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(영문) 대법원 1995. 12. 22. 선고 94누9221 판결

[초과소유부담금부과처분취소][공1996.2.15.(4),565]

Main Issues

[1] Whether the land is still subject to the regulation of the Act on the Ownership of Housing Sites even if the land on the public register is used for another purpose, if the land is used for another purpose

[2] The meaning of Article 2 subparagraph 1 (b) of the Act on the Ownership of Housing Site and whether Article 2 subparagraph 1 (b) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Ownership of Housing Site violates the parent law

[3] Whether the non-performance of the provisions in [Attachment 1] of the former Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Ownership of Housing Site violates the principle of equality under the Constitution

[4] Requirements for the exclusion of a housing site or a housing site owned by a corporation from the subject of excess ownership charges, which exceeds the upper limit of the ownership of each household held at the time of the enforcement of the Act

[5] The meaning of permanent buildings under Article 2 subparagraph 1 (b) of the Act on the Ownership of Housing Site

Summary of Judgment

[1] Even if land on the public register is used for another purpose, the land is still subject to the regulation of the Act on the Ownership of Housing Sites.

[2] In light of the legislative purpose of the Act on the Ownership of Housing Sites or the provisions of subparagraph 1 (b) of Article 2 of the same Act, if a permanent building is not constructed at all, the site referred to in the above provision does not mean only the land where the permanent building is not constructed at all, but also the whole land. In the case where such a building is constructed, it means only the land other than the land annexed to the building within the scope prescribed by the Presidential Decree. Article 3 subparagraph 1 of the former Enforcement Decree on the Ownership of Housing Sites (amended by Presidential Decree No. 13882 of May 10, 193) and Article 3 subparagraph 1 of the former Enforcement Decree on the Ownership of Housing Sites (amended by Presidential Decree No. 13882 of May 10, 1993) and Article 3 subparagraph 1 of the former Enforcement Decree on the Ownership of Housing Sites and the provisions of the same Table 1 are to be embodied in accordance with the purport of the above provision.

[3] The main sentence of the former Enforcement Decree [Attachment 1] and the column of the non-use area are limited to the scope of land annexed to a building excluded from a housing site subject to the application of the Act upon delegation by the upper law. In the case of a building owned by an individual, the building area of the building multiplied by the ratio of non-use area by the ratio of non-use area shall be the area as annexed land. On the other hand, in the case of a building owned by a corporation, the building area of the building shall be the area calculated by multiplying the building area of the building by the ratio of non-use area by the ratio of non-use area by the ratio of non-use area, and the total floor area of the building shall be the area multiplied by the ratio of non-use area by the ratio of non-use area, which is less than the individual, so the scope of annexed land shall be treated unfavorably than the individual. However, the purpose of restricting the different scope of annexed land is due to the need to prevent excessive ownership of a housing site for the smooth supply and efficient use of the housing site. Furthermore, its content itself shall not be deemed considerably unreasonable or contrary to the principle of equality.

[4] The use and development of a housing site exceeding the upper limit to the ownership of each household held at the time of the enforcement of the Act on the Ownership of Housing Sites, or a housing site owned by a corporation, which is a reason for the exclusion from the imposition of excess ownership charges, shall be used and developed with the content falling under each subparagraph of Articles 11(1) and 12(1) of the same Act, and if such content is not used continuously in accordance with the method of use at the time of the enforcement of the Act, it shall not be excluded from the imposition of excess ownership charges

[5] In full view of the contents and purport of Article 2 subparagraph 1 (b) of the Act on the Ownership of Housing Sites and Articles 2 and 3 of the Enforcement Decree of the former Act on the Ownership of Housing Sites, a permanent building under Article 2 subparagraph 1 (b) of the same Act shall be a building which is required to be permitted or reported under the Building Act and other related Acts and subordinate statutes, and which is not permitted or reported under the Building Act and a building which is subject to completion inspection, and which is not subject to completion inspection.

[Reference Provisions]

[1] Article 2 subparagraph 1 (b) of the Act on the Ownership of Housing Sites / [2] Article 2 subparagraph 1 (b) of the Act on the Ownership of Housing Sites, Article 3 subparagraph 1 (b) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Ownership of Housing Sites (amended by Presidential Decree No. 13882 of May 10, 193), attached Table 1 / [3] [Attachment Table 1] of the former Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Ownership of Housing Sites (amended by Presidential Decree No. 13882 of May 10, 193), Article 11 of the Constitution / [4] Articles 11 (1), 12 (1), and 19 of the Act on the Ownership of Housing Sites, Articles 2 and 3 of the Addenda (amended by Presidential Decree No. 13882 of May 30, 198), Article 3 subparagraph 1 (b) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Ownership of Housing Sites, Article 2 subparagraph 3 (1) of the former Enforcement Decree on the Ownership.

Reference Cases

[1] Supreme Court Decision 94Nu11064 delivered on April 21, 1995 (Gong1995Sang, 1981) / [2] Supreme Court Decision 93Nu20498 delivered on February 25, 1994 (Gong1994Sang, 1131), Supreme Court Decision 93Nu22968 delivered on March 22, 1994 (Gong1994Sang, 1351) / [4] Supreme Court en banc Decision 94Nu4257 delivered on November 16, 195 (Gong195Ha, 3808) / [5] Supreme Court Decision 94Nu3506 delivered on November 25, 1994 (Gong195Sang, 195Sang, 117)

Plaintiff, Appellant

Large Timber Co., Ltd. (Attorney Kim Ba-young, Counsel for defendant-appellant)

Defendant, Appellee

The head of North Korea of Busan Metropolitan City

Judgment of the lower court

Busan High Court Decision 93Gu4571 delivered on June 24, 1994

Text

The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

Reasons

The grounds of appeal by the Plaintiff’s attorney are examined (to the extent of supplement in case of supplemental appellate briefs not timely filed).

1. Regarding ground of appeal No. 1

Even if land, the category of which on the public register is a building site, is used for other purposes, the land is still subject to the regulation of the Act on the Ownership of Housing Sites (hereinafter referred to as the "Act"). (See Supreme Court Decision 94Nu1064 delivered on April 21, 1995).

In the same purport, the court below is proper to determine that the land of this case, the land category of which in the public register is a "place within the industrial area and is used as a factory site for the plaintiff's business purpose, even if the land is located within the industrial area and is used as a factory site for the plaintiff's business purpose, it falls under the housing site under Article 2 subparagraph 1 (b) of the Act, which is subject to charges as of the base date of imposition of excess ownership charges (hereinafter "charges"), and there is no error of law

2. Regarding ground of appeal No. 2

Article 2 subparagraph 1 (b) of the Act is one of the housing sites subject to the Act, and the land prescribed by the Presidential Decree as the land on which no permanent building is constructed among the land, the land category of which under the provisions of Article 5 of the Cadastral Act is a building site (hereinafter referred to as "Bed site"). In light of the legislative purpose of the Act or the provisions of the above provision, if the site mentioned in the above provision does not refer only to the land where a permanent building is not constructed at all, but also to the land where a permanent building is not constructed at all, it is reasonable to view that the whole land refers only to the land other than the land annexed to the building within the scope prescribed by the Presidential Decree, and if the building is constructed at all, it is reasonable to view that Article 3 subparagraph 1 of the Enforcement Decree of the Act (amended by the Presidential Decree No. 13882, May 10, 1993; hereinafter referred to as the "Enforcement Decree"), and Article 3 subparagraph 1 of the [Attachment 1] of the Enforcement Decree, and Article 98 (29) of the Enforcement Decree of the Act.

In addition, the main sentence of the Enforcement Decree [Attachment 1] and the non-scriptive column are limited to the scope of the land annexed to a building excluded from a housing site subject to the application of the Act upon delegation by the upper law. In the case of a building owned by an individual, the building area of the building multiplied by the ratio by specific-use area of the table shall be the area annexed to the annexed land. On the other hand, in the case of a building owned by a corporation, the building area of the building multiplied by the ratio by specific-use area of the table and the total floor area of the building shall be the area calculated by dividing the building area of the building by the ratio by the ratio by specific-use area of the table by the floor area of the relevant area by the floor area ratio of five, which is less unfavorable to the corporation as to the scope of the annexed land. However, the purport that different limits the scope of the annexed land is derived from the need to prevent excessive ownership of a building site than the individual for the smooth supply and efficient use of the housing site. Furthermore, the content itself is too unreasonable or contrary to the principle of equality.

The judgment of the court below to the same purport is correct, and there is no error of law such as the theory of lawsuit. All arguments are without merit.

3. Regarding ground of appeal No. 3

The view of the party members that the use and development of a housing site or a housing site owned by a corporation, which exceeds the upper limit of the ownership of each household at the time of the enforcement of the Act, shall be the use and development of the housing site falling under the subparagraphs of Articles 11(1) and 12(1) of the Act, and that if the housing site or housing site owned by a corporation is not used in the same content, it shall not be exempted from the imposition of charges even if it is used in accordance with the use at the time of the enforcement of the Act (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 94Nu4257 delivered on November 16, 195).

Although the judgment of the court below is somewhat insufficient or inappropriate in its reasoning, the decision to the effect that the land of this case does not constitute a housing site excluded from the imposition of charges under Article 20 (1) 1 or Article 20 (1) 8 of the Act and Article 26 (1) 5 of the Enforcement Decree of the Act is just in its conclusion in accordance with the above legal principles, and it is not erroneous in its conclusion, and there are no errors in the misapprehension of legal principles, such as the theory of lawsuit, or in the misapprehension of legal principles. The argument is without merit

4. Regarding ground of appeal No. 4

In full view of the contents and purport of the relevant provisions such as Article 2 subparagraph 1 (b) of the Act, Article 2 subparagraph 1 (b) of the Enforcement Decree, Article 2 subparagraph 1 (b) of the Act refers to a building which must be permitted or reported under the Building Act or other related Acts and subordinate statutes, and which does not obtain permission or submit a report, and a building which has to undergo a completion inspection and which has not undergone a completion inspection, and which does not undergo a completion inspection (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 94Nu3506, Nov. 25, 1994). The proviso of Article 2 (1) of the Enforcement Decree clearly provides the above points, and its content is very unreasonable or contrary to equity, so the proviso of Article 2 (1) of the Enforcement Decree cannot be deemed as a provision for invalidation in violation of the mother law.

Therefore, the judgment of the court below that the land annexed to an unauthorized building does not fall under the land annexed to a permanent building excluded from the subject of the imposition of the housing site ownership charge is correct, and there is no violation of the misapprehension of legal principles, such as the theory of lawsuit. There is no reason

5. Therefore, the appeal shall be dismissed, and all costs of appeal shall be assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Cho Chang-tae (Presiding Justice)

심급 사건
-부산고등법원 1994.6.24.선고 93구4571
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