[자동차관리법위반][미간행]
[1] The principle of interpretation of the administrative law in a case where the administrative law provides for the matters subject to the penal law
[2] In a case where a lessor who is an owner of a motor vehicle fails to comply with the duty of disclosure under Article 34(2) of the former Specialized Credit Financial Business Act to a lessee who uses a motor vehicle for the lease of a motor vehicle, whether the lessee bears the duty of disclosure under Article 37(1) of the former Motor Vehicle Management Act (negative
[3] In a case where Eul, who entered into a facility leasing contract with Gap company as a lessor, received a regular inspection order under the name of the head of the Gu and did not inform Eul, while Eul used a motor vehicle owned by Gap company, and thus failed to carry out the inspection order, the case affirming the judgment below which acquitted Eul company and Byung of all the charges of violating the former Automobile Management Act on the ground that Eul is the lessee Eul
[1] Article 12(1) of the Constitution, Article 1(1) of the Criminal Act / [2] Articles 37(1)3 and 81 subparag. 2 (see current Article 81 subparag. 22) of the former Automobile Management Act (amended by Act No. 8852, Feb. 29, 2008); Article 34(1) and (2) of the former Specialized Credit Financial Business Act (amended by Act No. 9459, Feb. 6, 2009); Article 37(1)3, and Article 81 subparag. 2 (see current Article 81 subparag. 22), and Article 83 of the former Motor Vehicle Management Act; Article 81 subparag. 2 (see current Article 81 subparag. 6, 2008); Article 34(1) and (2) of the former Specialized Credit Finance Business Act (amended by Act No. 9459, Feb. 6, 2009); Article 35(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act
[1] Supreme Court en banc Decision 90Do1516 Decided November 27, 1990 (Gong1991, 285) Supreme Court Decision 2006Do4582 Decided June 29, 2007 (Gong2007Ha, 1225)
Defendant 1 and one other
Prosecutor
Law Firm Jinjin, Attorneys Kim Jong-soo et al.
Seoul Central District Court Decision 2009No4431 Decided April 8, 2010
All appeals are dismissed.
The grounds of appeal are examined.
The interpretation of penal provisions must be strict, and the interpretation of the meaning of the express provision to the disadvantage of the defendant is not permitted because it is against the principle of no punishment without the law. Such interpretation of the law is equally applied to the interpretation of the administrative law in cases where the contents of the administrative law that is subject to the penal provisions are contents (see Supreme Court Decision 2006Do4582, Jun. 29, 2007, etc.).
Article 37(1) of the former Automobile Management Act (amended by Act No. 8852, Feb. 29, 2008; hereinafter the same) provides that "the head of a Si/Gun/Gu may order the owner of an automobile falling under any of the following subparagraphs to conduct inspection, maintenance, inspection, or restoration to the original state." Article 81 Subparag. 3 provides that "any person who fails to comply with an order issued under Article 37 shall be punished." Meanwhile, Article 34(1) of the former Specialized Credit Finance Business Act (amended by Act No. 9459, Feb. 6, 2009; hereinafter the same shall apply) provides that "any person who fails to comply with an order issued under Article 37(1) of the former Motor Vehicle Management Act shall be deemed as the owner of an automobile subject to the duty of disclosure, such as inspection, etc., imposed on the owner of the automobile subject to the order by the lessee and the lessee shall be deemed as the owner of the automobile subject of the order without delay."
According to the reasoning of the judgment below and the record, Defendant 2 Co., Ltd. entered into a facility lease agreement with the Nonindicted Co. 2 on June 5, 2007 on the BMF car owned by Defendant 2 Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “instant automobile”). Accordingly, the Nonindicted Co. 2 was using the instant automobile upon delivery; Defendant 1, who was in charge of the vehicle inspection in Defendant 2 Co., Ltd., received the order of inspection under the name of the head of Busan Jin-gu, stating that the instant automobile would be subject to regular inspection on or around January 16, 2008, did not notify the Nonindicted Co. 2 of the fact that the said order was not implemented within the given period. Examining these facts in light of the legal principles as seen earlier, insofar as the Nonindicted Co. 2 used the instant automobile in accordance with the above facility lease agreement concluded with Defendant 2 Co., Ltd., the lessor as the above lessee, and the Nonindicted Co. 2 cannot be deemed as having been liable to perform the said inspection order, and even if Defendant 2 did not notify it otherwise.
In the same purport, the court below determined that Defendant 1, a person in charge of the vehicle inspection of Defendant 2 Co., Ltd., cannot be punished as a violation of Article 81 subparag. 2 and Article 37(1) of the former Automobile Management Act, and as long as Defendant 1’s violation of the former Automobile Management Act cannot be established, Defendant 2 Co., Ltd.’s violation of the former Automobile Management Act cannot be established. Thus, it is just to have found Defendants not guilty of all the facts charged in this case, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to Article 34 of the former Specialized Credit Financial Business
Meanwhile, as Defendant 2 Company was negligent in giving due attention and supervision to prevent Defendant 1’s violation of the former Automobile Management Act, the prosecutor asserts that Defendant 2 Company should be punished as a violation of the former Automobile Management Act by joint penal provisions. However, as seen earlier, the lower court determined that Defendant 1’s violation of the former Automobile Management Act cannot be punished as a violation of the former Automobile Management Act by joint penal provisions, and that Defendant 2 Company cannot be punished as a violation of the former Automobile Management Act, on the ground that Defendant 2 Company was not negligent in giving due attention and supervision to prevent Defendant 1’s violation. Thus, the Prosecutor’s ground of appeal on this part is without merit.
Therefore, all appeals are dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.
Justices Park Si-hwan (Presiding Justice)