B. The case holding that since the plaintiff's claim was jointly inherited by the plaintiff, the plaintiff and the non-party, etc., and the defendant completed the registration of preservation of ownership in his/her sole name, the part in excess of his/her inheritance shares should be deemed null and void, and thus, the plaintiff's claim for recovery of inheritance pursuant to the legal principles of "A

C. Whether the right to recover inheritance is extinguished due to the lapse of the exclusion period of 10 years even in cases where there is an infringement of the right to inheritance after 10 years elapsed from the commencement date of inheritance (affirmative)

B. The case holding that since the plaintiff's claim was jointly inherited by the original owner, the defendant, and the non-party, etc. who are the original owner's property successors, the defendant's registration of preservation of ownership was completed in his/her sole name, the part exceeding his/her inheritance shares in excess of his/her inheritance shares constitutes a lawsuit for recovery of inheritance in accordance with the legal principles of "A", since

C. As long as a lawsuit is filed for the recovery of inheritance, the limitation period under Article 982(2) of the Civil Act, which is applicable mutatis mutandis by Article 999 of the same Act, shall be applied. Even if there is an infringement on the inheritance right ten years after the date the inheritance commences, the right to the recovery of inheritance shall be deemed extinguished due to the lapse of the limitation period of ten years.

(Dissenting Opinion 1)

The real owner of real estate claims the cancellation of the registration of invalidity of cause is based on the ownership itself, and is able to exercise the right at all times as long as there is ownership. The reason for acquiring ownership is inheritance, and the other party is the person who registered with the title of inheritor, and there is no reason to place restrictions on the exercise of the right. Thus, the real successor's claim for cancellation of the registration of invalidation of cause of inheritance against the real estate is an exercise of the ownership itself acquired on the ground of inheritance, and it is not particularly treated as a claim for restoration of the right to inheritance, and the claim for recovery of inheritance under Article 999 of the Civil Act shall be regarded as a right independent of the individual claim, and it is reasonable to interpret that the claim under Paragraph (b) above does not constitute the lawsuit for recovery of inheritance.

(Opinion attached to Dissenting Opinion)

If such a lawsuit is interpreted as a lawsuit for recovery of inheritance, it is reasonable to interpret that the exclusion period should be calculated from the date of commencement of inheritance by reference, and in other words, from the time of infringement of inheritance rights.

(Dissenting Opinion 2)

The term "title heir" as the other party to a claim for recovery of inheritance shall be deemed to mean only a person who has the appearance sufficient to believe that a person has a legitimate inheritance right at the time of commencement of inheritance even though the inheritance is not a legitimate inheritance right holder at the time of commencement of inheritance. Thus, as long as the defendant did not have the appearance sufficient to believe that a person is a legitimate inheritance right holder at the time of commencement of inheritance, the person who pretends to be the legitimate inheritance right holder, or the co-inheritors who denies the inheritance rights of other co-inheritors, and only he/she did not deny the inheritance rights of other co-inheritors, and the co-inheritors who actually occupies and manages the inherited property exclusively without denying the inheritance rights of other co-inheritors, it shall not be deemed to be the "title heir" who is the other party to the claim for recovery of inheritance, and unless the defendant does not have the same appearance as the inheritor at the time of commencement of inheritance, only one person who was entered in the family register at the time of commencement of inheritance cannot be deemed to constitute a claim for recovery of inheritance in relation to the inheritance of other co-inheritors.

(Dissenting Opinion 3)

In the case of the claim under paragraph (b) above, the Civil Act provisions on the claim for recovery of inheritance should not be applied to disputes surrounding the infringement of share among co-inheritors, such as the case of the claim.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiffs.

On the first ground for appeal

1. A lawsuit for recovery of inheritance under the Civil Act (amended by Act No. 4199, Jan. 13, 1990; hereinafter the same applies) refers to a lawsuit claiming recovery when the right of inheritance of Australia or the right of inheritance of property is infringed upon by the title holder or the right of inheritance of property. However, in a case where a real heir claims the ownership of property, such as the ownership or the right of inheritance, on the premise that he/she is the real heir with respect to the inheritance, and a claim for cancellation of the registration of the ownership or the right of inheritance of the inherited property is made against some co-inheritors who only have succeeded to the inheritance, as long as the claim that the ownership or the right of inheritance belongs to the inherited property is the cause of inheritance, it is reasonable to interpret it as a lawsuit for recovery of inheritance under Article 99 of the Civil Act, regardless of the cause of the claim (see Supreme Court Decision 79Da854, Jan. 27, 1981).

2. According to the facts established by the court below, on March 3, 1964, the deceased non-party 1, who is the original owner of the land of this case (643 1/1048m2 in Ulsan-gu, Ulsan-gu). He reported his wife on April 4, 1975 to the deceased non-party 2, the deceased non-party 3, the male-nam-do, the defendant 3, the third male-do, the plaintiffs 4, the deceased non-party 5, and the deceased non-party 6, the deceased non-party 3. The deceased non-party 3, the deceased non-party 3, the deceased non-party 3, the deceased, and the deceased non-party 3, the deceased non-party 3, the deceased non-party 3, the deceased non-party 3, and the deceased non-party 3, the deceased non-party 3, the deceased non-party 1, the deceased non-party 1, and completed the registration of this case under the name of the defendant 197.

3. The plaintiff's claim of this case is jointly inherited by the plaintiff, the defendant, and the deceased non-party 2, non-party 4, and 5, but the defendant completed the preservation registration under his own name, and thus the defendant asserts that the part exceeding the defendant's share in inheritance is null and void and claims for cancellation of the claim. Accordingly, since the plaintiff asserted that the share in the land of this case belongs to the plaintiffs on the ground of inheritance and only he claims cancellation of a part of the registration on the inherited property against the defendant who succeeded to the property, it shall be deemed as a lawsuit for the recovery of inheritance under Article 999 of the Civil Code, since the plaintiff asserted that the ownership in the land of this case belongs to the plaintiffs on the ground of inheritance, and it is not appropriate in this case.

Therefore, the judgment of the court below to the same purport is just, and there is no error of law by misunderstanding the legal principles as to the lawsuit for recovery of inheritance, and there is no ground for argument.

On the second ground for appeal

As long as the plaintiffs' lawsuit in this case is a lawsuit claiming the recovery of inheritance, the limitation period under Article 982(2) of the Civil Act, which is applicable mutatis mutandis by Article 999 of the Civil Act, shall be applied. Even in cases where there is an infringement of inheritance rights ten years after the commencement date of inheritance, the right to claim the recovery of inheritance due to the lapse of the limitation period of ten years shall be deemed to have expired (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 79Da854, Jan. 27, 1981; 87Meu2311, Jan. 17, 1989).

Therefore, the court below's determination that the lawsuit of this case was unlawful since it was filed on February 14, 1989 after the expiration of 10 years from March 3, 1964, which was the exclusion period, as the death date of deceased non-party 1, the deceased deceased, the deceased deceased, the deceased deceased, the deceased deceased, and the inheritance commencement date. The argument that the above provision of the Civil Act cannot be applied to the case of this case where the inheritance right was infringed upon by the deceased heir after the expiration of 10 years from the inheritance commencement date is not accepted. The court below's determination that the plaintiff's lawsuit of this case was filed after the expiration of the exclusion period, and that it is unlawful

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiffs. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices, except there is a dissenting opinion by Justice Lee Chang-chul, Justice Park Jae-dong, Justice Lee Jae-dong, Justice Song Jae-chul, and Justice Kim Yong-sik.

The dissenting opinion of the Supreme Court of Justice Lee Jae-chul, Justice Lee Jae-sung, and Justice Cho Man-chul is as follows.

1. Where an owner of a real estate or a right holder of a real estate claims the cancellation of a registration of invalidation of cause, the acquisition of ownership or right of share is the cause of inheritance, and where the registration of invalidation of cause refers to the successor who refers to the inheritance, or only one person has succeeded to the inheritance, or has succeeded to the inheritance exceeding his/her own share, regardless of the cause of the claim, the claim is a lawsuit for recovery of inheritance under Article 999 of the Civil Act (the Civil Act prior to the amendment as seen above refers to the Civil Act before the amendment; hereinafter the same shall apply). In such a case, the right of recovery shall expire ten years after the date of infringement of the right of inheritance, regardless of the cause of the claim.

A real estate owner’s claim for cancellation of a registration of invalidation of a real estate is based on the ownership itself, and is able to exercise the right at all times as long as there is ownership. The reason for acquiring ownership is inheritance, and the other party is the person who registered by attending the heir, and there is no reason to place a lawsuit for recovery of inheritance and to restrict the exercise of the right. In other words, claiming cancellation of a registration of invalidation of a cause of inheritance of a real estate against a real estate by inheritance is an exercise of the ownership itself acquired by the reason of inheritance, and it is not particularly treated as a claim for recovery of the right to inheritance, and the right to claim for recovery of inheritance under Article 999 of the Civil Act should be regarded as an independent right independent of the individual claim.

However, the Civil Act only provides for the limitation period of a lawsuit for recovery of inheritance, but does not provide for its nature, requirements, effects, etc., it may be doubtful whether there is a need or practical benefit to recognize a separate claim for recovery under other inheritance laws different from individual claims regarding inherited property. From this perspective, a lawsuit for recovery of inheritance is limited to a group of individual real right claims premised on the existence of inheritance rights. From this point of view, there is no room to understand that the Civil Act provides for the limitation period especially for the safety of transaction. However, if it is viewed so, the ownership of the heir is not extinguished, but the heir's right to claim the return of property is not extinguished, and in general, the heir's right to claim the return of property by the heir is extinguished, and it is also questionable whether it is necessary to protect such title heir under the sacrifice of the genuine right holder. In particular, under the provisions of the Civil Act, where the exercise of the right to claim recovery of inheritance takes place within the exclusion period of ten years from the commencement date of inheritance, the heir cannot have an opportunity to claim the recovery of inheritance, and the heir's immediately lose ownership.

Therefore, as in this case, it is reasonable to interpret that the plaintiffs' claim for cancellation on the ground that the registration of preservation of the defendant's name is null and void is due to inheritance, and even if the defendant registered preservation by reference to sole inheritance, it does not constitute a lawsuit for recovery of inheritance under Article 999 of the Civil Code.

2. If such a lawsuit is interpreted as a lawsuit for recovery of inheritance, as stated in the Majority Opinion, it is reasonable to interpret that the exclusion period is calculated from the date of commencement of inheritance by reference, and if so, from the time of infringement of inheritance rights.

Article 982(2) of the Civil Act, which provides for the limitation period of a lawsuit for recovery of inheritance, provides that “When 10 years have elapsed after the date of commencement of inheritance, 10 years have elapsed since the date of commencement of inheritance, this part is removed separately, it seems to be contrary to the explicit provisions to interpret that the initial date of the limitation period was when the right to inheritance was infringed, not the date of commencement of inheritance. Therefore, even where the right to inheritance was infringed after the lapse of 10 years from the date of commencement of inheritance, the majority opinion considers that the right to claim recovery of inheritance has already been extinguished due to the lapse of the limitation period of 10 years even if the right to inheritance was infringed after the lapse of 10 years from the date of commencement of inheritance. However, as long as the right to claim recovery of inheritance is deemed as a group of individual right to claim the inheritance

The initial exclusion period is premised on the exercise of rights, should be calculated from the time when the rights can be exercised, and it is contradictory to the fact that the exercise period of the rights to recover expires from the time when the rights are not infringed.

To do so, Article 982 of the Civil Code, which applies mutatis mutandis by Article 999 of the Civil Code, stipulates that a lawsuit for recovery of inheritance may be filed when the right of inheritance is infringed, and Paragraph 2 of the same Article stipulates the duration of the right to claim recovery of inheritance which may be exercised when the right of inheritance is infringed. Thus, the phrase "the date of commencement of inheritance" under Paragraph 2 of the same Article refers to "the date of commencement of inheritance if the inheritance, which is the object of recovery of inheritance, is returned again, the date of commencement of inheritance" under Paragraph 1 of the same Article is not contrary to the logic, but it does not necessarily mean that such interpretation is in violation of the code of law.

3. The interpretation of the law must be reasonable, and one of the words constituting the text of the law must be removed, not to understand its meaning, and the application of that law must not cause contradictions in the application of that law. In addition, it is not acceptable for the law to hold out a way to remedy it when the right is infringed and it is of the significance of that existence, but to avoid having the opportunity to claim its recovery from the beginning.

If the Majority maintains the interpretation like the Majority, the property for which inheritance registration has not been made for ten years from the date of commencement of the inheritance shall belong to his/her owner if it is registered in any way or by means of inheritance, and the true heir shall not have the opportunity to claim remedy for infringement of rights, and the interpretation of the law that leads to such result shall not be justified.

Therefore, I think that the precedents cited by the majority opinion should be changed.

Justices Kim Yong-han's dissenting opinion is as follows.

1. We agree with the majority opinion in regard to the fact that in the case of claiming the return of the inherited property against the person holding the title to the property of the inheritee (including shares) by inheritance, the person holding the title to the property of the inheritee has succeeded to the ownership of the property of the inheritee, and that in the case of claiming the return of the inherited property against the person holding the title to the inheritance, the claim for the recovery of inheritance under Article 99

2. However, “the person who becomes the other party to a claim for recovery of inheritance” shall be deemed to mean only a person who has any external appearance that makes it possible to believe as a genuine inheritance holder even if the inheritance is not a legitimate inheritance holder at the time the inheritance commences, and, for example, a person who already becomes an heir in the family register, etc. at the time the inheritance commences, but has already been stated as the heir in the family register, etc. at the time the inheritance commences, but only a person who has no such status, given up the inheritance, or becomes an heir due to the cause of disqualification, etc. Therefore, at the time the inheritance commences, a person who pretends to be a legitimate inheritance holder (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 86Meu2952, Jul. 21, 1987) by denying the inheritance rights of the co-inheritors or other co-inheritors and by denying only one person’s inheritance rights, or a person who actually takes possession of inherited property and manages it exclusively without denying the inheritance rights of other co-inheritors’s inheritance rights.

I agree with the majority opinion, and agree with the majority opinion, and the narrow interpretation of the scope of a person entitled to an inheritance is as follows.

First, after the inheritance has already commenced, a person who occupies the inherited property by pretending as being an inheritor is not an infringement on the true inheritor's right of inheritance, but an infringement on the ownership of the real inheritor's right of inheritance on the inherited property.

Second, Article 99(2) of the Civil Act provides for a short exclusion period if the true heir claims the exclusion of the infringement on inherited property based on the ownership of the inherited property in the above case is viewed as the exercise of the right to the claim for recovery of inheritance. If an infringement on inherited property has been committed ten years after the commencement of inheritance, if the real heir claims the exercise of the right to the inherited property as the claim for recovery of inheritance and the limitation period has already expired, it would be unreasonable that the result would be too unfair. Of course, in this case, it may be argued that the true heir has been deprived of his/her right for a long time, but it is not possible to allow the fact that the true heir has been deprived of his/her right to the inheritance (the illegal person) to whom the right to the inheritance was infringed.

Third, the purport of the Civil Act stipulating the limitation period of a claim for recovery of inheritance is to establish a legal relationship on inheritance as soon as possible and to protect a third party who believed and traded the same appearance as that of a person who has a real right to inheritance, and it cannot be said that the purpose of the Civil Act is to protect all third parties who have acquired inherited property.

However, if the scope of a person entitled to inheritance is narrow so that the subject of a claim for recovery of inheritance to which the exclusion period applies is narrow and interpreted as above, it may often arise when a third party who acquired inherited property from a person who is not a person entitled to real inheritance is unable to be protected, but it is inevitable to protect a person who has real ownership.

Fourth, in a case where a part of the co-inheritors excludes other co-inheritors from the inheritance, and occupies and manages the inherited property, such other co-inheritors already have the status of inheritor. Thus, the content of their right to inheritance may be realized by participating in the management of the inherited property (Article 265 of the Civil Act) or by the method of a claim for division of the inherited property (Article 1013 of the Civil Act), etc. Even if the inherited property has already been divided or disposed of, the division of the inherited property may be again claimed that the division of the inherited property is null and void, or a claim for payment of equivalent value to the inherited property may be made to the inherited property (i.e., a person who becomes a co-inheritors by recognition after the commencement of inheritance or by the final and conclusive judgment thereof or by the final and conclusive judgment on nullity of divorce). However, this is nothing more than a realization of the content of the ownership of the inherited share by the co-inheritors upon the demand of

3. Thus, even if the defendant, one of co-inheritors, claiming that the plaintiff's claim of this case was jointly inherited the ownership of the land of this case and claiming the implementation of the procedure for registration of cancellation as to the part exceeding the defendant's share of inheritance among the registration of preservation of ownership completed in his sole name as to the land of this case, insofar as only the defendant was stated on the family registry at the time of commencement of inheritance ( March 3, 1964) as if only the defendant had the same appearance as the heir, the defendant cannot be deemed to be the person entitled to the title of inheritance in relation to the share of inheritance of other co-inheritors, unless the defendant had the same appearance as the person entitled to the real inheritance. Thus,

Nevertheless, the court below held that the lawsuit of this case constitutes a lawsuit for recovery of inheritance under Article 999 of the Civil Act, and held that the lawsuit of this case was unlawful on the ground that the lawsuit of this case was filed after the expiration of the exclusion period under Article 982 (2) of the Civil Act which is applied mutatis mutandis by Article 999 of the Civil Act before the amendment by Act No. 4199 of Jan. 13, 190. Thus, the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles as to the claim for recovery of inheritance, which affected the conclusion of the judgment. Thus, the court below's decision

In the previous en banc Decision 79Da854 delivered on January 27, 1981, the other opinions should be changed.

The dissenting opinion of Justice Park Jong-young is as follows.

In the case of this case, there is no application of the provisions of the Civil Act on the claim for recovery of inheritance in respect of the dispute over the infringement of mutual rights between co-inheritors, such as this case.

The reasons for this are as follows, and support is given to the Dissenting Opinion by Justice Kim Yong-sik in the following supplement.

All co-inheritors who have a true heir’s position should be guaranteed the right to receive an inherited property distribution according to the inherited property at any time. For such realization of rights, the law is preparing the method of division of inherited property (Article 1013 of the Civil Act). The purpose of division of inherited property is to ensure the equitable and smooth distribution of inherited property, rather than to realize a request for prompt determination of the subject of ownership of inherited property as soon as possible, rather than to realize a request. To achieve this objective, the status of sharing inherited property should be maintained. If another co-inheritors’s right to share is infringed by a person of co-inheritors, other co-inheritors may remove such violation at any time by exercising their right to exclude the infringement of co-inheritors’s right to share, and recover their relationship originally as soon as possible. Moreover, the application of the provisions of the Civil Act on the right to claim for recovery of inheritance by other co-inheritors to the co-inheritors, and to recognize the status of the inherited property as being jointly owned by one year or more from the date of commencement of such infringement and to resolve it contrary to the purport of the joint ownership system.

Article 999 of the former Civil Code provides that Article 982 of the Civil Code concerning the legal action for the recovery of family head's inheritance shall apply mutatis mutandis to the infringement of the right to inheritance of property. However, Article 99 of the Civil Code amended by Act No. 4199 of Jan. 1, 1990 only moved Article 982 of the former Civil Code, but there is no change in the content.

In this regard, the previous discussion on the abolition of the short-term exclusion period is open from the legislative point of view, and the solution by legislation is not possible.In the meantime, the Supreme Court precedents, including the Supreme Court en banc Decision, including the integrated en banc Decision, have understood the reasons why it is inevitable to pay defects for the purpose of interpreting the revised interpretation in the past.

Chief Justice Lee Yong-ju (Presiding Justice) (Presiding Justice Lee Jae-ho, Justice Lee Jae-ho, Justice Lee Jae-ho, Justice Lee Jae-ho, Justice Lee Jae-ho, Justice Lee Jae-ho, Justice Lee Jae-ho, Justice Lee Jae-ho, Justice Lee Jae-ho