B. Whether administrative property is subject to acquisition by prescription

(c) Whether the administrative property is not used for its original purpose, but for its original purpose, can be deemed as having expressed its intention of disuse;

(d) The case holding that it cannot be deemed that a road has been used for a long time and has been de facto siteed, and it cannot be deemed as an official abolition

(b) Administrative property cannot be subject to judicial transactions unless public use is abolished, so it shall not be subject to prescriptive acquisition.

C. It cannot be deemed that an expression of intent to abolish the public use was made solely on the basis of the fact that the administrative property is not actually used for its original purpose, explicitly or implicitly, but there was a legitimate declaration of intention.

(d) The case holding that even if a building is built on a part of land which is not used as a long-term road and its surrounding site is located therein, if the owner of the adjoining land arbitrarily obstructed and exclusively uses it, it cannot be deemed that the management agency implicitly ceased its use as a road, unless it is based on lawful declaration of intention by the management agency, but because it is due to the fact that the owner of the adjoining land has arbitrarily obstructed and exclusively

1. The lower court rejected the instant land as follows: (a) on January 21, 1993, the ownership transfer registration was completed in the Defendant’s future on a 63 square meters road (number 1-15 omitted); (b) 681 square meters (number 1 omitted) of △△△△△-ri, Ge-gun, Gwangju-gun, which was the land prior to subdivision; (c) on the ground that the cadastral record was destroyed due to the Korean War on March 20, 1953; and (d) on the re-preparation of the land cadastre on March 20, 1953, the lot number was removed; and (d) on the instant land, the land was divided into and land category was changed into a parcel (number 1-1 omitted) and the owner was still in an unrepared state on January 21, 1993; (d) where the instant land has function as an urban planning road, but it was impossible to treat the instant land as a substitute for public performance, and (e) it did not violate the Plaintiffs’s right to acquire the instant land.

2. Therefore, we examine the part of the grounds of appeal purporting that the instant land does not constitute administrative property.

According to Article 2 of the State Property Act (amended by Act No. 122, Apr. 8, 1950) at the time the land category of the instant land is changed to a road, the administrative property refers to the property owned by the State and directly determined to be used or determined to be used for public use (property for public use) or for public use (property for public use). The artificial public property such as a road is an administrative disposition or an administrative disposition where it is actually used as an administrative property (see Supreme Court Decision 69Da418, 419, 420, Jul. 8, 1969). If the factual relations are as recognized by the court below, even if the Defendant is being used as a passage from the large road to the surrounding land, and the land category of the instant land can be deemed to have been actually used as a road, which is a state-owned property, and thus, the part of the instant land constitutes administrative property. Accordingly, the court below's conclusion is justified.

3. Next, we examine the part of the grounds of appeal purporting that the land in this case is no more administrative property since it was abolished for public use.

The administrative property cannot be a subject matter of judicial transaction unless it is closed for the public use. The expression of intention of abolition of the public use is no matter whether it is explicitly or implicitly, but there is a legitimate declaration of intention, and the fact that the administrative property is not actually used for its original purpose cannot be deemed to have been declared as having been disused. The burden of proving that the administrative property is an object of prescriptive acquisition is a person who asserts prescriptive acquisition (see Supreme Court Decision 92Da4973 delivered on July 27, 1993; Supreme Court Decision 93Da5620 delivered on March 22, 1994; Supreme Court Decision 93Da5620 delivered on March 22, 1994; Supreme Court Decision 93Da5620 delivered on the ground that a part of the land of this case was constructed, and it was not a legitimate declaration of intention of the office of administration, and thus, it cannot be viewed that the land of this case was not an exclusive land owner but an exclusive land owner.

4. Therefore, the court below's rejection of the plaintiffs' claim on the ground that the land in this case is not subject to the prescriptive acquisition as administrative property is just, and there is no error of law that affected the conclusion of the judgment by mismisunderstanding the facts contrary to the rules of evidence, such as the theory of lawsuit, or failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations, as it is not reasonable

5. Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Jeong Jong-ho (Presiding Justice)