[2] The method of appraising the property value, which is the basis for the calculation of the amount of division of property

[3] Whether the future retirement pay can be included in the liquidation property (negative)

[4] The case holding that where her husband received insurance money on behalf of her husband who is an insurance beneficiary, the amount received shall not be subject to division of property

[5] Where a debt owed by a married couple to a third party becomes subject to liquidation

[6] The case reversing the judgment of the court below which did not fully examine whether a loan obligation remaining at the time of divorce is subject to liquidation

[2] The value of the property, which is the basis for calculating the amount of division of property, shall not be necessarily recognized by the market price appraisal, but shall be assessed based on objectivity and rationality data.

[3] Unless there are special circumstances such as the date of retirement and the amount of retirement benefits to be received when one of the married couple worked in his/her workplace without retirement, the future retirement benefits can not be included in the property subject to liquidation on the sole basis of the possibility that he/she would receive the future retirement benefits, and the possibility of receiving future retirement benefits can be considered as "other circumstances necessary to determine the amount and method of division of property under Article 839-2 (2) of the Civil Code".

[4] The case holding that where the husband received insurance money from the wife who is a beneficiary of the insurance, the insurance money is the unique property of the wife, and it cannot be deemed that the property has been created by mutual cooperation between the parties, and the husband bears the obligation to pay the same amount to the wife, and that such obligation remains in existence separately from the division of property, the amount received by the husband cannot be considered as the object of division of property

[5] In principle, obligations owed by one spouse to a third party during marriage are not subject to liquidation as an individual's obligation, except for ordinary family affairs, but are subject to liquidation if it is an obligation accompanied by the formation of a common property.

[6] The case reversing the judgment of the court below which did not exhaust all necessary deliberations as to whether a loan obligation remaining at the time of agreement divorce is subject to liquidation

1. As to the existence of agreement between the parties on division of property

The court below rejected the Re-Appellant's assertion that the claim for division of property of this case is unlawful due to the agreement between the parties on division of property and the other party on April 27, 2001, on the ground that the Re-Appellant agreed to divorce between the re-appellant and the other party on April 27, 2001, and the Re-Appellant agreed to pay compensation amounting to KRW 270 million, consolation money amounting to KRW 30 million, driver insurance amounting to KRW 90,000,00,000, etc., and the above agreement was concluded. According to the facts and circumstances of the conclusion, in light of the above agreement, the above agreement was concluded. The above agreement is merely a provision that the Re-Appellant would return the remainder of the compensation and insurance amount paid by the other party to the other party, and the other party would receive consolation money from the post office accident insurance amount that the other party received on behalf of the other party and the other party would be paid to the other party. Thus, the remaining part cannot be seen as included in property division due to divorce.

Examining the relevant evidence in light of the records, the above recognition and judgment of the court below is just, and there is no error of law such as misunderstanding of facts against the rules of evidence or misunderstanding of legal principles as to the parties' consultation in division of property. The grounds for re-appeal cannot be

2. As to the subject and scope of division of property

A. The judgment of the court below

The lower court determined as follows: (a) the re-appellant’s property acquired under his/her name during his/her marital life based on his/her employment evidence has 138,00,000 won prior to August 28, 200; (b) 3,620 square meters prior to the order-based 10,000 square meters prior to the order-based 3,50 square meters (or equivalent to 109,50,000 won at a market price); (c) 610 modern apartment houses prior to the Gangseo-si 610,000 (or 80,000,000 won at a market price) and (d) the Re-Appellant’s retirement allowance to be received when the re-appellant was retired from the post office in which the re-appellant was working; (b) the re-appellant’s retirement allowance to be received by the other party’s co-inheritors’s 13,800,000,000 won and 30,000 other co-party’s co-party property division.

B. Judgment of the Supreme Court

(1) As to whether the previous case was subject to division of property and its value

(A) As to whether division of property is subject to division of property

The property division system provided for in Article 839-2 of the Civil Act mainly aims at the liquidation and distribution of the actual common property acquired during marriage. As long as the property has been created by mutual cooperation between the couple at the time of divorce, the court shall determine the amount and method of division by taking into account all the circumstances of both parties, such as the degree of contribution to the formation of the property at the request of both parties. In this case, even though the special property of one side of the couple is not the object of division in principle, if it is recognized that the other side actively cooperates in the maintenance of the unique property, even if it is not the object of division, and if it is recognized that the other party actively prevented the reduction thereof or has cooperated in the increase thereof, it may be subject to division (see Supreme Court Decisions 97Meu1486, 1493, Feb. 13, 1998; 2001Meu565, Jun. 12, 2001, etc.).

Examining the above legal principles and evidence in light of the records, it is just that the court below recognized the previous case as the subject of division of property, and there is no error of law such as misunderstanding of facts against the rules of evidence or misunderstanding of legal principles as to the subject of division of property. The ground for reappeal in

(B) As to the previous value of the instant case

However, we cannot agree with the court below's finding the value of the previous case as equivalent to 109,50,000 won.

Although the value of the property, which is the basis for the calculation of the amount of division of property, is not necessarily required to be recognized by the market price appraisal, it shall be evaluated based on objectivity and rationality data (see Supreme Court Decisions 95Meu175, 182, Oct. 12, 1995; 96Meu1397, Jun. 11, 199; 9Meu19,1909, 1916, Jan. 28, 200; 99Meu1909, 1916, etc.). No. 5-2, No. 5-2, cannot be a document that can be recognized as the market price of the previous case, and there is only a certificate of officially assessed individual land price submitted by the other party. Accordingly, since the officially assessed land price of the previous case can be known that the land price of the previous case is 7,070 won per square meter as of Jan. 1, 201; 2005Da3775,700, etc.

Ultimately, the court below's computation of the value before the instant case cannot be deemed to be based on objective and reasonable data. Thus, the court below erred by misunderstanding facts concerning the value of the property subject to division of property in violation of the rules of evidence or by misunderstanding the legal principles concerning the calculation of the value, which affected the conclusion of the judgment. Therefore, the ground of reappeal pointing this out has merit.

(2) As to whether the instant retirement allowance is subject to division of property

We cannot agree with the court below's decision that the Re-Appellant's retirement allowance of 138,00,000 won which the Re-Appellant would receive upon retirement in the future is subject to division of property

Unless there are special circumstances such as the retirement day and the retirement allowance to be received when one spouse works in the workplace without yet to retire, the future retirement allowance can not be included in the property subject to liquidation on the sole basis that it is probable that he would receive the future retirement allowance, and the possibility of receiving future retirement allowance is sufficient when considering "other circumstances necessary to determine the amount and method of division of property under Article 839-2(2) of the Civil Act" (see Supreme Court Decisions 94Meu1713, 1720, May 23, 1995; 98Meu213, Jun. 12, 1998, etc.).

Nevertheless, the court below, without any special circumstance such as the retirement day and retirement allowance to be received by the re-appellant, took the retirement allowance to be received in the future as the object of division of property. Thus, the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles as to the object of division of property, thereby affecting the conclusion of the judgment. Therefore, the ground for reappeal pointing this out has merit.

(3) As to whether insurance proceeds are subject to division of property

It is not acceptable for the court below to consider traffic safety insurance money claimed by the other party as the object of division of property.

Even according to the record, it is unclear whether the Re-Appellant received traffic safety insurance money of KRW 13,80,000 between May 200 and June 20, 200, insurance money of KRW 12,300,00 from the Dongyang Life Insurance Co., Ltd. on June 20, 200 on behalf of each other, and each of the above insurance money of KRW 12,30,000 on the record shows that each of the above insurance money is the other's unique property of the other who is the beneficiary. Since there is no evidence to deem that the insurance money is the other party's property acquired through mutual cooperation, the Re-Appellant is liable to pay the other party the same amount. This debt remains separate from the division of property, so even if the Re-Appellant received each of the above insurance money, it cannot be considered as the object of division of property.

Nevertheless, each of the above insurance proceeds is subject to division of property, and the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles on the subject of division of property, thereby adversely affecting the judgment. Therefore, this part of the grounds for re-appeal assigning this error has merit.

3. For obligations to be liquidated:

In principle, the obligation borne by one of the married couple to a third party during marriage is not subject to liquidation as an individual's obligation in addition to ordinary family affairs, but it is subject to liquidation if it is an obligation accompanied by the formation of a common property (see Supreme Court Decisions 95Meu1192, 1208, Dec. 23, 1996; 97Meu1486, 1493, Feb. 13, 1998, etc.).

According to the records, on November 2, 199, the re-appellant obtained loans of KRW 20 million from the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation Gangnam-si Branch as a general household loan from the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation's Gangseo-si branch on November 2, 199, and there was a balance at the time of the divorce. The above loan obligations of the re-appellant are related to daily home affairs or are likely to be a debt borne by the formation of the common property of the

Therefore, the court below should have deliberated on whether or not this part of the debt is the subject of liquidation, but did not have any examination. The court below erred by failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations on the debt subject to liquidation in the division of property, which affected the conclusion of the judgment. The ground for reappeal pointing this out also has merit.

4. Therefore, the order of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below for a new trial and determination. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Park Jae- Jae (Presiding Justice)