[2] The case holding that the display of a signboard does not constitute a public announcement by the owner of possession of the signboard

[3] The nature of possession of the temple property disposed of without permission from the competent Minister

[4] The place where the cause of interruption of prescription is asserted and the burden of proof is established and the degree of the burden of proof

[5] The scope of judicial claims as grounds for suspending the prescriptive acquisition

[6] The meaning of the party and his successor who have an effect of interrupting prescription

[7] The case reversing the judgment below which did not decide on the claim for interruption of prescription of the temple on the ground that the temple's filing of a lawsuit for cancellation registration against a third party, who is a formal registration titleholder, for the purpose of removing disturbance based on the ownership of the land, is practically an actual possessor, and thus, constitutes a judicial claim against

[2] The case holding that even if the signboard was attached to the "Doncheon Doncheon Station" at the entrance of the party branch, it cannot be deemed that the party branch was under possession of the inspection, on the ground that the signboard was attached to the name of the party branch and the name of the party branch, the head office of the superior office, and the horse branch, so that they can be left well in the snow of the people, and thus, it cannot be deemed that the person to whom the ownership or the right to possess the right to possess the ownership or the right to possess the right to possess the temple was externally announced as the temple, on the ground that the temple was not subject to the ownership or the right to possess the ownership or the right to possess the right to possess the right to possess the party branch since the death of the party branch, or that there was no expenses paid for the construction or the repair of the facilities of the building, etc.

[3] Even if disposal is permitted only with permission of the competent authority, and the purchase of real estate, the sale of which is prohibited without permission, is not obligated to investigate whether the seller's act of sale satisfies the legally effective requirements, in the case of the purchaser who purchased real estate from the nominal owner or his/her legal representative, who is recognized as having the legally general right of disposal, or his/her legal representative, the seller's act of sale is not obligated to investigate whether the sale satisfies the legally effective requirements. Thus, barring special circumstances such as where the purchaser knew or could have known that the permission was not granted by the competent authority, it shall be deemed that the seller possesses the real estate at the beginning of possession

[4] The responsibility to assert and prove the cause of interruption of prescription is the party that contests the completion of prescription, and the degree of the responsibility to assert is not necessary to explicitly express the suspension of prescription, but should be deemed to have fulfilled the responsibility to assert only the fact that falls under the cause of interruption.

[5] A judicial claim that is the cause of interruption of prescription does not mean the delivery of an object subject to prescriptive acquisition, the confirmation of existence of ownership, or the filing of a lawsuit for registration of ownership. In the case of infringement of ownership, the exclusion of interference based on ownership and the lawsuit for compensation for unjust enrichment or the lawsuit for claim for return of unjust enrichment

[6] In the case of paragraph (5) above, the interruption of prescription can only be effective between the parties and their successors. Here, the parties are not parties to the rights or claims which are the subject of prescription, and the successors are "persons who succeed to the rights which are subject to the effect of interruption from the parties involved in the interruption of prescription after the interruption of prescription becomes effective," and include not only general successors but also specific successors.

[7] The case reversing the judgment of the court below which did not determine extinctive prescription of the plaintiff temple at all times on the ground that, in light of the fact that the plaintiff temple's possession of the church party and continued to punish the building project, and that the plaintiff temple filed a lawsuit to cancel the registration of ownership transfer against the above third party had been implemented disadvantageously against the third party, the transfer registration of ownership, which was completed in the third party's name, was completed only in the form, and the third party's name was registered in the name of the third party, and the possessor still is the owner, and in such a case, the plaintiff temple filed a lawsuit to cancel the registration of ownership against the third party for the purpose of removing disturbance based on the ownership of the land is deemed to fall under the case where the possessor filed a judicial claim with the opposite party, and thus, it is deemed that the prescriptive prescription of the possessor's assertion was suspended, and the judgment of the court below which did not determine extinctive prescription of the plaintiff temple at all at all.

1. Summary of the judgment below

According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court below, the plaintiff 1 and the plaintiff 2 purchased the land of this case from the 30th of June 3, 191 to the 9th of the above 196th of the above 7th of the 196th of the 196th of the 196th of the 196th of the 196th of the 196th of the 196th of the 196th of the 196th of the 196th of the 196th of the 196th of the 196th of the 196th of the 196th of the 196th of the 196th of the 196th of the 2nd of the 1st of the 1st of the 1st of the 1st of the 1st of the 1st of the 3th of the 1st of the 1st of the 1st of the 1st of the 3th of the 1st of the 7th of the building. the 3th of the 1st of the deceased.

2. We examine the first ground for appeal.

A general inspection, which is not a private car or a private temple, is an unincorporated association or foundation with independent legal capacity and capacity to be a party, and thus, a person who ordinarily occupies the land and building of the inspection does not possess possession of it by a person who is in the position of widely known to the representative agency. However, even if it is a temple property or an Buddhist facility owned by the general inspection, if an individual actually controls it in a private person’s qualification regardless of the general inspection, the owner of possession shall be an individual, and the general inspection shall not be deemed to possess the property or facilities through it. Further, even if the general inspection was attached to the entrance of the party’s church of this case, it may not be deemed to have been a signboard of the Plaintiff’s possession or possession of the property or facilities, and even if it was attached to the name of the party of this case, the name of the party of the party of the inspection of this case, together with the name of the party of the party of the inspection of this case, which can be seen to have been left well in the building of the Plaintiff, the head office and the horse of this case’s inspection of this case.

According to the records, the decision of the court below that the party of this case has been under possession of the defendant is just and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the possessor or possessory right, such as the theory of lawsuit. The arguments are without merit.

3. We examine the second ground for appeal.

Even if disposal is permitted only upon permission by the competent authority and without permission, the purchaser of real estate, which is prohibited from disposal, is not obligated to investigate whether the seller's act of sale satisfies the legally effective requirements, barring special circumstances, in the case of the purchaser who purchased the real estate from the nominal owner or his/her legal representative recognized as having the legally general right to dispose of the real estate and who delivered the real estate (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 72Da88, Mar. 31, 1972; 78Da4469, Jul. 25, 1978; 80Da469, Jun. 9, 1981). Thus, barring special circumstances such as where the purchaser knew or could have known of the lack of permission by the competent authority, it shall be deemed that the purchaser possessed the real estate at the beginning of possession, and even if the sale becomes null and void due to the lack of the right to dispose of the real estate last, the nature of possession does not change (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 78Da469

According to the records, the court below is just in finding that the defendant occupied each of the lands of this case from the winter in 1973, and even if the defendant had worked as the plaintiff as the plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff's plaintiff.

4. We examine the third ground for appeal.

The assertion and burden of proof of the cause of interruption of prescription is the party disputing the completion of prescription, and the degree of the burden of such assertion requires not an explicit assertion that the prescriptive prescription has been interrupted, but an assertion is made only on the facts belonging to the cause of interruption. (See Supreme Court Decision 82Meu172 delivered on March 8, 1983).

However, according to the records, the plaintiff asserted in the preparatory brief (record 749 page) dated December 15, 1995, which was stated on the third day for pleading of the court below, that " insofar as the plaintiff temple was sentenced to winning the plaintiff's lawsuit on the land of this case through related civil procedure, it is clear that the prescription acquisition on the land of this case has been interrupted." In addition, since the plaintiff temple asserted that there was multiple civil lawsuits on the land of this case as to the land of this case by both parties, the court below should have deliberated and judged that such lawsuit constitutes a judicial claim and other provisional disposition, which constitutes the cause of interruption of prescriptive acquisition.

한편, 취득시효의 중단사유가 되는 재판상 청구에는 시효취득의 대상인 목적물의 인도 내지는 소유권존부 확인이나 소유권에 관한 등기청구소송은 말할 것도 없고, 소유권침해의 경우에 그 소유권을 기초로 하는 방해배제 및 손해배상 혹은 부당이득반환청구소송도 이에 포함되며 ( 대법원 1995. 10. 13. 선고 95다33047 판결 참조), 그로 인한 시효중단의 효력은 당사자 및 그 승계인 간에만 미치고, 여기서 당사자라 함은 중단행위에 관여한 당사자를 가리키고 시효의 대상인 권리 또는 청구권의 당사자는 아니며, 승계인이라 함은 '시효중단에 관여한 당사자로부터 중단의 효과를 받는 권리를 그 중단효과 발생 이후에 승계한 자'를 뜻하고 ( 대법원 1994. 6. 24. 선고 94다7737 판결 참조) 포괄승계인은 물론 특정승계인도 이에 포함된다. 이 사건에 있어서, 기록을 검토하여 보면, 원고 사찰은 이 사건 포교당에 관한 소유권을 행사하기 위하여 여러 가지 민사소송을 제기하거나 관여한 사실, 특히 피고가 1991. 9. 17. 대한불교 보광사의 소유명의로 등기되어 있던 이 사건 각 토지에 관하여 소외 사회복지법인 자비복지원 앞으로 증여를 원인으로 한 소유권이전등기를 경료하여 주자 원고 사찰은 1992년경 위 자비복지원을 상대로 춘천지방법원 강릉지원 92가합2618호로서 위 각 소유권이전등기의 말소등기청구소송을 제기하여 1993. 6. 3. 승소하였고 이에 위 자비복지원이 서울고등법원 93나33366호 로서 항소하였으나 1994. 4. 1. 항소기각되었으며 그 판결이 1995. 2. 28. 대법원 94다23852호의 상고기각판결 로 확정된 사실(갑 제7호증의 1, 2, 갑 제18호증), 한편 위 소송이 항소심이 진행 중이던 1994. 3. 29. 피고가 대표로 되어 있는 대한불교 보광사와 위 자비복지원은 위 강릉지원에서 위 자비복지원 명의의 각 소유권이전등기를 말소하기로 제소전 화해를 하고 그 화해에 기하여 1994. 6. 23. 위 자비복지원 명의의 각 소유권이전등기를 말소함으로써 이 사건 각 토지의 등기명의는 '대한불교 보광사' 앞으로 환원된 사실, 위 대한불교 보광사는 피고가 자신을 주지로 삼아 창립한 후 1976. 3. 6. 속초시청에 구 불교재산관리법에 따른 불교단체 등록 및 주지취임 등록을 하였으나 사찰로서 독립적인 실체를 가지고 있지 못하고 개인사찰의 형식으로 운영된 사실 등을 인정할 수 있는바, 사실관계가 이와 같다면 이 사건 각 토지에 관하여 위 자비복지원 명의로 마쳐졌던 소유권이전등기는 그 등기 후에도 피고가 이 사건 포교당을 점유하면서 계속하여 건축사업을 벌린 점, 원고 사찰이 위 자비복지원을 상대로 하여 제기한 소유권이전등기말소소송이 위 자비복지원에 불리하게 전개되자 화해의 방식으로 그 등기명의를 다시 대한불교 보광사 명의로 환원한 점 등에 비추어 볼 때, 형식상으로만 그 등기명의를 위 자비복지원 앞으로 등기한 것일 뿐 실질적으로는 여전히 피고가 그 소유자로 행세하여 왔다고 할 것이고, 이러한 경우 원고 사찰이 이 사건 각 토지의 소유권에 기하여 그 방해배제를 목적으로 위 자비복지원을 상대로 위 말소등기소송을 제기한 것은 실질적으로는 피고를 반대 당사자로 하여 재판상 청구를 한 것에 해당한다고 볼 것이고 이로써 피고 주장의 취득시효는 중단되었다가 위 재판상 청구에 기한 판결이 확정될 때인 1995. 2. 23.부터 다시 진행한다 고 볼 것이다. 만일 부동산등기부등본(갑 제11호증의 1 내지 11)상 등기원인의 기재와 같이 피고가 1991. 8. 27. 위 자비복지원에게 이 사건 각 토지를 실제로 증여한 것이라면 피고는 특별한 사정이 없는 한 그 증여계약에 기하여 위 자비복지원에 대하여 인도의무를 지고 있었을 것이므로 피고의 점유는 그 증여일로부터 타주점유로 변경되어 그 인도의무가 제소전 화해로 소멸될 때까지 동일한 점유상태가 계속되었을 터이고, 설사 그 기간 동안 위 자비복지원에 귀속되었던 자주점유를 피고가 후에 승계하였다고 할지라도 원고 사찰이 1992년경 위 자비복지원을 상대로 앞서 본 소유권이전등기말소청구의 소를 제기한 이후에 중단의 효과를 받는 권리를 승계한 것이므로 그 재판상 청구로 인한 시효중단의 효력은 승계인인 피고에게도 미친다고 할 것이다. 그러므로 어느 모로 보나 피고 주장의 취득시효는 원고 사찰의 위 소제기로 인하여 중단되었거나 시효기간 중 타주점유로 변경되어 그 요건을 갖추지 못하였다고 할 것이다. 그 밖에 갑 제11호증의 1 내지 10의 각 기재에 의하면, 원고 사찰이 이 사건 각 부동산의 등기명의자인 대한불교 보광사(대표자 주지 피고)를 상대로 동 부동산에 관하여 매매, 증여, 양도, 저당권·전세권·임차권의 설정 등 일체의 처분행위를 금지하는 처분금지가처분결정을 받아 1992. 8. 31. 그 기입등기를 경료한 사실을 인정할 수 있고, 위 대한불교 보광사는 앞에서 인정한 바와 같이 피고의 사설 사암에 지나지 아니하므로 그에 대한 가처분은 곧 피고에 대한 가처분으로 보아야 할 것이므로 위 가처분에 의하여서도 시효중단의 효력이 발생하였다고 보아야 할 것이다.

Therefore, the judgment of the court below is erroneous in the misapprehension of the judgment that affected the conclusion of the judgment, as it did not judge at all the plaintiff's assertion of interruption of prescription.

5. Therefore, the judgment of the court below is reversed and the case is remanded to the court below. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Lee Yong-hun (Presiding Justice)