[특정범죄가중처벌등에관한법률위반(도주차량)][공1994.10.15.(978),2701]
A. The meaning of "domination" under Article 5-3 (1) of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes
(b) The case holding that it is difficult to recognize that the victim has a criminal intent to escape if he/she leaves the site without informing the driver of contact information, etc. because the victim was fine after examining his/her physical condition after the accident;
(a) The term “when a driver of an accident runs away without taking such measures as provided in Article 50 (1) of the Road Traffic Act such as aiding a victim” provided in Article 5-3 (1) of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes means the cases where the driver of an accident runs away from the accident site before he performs his duties provided in Article 50 (1) of the Road Traffic Act, such as aiding the victim although he knows that the victim was killed or injured, resulting in a state that
B. The case holding that it is difficult to recognize that the victim has a criminal intent to escape if he/she leaves the site without notifying the accident driver of any contact address, etc., on the ground that the victim is fine after examining his/her physical condition after the accident.
Article 5-3 (1) of the Aggravated Punishment Act
A. Supreme Court Decision 91Do1831 delivered on April 10, 1992 (Gong1992, 1636) decided June 11, 1993 (Gong1993Ha, 2066)
Defendant
Defendant
Attorney Lee Jong-chul et al.
Daejeon High Court Decision 93No534 delivered on June 9, 1994
The judgment of the court below is reversed and the case is remanded to Daejeon High Court.
We examine the grounds of appeal.
The phrase “when a driver of an accident runs away without taking such measures as provided in Article 50(1) of the Road Traffic Act such as aiding a victim” provided in Article 5-3(1) of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes refers to a case where the driver of an accident, despite his knowledge of the fact that the victim was killed or injured, leaving the scene of the accident before performing his duty provided in Article 50(1) of the Road Traffic Act, such as aiding a victim, brings about a situation that cannot be determined as the victim of the accident (see Supreme Court Decision 92Do3437, Jun. 1
The lower court affirmed the first instance judgment, which was sentenced to the rate under Article 5-3(1)2 of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes, Article 268 of the Criminal Act, Article 50(1) of the Road Traffic Act, and Articles 40 and 50 of the Criminal Act, by recognizing the fact that the Defendant, while driving a vehicle, did not take measures such as aiding and abetting the victim, but did not rescue the victim, and escaped from the site.
However, in light of the part of 2 victims, who were used in the vehicle in which the defendant was driving, the defendant stopped immediately after the accident, looked at the situation of 4 people in which the victim was moving from the vehicle, and examined the physical condition of the vehicle immediately after the accident, and then he was able to pay the fine. Under such circumstances, the defendant did not have any room to take any particular relief measures against the above scambling, so the defendant's act of leaving the site cannot be applied to Article 5-3 (1) of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes. Accordingly, the court below recognized that the defendant escaped without taking relief measures against the above scambling immediately after the accident in this case, and did not err by misapprehending the legal principles on the scambling vehicle or by violating the rules of evidence.
Then, the court below found that the accident of this case was committed by the victim at the time when the defendant was driven by the driver, and that the accident of this case was committed on the ground by the victim, and that the defendant immediately stopped after the accident and asked the victims about the degree of injury from the accident at the time of the accident at the time of the accident, and that "one person during the defendant's driving, who was knee's knee kne se se se se se se se se se se se se se se se se se se se se se se se se se se se se se se se se se se se se se se se se se se se se se se se se se se se se.
If so, the court below should have tried more to determine the defendant's intention to commit a crime of escape after this year by examining what meaning the above steering virtue is fine for the defendant, etc. under any circumstances, but the measures that the defendant recognized as having the criminal intent to commit a crime of escape under the above holding cannot be said to be erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as to vehicles of escape, or in the violation of the rules of evidence or in the incomplete hearing.
The judgment of the court below is reversed and remanded. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.
Justices Lee Don-hee (Presiding Justice)