 2005 against the plaintiff Cho A; hereinafter the same shall apply) on the ground that " there is a defect in failing to state the grounds for calculation of additional tax, etc. in the notice of tax payment" and again impose the additional tax in this case. However, the plaintiffs did not change the "the imposition of additional tax" into "the imposition of additional tax" within 60 days from the date when the notice of the imposition of additional tax in this case was received, the part of the lawsuit in this case claiming the revocation of the disposition of additional

B. Determination

On the other hand, in cases where there exists a correction or re-determination to change the original imposition of the same taxation object while a legitimate revocation suit is pending, where there exists a correction or re-determination to change the original imposition of the same taxation object, and where the grounds for revocation (actual illegality) alleged to exist in the initial imposition disposition exists in the same manner as in the decision of correction or re-determination of correction, and where the initial imposition is deemed unlawful, the plaintiff may seek a revocation of the correction or re-determination by modifying the purport of the claim without having to go through a separate procedure for the previous trial against the decision of correction or re-determination, and in such cases, where the initial lawsuit is filed within the legitimate filing period, it is unnecessary to separately judge whether the period for filing a lawsuit to change the claim for the correction or re-determination is complied with (see Supreme Court Decision 2010Du7796, Nov. 29, 2012).

On October 1, 2010 through October 5, 2010, the Defendants revoked ex officio the imposition of additional tax and imposed the additional tax on the Plaintiffs on the grounds that the imposition of global income tax and value-added tax was made on October 1, 2010 through the imposition of global income tax (it constitutes the imposition of additional tax). Accordingly, the Plaintiffs filed the instant lawsuit on March 27, 2012, which is within the filing period prescribed by the Administrative Litigation Act after going through the appeal procedure. During the instant lawsuit, the Defendants filed the instant lawsuit on the grounds that the grounds for calculating additional tax are not stated in the notice of tax payment.” From December 2012 to January 2013, the Defendants issued the imposition of additional tax in this case by stating the grounds for calculating additional tax in the second notice of tax payment, and the Plaintiffs changed the “additional imposition of additional tax” from the “existing imposition of additional tax” to the “additional imposition of additional tax” on November 26, 2013, not the previous imposition of additional tax or existing imposition of additional tax.

In light of the aforementioned legal principles, inasmuch as the Plaintiffs filed the instant lawsuit against the instant global income tax and value-added tax disposition, including the imposition of additional tax, within the filing period, without examining whether the Plaintiffs changed the purport of the instant imposition of additional tax within 60 days from the date on which they became aware of the imposition of the instant penalty tax, to “the imposition of additional tax” and “the cause of the instant claim,” the part of the instant lawsuit claiming revocation of the imposition of additional tax should be lawful.” Therefore, the Defendants’ safety defense is without merit.

3. Whether the imposition of global income tax, value-added tax, and additional tax is legitimate

A. The plaintiffs' assertion

(1) Plaintiff Cho AA

In order for this KK to engage in money transaction in the bank account under the name of the Plaintiff Cho Jae-A, the denyingr due to bad credit standing, it was merely a loan agreement, agreement, etc., and the person who actually participated in the instant charnel business as a member of the means is this KK. Therefore, imposing global income tax, value-added tax, and additional tax on Plaintiff Cho Jae-A, who is only the nominal lender, is illegal in violation of the substance over form principle under Article 14(1) of the Framework Act on National Taxes.

(2) The plaintiffs (related to the right to sell each salary)

(A) Income-related

1) The receipt of OO's KRW 1,00, which is the first issue of the instant case from SS pursuant to the agreement between June 13, 2005 and September 20, 2007, was made by the pertinent authorities on the condition that the non-performance of the conditions becomes final and conclusive due to the absence of the extension in the relevant administrative litigation, and accordingly the validity of the said agreement is retroactively extinguished, the human means return the money received to SS with the original state. Thus, it cannot be said that the human means have finally obtained the key income of the instant case No. 1. Accordingly, the instant disposition imposing global income tax on the premise that the human means has finally obtained the income of the OOO's source.

2) Even if the method of a person gains the income of the instant No. 1 in a conclusive manner, the transfer of the right to sell the instant title to the instant case constitutes the transfer of a bond or conditional bond or call option in order to raise funds from SS. (1) It is difficult to see that there is income in the case of the transfer of the right to collateral, and 2) It is not subject to the transfer of conditional bond or call option, as stipulated in each subparagraph of Article 94(1) of the Income Tax Act.

For the above income to become a business income, one of the businesses prescribed in the subparagraphs of Article 19 (1) of the Income Tax Act shall be the income earned continuously and repeatedly under his own account and responsibility for profit. It is difficult to view the transfer of the right to sell in advance of the means of seal as having been continuously and repeatedly conducted once, and it is also difficult to view that the transfer of the right to sell in advance of the means of seal has been made continuously and repeatedly. Moreover, it is unclear whether the instant charnel business falls under the business prescribed in each subparagraph of Article 19 (1) of the Income Tax Act to the extent that it is not clearly stated where it falls under any of the businesses listed in each subparagraph of Article 19 (1) of the Income Tax Act, and therefore,

Although the transfer price of business rights falls under other income, since the expansion of the number of houses installed in a charnel house does not occur in the form of the right to sell the house per se allocated to the means of human beings, the right to sell the house per se cannot be deemed as the business right, and it cannot be deemed that the above income falls under other income as the consideration for the transfer of business rights.

Therefore, the key issue of this case is that the income of this case is not subject to taxation under the Income Tax Act, and thus, it is unlawful to levy income tax.

3) Even though the key income of the instant case No. 1 constitutes income subject to taxation under the Income Tax Act, the tax authorities either conduct a field investigation or investigate and deduct necessary expenses, and the Defendants imposed income tax on the entire amount of income as business income without deducting necessary expenses.

(B) Value-added tax

1) As seen in the “value-Added Tax Act” does not fall under the sales right of the container, and even if it falls under the goods, it is illegal to impose value-added tax on it even though it does not fall under the goods, as seen in the “1.f.,” the FF firm Foundation lost the lawsuit related to the expansion of the container storage in a charnel house. As such, the sales right per container allocated to the person means does not occur from the beginning or retroactively extinguished. Therefore, even if there is no goods subject to value-added tax, it is illegal to impose value

"2) Even if the right to sell a charnel land exists as a goods, it is deemed that the human means of transfer of the right to sell a charnel land to SS is the offering of security for the investment of SS. The offering of goods as security constitutes a case where the supply of goods under Article 6 (6) 1 of the former Value-Added Tax Act (amended by Act No. 9915 of Jan. 1, 2010; hereinafter referred to as the "former Value-Added Tax Act") is not considered as the supply of goods under Article 6 (6) 1 of the former Value-Added Tax Act. Thus, the imposition of value-added tax is unlawful. 3) Meanwhile, the right to sell a charnel land can be deemed as the provision of services related to a charnel house, which is a cemetery facility. Since Article 12 (1) 4 of the former Value-Added Tax Act and Article 29 (7) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Value-Added Tax Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 22043 of Feb. 18, 2019).

4) Even if value-added tax can be levied, the Defendants were to impose value-added tax on the FOO won received from a human means by FOO Foundation. Thus, the Defendants were to impose value-added tax only on the remainder after deducting it from the input tax amount. It was unlawful that the value-added tax was imposed on the entire OO won.

5) Meanwhile, at 25,004, the number of charnels currently approved at 25,004, the value-added tax shall be imposed only on the remaining 3,171 excluding the 21,833 equipment provided by Switzerland as payment in lieu of payment to the construction companies. Thus, the value-added tax shall be imposed on the remaining portion of OOOs less 3,171/35,000 from the remainder of OOs whose value-added tax has already been imposed.

(3) Plaintiff Dodd Dod Dod Dod Dod Dod Dod Dod Dod

Plaintiff DohD merely tried to recover the custody of a charnel from the public corporation, and it does not sell it to the WT after purchasing 3,715 equipment of a charnel house in its name and on its own account, under the business operator’s name and on his own account. Thus, the Plaintiff DohD is not a business operator under the Income Tax Act or a person liable for value-added tax.

Even if the Plaintiff’s business operator is the Plaintiff’s business, the Plaintiff’s Dodd Dod Dod Dod Dod Dod Dod Dod Dod Dod Dod Dod Dod Dod Dod Dod Dod ○ Dod Dod Dod Dod Dod Dod Dod Dod

Therefore, imposing income tax, value-added tax, and additional tax on the above part is illegal.

(b) Related statutes;

Attached Form 5 is as shown in the relevant statutes.

C. Determination

(1) Determination on the Plaintiff’s assertion

On the other hand, Article 14(1) of the Framework Act on National Taxes provides that “if the ownership of income, profit, property, act or transaction subject to taxation is merely nominal, and there is another person to whom such ownership belongs, the person to whom such ownership belongs shall be subject to the application of tax-related Acts.” Therefore, if there is another person who substantially controls and manages such income, profit, property, act or transaction differently from the nominal owner, the nominal owner shall not be the person to whom such income, profit, or appearance belongs, but the person who actually controls and manages such taxable object shall be the person to whom such income, profit, or appearance belongs pursuant to the principle of substantial taxation. Furthermore, whether such a case falls under the above should be determined by comprehensively taking into account various circumstances, such as the circumstance leading up to the use of the nominal owner, the degree and scope of the nominal owner’s involvement, internal liability and calculation relationship, and the existence of independent management and disposition authority on the taxable object, which, in principle, bears the burden of proof for the existence and tax base, and even in cases where the nominal owner and the actual owner of the transaction are different, it is not clear.

In full view of the purport of the arguments in the entirety or in part of the arguments by Gap, Gap, 1, 33, 47, 48, 49, Eul, Eul, and Eul were present on behalf of the plaintiff Cho Jong at the time of the tax investigation, and investigated the transfer of the charnel project and the right to sell the house of this case. In the course of the investigation, this K gave specific answers to the process of the implementation of this case's charnel project and the transfer of the right to sell the house of this case. In this case, the person who was punished for the violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes (tax) and the Punishment of Tax Evaders in relation to the transfer of the right to purchase the houses of this case is not the plaintiff Cho Jong, and the plaintiff Cho Jong-chul was not the member of the human means of funding, and the plaintiff Lee 2, who participated in the investigation by the regional tax office of this case, was not the subject of the first agreement to the effect that the plaintiff Lee 5, who was stated in the name of the plaintiff Lee 2, as the principal agent of this case.

Therefore, Defendant***** the director of the tax office’s global income tax and its additional tax as stated in [Attachment 1] No. 1] of [Attachment 1] against Plaintiff ChoA, and the disposition of imposition of the value-added tax as stated in [Attachment 6] of Defendant △△ Tax Office’s [Attachment 6] against Plaintiff Cho Young-A], and the disposition of imposition of additional tax therefor are unlawful. Thus, the above assertion by

(2) Determination as to the plaintiffs' assertion on the right to sell shares in the salary ledger

(A) The nature of the agreement dated June 13, 2005 and the agreement dated September 20, 2007

1) First of all, with respect to the developments of the Agreement dated June 13, 2005 and the Agreement dated September 20, 2007, the Health Center suspended its business due to the shortage of funds during the implementation of the instant charnel project; the human means of acquisition of the instant charnel project from E around March 22, 2005; the human means of acquisition of the instant charnel project under the name of the human means of 00, the 200, which is legally restricted in the process of the instant charnel project, established the FF Foundation around March 30, 205 ( its own contents are as follows); the 20,000,000,000,000,000,000,0000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,00,000,00,000.

2) FF사재단의 성격에 관하여 보건대, 앞서 인정한 사실, 앞서 든 증거에 의하여 인정할 수 있는 다음과 같은 사정들, 즉, 2005. 3. 30.경 FF사재단의 규약에 FF사재단의 대표는 손RR, 이사는 서EE, 이QQ, 이KK, 원고 손DD, 박PP, 원고 백CC로 기재되어 있는데(을가 제6호증의 1 참조), ① 서EE이 2010. 6. 8. 중부지방국세청에서 조사를 받으면서 'FF사재단의 대표인 손RR는 인수단의 일원이었던 박PP의 대리인이다', '손RR는 박PP 등이 지정한 CEO 정도이고, FF사재단은 박PP 등이 임의로 만든 단체 정도로만 알고 있다', 'FF사재단은 손RR를 대표로 하여 MM저축은행에서 파견된 이XX, 장YY, 김ZZ 등이 근무하고 있다'는 취지로 진술하였고(을가 제4호증 중 제3, 6, 7면 참조), 원고 손DD도 2010. 6. 26. 중부지방국세청에서 조사를 받으면서 '손RR는 박PP을 통하여 FF사재단의 대표가 되었다'는 취지로 진술한 것(을가 제3호증 중 제9면 참조)에 비주어 손RR는 인수단측 사람이고, 나머지 이사들도 대부분 인수단의 구성원으로 구성되어 있는 점, ② 납골당 안치기수 증설 관련 소송이었던 수원지방법원 2009구합1243호 판결에서도 '이KK, 원고 손DD, 박PP, 원고 백CC이 이 사건 납골당 사업 등을 위하여 FF사재단을 설립하였다'고 설시되어 있는 점(을가 제18호증의 1), 한편, ③「구 장사 등에 관한 법률」(2007. 5. 25. 법률 제8489호로 전부 개정되기 전의 것) 제14조 저12항은 '유골 500구 이상을 안치할 수 있는 사설납골시설을 설치・관리하고자 하는 자는 민법 에 의하여 납골시설의 설치・관리를 목적으로 하는 재단법인을 설립 하여 야 한다. 다만, 종교단체에서 설치・관리하는 경우…에는 그러하지 아니하다'고 규정하여 유골 500구 이상을 안치할 수 있는 사설납골시설을 설치・관리할 수 있는 자의 자격요건을 제한하고 있었던 점 등을 종합 하면, FF사재단은 인수단이 이 사건 납골당사업을 함에 있어 관련 법령의 제한을 회피하기 위하여 설립한 단체에 불과하고, 인수단과 SSS에 대하여 독립된 의사결정을 하고 별도의 이해관계를 가지는 주체로 보기는 어렵다.

3) 다음으로 이 사건 2005. 6. 13.자 약정의 법적 성격에 관하여 보건대, 위 약정서의 제목이 '분양권 양도계약서'이고, 위 약정서에 '봉안당 분양권 35,000기를 양도한다는 취지로 기재되어 있기는 하나, ① SSS는 양도대금 OOOO원 중 OOOO원을 계약금으로 지급하였는데, 아직 납골당 안치기수 증설을 승인받지 못한 상황이어서 봉안당 분양권을 실제로 이전받을 수 있을지 여부를 넘어서 봉안당 분양권 자체가 존재할 것인지 여부도 알수 없는 위험한 상황이었음에도 매매계약에서의 일반적인 계약금율, 즉 10%를 훨씬 초과하여 약 28%(≒ OOOO원 + OOOO원)를 계약금으로 지급한 것이 이례적이라는 점, ② 위 약정서에는 납골당 안치기수가 80,000기 이상 증설되지 아니하는 경우, 예컨대 55,000기가 증설되는 경우 잔금 OOOO원을 전혀 받을 수 없고, 45,000기 이하로 증설되는 경우 인수단이 잔금을 받을 수 없음은 물론이고 계약금 OOOO원에 더하여 45,000기와 차이에 OOOO원을 곱한 금원을 반환하여야 하는 것처럼 기재되어 있는데, 봉안당 분양권 35,000기를 양도할 의무를 부담할 뿐인 인수단이 납골당 안치기수 증설, 즉 이 사건 납골당사업의 성패에 따라 SSS에게 이미 지급받은 계약금 및 그에 대한 지연이자 상당의 손해를 넘어서서 돈을 반환하여야 한다는 취지의 규정을 두는 것이 일반적인 매매계약에서는 매우 이례적이라는 점, ③ 위 약정이 매매계약이라면, 인수단이 SSS로부터 잔금을 지급받고 동시에 봉안당 분양권을 이전하는 것으로 계약이 종료될 것인데, 위 약정은 인수단이 봉안당 분양권 35,000기를 분양대행사를 통하여 일반에 분양하고, 그에 따른 순수익금을 인수단과 SSS가 반분한다고 규정하고 있는 점, ④ MM저축은행의 2005. 6. 28.자 '대출요청에 따른 검토 보고서'에 'FF사 인수자가 보유할 납골당 회원권증서(약 35,000기)를 담보로 하여 P/F방식으로 대출지원'이라 기재되어 있는 점, ⑤ 원고들도 이 사건 2005. 6. 13.자 약 정은 SSS 내지 MM저축은행 등으로부터 자금을 지원받고 이에 대하여 담보를 설정하기 위한 계약이라는 취지로 주장하고 있는 점 등을 종합하여 보면, 이 사건 2005. 6. 13.자 약정은 인수단이 SSS에게 봉안당 분양권을 양도하는 단순한 매매계약으로 보기는 어렵고, 이 사건 납골당사업과 관련한 투자 및 담보에 관한 약정으로 봄이 상당하다.

4) The following facts are difficult to conclude an agreement with the Seoul High Court 0.200 . 20 . 6 . 6 . 2 . 4 . 2 0 . 2 0 . 2 0 . 2 0 . 4 0 . 2 0 0 . 2 0 0 . 4 2 0 . 4 2 0 . 2 0 2 0 0 . 8 2 0 0 2 0 . 3 0 2 0 2 0 . 4 2 0 0 . 3 0 2 0 0 . 4 2 0 0 . 3 0 2 0 02 0 . 4 0 2 0 2 0 . 3 0 2 0 2 0 . 3 0 2 0 2 0 2 3 3 201 . 3 2 2 3 0 2 2 2 . 3 2 0. . 3 . 3 3 0.

(B) Determination on the assertion regarding income tax

1) As above, the FF foundation is merely an organization established by human means or SS to avoid legal restrictions in the operation of the instant charnel project, and it is difficult to view it as an entity with independent decision-making and separate interests between human means and SS. ② The agreement of June 13, 2005 is in line with the substance to view it as an agreement on investment and security for the plaintiffs who intend to operate the instant charnel project by SS or MM Savings Bank. ③ The agreement of September 20, 2007, which was received from human means to withdraw from the instant charnel project and to receive compensation for it, is reasonable to view it as the business entity prior to the instant charnel project as the amount of compensation for the instant 0 OFO as the business entity prior to the instant 1st, and to view it as the issue of the 0th, the amount of compensation for the 00 OFO as the business entity prior to the instant charnel project. Meanwhile, it is reasonable to view it as the business entity prior to the instant 1st, the 000 OFO of the instant project.

2) We examine the assertion that the means of seal did not obtain a definitive income.

A) In the event that a seller cancels a sales contract by failing to perform the obligation to pay the remainder, if the buyer completed the registration of ownership transfer in advance, while entering into a sales contract for real estate, the above sales contract becomes retroactively null and void, and thus, the disposition imposing capital gains tax on the seller under the premise that the seller has any income arising from the transfer of the property is illegal. Even if there is a claim for correction based on the subsequent cause, such as cancellation of the contract, etc. after the tax authority imposed the disposition, a separate dispute may be raised as to the disposition itself (Supreme Court Decision 200Du5972 Decided September 27, 200

(2) Although it is unclear that the plaintiffs had no fixed income. 80,000,000,0000 20,00000 20,0000 20,0000 20,00000 20,0000,0000 20,000022,00022,00022,0000,0000,00022,00022,0000,0000,0000,0000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,00,000,00,000,00,00,00,00,00,00.

3) We examine whether it constitutes business income under the Income Tax Act.

A) Business income under the Income Tax Act refers to income under each subparagraph of Article 19(1) of the Income Tax Act. Whether it falls under the business income under the Income Tax Act ought to be determined according to the ordinary social norms, taking into account whether the business is for profit-making purposes and whether it has continuity and repetition to the extent that it can be seen as business activities in light of its size, recovery, attitudes, etc. (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 88Nu8753, Mar. 28, 1989).

B) First of all, as to whether the instant charnel project falls under the business stipulated in each subparagraph of Article 19(1) of the former Income Tax Act (amended by Act No. 8825 of Dec. 31, 2007; hereinafter referred to as the "former Income Tax Act"), which was enforced at the time of the instant case, the health class, Article 19(1)15 of the former Income Tax Act provides as business income the "income generated from the social and private service business" and the main sentence of Article 29 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 22034 of Feb. 18, 2010; hereinafter referred to as the "former Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act") stipulates as business income, and the scope of the instant charnel project constitutes the Korea Standard Industrial Classification, Article 24 and 25 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act (amended by Act No. 8825 of Dec. 31, 200; hereinafter referred to as the "Korea Standard Industrial Classification Association and 29, etc.

C) We examine whether the means of human beings have continuously and repeatedly earned income from the activities conducted for profit purposes in connection with the instant charnel project.

The amount of compensation paid by a project operator in connection with the expropriation or transfer of a reclamation work after the business is conducted by the project operator due to the expropriation or transfer of the construction work (see Supreme Court Decision 2006Du9535, Jan. 31, 2008) is reasonable to include the amount of total income in the case of compensation for losses of other assets, such as compensation for losses, business compensation, compensation for temporary closure or closure of a construction business, or compensation for losses, etc. which are reduced in connection with the project in question (see Supreme Court Decision 2006Du9535, Jan. 31, 2008). While the project operator entered into a partnership contract with the reclamation license holder, etc. to jointly execute reclamation work and distribute profits arising from the construction work, it is reasonable to calculate the amount of income arising from the above construction work in accordance with the above distribution ratio of profits, and it is reasonable to calculate the amount of income arising from the above construction business under Article 20 (1) 5 of the Income Tax Act and Article 233 (1) 9 (2) 5) 2 of the Enforcement Decree of the Act.

Based on the above legal principles, in light of the facts acknowledged earlier, and the circumstances acknowledged earlier, it is reasonable to view that the seal means, while promoting the instant charnel project, transferred the status of the proprietor or partner of the instant charnel project, and received the income amount of the first issue of this case under the pretext of compensation or settlement for the profits accrued from the instant charnel project in the future. However, although the seal means is of property value, the status of the proprietor or partner of the instant charnel project is not subject to capital gains tax under Article 94 of the former Income Tax Act (Provided, That it is reasonable to view the seal as business right under Article 94 (1) 4 (a) of the former Income Tax Act, but it is not subject to capital gains tax (it cannot be deemed that the right to purchase the seal house is transferred along with the fixed assets for business, and it does not fall under capital gains). The seal means transferred the status of the proprietor or partner of the instant charnel project, and deducted the necessary expenses incurred from the instant 1st issue received from SS, as business income as prescribed in Article 1 of the Income Tax Act.

Even if the income of this case does not constitute business income, Article 21 (1) 7 of the former Income Tax Act provides that "the money and valuables received in consideration of transfer or lease of business rights or other similar assets or rights" is "other income." The "business rights" here include the tradition, social credibility, location conditions of the company, existence of special manufacturing technology or special trading relations, etc., and other intangible property values such as excess earnings that can bring about more profits than those of the same kind of manufacturing and sale (Supreme Court Decision 84Nu281 Decided April 23, 1985) which refer to the "business income of this case" and "the economic profits that the business income of this case is obtained in consideration of the above business income of this case" is also included in "the economic profits that the business income of this case is obtained in consideration of the above business income of this case from the "the business income of this case" and "the business income of this case shall not be subject to the approval of the other tax office's other income under the jurisdiction of S. 1, 2007.

4) We examine the assertion on necessary expenses.

A) In a case where a tax assessment is conducted based on the on-site investigation decision on the omitted sales amount, the taxpayer should assert and prove the necessary expenses corresponding to the omitted sales amount, and when the amount of income can be determined by the method of the on-site investigation, it cannot be determined by the method of the on-site investigation. If the tax authorities discovered the omitted sales amount during the taxable period by the on-site investigation and recognized the necessary expenses corresponding thereto by the on-site investigation, it cannot be deemed impossible to make a decision on the on-site investigation. Thus, if necessary expenses not recognized by the tax authorities exist, the taxpayer should assert and prove it, and the income cannot be determined by the method of the on-site investigation to deduct the necessary expenses (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2002Du12786, Dec. 12, 2003).

B) As to the instant case, the Plaintiffs are liable to prove necessary expenses to the Defendants, who are the tax authorities, or only claim that the OOOOO was used as necessary expenses (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 6th of November 24, 2012). Since the Plaintiffs did not submit evidence that the OOOOO was actually spent as necessary expenses, this part of the Plaintiffs’ assertion is without merit.

(B) Determination on the assertion regarding value-added tax

(3) As seen earlier, the agreement between S. 2 and S. 2 on September 207, 207 regarding the transfer of 18,00 shares of the 20-use charnels to the 20-use public office for sale, and the payment of money pursuant to the agreement, is recognized as above. On the other hand, the 20-use public office for sale, as it receives from S.E the transfer of its business status such as the right to permit the instant charnels from S. 2 and the 20-use public office for sale, and it is difficult to view that the 20-use public office for sale, which is the first time, transferred the right to purchase the instant charnels to S. 20-use public office for sale, under the agreement dated September 20, 207 and the 20-use public office for sale, and that the 20-use public office for sale, which is the first time before the 20-use public office for sale, transferred its ownership to S. 20-use public office for sale.

(3) Determination as to the Plaintiff’s assertion of Dad Dod Dod Dod Dod Dod Dod

"1) According to the above facts, the plaintiff Dog-man and the plaintiff Dog-D's 2's 3,715 Dog Investment's Dog Investment's Dog Investment's Dog Investment's Dog Investment's Dog Investment's Dog Investment's Dog Investment's Dog Investment's Dog Investment's Dog Investment's 2000 Dog Investment's Dog Investment's 205 Dog Investment's Dog Investment's Dog Investment's 200 Dog Investment's Dog Investment's 205 Dog Investment's Dog Investment's 200 Dog Investment's Dog Investment's Dog Investment's 200 Dog Investment's Dog Investment's Dog Investment's Dog Investment's Dog Investment's Dog Investment's 200 Dog Investment's Dogl Investment's 20 O's Dog.

A) First of all, the argument that the Plaintiff’s Doctrine 2 was merely an assistance to the Plaintiff’s business for the said Doctrine 2’s Doctrine 2’s Doctrine 2’s Doctrine 2’s Doctrine 2’s Doctrine 2’s Doctrine 1’s Doctrine 2’s Doctrine 2’s Doctrine 1’s Doctrine 2’s Doctrine 2’s Doctrine 2’s Doctrine 2’s Doctrine 205’s Doctrine 1’s Doctrine 2’s Doctrine 2’s Doctrine and Doctrine 2’s Doctrine Doctrine 2’s Doctrine Doctrine.’s Doctrine.

B) Next, it is difficult for the Plaintiff to accurately collect the amount equivalent to the KRW 100 per 200 OE per 200 gram, and sell it to the 1st POE for the same amount as that of the said work. According to the Plaintiff’s argument, there is evidence No. 20 gram, which is consistent with the Plaintiff’s above argument, and according to the above evidence, there is evidence No. 160 gram 165 for the 20th gram 165 for the violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes (Tax), etc. of Suwon District Court, which was present as a witness, and it is difficult for the 20th OE to acknowledge that the 6th Do Do 30 Do Do 1 stated that the 60 Do Do 1 stated that the 60 Do Do 1 stated that the 60 Do Do 30 Do Do 1 stated that it received money from the witness and delivered money to the 6th Do 2. Do 2.

On the other hand, as seen earlier, there is no consistent statement made by Plaintiffs Dood and DooE, and there is no other data that Plaintiff Doodd Dood Dood d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d

3) Next, we examine value-added tax.

A) As to whether a person is liable for tax payment, Article 2(1) of the Value-Added Tax Act provides that a person who independently supplies goods or services for business purposes is the person liable for value-added tax, regardless of whether it is for profit-making purposes. Here, “a person who independently supplies goods or services for business purposes” refers to a person who supplies goods or services in the form of business to the extent that a value-added can be created and paid by creating a value-added (see Supreme Court Decision 2010Du8430, Sept. 9, 2010).

As seen earlier, as to the instant case, Plaintiff Dohdddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddd

B) Next, we find it difficult to view that, with respect to the claim that the Plaintiff DooD collected the certificate of the establishment of a charnel from the public corporation and sold it to the WT for a period of KRW 800,000 per unit to the public corporation, and there is no added value created by selling it to the WT, it is difficult to view that the health team and the Plaintiff DooD recovered the certificate of the establishment of a charnel from the public corporation to the IMO for a period of one unit.