beta
(영문) 대법원 2003. 1. 24. 선고 2002두9179 판결

[해임변경처분취소][공2003.3.15.(174),734]

Main Issues

[1] The meaning of "labor movement" under Article 58 (1) 4 of the Private School Act

[2] The case holding that the act of a professor of a private university holding or supervising various assemblies or distributing printed articles in support of a labor union's strike opposing the sale of the treatment motor vehicle overseas does not constitute a "labor movement" as a ground for dismissal under Article 58 (1) 4 of the Private School Act

[3] Criteria to determine whether disciplinary action against a private school teacher goes beyond the limits of discretion

[4] The case holding that a disciplinary dismissal disposition against a professor of a private university is an abuse of discretion

Summary of Judgment

[1] In light of the purport of Article 33(2) of the Constitution, the concept of a labor movement under Article 58(1)4 of the Private School Act is reasonable to interpret it narrowly to mean an act directly related to it based on the so-called three labor rights, such as the right to organize, the right to collective bargaining, and the right to collective action to improve the working conditions of workers.

[2] The case holding that the act of a professor of a private university distributing printed articles does not constitute "labor movement" as a ground for dismissal under Article 58 (1) 4 of the Private School Act on the ground that the act of distributing printed articles cannot be deemed as an act related to the right to work as a teacher since he made a speech to support an industrial action by a labor union that is against the sale of the medical automobile overseas

[3] When a disciplinary measure is taken against a disciplinary person who is a teacher under the Private School Act, the disciplinary measure shall be taken at the discretion of the person having the authority to take the disciplinary measure. However, if the person having the authority to take the disciplinary measure as an exercise of the authority has considerably lost validity under the social norms, it may be deemed unlawful only when it is recognized that the person having the authority to take the disciplinary measure has abused the authority to take the disciplinary measure. If a disciplinary measure against a teacher has considerably lost validity under the social norms, it may be deemed that the contents of the disciplinary measure can be objectively and objectively unreasonable in light of various factors such as the content and nature of the alleged misconduct, the purpose of the disciplinary measure, and the criteria for the determination of disciplinary measures. Even if the exercise of the authority to take the authority to take the disciplinary measures is left at the discretion of the person having the authority to take the disciplinary measures, it is against the public interest principle that should exercise the authority to take the disciplinary measure for public interest, or the person having the authority to take the disciplinary action generally takes a disciplinary measure contrary to the degree of flight, thereby violating the principle of proportionality or the principle of equality.

[4] The case holding that disciplinary action against a professor of a private university was abused or abused within the scope of discretion, taking into account various circumstances, including the fact that the disciplinary action against a professor is not recognized as grounds for disciplinary action, and the remaining grounds for disciplinary action is due to good faith, minor mistake, or negligence for public interest, and that no damage was caused thereby, and contributed to the school and the community as a professor

[Reference Provisions]

[1] Article 58 (1) 4 of the Private School Act, Article 33 (2) of the Constitution / [2] Articles 58 (1) 4 and 61 (1) 1 and 3 of the Private School Act, Article 33 (2) of the Constitution / [3] Article 61 (1) of the Private School Act, Article 27 of the Administrative Litigation Act / [4] Article 61 (1) 1 and 3 of the Private School Act, Article 27 of the Administrative Litigation Act

Reference Cases

[1] Supreme Court Decision 90Do2310 decided Feb. 14, 1992 (Gong1992, 1078) / [3] Supreme Court Decision 91Nu11308 decided Jun. 26, 1992 (Gong1992, 2298), Supreme Court Decision 95Nu18727 decided Apr. 26, 1996 (Gong196Sang, 1748), Supreme Court Decision 99Du2611 decided Aug. 20, 199 (Gong199Ha, 1903), Supreme Court Decision 98Du1613 decided Jun. 9, 200 (Gong200Ha, 16666), Supreme Court Decision 9Du283838 decided Oct. 38, 200 (Gong200, 1666)

Plaintiff, Appellee

Plaintiff (Law Firm Gyeong, Attorneys Kang Jong-soo et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Defendant

Ministry of Education and Human Resources Development shall review the Teachers Disciplinary Review Committee

Defendant Intervenor, Appellant

The Intervenor joining the Defendant (Law Firm Haeng, Attorneys Noh Jeong-soo et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Judgment of the lower court

Seoul High Court Decision 2002Nu327 delivered on August 22, 2002

Text

The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant joining the defendant.

Reasons

1. In light of the purport of Article 33(2) of the Constitution, the concept of labor movement under Article 58(1)4 of the Private School Act, which is the basis thereof, should be interpreted narrowly to mean an act directly related to the above, based on the so-called three labor rights, such as the right to organize, the right to collective bargaining, and the right to collective action to improve the working conditions of workers (see Supreme Court Decision 90Do2310, Feb. 14, 1992).

In this regard, the judgment of the court below that the act of the plaintiff holding and supervising various assemblies as stated in its holding and distributing printed matter while making a speech to support the industrial action of the labor union of the above company that was under way against the overseas sale of the Daewoo Motor Co., Ltd., cannot be deemed as an act related to the right to work as a teacher, and that the act constitutes grounds for disciplinary action under Article 61 (1) 1 and 3 of the Private School Act as a professor's act of division and injury to dignity as a professor, aside from the fact that such act constitutes grounds for disciplinary action under Article 61 (1) 4 of the Private School Act, the judgment of the court below that the act does not constitute "labor movement" as a ground for dismissal under Article 58 (1) 4 of the Private School Act, is just, and there is no error of law by misunderstanding the legal principles as to "labor movement" under

2. According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court below, the court below cited the judgment of the court of first instance and sent a letter expressing the meaning of attention in the future of the president of the university affiliated with the Defendant joining the Defendant, cannot be deemed to fall under the grounds for disciplinary action immediately, and even in such a case, the piracy itself cannot serve as an independent grounds for disciplinary action, and thereby, must meet the grounds for disciplinary action prescribed in the relevant Acts and subordinate statutes. The Plaintiff did not act as above in the position of professor of the above university or the professor's Council, but did not act as above in the name of the above university as a joint representative of the outside committee or citizens' solidarity. Thus, the Plaintiff's activities do not appear to have objectively expressed the position of the above university. In addition, it is difficult to view that the Plaintiff's activities do not go against society or have a non-ethic and moral character, and thus, it cannot be deemed that the Plaintiff violated the duty of good faith and good faith of the above university, and thus, it cannot be viewed that the Plaintiff violated the above company's employment or industrial cooperation.

3. Whether to take a disciplinary measure against a disciplinary person who is a teacher under the Private School Act is at the discretion of the person having authority to take the disciplinary measure. However, if the person having authority to take a disciplinary measure as an exercise of authority is recognized to abuse the discretionary power, it may be illegal. If the disciplinary measure against a teacher has considerably lost validity under the social norms, it should be determined that the contents of the disciplinary measure can be objectively and objectively unreasonable, in full view of various factors, such as the content and nature of the misconduct causing the disciplinary measure, the purpose of the disciplinary measure, and the criteria for the determination of disciplinary measures. Even if the exercise of authority to take a disciplinary measure is left at the discretion of the person having authority to take a disciplinary measure, it violates the public interest principle that should exercise the authority to take disciplinary measures for public interest, or is generally considered as a disciplinary reason, compared to the degree of flight, and thus violates the principle of proportionality, or violates the standards of general application of the same degree without any justifiable reason, and thus, the disciplinary measure against a teacher has violated the principle of equality and discretion (see Supreme Court Decision 960Do60.

According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court below, the court below accepted the judgment of the court of first instance that it cannot be recognized as the grounds for disciplinary action against labor movement and harmful acts among the grounds for disciplinary action, and the remaining grounds for disciplinary action are conducted in the name of various committees or professors' councils, not individuals, and thus, it seems that the plaintiff's act was conducted in good faith for the public interest rather than for the personal interest, or that the plaintiff's act was more inappropriate than for the contents of the plaintiff's act. In addition, it was one of the causes that the intervenor or the president of the above university responded to the suspicion raised by the professor's Council. In addition, the part of the judgment was due to the plaintiff's intentional act, not for the plaintiff's intentional act, but for minor mistake and negligence, and the damage therefrom was not different. Considering the various circumstances revealed in the arguments such as the plaintiff's contribution to the school and community through research and education, the court below determined that the disposition of this case was an abuse of discretion or its discretionary power is too excessive, compared with the disciplinary action of this case.

In light of the above legal principles and records, we affirm the above judgment of the court below as just, and there is no error of law as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal.

4. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and all costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Song Jin-hun (Presiding Justice)

심급 사건
-서울고등법원 2002.8.22.선고 2002누327