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(영문) 대법원 1987. 12. 22. 선고 87다카1458 판결

[보증채무금][집35(3)민,355;공1988.2.15.(818),336]

Main Issues

(a) Effect of the violation of Article 12 of the Mutual Saving and Financing Act;

B. The validity of procedural acts conducted in the first instance trial where a party expressed a litigation relation and testified in the appellate trial;

C. The case that reversed and remanded the part of the judgment of the court below on the delayed payment damages

Summary of Judgment

A. The purport of Article 12 of the Mutual Savings and Finance Company Act, which prohibits a loan exceeding a certain amount for the same person, is to place the loan business, etc. of the mutual savings and finance company, the original profit-making corporation, in principle, to the company's autonomy. However, due to its public nature according to its financial intermediary function, the provision aims to provide more opportunities for credit to a certain person by regulating excessive credit for a specific person. Therefore, this provision is deemed the so-called regulation, and even if the loan was made in excess of the limit, it does not affect the validity under the private law.

B. If a representative of the parties appeared on the date of pleading at the original instance and expressed a litigation relationship and testified on the result of examination of evidence, that party would have invoked all the methods of attack and defense and the result of examination of evidence in the first instance trial proceedings

C. The case where the court of final appeal reversed the part on the late payment damages in the judgment below

[Reference Provisions]

(a) Article 12 of the Mutual Saving and Financing Act; (b) Article 88 of the Civil Procedure Act;

Reference Cases

B. Supreme Court Decision 79Da2148 delivered on July 22, 1980

Plaintiff-Appellee

Jinjin Mutual Savings and Finance Co., Ltd., Counsel for the defendant-appellant

Defendant-Appellant

Defendant Law Firm Il-gu Seoul East Law Office, Attorneys Hong Hong-soo, Counsel for the defendant-appellant-appellee

Judgment of the lower court

Seoul High Court Decision 86Na4292 delivered on May 25, 1987

Text

1. Of the judgment below, the part against the plaintiff of the judgment of the court of first instance is revoked in excess of the amount ordered to be paid below, and the part ordering a payment of money equivalent to the cancelled part is reversed, and the part ordering a payment of money is modified as follows:

The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff 37,038,660 won with 25 percent interest per annum from July 1, 1986 to the date of full payment.

2. The defendant's remaining appeals are dismissed.

3. All costs of the lawsuit shall be borne by the defendant.

Reasons

We examine the grounds of appeal.

With respect to the First Ground:

Article 12 of the Mutual Savings and Finance Company Act prohibits mutual savings and finance companies to pay, lend, or discount bills exceeding the limit prescribed by the Presidential Decree within the extent of 5/100 of the total sum of the capital, reserves, and other surplus to the same person. The purport of this provision is that the loan business, etc. of a mutual savings and finance company, which is the original profit-making corporations, is in principle entrusted to the company's autonomy, but it is intended to give more opportunities to extend loans to a person by regulating excessive credit to a specific person due to the public nature due to his/her financial intermediary function. Therefore, this provision shall be considered as the so-called regulation regulation, and even if the loan was made in excess of the limit, it shall be considered that there is no influence on the validity of private law.

On the other hand, Article 17 of the same Act does not directly relate to the restriction on the borrowing of funds by a mutual savings and finance company to faithfully maintain the capital of the mutual savings and finance company. Thus, even if a loan was made beyond the above limit, it would bring about profits from the management of the capital or funds, and it would bring about a loss to the same person's credit or collateral, and it would prevent the aggravation of the capital structure of the mutual savings and finance company depending on his credit or collateral by regulating convenient credit to the same person. If the above provision is not deemed as effective, but as so-called so-called "effective provision", if the loan is null and void, the person who received the loan can claim the invalidity of the loan on the ground that it exceeded the above limit on the account of its internal circumstances, and even if the mutual savings and finance company did not adjust the limit on the account of its own internal circumstances, it can be argued that the loan was null and void because it exceeded the new limit on the loan itself, and it can be argued that the loan goes beyond the new limit on the grounds of its own self-regulation.

Ultimately, the court below is just in holding that the above provision is valid under the control regulation, and it is not erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as otherwise alleged.

With respect to the second ground:

As seen earlier, the lower court cannot be deemed unlawful on the ground that the instant loan has not taken into account the negligence as alleged by the Plaintiff ex officio with respect to the establishment of the instant claim relationship that ought to be effective under the private law, and in light of the records, the failure to take such consideration cannot be deemed to contravene the principle of good faith and fairness.

The assertion is groundless.

With respect to the third point:

According to the statement of the fourth pleading of the court below, it is possible to find out that an agent of the party was present at the date of pleading, present the litigation relationship, and present the result of the examination of evidence, and if the facts are the same, that party would have invoked all the methods of attack and defense, and the result of examination of evidence (see Supreme Court Decision 79Da2148, Jul. 22, 1980). Thus, even if the party did not state the result of pleading at the date of pleading before that date, the illegality in the first instance court was completely cured.

With respect to the fourth point:

According to the judgment of the court below, the court below held that the plaintiff is a person who has received interest from 12,961,340 won and interest from June 30, 1986 out of the principal of the loan 50,000,000 won and the loan of this case from June 30, 1986. However, in the conclusion of the judgment, the defendant is obligated to pay damages for delay at the rate of 25% per annum from the day after July 1, 1986 to April 15, 1986 to the day of service of the complaint of this case, which is obvious from the day of service of the complaint of this case to the day of full payment, the part corresponding to the above amount of the loan of this case against the plaintiff of the judgment of the court of first instance is revoked and the defendant is ordered to pay the above amount to the defendant.

Even after examining the reasoning of the judgment of the court below with the record, it is not found that the period of calculating damages for delay exceeds 37,038,660 won, which is the balance of the above principal, from July 1, 1986 to April 16 of the same year, and again is to be added from April 16 of the same year to June 30 of the same year, and there is a circumstance that the period of calculating damages for delay from April 16, 1986 to June 30 of the same year should be double calculated. In addition, according to the records, the appeal against the judgment of the court of first instance that dismissed the plaintiff's entire claim, and the appeal against the defendant is with a maximum of 37,038,60 won and the amount with 25,000 won per annum from July 1, 1986 to the full payment date, and there is no error in the law of 16.4% per annum from 16.84% per annum to 1986.16.6% per annum of the above interest rate for the above.

Therefore, the part of the judgment of the court of first instance against the plaintiff is revoked in excess of the amount of twenty-five percent per annum from July 1, 1986 to the date of full payment, and the appeal against the part ordering the payment of the corresponding amount is with merit. Therefore, this part of the judgment of the court of first instance is reversed, and this part of the judgment of the court below is sufficient to be judged on the party members based on the facts established in the judgment below and the record. Thus, in the judgment as to Article 407 subparagraph 1 of the Civil Procedure Act as to the above ground of appeal No. 4, the decision of the court of first instance against the above part of the judgment of the court of first instance is revoked, and the order ordering the payment of the corresponding amount exceeds the scope of the plaintiff's objection, and the defendant ordered the payment of the corresponding amount to the above part of the judgment of the court of first instance with the deduction of this part as well as the part ordering the plaintiff to pay the amount of money from the court of first instance to the date of full payment from July 1, 1986 to the appeal.

Justices Park Jong-hee (Presiding Justice)