[2] Whether the crime of interference with business is established in a case where a large number of workers refused to provide labor by collective action, not a legitimate industrial action, thereby impairing the normal operation of their business (negative)

[3] The meaning of "safety protection facilities" under Article 42 (2) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act and the method of determining whether such facilities are applicable

[4] In a case where there was an act of suspending, discontinuing, or obstructing the maintenance and operation of safety protection facilities at a workplace, but there was no danger to human life or body at all, whether a violation of Article 91 subparag. 1 and Article 42(2) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act is established (negative)

[2] If a large number of workers refuse to provide labor, such as collectively leaving or absent from a workplace under mutual communication, thereby causing damage to the normal operation of their business, such as the production and sale, etc., the act constitutes the crime of interference with business, unless it is a legitimate industrial action under the labor-related Acts and subordinate statutes, and the illegality of such act is excluded, and it constitutes a crime of interference with business by multiple force.

[3] The term "safety protection facility" under Article 42 (2) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act means a facility necessary for the prevention of harm to people's life or body, and whether it falls under such facility should be determined by taking into account specific and comprehensive circumstances, such as the nature of the facility in question, the function of the facility in question, and the risks that may occur when the facility in question is not maintained and operated normally.

[4] Considering that the legislative purpose of Article 42(2) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act is “safety of human life and body,” and that it constitutes an element of this crime under Article 42(2) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act by nature, in a case where the act constitutes a safety protection facility and the act of suspending, discontinuing, or obstructing the maintenance and operation of such safety protection facility does not cause any danger to human life and body due to taking necessary safety measures in advance, if the act of taking necessary safety measures in advance does not constitute a violation of Article 91 subparag. 1 and Article 42(

The issue of whether to implement corporate restructuring, such as layoff, corporate merger, and privatization of public enterprises, belongs to a high-level managerial decision by a management body, which is subject to collective bargaining in principle, and, unless there are special circumstances such as it is promoted with an urgent managerial necessity or a reasonable reason without any justifiable reason, if a trade union is going to go to an industrial action in order to substantially oppose the implementation of the industrial action, the legitimacy of the purpose of the industrial action cannot be recognized (see Supreme Court Decision 9Do5380 delivered on February 26, 2002). In this context, the phrase "actually opposing the implementation of the industrial action" includes cases where a trade union is against the implementation of the industrial action, even though it accepts the industrial restructuring, such as privatization, and as a result, it can be seen that the industrial action can be seen as substantially opposing the purpose of the industrial action by establishing the conditions requiring it to not achieve the purpose of the industrial action.

In light of all the circumstances acknowledged by the evidence adopted, the lower court determined that the Defendants asserted the requirements that are difficult to accommodate from the Korean Industrial Complex Corporation (hereinafter “Corporation”) and that they were engaged in the strike of this case for the purpose of opposing the implementation of privatization. In light of the records and the above legal principles, the lower court’s aforementioned determination is justifiable, and there is no error of misapprehending the legal doctrine on the legitimacy of industrial action or misunderstanding the facts.

2. Regarding ground of appeal No. 2

In a case where a large number of workers are collectively absent from or absent from a workplace under their mutual communication and thereby causing damage to the normal operation of their business, such as the production and sale, etc., the act constitutes the crime of interference with business by constituting the crime of interference with business, unless the act is a legitimate industrial action under the labor-related Acts and subordinate statutes, and the illegality of which is excluded, constitutes the act of interference with another person’s business by multiple force (see Supreme Court Decision 90Do2771, Apr. 23, 199

Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the records and the above legal principles, the court below is just in holding that the industrial action of this case constitutes an obstruction of business by force, and there is no error of law such as misunderstanding of legal principles as to the obstruction of business and misunderstanding of facts due to violation

3. As to the third ground for appeal

A. The lower court affirmed the first instance judgment convicting the Defendant of the violation of the Labor Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act on the following grounds: (a) whether a specific facility in the workplace constitutes a safety protection facility is deemed a safety protection facility under Article 42(2) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (hereinafter “Labor Relations Adjustment Act”) on the ground that the instant heat-combined power plant’s installation, such as electric power generator, boiler, etc., team facilities such as fire-fighting water supply facilities, water supply facilities such as a fire-fighting water supply facility, compression machine into plant, instrument air supply facilities, etc. (hereinafter “each of the instant facilities”) may cause harm to human life and body if the industrial action is suspended, discontinued, or obstructed; and (b) thus, it constitutes a safety protection facility under Article 42(2) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (hereinafter “Labor Act”).

B. However, we cannot accept the above determination by the court below for the following reasons.

Article 42(2) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Commission Act provides that "the act of suspending, discontinuing, or obstructing the normal maintenance and operation of facilities installed to protect safety of a workplace shall not be conducted as an industrial action." The term "safety protection facilities" here refers to facilities necessary for preventing any danger to human life or body, and the issue of whether such facilities are applicable shall be determined by considering specific and comprehensive circumstances, such as the nature of the workplace in question, the function of the facilities in question, and the risks that may occur when the facilities are not normally maintained and operated (see Supreme Court Decision 2002Du7425 delivered on September 30, 2005).

On the other hand, considering the fact that the legislative purpose of Article 42(2) of the Labor Union Act is “safety of human life and body” and Article 42(2) of the Labor Union Act as the elements of this crime, considering the following as a whole: (a) even if a person constitutes a safety protection facility and an act to suspend, discontinue, or interfere with the maintenance, operation of the safety protection facility is committed, if there is no danger to human life or body due to taking necessary safety measures in advance, then the crime of violation of Articles 91 subparag. 1 and 42(2) of the Labor Union Act is not established.

However, while all of the instant facilities are deemed to be “safety protection facilities”, the lower court did not explain whether the suspension, abolition, or obstruction of the normal maintenance, operation of each of the instant facilities causes danger to human life and body for any reason. In addition, there was questioning materials sent by the Corporation to the Ministry of Labor and the statement of the head office personnel labor team head office of the Corporation, even though the evidence that each of the instant facilities is a safety protection facilities under Article 42(2) of the Labor Union Act, and there was a statement by the head office of the Corporation as to whether the said evidence alone is a facility to prevent danger to human life or body for any reason, and it is difficult to confirm any specific danger if the suspension, closure, or obstruction of the normal maintenance, operation of each of the instant facilities

Therefore, the court below should have deliberated further on what grounds the each facility of this case cited in this part of the facts charged, such as whether the facility of this case is a facility to prevent danger to human life and body, which is specifically dangerous facility, whether the operation of each facility of this case took necessary safety measures in the suspension of operation of each facility, and which risks to human life and body, and whether the facility of this case suffered damage to human life and body due to the suspension of operation of each facility, and whether the facility of this case suffered damage to human life and body because the facility of this case supplied with steam from the heat consolidated power plant of this case because it was planned to supply steam during the scheduled time, and then should have examined whether the establishment of the crime of violation of Article 91 subparagraph 1 and Article 42 (2) of the Labor Union Act can be recognized. However, the court below rejected the defendants' assertion and found guilty of this part of the crime without mentioning what reason each facility of this case constitutes the safety protection facility. Thus, the court below erred in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the concept of "safety protection facility" in the Nowon Act.

Therefore, the part of the judgment of the court below which violated the Trade Union and Labor Relations Act against the defendants should be reversed as it is unlawful, and as long as the above part of the judgment of the court below is in a mutually competitive relationship with the remaining part which was found guilty, the decision of the court below shall be reversed in its entirety.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the lower judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee Hong-hoon (Presiding Justice)