Litigation costs shall be borne by the plaintiff.

The following facts may be acknowledged as either in dispute between the parties or in combination with the whole purport of the pleadings in the entry of the evidence No. 1.

A. On November 25, 2009, the Plaintiff, who was in fact in possession of B, a dredging vessel (a total weight of 549.212 tons; hereinafter referred to as “the instant vessel”), was anchored the instant vessel by fixing an anchor at the bottom of the spud on the spud (Spud) near the Musan Musan (Mademban), and by adjusting the anchor range to approximately 100 meters, respectively, at approximately 45 degrees of the stem base. However, on March 4, 2010, the instant vessel, at around 06:0, when the flood of the main body took place, was destroyed by four parts of the Rusg (Lug) connected with the port engine, and was destroyed by more than 6 parts of the vessel’s sinking of the vessel’s engine (hereinafter referred to as “the instant vessel’s sinking of the engine structure”).

B. In relation to the instant accident on July 19, 201, the Korean Maritime Safety Tribunal rendered a ruling to find out the fact that “this sinking accident is caused by flooding of engine rooms by the owner of dredging vessels while at anchor in Dotando, the engine room was flooded, and the body of real force was cut off by the combination of the body and the body of the body of the body and the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the vehicle of the vehicle of the vehicle of the body of the vehicle

2. The plaintiff's assertion

A. The subject matter of the Korean Maritime Safety Tribunal’s ruling is a marine accident caused by a vessel, and the instant vessel, which is a dredging vessel registered as construction machinery under Article 3 of the Construction Machinery Management Act, constitutes construction machinery, and thus, the instant accident is not subject to the Korean Maritime

B. In the instant adjudication, the instant adjudication: (a) even though the representative director C Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “C”) involved in a marine accident was not present, the instant adjudication was rendered without a fine for negligence; and (b) E, the person in charge of the C site office, ordered its subordinate employees FF in violation of the Protection of Communications Secrets Act, instructed the Plaintiff’s employees G and private currency contents, and adopted evidence submitted by recording and recording them.

C. The instant vessel: (a) arbitrarily transferred anchors from C to an area where the depth of the body was lower; and (b) was destroyed due to the imbalance between the body of the body and the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the vessel; (c) as the engine of the instant vessel was sunken due to the sloping, C’s negligence is larger than the Plaintiff’s negligence on the occurrence of the instant accident; or (d) there is no Plaintiff’s negligence on the part of the vessel.

3. Determination

A. Whether the accident of this case is subject to adjudication

Article 3 of the former Act on the Investigation of and Inquiry into Marine Accidents (amended by Act No. 10802, Jun. 15, 201; hereinafter referred to as the "Maritime Inquiry Act") provides that "in order to inquire into a maritime accident, the Minister of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs shall establish a maritime safety tribunal under his/her jurisdiction." Article 2 subparagraph 1 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Act provides that "marine accident means an accident falling under any of the following subparagraphs, which occurs at the sea and inland waters (in the territorial waters)." Article 2 subparagraph 2 of the Marine Inquiry Act provides that "the vessel is unable to navigate, anchor, caps, or navigate or navigate a vessel." Article 2 subparagraph 2 of the former Act provides that "a vessel means a structure that navigates or navigates on the water and is prescribed by Presidential Decree as a structure that can navigate or navigate a vessel", and Article 2 subparagraph 2 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Investigation into and Inquiry into Marine Accidents (including a vessel's ability to navigate a barge under Article 237 of the former Enforcement Decree).

In full view of the provisions of the relevant laws and regulations, the instant vessel, which is a dredged vessel and navigated by being towed or pushed by another vessel due to the lack of self-way navigation capacity, constitutes a barge under the Ship Act, and the instant accident involving the instant vessel sunken by the barge constitutes a marine accident under Article 2 subparag. 1 (d) of the Marine Trial Act. Moreover, Article 26 subparag. 7 of the Ship Act is a maritime accident under Article 3 of the Construction Machinery Management Act on the premise that the instant vessel, which is a barge, falls under a vessel under Article 1-2(1) of the Ship Act, is excluded from the application of some provisions of the Ship Act on the premise that the instant vessel falls under a vessel under Article 3

Therefore, this part of the plaintiff's assertion is without merit.

B. Whether the adjudication procedure of this case is unlawful

Among the persons involved in marine accidents, those other than marine officers and pilots may have their representatives appear in the inquiry court (Article 57 of the Marine Inquiry Act, Article 44(1) of the Enforcement Decree of the Marine Inquiry Act). Thus, in the adjudication procedure of this case, there is no illegality in the proceeding of the procedure on the ground that C’s representative director appeared in the inquiry court without his own attendance.

In addition, wiretapping of telecommunications under Article 2 subparag. 7 of the Protection of Communications Secrets Act means only recording of telecommunications content by a third party without the consent of the sender and receiver who is the party to the telecommunications. Thus, recording of telecommunications content by one of the parties to the telecommunications does not fall under wiretapping (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2010Do9016, Oct. 14, 2010). Considering that Article 51 of the Marine Trial Act adopts the principle of free evaluation of evidence, it cannot be concluded that the recording tape or recording of the recording is inadmissible solely on the ground that the recording of communications with the other party during the other party’s site is in secret (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2009Da37138, 37145, Sept. 10, 2009). Thus, F cannot be said to have violated the procedure of this case by adopting and recording the content of private conversations with G and submitting evidence.

Therefore, the plaintiff's assertion on this part is without merit.

C. Whether the instant recommendation ruling was unlawful

The maritime safety tribunal of various levels, if necessary, may make a ruling to recommend or order correction or improvement to a person related to the cause of a marine accident other than marine officers or pilots (Article 5(3) and Article 2 subparag. 3 of the Marine Trial Act). The matters to be corrected or improved should be related to the cause of a marine accident. However, the Marine Trial Act adopts the principle of free evaluation of evidence; there is no provision on admissibility while choosing a psychological structure similar to criminal procedure; and the relationship between the cause of a marine accident is the very uncertain concept, and there is no choice but to be recognized by the Central Marine Safety Tribunal, which is an administrative agency. In particular, in the case of a ruling on recommending correction or improvement, the relationship between the matters to be recommended for correction or improvement is not necessarily bound by the strict framework of causation, but should be understood as a normative and legal issue that the recommendation for correction or improvement can objectively vest in the person related to a marine accident from the point of view of promoting the prevention and safety of a marine accident similar to the marine accident in question (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2004Da1394.

In full view of the evidence adopted earlier and the statements in Gap evidence Nos. 9, 10, and 15, the whole purport of the pleadings is as follows: the ship of this case was damaged by part of the spud support structure prior to the accident of this case, and damaged by sea water flow through damaged parts, and was sunken under water (hereinafter referred to as "spud accident") on January 29, 2009; the plaintiff repaired the ship of this case after towing the ship of this case on February 14, 2009, and cut down the iron plates with reticulate with retice with retice with retice with retice with retice with retice with retice with retice with retice. The plaintiff could at all be found at all times as a dispute surrounding the termination of the contract for the lease of machinery and equipment, but the plaintiff could have a manager of the ship of this case at issue on January 25, 2009.

Examining the above facts in light of the legal principles as seen earlier, it can be deemed that the Plaintiff, as the de facto owner or possessor of the instant vessel, was responsible for safely managing the instant vessel, failed to perform its safety management responsibilities, such as failing to appoint a full-time manager, etc. even though the Plaintiff was in vulnerable condition to flooding due to the preceding accident, was a cause for the instant accident. Moreover, it is difficult to deem otherwise on January 31, 2010, which was around one month prior to the date of the instant accident, C voluntarily moved anchor to the instant vessel for dredging construction.

Therefore, there is a reasonable ground to view that negligence in managing the Plaintiff’s duty is related to the instant accident from the normative and legal perspective, and from the perspective of promoting the prevention of similar marine accidents and the safety of safety in the future, the correction order can be objectively reverted to the Plaintiff, who is the person involved in the marine accident. Thus, the instant adjudication cannot be deemed unlawful. The Plaintiff’s assertion on this part cannot be accepted.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim is dismissed as it is without merit, and the costs of lawsuit are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

[Attachment-dae]

Justices Ko Young-han

Justices Kim Chang-suk