[2] Whether the head of a tax office shall determine and notify the application for payment in kind before receiving a notice of determination of tax base and inheritance tax amount within seven days from the date of receipt of the application (negative)

[2] Article 20 (2) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Inheritance Tax Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 13801, Dec. 31, 1992) provides that where a payment application is made in kind by the payment deadline after receiving the notice of tax base and amount of tax, the head of a tax office shall notify the decision and amount of tax within seven days from the date of receipt of the application, and it is clear that it does not provide that the decision and amount of tax shall be determined and notified within seven days from the date of receipt of the application.

Meanwhile, Article 26(2) of the Act provides that where the inheritance tax is not paid within the payment deadline or is paid below the amount to be paid pursuant to Article 20-2(2) of the Act, an additional tax for additional payment shall be collected, and Article 20-2(2) of the Act provides that the person who submits the inheritance tax return shall make a voluntary payment of the reported amount within the payment deadline, the amount for which an application for payment in kind is made pursuant to subparagraph 4 of the same Article and Article 29 shall be deducted from the amount to be voluntarily paid, and Article 19-2(1) of the Enforcement Decree of the Act provides that an additional tax shall be collected for the period

In full view of the provisions of the above relevant Acts and subordinate statutes, the head of a tax office shall grant permission for payment in kind if the requirements for permission for payment in kind are met, such as an application for payment in kind, within the time limit for application under Article 20 (1) of the Enforcement Decree, and the term “amount for which an application for payment in kind is made in accordance with Article 29 of the Act” under Article 20-2 (2) 4 of the Enforcement Decree means only the amount which meets the requirements for payment in kind under Article 29 of the Act. Thus, if a taxpayer fails to pay the amount of payment in kind upon the application for payment in kind which does not meet the requirements for payment in kind under Article 29 of the Act, it shall be subject to an additional payment in kind (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 91Nu9374, Apr. 10, 1992; 95Nu1712, Sept. 29, 195).

In the same purport, the lower court is justifiable to have determined that the Defendant’s application for payment in kind with respect to the instant real estate did not meet the lawful requirements for permission of payment in kind, and that it was lawful to impose an additional tax for the period from the date of application for payment in kind to the date of the payment in kind. In so doing, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the erroneous payment in kind of inheritance tax

2. As determined by the court below, after the Defendant received an application for payment in kind from August 1993 to December 1994, the inheritance tax base was determined as KRW 7,498,846,775 increased by 2 billion compared to the initial return amount. As to other real estate which permitted payment in kind, an additional payment for the period from the date of application for payment in kind to the date of decision of refusal of payment in kind was imposed without imposing an additional payment for the period from the date of application for payment in kind to the date of decision of refusal. However, in light of the value of inherited property, the inheritance tax amount that can be claimed for payment in kind is limited to the value of real estate and securities that are inherited property, and thus, it does not contravene the principle of trust and good faith or the equity of tax.

The judgment of the court below to the same purport is just, and there is no error of law by misapprehending the legal principles on the principle of good faith or by failing to exhaust any judgment, contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal. The Supreme Court precedents cited in the grounds of appeal are inappropriate to be invoked in this case, unlike the case and purport. Accordingly

3. Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition.

Justices Lee Don-hee (Presiding Justice)