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(영문) 대법원 2012. 11. 22. 선고 2010두22962 전원합의체 판결

[건축불허가처분등취소][공2013상,54]

Main Issues

In a case where the proviso of Article 19-4 (1) of the former Parking Lot Act and Article 12 (1) 3 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Parking Lot Act allow the alteration of the purpose of use of an annexed parking lot which creates demand for parking in certain cases and do not delegate to the municipal ordinances concerning it, but Article 15 (2) of the Ordinance on Parking Lots at the time of leisure, which provides that the purpose of use of an annexed parking lot shall not be changed until the relevant facilities are extinguished, the case affirming the judgment below holding that the above municipal ordinance provisions have no effect by prescribing matters

Summary of Judgment

In a case where Article 19-4(1) proviso to Article 19-4(1) of the former Parking Lot Act (amended by Act No. 10159, Mar. 22, 2010; hereinafter “Act”) and Article 12(1)3 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Parking Lot Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 22458, Oct. 21, 2010; hereinafter “Enforcement Decree”) allow the change of the use of an attached parking lot for buildings, golf driving ranges, or other facilities causing demand for parking, and do not delegate to municipal ordinances, but Article 15(2) of the Ordinance of the Parking Lot Act (hereinafter “Ordinance of this case”) provides that the restriction on the change of use of an attached parking lot cannot be changed until the relevant facilities are extinguished, the case affirming the judgment below’s determination that the restriction on the change of use of an attached parking lot does not have the effect of delegation of rights to the adjacent facilities under Article 19(4) of the Act and Article 7(2) of the Enforcement Decree of the former Enforcement Decree of the Parking Lot Act.

[Reference Provisions]

Articles 19(1) and (4), and 19-4(1) of the former Parking Lot Act (Amended by Act No. 10159, Mar. 22, 2010); Articles 7(1), 7(2)1, and 12(1)3 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Parking Lot Act (Amended by Presidential Decree No. 22458, Oct. 21, 2010); Article 4(3) of the Framework Act on Administrative Regulations

Plaintiff-Appellee

Lot shopping Co., Ltd. (Law Firm Rate, Attorneys Park Gi-sung et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Defendant-Appellant

Women's Water Market

Judgment of the lower court

Gwangju High Court Decision 2010Nu985 decided September 30, 2010

Text

The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.

Reasons

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. Regarding ground of appeal No. 1

A. According to Article 22 of the Local Autonomy Act and Article 4(3) of the Framework Act on Administrative Regulation, in a case where a local government establishes a municipal ordinance concerning the restriction on the rights of residents, the imposition of obligations on residents, or penal provisions, the contents thereof must be delegated by law. Thus, the municipal ordinance that stipulates matters concerning the restriction on the rights of residents or the imposition of obligations on residents without delegation by law is invalid (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2006Do52, Dec. 13, 2007; 2007Do134, May 28, 2009).

B. (1) Article 19(1) of the former Parking Lot Act (amended by Act No. 10159, Mar. 22, 2010; hereinafter “Act”) provides that “A person who intends to construct or install a building, a golf practice range, or other facilities that may create demand for parking (hereinafter “facilities”) within an urban area and a Class-II district unit planning zone under the National Land Planning and Utilization Act, and an area stipulated by ordinances of a local government, shall establish an annexed parking lot (including a parking lot for loading and unloading freight or for performing other projects; hereinafter the same shall apply) inside the relevant facilities or within the site thereof,” and Article 19(4) of the same Act provides that “Where an annexed parking lot is smaller than the scale prescribed by the Presidential Decree in the case of paragraph (1) of the same Article, an annexed parking lot may be established independently or jointly in the vicinity of the site of the facilities, notwithstanding the provisions of the same paragraph.” In this case, the scope of the vicinity of the site

The main text of Article 7(1) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Parking Lot Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 22458, Oct. 21, 2010; hereinafter “Enforcement Decree”) provides that “the size prescribed by Presidential Decree” under the former part of Article 19(4) of the Act refers to the size of 300 parking spaces,” and Article 7(2) of the same Act provides that “the scope of adjacent areas of a site for a facility under the latter part of Article 19(4) of the Act shall be prescribed by municipal ordinance of a Special Self-Governing Province, Si, Gun, or autonomous Gu within the scope falling under any of the following subparagraphs,” and stipulates that “the scope of adjacent areas of a site for a facility under the latter part of Article 19(4) of the Act shall be within 300 meters in straight distance or 6

In addition, according to the delegation of this Act and the Enforcement Decree, Article 15(1) of the Act provides that “In the event an annexed parking lot is established solely or jointly pursuant to the provisions of Article 19(4) of the Act, the scope of the neighboring area of the site of the facility shall not exceed 200 meters in straight line or 400 meters in visible distance from the boundary of the site to the boundary of the annexed parking lot.”

However, the Ordinance of this case imposes certain restrictions on the use of parking lots by providing that "a annexed parking lot established pursuant to paragraph (1) shall not be used for any other purpose until this facility is extinguished" in paragraph (2) of the same Article (hereinafter referred to as the "Regulation of this case").

Meanwhile, Article 19-4(1) of the Act provides that “A parking lot shall not be used for any purpose other than a parking lot: Provided, That this shall not apply where it falls under the criteria prescribed by Presidential Decree.” Article 12(1) of the Enforcement Decree provides that “Where the use of an attached parking lot may be changed pursuant to the proviso to Article 19-4(1) of the Act, and subparagraphs 1 through 5 of Article 19-4 of the Act provides that “Where the head of a Si/Gun/Gu confirms the excess portion as a parking lot exceeding the standards for installation or restriction on installation of an attached parking lot.”

(2) In full view of the aforementioned relevant laws and regulations, even in cases where the alteration of the use of an attached parking lot is permitted pursuant to the proviso of Article 19-4(1) of the Act and Article 12(1)3 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act, the provisions of this case, which form the basis of the instant provisional disposition of denying the use of the purpose of use, restrict the exercise of property rights by the owner of the attached parking lot by preventing the alteration of the use until the extinguishment of the relevant facilities. In light of the aforementioned legal principles, in order to be valid, the provisions of this Ordinance should be delegated by law, and it

However, the instant ordinance provisions are irrelevant to “the scope adjacent to the site of a facility” which is delegated by Article 19(4) of the Act and Article 7(2) of the Enforcement Decree of the Enforcement Decree. Furthermore, the instant ordinance provisions expressly stipulate the restriction on the use of an attached parking lot without delegation of the ordinances of local governments under Article 19-4(1) of the Act and Article 12(1) of the Enforcement Decree of the Enforcement Decree. Thus, the instant ordinance provisions are invalid because they stipulate matters concerning the restriction on the use of rights of residents without delegation of Acts.

C. The judgment of the court below to the same purport is just, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the interpretation of Article 15 (2) of the Ordinance.

2. Regarding ground of appeal No. 2

Unless the application for a building permit is in conflict with any restriction prescribed by the relevant statutes, such as the Building Act, a building permit holder shall grant a building permit under the same statutes, and notwithstanding the absence of a serious public interest, a permit granted to a person meeting the requirements shall not be denied for reasons other than those prescribed by the relevant statutes (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 92Nu3038, Dec. 11, 1992; 2009Du8946, Sept. 24, 2009).

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, after compiling the adopted evidence, the court below acknowledged the facts as stated in its reasoning. The defendant's act as the ground for the provisional disposition of the building permission of this case does not constitute grounds for restrictions on construction permission under relevant Acts and subordinate statutes, and the opposition of neighboring residents or existing gas stations per se cannot be a legitimate basis in determining whether the building permission of this case was granted, and it is difficult to deem the existing gas stations' business losses due to the construction of the gas stations of this case as losses for public interest. In light of the above, the court below determined that the construction permission of this case was unlawful, since it is difficult to view that the existing gas stations' living threats and dangerous facilities of the existing gas stations constitute the necessity of public interest to restrict the building permission of the gas stations of this case.

In light of the above legal principles and records, the above judgment of the court below is just, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to serious public interest needs relating to provisional disposition of denial of construction.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Yang Chang-soo (Presiding Justice)

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