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(영문) 대법원 1978. 4. 11. 선고 77누237 전원합의체 판결

[재산세부과처분취소][집26(1)행,131;공1978.6.15.(586) 10790]

Main Issues

In the procedure of dissatisfaction with a disposition imposing local tax, notice of extension of the period of request for review and rejection thereof.

Summary of Judgment

Article 58(6) of the Local Tax Act provides that the period of review may be extended by notifying the extension of the period of review by notifying the request for review, and Article 58(9) provides that if the request for review is not notified within the prescribed period, the request for review shall be deemed dismissed. In this case, the notification shall take effect as a non-disclosure notification only when the other party knew or could have known, and if 30 days have elapsed prior to the receipt of the notification of extension, the request for review may be deemed dismissed (Majority Opinion).

[Reference Provisions]

Articles 58(6) and 58(9) of the Local Tax Act

Plaintiff-Appellee

Dong Life Insurance Co., Ltd., Counsel for the defendant-appellant

Defendant-Appellant

Attorney Hwang Sung-sung, Counsel for the defendant-appellant of Yeongdeungpo-gu Seoul Metropolitan Government

Judgment of the lower court

Seoul High Court Decision 76Gu610 delivered on August 24, 1977

Text

The judgment below is reversed and the case is remanded to Seoul High Court.

Reasons

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. The court below's decision that the defendant's request for review was made within 197.1.5 of the above 197. The plaintiff's request for review was made within 197.4.13, 1976.4.15, and the plaintiff's request for review was made within 197.4.6 days after 6.6 days after 6.6 days after 6.6 days after 196.6 days after 6.6 days after 6.6 days after 7 days after 196.6 days after 6.6 days after 196.6 days after 7 days after 6.6 days after 196.6 days after 7 days after 196.6 days after 7 days after 6.6 days after 196.6 days after 7 days after 196.6 days after 7 days after 196.6 days after 6 days after 196.4 days after 197.

2. According to Article 58 (5) of the Local Tax Act, when the Minister of Home Affairs receives a request for examination, he shall make a decision within 30 days from the date of receipt of such request: Provided, That 30 days shall begin from the date of receipt of such request by the Minister of Home Affairs under Article 46-2 (2) of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act; however, the period for correction shall not be included in the period for examination, if it is impossible to make a decision within 30 days from the date of receipt of the request for examination, and it shall be extended again by 45 days from the date of receipt of the request for examination; however, Article 58 (6) of the same Act provides that the above 30 days (30+45) period for examination or extension shall be deemed to have been rejected if the other party becomes aware of such determination or has no effect on delivery of the decision before the date of receipt of the request for examination or re-inspection (see Article 58 (12) of the same Act) shall be deemed to have no effect on delivery of the notice or re-issuance of the decision under this Ordinance.

In light of the records and the above provisions, the decision period of 30 days for the plaintiff's request for review (Article 58 (5) of the Act) can be accepted as the decision period of June 23, 1976 (the date of demand), as recognized by the court below, it cannot be found that there was a notice of extension of the decision period under Article 58 (6) of the Act in June 22, 1976, like the decision of the court below. According to the records, it can be viewed that the above certificate was sent to the plaintiff's future with the content that the notice of extension of the decision period for the request for review was about June 22, 1976 under the name of the Minister of Home Affairs (Article 58 (6) of the Local Tax Act) and that it would be difficult to find that there was a notice of extension of the decision period until June 26, 1976.

Therefore, the decision of the court below that the lawsuit of this case was lawful on the premise that the period of the decision of this case was lawfully extended despite the fact that the period of the decision of this case was extended after June 24, 1976, the day following the expiration date of the decision of this case under Paragraph (9) Paragraph (12) of the above Article, and the decision of the court below that the lawsuit of this case was lawful is erroneous because it did not properly examine evidence No. 9-12 of this case or misunderstanding the legal principles as to the notice of extension. This decision of minority opinion of this case affected the conclusion of the decision as to whether the decision of this case complies with the period of the decision of this case. If the minority opinion of this case was delivered after the extension of the period of the decision of this case, the minority opinion of this case is interpreted to have an effect of extending the period even after the arrival of the notification after the decision period, and it is interpreted to have reached the extended period within the period of the decision period or the extended period of the decision of this case.

Therefore, the decision of the court below is reversed and remanded. This decision is delivered with the assent of all participating judges, except there is a opinion of the Supreme Court judge's Do-dong Kim Do-dong-dong-dong Kim Jong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong-dong

The dissenting opinions of the judges of the Supreme Court are as follows: the presiding judge of the Supreme Court, the civil flag, the fluorial flag, the fluorial leap, the Kim Jong-ju

The majority opinion is 6.23 days following the review period of 30 days, which is 6.22, which is 6.25 days, so it is clear that the decision of extension has not been notified within 30 days from the time limit of 30 days, and the request for review is deemed to be dismissed pursuant to paragraph 9, so it is interpreted to the purport that the extension cannot be extended in the case where the decision of extension is closed to the time limit of dismissal, and even it is unreasonable.

However, the provision of Paragraph 9 is the case that prevents the prompt progress of the relief procedure due to the excessive delay in the preceding trial procedure. It is clear that the first play, which is premised on the existence of notification of extension of the period of ice 30 days and it is clear that it does not contain the five-day period, and it is clearly known that it has been formally deducted from the opinion of Paragraph 12 of Article 58, because the majority opinion seems to fall under "when there is no notification within the period stipulated in Paragraph 6 of Article 9, this period is not more than 30 days, but rather than 30 days, and if it is read well, it is 9 days more than 9 days more than 30 days more than 9 days more than 9 days more than 9 days more than 9 days more than 9 days more than 9 days more than 9 days more than 9 days more than 9 days more than 9 days more than 9 days more than 9 days later.

Next, the above 30 days (the same shall apply to the case of extension) set as the review period under Article 58 refers to the restrictions on the government offices concerned, but at the same time, the government offices concerned may fully utilize the period, and no person may reduce or shorten the period. The period of notification may not be reduced. However, the majority opinion states that the period of 30 days is more than that of the office, as it is not given the authority to regard it as the service period of notification and the notice is less than that of the office, and that it may not be abandoned if it takes 31 days long, the notification itself cannot be given without giving up it. In addition, if the parties are more than 30 days, the notice of extension is issued within 30 days from the first 30 days after the date following the date of the review, which is 30 days later, the former shall be regarded as valid and the latter shall be deemed as invalid at the same time, and the latter shall not be deemed as more than 30 days after the expiration of the new decision, which shall be deemed as more than 30 days after the expiration of the notice.

In summary, the majority opinion interpreted that there is no possibility of expectation for a person subject to the law and interpretation of the purport of the pre-determination procedure, and it is not a criticism that a person subject to the law will be due to the fact that he is due to the fact that he is not able to be able to give a person due to the fact that he is unable to be able to be able to be able to be able to be able to be able to be able to be able to be able to be able to be able to be able to be able to be able to be able to be able to be able

Justices Kim Jong-young (Presiding Justice) No one shall sign an overseas trip with the judge of the Supreme Court of Korea, who is the President of the Republic of Korea, who is the President of the Republic of Korea, the President of the Republic of Korea, the President of the Republic of Korea, the President of the Republic of Korea, the President of the Republic of Korea, the President of the Republic of Korea, the President of the Republic of Korea, the President of the Republic of Korea, the President of the Republic of

심급 사건
-서울고등법원 1977.8.24.선고 76구610
본문참조조문
기타문서