When Defendant 11 fails to pay the above fine, the above defendant shall be confined in a workhouse for the period calculated by converting 50,000 won into one day.

However, with respect to defendants 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, for three years from the date this judgment became final and conclusive, and for two years from the date this judgment becomes final and conclusive, the execution of each of the above punishments shall be suspended for two years from the date this judgment becomes final and conclusive.

Defendant 11, Defendant 12, and Defendant 13 are ordered to pay an amount equivalent to the above fines.

Of the facts charged in the instant case, Defendant 12 was acquitted of violating the Occupational Safety and Health Act regarding explosions on March 14, 2013 against Defendant 12.

【Basic factual relations

1. Status of the Defendants

A. Defendant 12 (Defendant 7 of the judgment of the court of appeal) and Defendant 13 (Defendant 8 of the judgment of the court of appeal)

1) Defendant 12 Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “Defendant 12 Co., Ltd.”) is a company established for the purpose of manufacturing and selling petroleum chemical products. Defendant 12 Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “Defendant 12 Co., Ltd.”) is a business owner who runs the ○○ factory that manufactures synthetic resin, such as high density polyethylene (HDPE, HGDDD) by employing 306 full-time workers at the address 1 omitted.

2) Defendant 13 Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “Defendant 13 Co., Ltd.”) is a company established for the purpose of manufacturing (location 2 omitted), etc., and Defendant 12 Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “Defendant 13 Co., Ltd.”) is a company that installed two (V-059 E, F), and two (V-16C, and two (V-166, D), one of the two (V-13,000 construction costs, seven (793,000,000,793,000,000,000 full-time workers and five (555) on February 13, 2013, 2013, each of the above construction works performed by Defendant 13 Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “Defendant 13 Co., Ltd.”) by being awarded a contract with Defendant 12 for the interim storage of high density of ○○ plant (HDPE, H-05).

B. The remaining Defendants

1) Defendant 1 (Defendant 1 of the judgment of appeal) is the head of Defendant 12’s petroleum business department ○○ factory, who is the person in charge of safety and health management of employees belonging to the above factory.

2) Defendant 6 as the team leader of Defendant 12 Company 12’s ○○ Factory PE (Pool) production team (the equipment under its control is changed management procedure, and the work permission team for the safety work permission procedure) shall take charge of overall management related to the operation of the team at ordinary times, manage the progress of the work of the production facilities managed by the team during the regular repair period (the work permission team or the subcontractor shall conduct the work after obtaining the work permission for the safety work from the work permission team when the work is performed within the dangerous area, such as inspection, maintenance, shift, pipeline connection, electrical and mooring, etc.). The work permission team shall state the contents of the work permission, the results of the review, the time of the work, and the matters of attention. The work permission team shall issue the safety work permission after checking the risk of danger in advance, and notify the work executor of the danger in the work permission and finally post it on the site after obtaining his signature from the work executor, and shall inspect the safety danger in the work environment.

3) Defendant 7 manages the adjustment rate of production plan, product production, maintenance and repair of facilities, safety of employees, attitudes, etc. under the direction of the head of the ordinary team leader of the ○○○ Factory Production Team of Defendant 12. During the regular repair period, Defendant 7 shall report the work progress to the team leader concerning the production facilities managed by the team during the regular repair period, and shall be in charge of managing and supervising whether the on-site supervisor, supervisor, and supervisor of the safety work permit are properly performing the work of checking and removing the safety hazards in the work site.

4) Defendant 2 (Defendant 2) is a shift agent of the PE production1 team of Defendant 12, and manages the production, quality, safety, work matters, environment, etc. in accordance with the direction of the head of the ordinary team and the director of the division. During the regular repair period, Defendant 2 (Defendant 2) takes charge of the field management, such as proposing and issuing a work permit, and designating a field supervisor, etc., after examining whether there is any danger and injury upon receiving a work list.

5) Defendant 3 (Defendant 3) is the head of the ○○○ Factory Production Team of Defendant 12 Company, and manages flat high density polyethyl production facilities. During the regular repair period, Defendant 3 (Defendant 3) is in charge of the duties of checking safety risk factors in the workplace and reporting to the head of the team, etc. when safety risk factors occur during the regular repair period.

6) Defendant 8, as the head of the ○○ Factory Public Service Team of Defendant 12 (the changed review team in the process of management of production facilities, etc., and the work performance team in the process of permission for safety work), has conducted a technical review on the maintenance, repair, construction, and change of fixed equipment in the factory, such as a drum, pen, heat exchanger, tank, and scam, at ordinary level, and is the second inspector in charge of the inspection of the permit for safety work during the period of regular repair.

7) Defendant 9 is the vice head of the ○○ Factory Public Service Team and the head of a fixed machinery group of Defendant 12, who takes charge of technical review, etc. on the repair, maintenance, new installation, and change of the flat fixed equipment. During the regular repair period, Defendant 9 is conducting two-lane inspections of the inspection items in the work permit and managing and supervising the on-site supervisor’s work site’s work work site’s work site’s work site’s safety hazards.

8) Defendant 4 (Defendant 4 of the judgment of appeal) is responsible for repairing and maintaining fixed devices at the site as an agent of Defendant 12 Company 12’s ○○ Factory Team as an agent, and for confirming whether the work is properly conducted as an on-site supervisor during the regular remuneration period.

9) Defendant 10, as the head of the safety and permission team of Defendant 12’s ○○ Factory Safety Team, shall administer the rental business, such as safety and environment-related affairs, industrial accident prevention plans and safety education, risk prevention measures, management of safety facilities at the site, and field patrol for safety management. During the regular repair period, Defendant 10 shall take charge of the preparation and submission of safety work plans for field safety management, check on-site gas, and safety measures, and take measures to suspend construction immediately upon discovery of risk factors, and manage and supervise the safety environment team members by visiting them at the site to conduct safety patrol.

10) Defendant 5 (Defendant 5 of the judgment of appeal) is the head of the manufacturing business of Defendant 13, Defendant 13, who is the head of the manufacturing business of Defendant 13, is the head of the field director in charge of overall management of the work site, such as field human resources management, work progress management, settlement management, safety management, etc., at the construction site of the ○○○ factory contracted by Defendant 12 and the construction site of the installation of the last person, and is the safety and health management manager of

11) Defendant 11 (Defendant 6 of the judgment of the appellate court) is the chief of the safety team of Defendant 13, who is responsible for safety management, such as identifying all risks at the site of the safety team of Defendant 13, conducting safety education for workers, and managing and removing the risks discovered during the work.

2. The gender and manufacturing process of high density polyethylene;

고밀도 폴리에틸렌은 흰색이나 우윳빛을 띄는 미세한 입자(Pellets, 펠릿) 또는 작은 알갱이(Granules, 그래뉼) 형태의 화학제품이고, 소방법상 특수가연물인 합성수지류로서 자연발화점은 349℃이다. 고밀도 폴리에틸렌은 공기 중에 분진이 부유하면 분진폭발을 일으키고 화재 시 다량의 연기와 유독가스를 발생시키므로, 분진누출 시 강제로 환기를 시키고 점화원을 제거하여 폭발을 방지하여야 할 필요가 있다.

Defendant 12’s plant at ○○○○, Inc., made high density polyethylene (Slurry, slurry, and slurry) by reactioning raw materials, such as ethylene, hydrogen, mercury-1, etc. at the reaction season, and dried them, stored polyethylene intermediate products (Flurry, plug) in a storage tank (Slur, plug) in the form of powder, remaining after gas from the reaction is recovered, and stored them in the storage tank (Blender, blurler).

3. The process during which Defendant 12 works for installation of the last day in the ○○ Factory;

(a) Blaver explosion on June 28, 2012;

On June 28, 2012, Defendant 12’s high density polyethyl manufacturing plant explosiond by the causes presumed to be static electricity or metal-stamping. On the influor of the 6th anniversary of the 6th anniversary of the 6th anniversary of the 6th anniversary of the 6th anniversary of the 6th anniversary of the 2010 fire. Accordingly, Defendant 12 decided to organize an accident investigation committee and establish a new type of accident, and set up two days of the damaged 2th anniversary of the 4th anniversary of the 4th anniversary of the 6th anniversary of the 12th anniversary of the 6th anniversary of the 2012.

(b) the progress of the procedure for requesting the change of the private day for the installation of the Manle Day on August 2012 and the contract;

Defendant 12, the company production team of Defendant 12, the company's ○○ factory production team, following the change management procedure of Defendant 12, requested each of the safety environment teams, public service teams, and technology teams, which are the review department, to review the change request containing the establishment of Manle on August 2012. Each of the above teams approved the request after review by sector on the work of installation of Manle on the shooting day. Defendant 1, the factory manager, was the final approval.

After that, on January 18, 2013, Defendant 12 concluded a contract between Defendant 13 and Defendant 13 with the content that the construction amount shall be KRW 13 million and that the construction amount shall be set up for four days in ○○ Factory.

(c) establish a plan for regular remuneration (T/A, Turn grounds A) in 2013;

Based on the field safety and health management plan formulated on March 5, 2013 by the safety environment team established on February 27, 2013, based on the “PE 1 Team 2013 T/A Program” established on February 28, 2013 by the production team, “HDPT/A Work Plan” established on February 28, 2013 by the public service team, and “PE 1 T/A site safety and health management plan formulated on March 5, 2013.” From March 12, 2013 to April 6, 2013, Defendant 12 formulated on March 13, 2013 on the basis of the field safety and health management plan formulated on March 5, 2013.

(d) On-site preparation work for the installation of the front part of the shooting day;

Defendant 12, from March 12, 2013 to March 14, 2013, Defendant 12 suspended all operation of ○○ factory ethylene process from March 12, 2013 to March 14, 2013, and was engaged in the Purge work that discharges inflammable gas by inserting nitrogen gas within the shooting days through pipes.

(e) Work progress on the date of the accident;

Defendant 2 issued a work permit on March 14, 2013 (the date of the accident; the same day; hereinafter the same day) 08:00, and delivered to Defendant 13 a work permit for installation of luxy work, etc., and Defendant 13 completed the work of replacing two days of damage to Defendant 13 on June 28, 2012.

After the first instance trial, Defendant 13 was engaged in the work of setting up a manle at two lasts during the fourth period from around 13:0 to 14:30 as the rest day, and reported that Defendant 12 was in progress during the break time at around 15:00.

Since then, at around 15:30 to 16:10, the workmen belonging to Defendant 13 made a hole in the original form where a manle is installed at a cut hole, installed a reinforced plate where a manle is installed around a hole, and requested Defendant 12 to conduct an examination. However, Defendant 12, who supervised and supervised Defendant 12, instructed Defendant 12 to change the location of a reinforcement board, and removed melted reinforced plates using a cut hole.

After Supging, the workers belonging to Defendant 13 were engaged in the work of expanding a hole by using a cutting machine and rhying the surrounding shape in accordance with the direction of the employees belonging to Defendant 12. From 18:00 to 18:00 to 18:00 to 18:0 to 12.

From around 20:30 to around 20:51, employees belonging to Defendant 13 explosiond two occasions on July 20:51, when Defendant 12 had been engaged in a melting work by using a folder in compliance with Defendant 12’s employees’ instructions. [The accident scene is that the total of six shooting days is placed in the form of 2nd three lines (the first is from the left side to V-059 D, E, and F), the first diameter was 5 meters, height, 300 meters, capacity was 50 meters, 27 meters from the folder work, 7th to the folder work, 5th day from the 6th day of the accident, and 9th day from the 5th day of the accident, 5th day from the 205th day of the explosion, and 5th day from the 7th day of the accident.]

【Criminal facts

Defendant 12’s factory ○○, as seen above, had a blost explosion accident occurred on June 28, 2012, decided to install manle on the side of the shooting day for the purpose of convenience such as internal inspection, cleaning, etc. during the regular repair period of 2013, and continued to install manle on March 14, 2013.

1. Defendants 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 joint occupational injury, death by occupational negligence (2013 high-class 954);

A. Defendants’ breach of occupational duty

1) Defendant 1

Defendant 12 is the final approving authority of the change and management procedure of the ○○ Factory Facilities and the final approving authority of the plan for regular repair work, employees belonging to the factory, and safety and health management manager responsible for the safety of workers. As seen above, in the event that the installation of a man-many is carried out on the business of installing a plug including a fracker or gas during the regular repair period, it is confirmed whether the risk of fire and explosion of the plug remaining inside the shooting days was accurately assessed in the course of final approval of the request for review of change of the facilities after the process of review of change, and the measures to safely remove the plugs located inside the shooting days shall be included in the regular repair plan, and as long as the work is carried out simultaneously at 70 places inside the ○○ Factory during the regular repair period, there was a duty of care to set an appropriate remuneration period for securing the safety of the work site and to place appropriate safety-related personnel so that the work can be carried out safely.

Nevertheless, the Defendant approved a request for a review on the change of the date based on the assessment of risk, which does not consider the possibility of fire and explosion due to the remaining plug during the work of installation of the man-day, and did not take measures to include the pluging process in the work of regular repair planning to completely remove the plug existing inside the shooting day. At around 09:00 on March 13, 2013, the day before the accident occurred, the Defendant did not take measures such as suspending the internal pluging work even though he knew of the fact that it is difficult to completely remove the pluging work from the date of the accident, and even though he did not take measures such as suspending the fire work, he did not recruit the manpower in charge of safety during the fixed repair period or did not adjust the manpower remuneration period and the work to supervise the work site in compliance with the status of the person who was in charge of the last pluging work and supervision at the work site.

2) Defendant 6

The Defendant, as the head of the team in charge of requesting a change in the process of management, and the person in charge of formulating a plan for regular repair of the production team including the selection of the work to be implemented during the period of regular repair, and the person in charge of formulating a plan for the management of human resources, as the final right holder and the work manager of the permit for the safety work for the work for the work for the installation of the production team, which is the production facility of the production1 team, shall accurately assess the risk of fire and explosion due to the remainder in the work for the installation of the last time, and shall establish a plan for the clean learning process to remove the inside the shooting and the regular repair plan to secure sufficient personnel in charge of the safety, assess all possible risks during the work for the installation of the last time, and issue the work permit to the person in charge of the work for the first inspection and the issuance of the work permit, and if shocks within the shooting day, there was a risk of spreading the inside the wall on the shooting day, so that the work can not be conducted during the work for another day.

Nevertheless, in the process of examining changes according to the changed management procedure, without considering the possibility of fire and explosion caused by the remaining fluence, the Defendant approved the request for review of changes on the basis without correcting the danger, thereby allowing Defendant 1 to approve the request for review of changes on the basis. When formulating the regular repair plan, the Defendant did not include the clean learning process to completely remove the interior fluor within the shooting day, and as a result, the Defendant recruited the personnel in charge of safety during the regular repair period or did not adjust the remuneration period and work schedule to the situation of human resources, thereby failing to properly observe and supervise the site safety by making two or more work supervisors and work supervisors at the time of the installation of the last fluor, which did not conduct safety education prior to the work, and the Defendant continued to conduct the installation of the last fluoring work without checking whether the internal fluoring work was completely implemented, and the installation of the last fluoring work permit, including the installation of the front fluoring work permit, and did not properly monitor and supervise the installation of the front work.

3) Defendant 7

The defendant is a person in charge of the change management procedures and a person in charge of the interim right to request the change of the production team's regular repair plan, including the selection of work to be implemented during the period of the change management request and the plan for the management of human resources, and the interim right to request the change of the production team's regular repair plan to be implemented during the period of the regular repair permit. The defendant is a person in charge of the change management procedure and the person in charge of the interim right to request the change of the production team's regular repair plan. The defendant shall accurately assess the possibility of fire and explosion caused by the remaining fluence during the installation of the last day and establish a plan for the clean learning process and the regular repair plan secured sufficient human resources for the full removal of fluence inside the shooting day. As the interim right to the safety work permit, the defendant is issued a safety work permit by assessing all possible risks during the work such as the installation of the last day and inflammable gas first and the issuance of the safety work permit, and the defendant shall conduct the relevant education for the day of the work to prevent the shock from being done.

Nevertheless, the Defendant reviewed the possibility of environmental pollution caused by the remaining fluorization inside the shooting day during the installation of the Mangyle, without considering the risk of fire and explosion of fluor, and did not include the fluoring process to completely remove the internal fluor in the regular repair plan. As a result, the Defendant recruited the personnel in charge of safety during the regular repair period or did not adjust the remuneration period and work schedule in accordance with the status of human resources, which led to a situation in which the on-site supervision and supervision are not properly performed. Furthermore, the Defendant did not conduct safety education prior to the work, and did not check whether the internal cluoring work was completely conducted, and did not properly perform the internal supervision and supervision in the process of performing the internal cluoring work permit, and did not properly perform the internal supervision and supervision in the process of performing the internal cluoring work permit.

4) Defendant 2

The defendant shall draft a safety work permit, manage and supervise work monitors, check the risks related to the work, take necessary safety measures and prepare a permit after confirming the conditions of the work site and completing necessary safety measures and work preparation when preparing a work permit, and when special safety work, such as burners or filing a complaint, is performed in two or more kinds of processes, a permit for each work shall be issued, and when the work prior to the work is performed, a permit for each work shall be issued, and when the work is performed, the removal of inflammable substances such as removal of inflammable substances, containers, pipes, etc., and the work progress shall be checked until the work is completed in addition to the work hours, and the work progress shall be thoroughly supervised by the work supervisor so as not to cause fire or explosion, and when shock occurs in the work day, a permit for each work shall be conducted in a way that does not cause shock, etc., and when shock occurs in the inside the wall of the work, the work can be performed in a way that does not cause any danger of dust.

Nevertheless, the Defendant issued a safety work permit without checking the conditions of the workplace, the risk factors related to the work, and the existence of inflammable substances in the front day with the worker before issuing the work permit in connection with the installation of the last day. The Defendant issued a safety work permit without checking the condition of the workplace, and whether there is any residues of the inside of the work day, and issued one safety work permit for the installation of the last day and the installation of the second day. In addition, the Defendant did not instruct the supervisor of the work to remove the first day by washing the inside day, but did not instruct the supervisor of the work to remove the first day. The Defendant did not deliver the safety work permit to the Defendant 3, who is the supervisor, to educate the contents of the work, etc. while designating the overlapping area of Defendant 3, which made it difficult for the supervisor of the work to properly conduct the work by designating the overlapping area of Defendant 3, and in the process of the installation of the first day to proceed with the installation of the second day by the time of the completion of the work of the first day.

5) Defendant 3

The Defendant, as a supervisor of the work neglected installation, has confirmed the preparation of the work permit, has taken necessary safety measures such as confirmation and removal of the danger factors prior to the work, has been suspended work, has been reported to the final permission-granting authority, has completed safety measures, has been conducted to the workers, has been conducted after checking the overall matters concerning safety measures at the time of resumption after suspension of work for more than one hour, has been posted the work permit at the site, has to begin work after checking the overall matters concerning safety measures at the time of resumption after suspension of work, and has a duty of care to prevent other work that can be shocked from being done on the inner wall of the shooting day because, if shock occurs within the shooting day, there is a high risk that the dust might occur due to the shock.

Nevertheless, the Defendant neglected the contents of work, work methods, safety rules, etc. to work without recognizing the danger of explosion, thereby failing to perform the duties of the workers, and caused the workers to work without properly recognizing the danger of explosion, and caused the work workers to perform the duties of the workers to perform the work at the site around the site where the work for the installation of the man-made is carried out, and the work for the installation of the rain to ensure the installation of the rain at the same time, without taking safety measures against it. Rather, the Defendant continuously carried out the work for the installation of the rain in the process of the installation of the rain.

6) Defendant 8

The defendant is the head of a public service team responsible for the change and review of the procedure for the management of changes and the implementation of the work in the procedure for the permission for the safety work. The defendant is responsible for closely examining the work contents and the period of the regular remuneration period established by the production team, including the work plan and the human resources management plan. In particular, considering the fact that the above work as the head of the department in charge of the works for the installation of the last time is first conducted since the establishment of the defendant 12's ○○ factory, an appropriate evaluation of the risk factors is conducted, the defendant shall instruct and supervise the production of an empty work plan by including click learning work or the process of completely removing flicks which remain inside the company's 70 days during the regular remuneration period, so that the defendant can secure the safety of the work site at a time when 70 days are engaged in the work site at a time during the regular remuneration period, and establish an appropriate remuneration plan for the work site, secure the safety section necessary, conduct the work safety inspection guidelines and supervision of the safety manager's prior work safety inspection and supervision guidelines.

Nevertheless, when formulating a regular repair plan for Defendant 12 ○○ Factory in 2013, the Defendant, along with the production team, included the work within the regular repair period, but did not prepare a specific work plan, furthermore, did not evaluate inherent risks inherent in the last day installation work, and thereby did not include in the work process the clean learning process to remove the whole internal flascing in a shooting day, and as a result, the Defendant did not supplement the personnel in charge of safety during the regular repair period or adjust the remuneration period and work schedule to the situation of human resources, and did not properly conduct on-site safety surveillance and supervision by monitoring and supervising two or more work sites per person when the last day is installed. In addition, the Defendant did not properly designate the inspection items in the safety work permit as two-lane or not instruct the public service team and supervisor to do so, and did not completely remove the inner flacing work and supervision over the last day.

7) Defendant 9

The Defendant, as a person in charge of the affairs, etc. that establish a regular repair plan by assisting the head of the public service team, is to conduct the work so that the last day of the work for the installation of the last time is appropriate by evaluating the risk factors first conducted since the establishment of the ○○ Factory, taking into account the fact that the last day of the work for the installation of the last time is appropriate, to include the clock work or process to completely remove the clock in the inside of the shooting day, and to establish a regular repair plan to ensure the safety of the work site and to ensure the safe work by setting the appropriate period of remuneration to ensure the safety of the work site, to secure the special safety section necessary for the work, to conduct the safety education before the work, to conduct the second physical check on the items of the work before the work, to conduct a review of the safety management plan, the appointment of the work supervisor, the work supervisor, to observe the work supervision guidelines and procedure, and to supervise the work properly.

Nevertheless, the Defendant did not include in the work of the fixed-term repair period, and as a result, the Defendant did not recruit the personnel in charge of safety during the fixed-term repair period or adjust the remuneration period and work schedule in accordance with the status of human resources, caused a situation in which the on-site safety surveillance and supervision is not properly performed. In addition, the Defendant failed to direct the inspection items in the safety work permit in two-lanes or to direct the work supervisor to do so, thereby leaving the work site to leave the work site. Defendant 4 left the work site by failing to properly manage and supervise Defendant 4, who is the work supervisor, thereby leaving the work site.

8) Defendant 4

The Defendant, as a supervisor of the work performed at the work site prior to the commencement of the work, has to enter the work site prior to the commencement of the work and to verify the conditions of the work site and the safety of the work process by confirming the condition of the work site and the safety of the work site. After conducting safety education for workers, the Defendant has to conduct the work after conducting safety education for workers. In the process of the work, the Defendant has a duty of care to ensure that other work is not carried out due to shock in the work site, such as checking whether the work is conducted safely in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the workers using the fire work tools, etc., and taking appropriate measures such as corrective instructions immediately upon discovery of the risk factor, and immediately taking corrective measures, etc. when the risk factor is discovered, the Defendant has to exercise a duty of care to prevent any other work that can be shocked from being carried out on the wall of the shooting day.

Nevertheless, the Defendant did not properly check the conditions of the work site related to the installation of the Mangyle, and did not take measures such as requesting the production team to remove fluor in spite of the existence of a large quantity of fluor inside the shooting day. As a result, the Defendant did not conduct safety education for the risk factors related to the work so that workers did not anticipate the risk of explosion at all, and did not attend the work site and proceed with the work in accordance with the safety work permit, without supervising the operation in accordance with the safety work permit, left the work site before explosion. The Defendant left the work site before explosion, without supervising the operation in accordance with the safety work permit, was caused by the shock that occurred in the process of the installation of the Mangyle and the shooting day, and he slur who was faced with the inner wall up on the bottom of the upper part, the Defendant Company 13 continued to perform the work in the process of the installation of the mangyle to the explosion and caused the danger of explosion by leaving the inner part of the explosion to progress.

9) Defendant 10

As a safety manager who manages industrial accident prevention plans, safety education, prevention of harm and danger, etc., the Defendant has a duty of care to check the preparation status of a direct safety work permit, finally confirm on-site safety variables, to issue a work permit if safety measures are incomplete or to find dangerous factors, and to thoroughly direct and supervise the on-site patrol and inspection during the work and to place appropriate safety patrols to perform them.

Nevertheless, the Defendant did not confirm the preparation status of the safety work permit during the installation of the Mandole, and did not finally confirm the safety variables, and found the risk factors of the work of the Mandole installation as the shooting day only as inflammable gas that remains inside the shooting day, and caused the removal of the risk factors by gas removal based on the nitrogen wave, so that the Defendant carried out the work without any countermeasures for plug, which is inflammable substances remaining inside the shooting day, and the safety patrolr could not properly carry out the patrol at the Mandole site without raising adequate number of personnel even though there is a shortage of the safety environment team members to carry out the safety patrol during the regular repair period.

10) Defendant 5

피고인은 사일로 등 고정기기 유지·보수업무를 오랫동안 해왔으므로 사일로 내부에 가연성 물질인 플러프가 남아 있을 것이라는 것을 예상할 수 있었고, 2012. 6. 발생한 ▷▷ 폭발사고 현장에 투입되어 수리작업에 참여한 경험도 있어 화기작업이 예정된 사일로 맨홀설치작업이 매우 위험한 작업으로 사일로 내부 및 주변에서 플러프가 완전히 제거된 후 작업을 진행해야 한다는 것을 알고 있었다.

In such a case, the Defendant, who is responsible for the safety manager of a supplier and supplier, has the duty of care to inform the workers of the risk of plug, to check whether the plug remains inside the work site prior to the commencement of the work, or to check whether the plug remains in the work site, and to proceed with the work while checking whether the plug remains in the process of the installation of the plug, to check whether the work workers remain in the work site, to check whether the plug remains in the work site, or to check whether the plug remains in the work site, to check whether the plug remains in the work site, to check whether the plug remains in the work site, and to check the existence of the plug, to stop the work for the workers, and to request Defendant 12, the prime contractor, to remove the plug, and to perform the plug work after completely removing the plug.

Nevertheless, while engaging in the work of installation of the Mangyle, the Defendant did not closely verify whether there are explosions, such as flus, in the working environment, according to Defendant 12’s employees’ work demand, or did not confirm the risk of flusing, did not notify the workers of the risk of flusing, did not prepare the safety inspection report of the fire work process, and left the scene as a field agent and the work should be completed safely. However, even if the work is completed, the Defendant left the scene around 17:00.

11) Defendant 11

As a person in charge of safety management at the work site, the Defendant notified work workers of the risk of plug, sent at the work site prior to the work site to confirm or instruct the plug to confirm whether the plug remains inside the work site, and the work workers should proceed with the work when confirming whether the plug remains in the work site during the work site where the plug installation is being carried out. The work workers should report whether the plug remains in the work site, confirm whether the plug remains in the work site, check whether the plug remains in the work site, and check the existence of the plug, and have the duty of care to perform the plug work after requesting the work workers to stop the work at the work site, Defendant 12, the original work site, removed the plug completely, and then have the duty of care to perform the plug work.

Nevertheless, the Defendant did not confirm the existence of the plug within the work site prior to the work site, and did not notify work workers of the risk of the plug or instruct work workers to report the fact that the plug remains during work. Rather, the Defendant did not suspend work even after checking the decline of the plug in the plug.

(b) Occurrence of death or injury caused by explosion on days of death;

The Defendants’ negligence in the above co-occupational negligence, as the man-made installation work for the fourth day was carried out in succession, and the last day of the 4th day was caused by the vibration and sway installation work by the vibration tools and the upper day, thereby leaving the lower part of the inner wall of the 1st (V-059D) as the shooting day. However, the plugg, etc., generated by Defendant 13’s work workers, when melting for the installation of the man-made, were laid down to the inner plug, and a large voltage was caused by the plugg, etc., coming into the upper part of the plug and on the wall, and the rapid explosion occurred from the above explosion on March 14, 2013 to the 9th day of the 5th day of the plug, and the pluggg, etc., caused to be laid down to the lower part on the wall of the 19th day (5th day of the plug).

At a point of 27 meters upper than V-059 D) and above explosion, the victim Nonindicted 3 (year 52), Nonindicted 4 (year 41), Nonindicted 5 (year 47), Nonindicted 6 (year 41), Nonindicted 8 (year 57), Nonindicted 9 (year 55), Nonindicted 10 (year 47), and 11 (year 52), Nonindicted 13 (year 52), Nonindicted 12 (year 52), Nonindicted 13 (year 38), Nonindicted 42 (old explosion), Nonindicted 32, Nonindicted 42 (year 42), Nonindicted 15 (year 164), and Defendant 16 (year 164), who was working for the defendant 13, who was working for the defendant 13 at a point of 9 meters above the shooting, was exposed to or was exposed to the scene of the accident (year 146), Nonindicted 46 (year 16).

Therefore, the victim non-indicted 3, 4, and 6 were damaged by diversified frighting, the victim non-indicted 5 was damaged by frighting frighting frighting frighting frighting frighting frighting frighting frighting frighting frighting frighting frighting frighting frighting frighting frighting frighting frighting frighting frighting frighting frighting frighting frighting frighting frighting frighting frighting frighting frighting frighting frighting frighting frighting frighting frighting frighting frighting frighting frightite, the victim non-indicted 12 died from frighting frighting frighting frighting frighting frighte, the victim non-indicted 6.

Accordingly, the Defendants jointly caused the death of six victims, Nonindicted 3, etc. due to the above occupational negligence, and the Defendants suffered injury to 10 victims, Nonindicted 8, etc.

2. Violation of the Occupational Safety and Health Act by Defendants 1 and 12 (Ordinance of the Ministry of Health and Safety)

A business owner shall take safety and health measures prescribed by the rules on standards for occupational health and safety, such as maintaining the floor of the workplace in a safe and clean state so that no danger, such as getting off or getting off the workplace, etc., and shall not use an organization which has not received safety certification.

Nevertheless, Defendant 1, as a person in charge of safety and health management for employees of Defendant 12’s ○○ Factory, used an apparatus that did not receive safety certification without implementing safety and health measures over a total of 429 items as indicated in the attached Table of Crimes (1), including that the indoor floor of the wastewater treatment plant is not maintained safely and cleanly at the time of special supervision conducted by the Gwangju Regional Employment and Labor Office from March 18, 2013 to April 1, 2013, and Defendant 1, as an employee of Defendant 12, committed such a violation as above with respect to the Defendant’s business.

3. Violation of the Occupational Safety and Health Act by Defendants 5 and 13

(a) Violation of the Occupational Safety and Health Act related to an explosion accident (2013 highest 954, 2013 highest 1469);

(1) The business owner shall not use any dangerous substance, such as a place where explosion or fire is likely to occur due to a dangerous substance, or any fire, machine, apparatus, tool, tool, etc. which occurs or is likely to occur at the upper part thereof, and (2) No dangerous substance, any dangerous work such as flammable or inflammable solid substance other than dangerous substance, or pipeline, tank, drum, etc. which are likely to be inflammable or inflammable, shall be allowed to be conducted in advance without taking measures for the prevention of explosion or fire, such as removal of inflammable or inflammable solid substance other than dangerous substance or dangerous substance.

Nevertheless, Defendant 5, as a person in charge of safety and health management for the installation of the Mandole on the business day in the ○○ Factory contracted by Defendant 12 by Defendant 13, did not take measures to prevent harm and danger as above, allowing employees under his control to continue to contact and melting with six victims, as described in the above Paragraph 1, without taking measures to prevent harm and danger and injury as a person in charge of safety and health management for the installation of Mandole on the business day in which Defendant 13 was contracted by Defendant 12, and without taking measures to prevent harm and danger, at night, he did not cause death of six victims, Nonindicted 3, etc., as described in the above Paragraph 1. Defendant 13, who is an employee of Defendant 5, committed an act in violation of the above provisions

(b) Violation of the Occupational Safety and Health Act related to special supervision (2013 highest 1727);

Where a business owner installs safety risks in order to prevent the falling, etc. of workers, he/she shall take measures for preventing risks prescribed by the rules on standards for occupational safety and health, such as installing a network to prevent the occurrence of the edge or object from falling off or getting off, and shall not use an organization which has not received safety certification.

Nevertheless, Defendant 5, as a person in charge of actual safety and health management for employees of Defendant 13 Co., Ltd., Defendant 12, from March 20, 2013 to March 27, 2013, as Defendant 12 Co., Ltd., Defendant 5 used an organization that did not receive safety certification without taking risk prevention measures over a total of 53 cases as shown in the attached Table 2, including that Defendant 5, who is an employee of Defendant 13, did not install the end board or vertical protection network at the special supervision conducted by the Gwangju Regional Employment and Labor Office. Defendant 5, as above, committed an act of violating the Defendant’s duties.

1. Each legal statement of the defendant 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10, each legal statement of the defendant 2, 5, and 11;

1. Each prosecutor's protocol of examination of the suspect against the defendant 3, 4, 5, and 11;

1. Each prosecutor’s protocol on Nonindicted 18, 19, 13, 20, 21, and 22

1. Each police statement of Nonindicted 14, 23, 17, 16, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 10, 9, 38, 39, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, and 46

1. The actual condition survey report;

1. 각 내사보고 및 수사보고[사고현장 배관반장 공소외 16 진술에 대하여, 작업자 진술청취건, 폭발당시 생존자 공소외 16, 13, 14 진술 청취 요점, 사일로 맨홀작업에 사용된 공구 설명 및 사진자료 첨부, 사일로 분진 제거 클리닝에 대해, □□공단 내 석유화학제품 생산업체들의 사일로 분진제거 작업방법에 대해, 사일로 물세척건, ◈◈◈◈ 공소외 47 이사 진술건, 압 제1호 이메일 자료(익일 08:00부터 화기작업 예정), 피고인 12 회사 작업감시, 감독인력 부족 문제건, ♤♤화학 ○○ HDPE 공장에서 사일로 수리작업 시 사일로를 물세척한 내용 관련 자료 첨부]

1. A written autopsy report, each death diagnosis report, and a report on the results of autopsy and appraisal;

1. Each written diagnosis;

1. Scenes image outputs at the scene of the accident, and photographs of Defendant 12 on the site of the ○○ Factory Accident;

1. Safety work permit; and

1. Arrangement map of work sites;

1. A copy of the safety permission procedure, PT data, production team work procedure, official team work procedure, change management procedure, and copy of the report;

1. The explosion classified by the substance safety and health data (high density polyethylene), V-059 A-D shooting;

1. A copy of risk assessment (K-PSR techniques) for V-059 A-D M/H operations;

1. A written appraisal of the cause of explosion of ○○○ Defendant 12 (the second written appraisal);

1. Guidelines for safety management concerning the maintenance and repair of chemical factories;

【Crimes No. 2 at the Time of Sales】

1. Defendant 1’s legal statement

1. A report on safety and health supervision, including manufacturing business;

【Criminal facts of No. 3-B at the Time of Sales】

1. Defendant 5’s legal statement

1. The police suspect interrogation protocol against Nonindicted 20

1. The police statement of Nonindicted 48

1. A table of construction safety and health supervision and checkup;

A. Facts charged and the Defendants’ assertion

A prosecutor brought a public prosecution to the effect that the instant accident occurred, “In the course of performing the work of installation of a sloping and dust by the vibration tools, caused a sudden explosion inside the shooting day because of a sloping dust or an incomplete spread work, or a gas measurement on the remaining gas that was not verified by the installation of a sloping in the lower part of the shooting day and caused a sudden explosion.” As a result, the prosecutor prosecuted the instant accident to the effect that “the occurrence of the instant accident, which occurred in the course of the sloping work for installation of a sloping gas on the lower part and the wall, caused a sudden explosion due to a sudden breakdown on the lower part of the shooting day and on the wall.”

As to this, Defendant 1, 2, 3, 6, 10, 8, 7, 9 and the defense counsel argued that the possibility of explosion of inflammable gas remaining within the shooting day or accumulated by the third heat source is rare, and that it is difficult to see that there was a concrete vision of accident occurrence even if explosion occurred due to the action of the internal plug on the shooting day, it is difficult to view that there was an explosion clearly.

(b) Fact of recognition;

According to the evidence adopted and examined by this Court, the following facts are recognized.

1) On March 14, 2013, in the upper part of the shooting day (V-059D) where the instant accident occurred, around 20:51, at around the first explosion (V-059 D), nine persons were in office in the upper part under the direction of Nonindicted 16, the head of the Working Group of Defendant 13, and on the lower part of the day (second floor), Nonindicted 13 was in office with the pipe pipe Nonindicted 15, 14, and 52, used a hole on the Gu cut by using the pipe pipe 15, 14, and 52.

2) From March 12, 2013 to March 14, 2013, the date of the instant accident, Defendant 12’s factory: (a) suspended polyethyl process from the operation of polyethyl process to the am on March 14, 2013; (b) removed inflammable gas by doing so; (c) on the day of the accident, around 13:00, around 13:00, after checking whether there were gas residues by drilling electric shocks, etc. and by inserting gas therein.

3) 피고인 13 회사 작업자들이 맨홀설치를 위하여 구멍을 뚫을 때부터 사일로 내부에서는 플러프 분진이 떨어지는 것이 목격되었고, 사일로 안쪽을 들여다보았을 때에는 사일로의 깔때기 모양 하단부(Cone, 콘)에 손으로 쓸어 담으면 한 움큼 쥘 수 있는 분량의 분말이 남아 있었으며, 사고 당일 18:00 이후 야간작업을 시작할 무렵에는 사일로 아래의 바닥으로 10kg 부대자루 분량의 분말이 흘러나와 있어 피고인 12 회사 현장직원인 피고인 3의 지시에 따라 피고인 13 회사 작업자들이 사일로 하부 밸브를 잠근 다음 흘러나온 플러프를 치우고, 다른 일부 사일로에는 마대포대를 가져와 그 하부 입구를 묶어 놓기도 했다.

4) Although Defendant 13’s employees engaged in the work of Defendant 13 either potents in the o’clock on the day of the instant accident and polyman reinforcement plates were used on the day of the instant accident, Defendant 12’s agent Nonindicted 33 instructed that the agent of Defendant 12’s official team would have been wrong, and then opened the reinforcement board, cut off the reinforcement board, and cut off the hole widely by the rasher, and then 20:0 to 20:30 hours break again, Nonindicted 13 et al. conducted a provisional attachment.

5) From 18:00 to 18:00, there was a strong vibration in the shooting day to make a moving passage to the shooting day by using iron plates, and the employees of Defendant 12 and Defendant 13 at the site showed that, thereby, they flusing away from the shooting day. In addition, Nonindicted 13 at the time of having contacted the instant accident immediately before the instant accident, the inside was not easily seen, but there was a dust in the part where the light was cut off, and there was a dust in the front, and there was a dust out of the hole.

6) While marropher shielding that was implemented in the process of melting the manle reinforcement board causes a spatial shock between the melting studs and the breasts, melting the melting of the melting and melting of the melting materials by using the electric heat of the early high temperature generated at that time, less fugitives are generated compared to the ordinary melting of the upper temperature that directly uses electric shocks, but if there is an indirect contact between melting and the melting of the melting materials by direct contact or melting of the melting strings, a considerable quantity of metal melting and surrounding areas may be created. When Nonindicted 13, on the ground of the instant accident, melting Nonindicted 13, prior to the instant accident, melting the melting 10cm length from the end of the melting earth to the end of the melting one, and part of the melting liding to the surface of the liding or the melting liding date.

7) At the time of the instant accident, Non-Party 25 and 28, who was in the process of mooring at the site of Defendant 13, had been engaged in the instant accident, had observed the pipes installed adjacent to the date of the accident while moving to assist in the work on the accident shooting day, and Non-Party 24, who was on the part of the accident, was flying off on the wall, showed that the light which was probied from the wall on the side of the accident, was probied by the upper half. After the locking, explosion occurred along with the large “adication”. On the other hand, the first explosion on the shooting day, Non-Party 13, who was in the middle of the man-made hole, was on the top of the man-made hole and was on the top of the fourth parallel, and was on the top of the fourth parallel, after having been on the top of the man-made hole, and was on the top of the first hole, at the time, at the top of the dust, there was a very high rate of dust and gas damage.

(c) Results of the expert’s appraisal and analysis on causes of explosion;

1) Part of the Secretariat of the National Scientific Investigative Institute;

The Secretariat of the National Institute of Scientific Investigation (hereinafter referred to as the "Secretariat") submitted to the police the following appraisal request report through three on a site investigation from March 15, 2013 to March 21, 2013.

A) In light of the fact that polyethyl ethyl melting is melting on the inner wall of the shooting day (V-059B, D) explosiveed by the instant accident, and the inner wall of the non-explosion (V-059C) is attached to a large quantity of polyethyl ethyl powder on the wall surface, etc., it is presumed that polyethyl ethyl powder was in large quantity inside the shooting day before explosion occurs.

B) In light of the fact that sculptures, etc. cut from the inner cruel of explosions are identified, it is presumed that combustible gas has been generated and distributed by the process of heating, etc. while in contact with polyethyl powder, which was generated from the cutting process of the lower part of the dusts.

C) Considering the fact that there remain 6 dunes of the original cutting part of V-059 D with the first explosion (V-059 D) and the fact that there is a melting trace, it is presumed that explosion has occurred due to the fire, etc. that occurred in the course of melting work, and it is assumed that explosion has occurred by spreading inflammable gas distributed inside the shooting day.

(d) A nearby shooting (V-059B) is presumed to have been explosiond by heat and flames emitted due to explosion generated inside the first explosion (V-059D) and to have burned nearby combustible materials, and attaching combustible gas, etc. distributed inside the shooting day adjacent to that wave.

(ii)the Supreme Prosecutors' Office Scientific Investigation Team;

The Supreme Prosecutors' Office Scientific Investigation Team of the Supreme Prosecutors' Office (hereinafter referred to as the "Stop Fire Investigation Team") conducted a fire scattering test in the process of cutting off, cutting off, and galeing from May 16, 2013 to May 17, 2013, and submitted to the Prosecutor's Office a report on the grounds of explosion with the following contents:

A) In order to generate inflammable gas due to thermal melting of polyethyl dust, more heat than a ionide (referring to polyethyl ionene dye dye dye dye dye dye dye dye dye dye dye dye dye dye dye dye dye dye dye dye dye dye dye dye dye dye dye dye dye dye dye dye dye dye dye dye dye dye dye dye dye dye dye dye dye dye dye dye dye dye) continuously supplied.

B) The possibility of explosion by remaining gas not returned inside the shooting days is presumed to be low, in light of the fact that all the blosting machines (a machine sending wind to a voltager) was cut off on the shooting day before 50 hours prior to the occurrence of the accident, and spread and ventilation was carried out, and that there was no malfunction in the time of measuring the remaining gas on the date of the accident.

(C) As a result of an experiment conducted to cut dust into canlelight slelights by cutting powder products containing dust into their inner wall of explosions, it would result in a sudden combustion and strong pressure when the dust dust slelights occur when the dust slelights occur after slelighting, burning, and burning canlelights, the highest temperature of which is 1,200 cclelights.

D) The thalthic temperature generated from the contact at the contact of the contact at the time of the contact at the time of the contact at the time of the contact at the time of the contact at the time of the contact at the highest of 520.6C, which is sufficient temperature to be the direct source of the dust. Therefore, as the dust attached to the inner wall of the stalthic by shock, such as the radar work, has broken down, and as a result, the stalthic concentration at the lower level and on the wall of the stalthic is presumed to have occurred, and as a result, it is presumed that a sudden explosion has occurred because the dust loaded on the lower level and on the wall of the stalthic has broken out, and the concentration of dust has been increased, thereby making it presumed that

3) Nonindicted 49 professor of △△ University

On April 17, 2013 and April 26, 2013, Defendant 12 analyzed the following causes of accidents based on the CCTV images at the time of the accident and the results of the on-site investigation conducted in Defendant 12’s factory ○○○ Factory on April 26, 2013.

A) It is difficult to cause fire or explosion due to the occurrence of a large quantity of inflammable gas due to the characteristics of Aluminium, which is fast cooling, by a heat source by the crowdfunding, or by in contact with polyethyl powder powder.

B) While working workers have been melting inside a shooting, some of the aluminium aluminium bars, which are not melted, have been melted, and at the same time, there was an initial fire in polyethyl powder powder at the lower part of the lower part, and at the same time, combustible gas generated by burning in the upper direction at a rapid speed of ethyl sirens attached to the lower part of the lower part and the inner wall, is presumed to have been explosively explosiond.

4) Non-Indicted 50 of the professional examiners

The results of hearing the opinions of Nonindicted 50 designated by this court as professional examiners are as follows.

A) In light of the temperature measured in the testing conducted by the prosecution fire reduction team, it is extremely insufficient to generate inflammable gases by heating high density polyethylene. Therefore, it is difficult to view that explosion has occurred due to addition of chemical source after the generation of inflammable gas by the foregoing substance, such as the result of appraisal between the state and the water.

B) In order to reach or exceed the lower limit of powder explosion, the volume of load on the surface must reach the degree of observation. However, in light of the fact that an explosion did not occur even if several times of having been conducted prior to the occurrence of an accident, and there was no specific testimony that a large amount of dusts at the time of being melted was widely laid off inside the shooting day, it is unreasonable to view that the direct ignition was made in the shot dust from the beginning.

C) From the scene photographs of the accident site, at least a number of dust-proof stories was slided at the inner wall of the accident site. However, as high temperature melting from the wall that occurred in the process of melting to the vertical or large angles, if they fall down on the wall surface so as to fall down, the cooling speed is rapidly high, and the possibility of reduction of heat is high. Considering that the above conditions were created, the melting of gas on the last floor at the lower end of the accident site is opened, and again, the area of the wall was dried by a large-scale explosion with the lower part of the container, which led to a large-scale explosion of the wall, and the explosion and melting of the lower part of the wall, which led to an explosion or a large-scale explosion rate (the main body and the lower part of the wall, which led to a large-scale explosion of the wall and the lower part of the wall, were dried with an explosion or a large-scale explosion rate. At the same time, it was likely that they were burned by an explosion and burning pressure.

C. Determination

1) As to the explosion of remaining gas

As seen earlier, Defendant 12: (a) carried out the internal plug and ventilation work on the day of the accident after cutting off the inner plug on the day of the accident; (b) carried out the excavation and ventilation work on the day of the accident; (c) there was no remaining gas by drilling, even if there was no continuous heat source, the remaining gas does not reach the level of gas emissions capable of explosion only with the remaining gas generated by naturally decomposition of the wall and floor through the process of spreading within the sand where the gas was naturally removed; and (d) it is difficult to view that there was no other internal plug within the premise that there was no other external pluging work under the premise that there was no possibility of remaining gas remaining within the premise that there was no other external pluging work under the premise that there was no other external pluging work, in light of the material and temperature, etc. of the fact that there was no continuous pluging heat necessary for gas generation; and (e) there was no possibility that there was no other external pluging work under the premise that there was no other internal plation work.

2) As to earthquake explosions

There is a difference between the large fire reduction team and Nonindicted 49, and Nonindicted 50 of the specialized examination committee, in regard to whether the first place of melted absence or the first place of melting waste is plug which was stored on the floor on the floor of the shooting day, whether it is plugf floor attached to the inner wall of the shooting day, or not, or whether it is plugged by vibration while falling and falling out by vibration, there is a difference between the large fire reduction team and the specialized examination committee.

The opinions and the grounds of the above experts and the explosions of dust explosion generally vary depending on the chemical nature and formation of dust dust, the size and distribution of entrance drawings, the state of visitors and surface, and the intensity of the pots, etc., so the upper and lower width is considerably wide compared to gas explosion. In a case where plugs attached to the inner surface due to external vibration inside the shooting days the height of which exceeds 20 meters, are falling short of the inner surface due to external vibration, there is sufficient possibility that they were laid down due to the resistance from the air and the resistance. On the other hand, according to the video conducted by Defendant 12 after the accident, the processed dusts generated at the time of the accident and at the time of the accident can not be excluded from the first stage of combustion or explosion because it can be confirmed that there was a possibility that the first stage of combustion or explosion was made on the wall surface as the first day of combustion or explosion.

However, the above experts' opinions agree with regard to the fact that the accident of this case occurred as the explosion conditions were formed due to scattering materials and internal fluences, and the following circumstances which can be known from the above recognition facts are ① fire extinguishings and fluorries from the melting machine at the time of using lids and lids, and ② immediately after the 4th of explosion, there was no possibility of spreading and gas from the inner fluoring date to the outside, ② there was no possibility of spreading the dust and gas to the outside of the gluoring date, ③ there was no possibility of spreading other than the first gluoring date in the process of using glusium, ③ there was a work involving a considerable amount of dust in the outer wall and upper part before and after the glusing, and ④ there was an accident that occurred out of the gluoring date to the outside of the gluoring date, and ④ there was no possibility of spreading other than the first gluoring date in the process of spreading.

3) Sub-decisions

Therefore, with respect to the explosion of the instant accident, the part of the facts charged, except for the part that the processed dust, etc., was stuck to inflammable gas and fluorries in the indictment, shall be found to have caused a sudden explosion, as stated in its reasoning, with regard to the explosion of the instant accident, with the addition to the part that the processed dust, etc., generated by Defendant 13’s contact with the employees of the company, was laid to the fluor in the inside of the shooting day and caused a heavy pressure, and as the fluorg dust on the wall was laid to the fluor and on the wall.

2. Determination on Defendant 2 and his/her defense counsel’s assertion

A. Summary of the assertion

The Defendant issued a work permit for the installation of the man-made hole separately from new work, installation work, and mooring work, and issued a permit for the installation of the man-made hole, and prohibited the vertical work such as the melting work. As such, the Defendant did not allow the man-made hole installation work at the same time with one work permit.

B. Determination

1) On the part of Defendant 13, immediately after the instant accident occurred, Defendant 13 collected work permit at the scene of the accident (the work site column includes “Sildo/Blur BTM,” “fire complainting fire for the installation of new Sildo & Blender,” “work permit-related non-intervening work” in the work site column; hereinafter “work permit 1”) and submitted it on March 19, 2013 when the police investigation began, which was different from that of Defendant 13’s submission to the police officer on March 15, 2013, and the Defendant asserted that “the above work permit for the removal of the above work permit from the date of the instant accident to the date of the removal of the work permit from the date of the instant accident,” and that “the above work permit for the removal of the work permit for the first time after the date of the accident to the date of the first time after the date of the accident.”

2) However, in full view of the following circumstances revealed by the evidence and the record as seen earlier, it is reasonable to view that the Defendant issued a work permit ① to Defendant 13 at the time of issuing the work permit and granting permission at the same time as the last installation work including the contact work and the rain work. On the other hand, the work permit ② The contents of the work permit are written after the instant accident, and it cannot be said that the work permit was normally issued before the instant accident.

A) On the day of the accident on the day of the accident, the contact work and the vision work was conducted at the same time during the installation of the mandones on the day of the accident.

From the day of the accident, Defendant 13 carried out the work of cutting the top hole in part of the installation day of the Mangle and cutting up the reinforcement board around it, from 18:00, Defendant 13 had been engaged in the work of cutting up at the same time. However, from among the employees of Defendant 12 who had been at the site, directized work was prohibited, and he was not allowed to do so. Defendant 3, the work supervisor, was asked of the workers of Defendant 13, who was asked about whether he would be melting, immediately allowed the work, and Defendant 4, the work supervisor, was allowed to leave the site without saying a report to do so, and was removed from the site on the day of the accident, and the official team staff was removed from the site on the day of the accident, and was removed from the site on the day of the accident, and was removed from the site on the day of the accident, and was found to have been removed from the site on the day of the accident.

B) Defendant 13’s statement is consistent with the fact that only one written work permit was issued and that there was a work permit for the entire installation work at the time.

At least 15:00 on March 13, 2013, the day before the instant accident occurred, Nonindicted 18, who is an employee of the Defendant 13, attended a meeting held at the production team office on behalf of Defendant 5, and told Defendant 1 to perform the installation work of new date and the installation work of the last time on the following day. The head of Defendant 6’s team first required to do so on the new date, which means 16:0 after the completion of the meeting, Defendant 5’s report to Defendant 1, the pipeline was fast at the latest, and Nonindicted 3 did not immediately request the installation work of the first time after the establishment of the first time, and Defendant 4 did not look at the first time on the construction permit of the second time, and Defendant 4 did not appear at the work permit of the second time, and Defendant 4 did not appear at the work permit of the second time on the date of the instant accident. However, Defendant 4 did not appear at the work permit of the second time on the date of the instant accident.

C) Defendant 3 and Defendant 4 recognized the fact that the Defendant permitted the installation work of the Mandones on the day of the instant accident at an investigative agency, and that the fact was made ex post facto.

At the police first, Defendant 3 and Defendant 4, a field supervisor and supervisor, asserted that they carried out work based on the work permit stating the phrase “the prohibition of vertical work” from the Defendant on the day of the instant accident, upon obtaining the work permit from the Defendant on the day of the instant accident. On the grounds that the statement on the process of delivery does not coincide with the Defendant, and that measures on inspection items and instructions in the work permit were not taken at the site, Defendant 4 continued to change the statement, such as re-afusing the work permit before the instant accident during the four-time interrogations, although the signature and the private person in the disturbance of the work supervisor did not have his body, they did not know that the signature of the work permit was in accord with the content, but did not know that it was fabricated.

I begin with the prosecutor's office, I would like to see the fact. I would like to say that I would like to see that I would like to see the above fact. I would like to say that I would like to see that I would like to see the fact. I would like to say that I would like to see that I would like to see that I would like to see that I would like to see that I would like to see that I would like to see that I would like to see that I would like to see that I would like to see. I would like to say that I would like to see that I would like to see that I would like to see that I would like to see that I would like to see that I would like to see the fact that I would like to see that I would like to see that I would like to see that I would like to know that I would like to see that I would like to see that I would like to see that I would like to see that I would like to see that I will work permit to us will work.

Then, Defendant 3 and Defendant 4 maintained the position that they would be fake to the above written work permit even after being examined in her face with the Defendant, and Defendant 4 also pointed out that the contents of the written work permit ② were examined and doubtful. In addition, Defendant 3 stated in the three-time suspect examination conducted immediately after her face-to-face examination that “There is a private person who presented a work permit, despite being unaware of who was the two agents of Defendant 2 during the first-aid service after getting injured and getting out of the accident in question, although he was not aware of the fact that he was the two agents of Defendant 3 during the three-time suspect examination conducted immediately after her face-to-face examination.” Defendant 4 also stated that Defendant 4 presented the work permit after the occurrence of the accident in this case, requested the Defendant to write his signature, requested to write his signature, and the signature and private person on the part of the extension period of the work permit was stated in the body of the other person, and did not present his true position.

Considering the aforementioned circumstances, including Defendant 4 and Defendant 3’s history of the statement, the structure and rationality of the contents of the statement, the situation before and after the accident, and the degree of agreement between Defendant 13’s employees, etc., it is not deemed that Defendant 4 and Defendant 3 made a false statement at the prosecutor’s office.

D) Permits to work do not constitute a normal working permit.

A normal work number is assigned to one work. If the defendant issued the work permit for the last work permit in addition to the installation work and the non-installation work, the two work permit forms different work numbers. However, the work permit forms the two different work numbers. ② The work permit forms the same work number as the work permit ①, ② The work permit forms the part of “Bender V-059 G through JTM Pozle production”, not Defendant 13, but Defendant 13, and the police investigation reveals that the studio on the day of the instant accident was performed by the Defendant’s work permit for the “B-05 Line installation and non-installation work” including the above work from the Defendant, and ② the work permit does not indicate that the on-site supervisor conducted the work in the front inspection and the demand, and the confirmation document is omitted.

In light of the fact that there is a serious defect in the work number and the contents of the work, and there is no indication in the second inspection and the confirmation statement about the workers to have been performed before the work, unlike other work permits issued on the same day, it is difficult to regard the work permit as being normally issued before the work.

E) The Defendant did an act that is formally difficult to understand in the process of submitting a work permit (2) and there is no credibility of the Defendant’s statement on the grounds of its acquisition.

On March 15, 2013, about five hours after the occurrence of the accident, the Defendant, at around 01:38, 01:00, was placed in the nearby stairs due to the accident for which the police's access was controlled by the police. The Defendant was asked from the police officer to check whether he was into the polysperson on the ground of unsperson, and submitted a work permit 2.

However, in light of the fact that the police manpower, etc. were dispatched to the site immediately after the accident in this case and carried out the accident management along with the employees of Defendant 12 and Defendant 13, and Defendant 12 and Defendant 13 searched the site by using their employees to secure the work permit on the day of the accident, and that the work permit that was located far around the scene was not discovered until five hours after the accident occurred until the date of the accident, it is difficult to believe the Defendant’s statement about the process of obtaining the work permit is difficult. Furthermore, according to the Defendant’s statement, the Defendant’s statement is clearly anticipated to receive the investigation in relation to the accident in this case as the captain and the issuer of the work permit. However, even though the Defendant entered the place near the police control area to the near the scene of the accident in question, it was doubtful by arbitrarily citing the work permit to have been preserved in the scene, and it is difficult to reasonably explain the reasons why the Defendant did not perform the above act unless the Defendant acted for the purpose of manipulating or concealing the work permit.

3) Therefore, the above argument by the defendant and his defense counsel cannot be accepted.

3. Determination as to Defendant 5, 11 and defense counsel’s assertion

A. Summary of the assertion

The Defendants trusted that Defendant 12 had been properly engaged in the field and cleaning work, and under the above circumstances, it is difficult to view that the Defendants had a duty of care to check whether there remains a fluor inside the shooting day and to suspend the work. In addition, the Defendants did not have been able to anticipate the risk of the occurrence of an accident only with the result of the inflammable gas measurement conducted by Defendant 12 prior to the work, and there was no expectation to suspend the work in Defendant 13, the subcontractor, solely on the ground that the employees of Defendant 12, the prime contractor, were fluor, under the circumstances where the employees of Defendant 12 were specifically ordered to engage in the work.

B. Determination

The above evidence and records revealed as follows. In other words, the defendants are the field manager and safety manager of the defendant 13 company who directly employs daily workers and perform the contract work, and there is no material to view that the defendant 13 was entrusted to the defendant 12 company, who is the contractor, exclusively takes charge of safety matters within the workplace. On the day of the accident in this case, it was observed that the defendant 12 company was able to get off combustible materials within the shooting days from the date of the accident in this case to the time of the melting work. The duty to follow the original contractor's instructions cannot be seen as having priority over the duty to take safety consideration for the employees under his command. In full view of the defendants' career and experience in the field, at the time of the accident in this case, the defendants did not have any duty to ascertain the possibility of explosion and the possibility of explosion before reliance on the results of the spread and gas measurement work conducted by the defendant 12 company, and if so, there was no adequate possibility to expect the danger of explosion in the region.

Therefore, we cannot accept the above argument of the defendant and defense counsel.

- Defendant 1: Articles 268 and 30 of the Criminal Act; Articles 268 and 30 of the Criminal Act; Articles 71, 67 subparag. 1, and 23(1) and (3) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act; Articles 71, 67 subparag. 1, and 23(1) and (3) of the same Act; Articles 71, 67 subparag. 1, and 24(1) of the same Act; Articles 71, 67-2 subparag. 1, and 34-4(1)1 of the same Act (the use of an apparatus without safety certification) of the same Act;

- Articles 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 of the Criminal Act: Articles 268 and 30 of the Criminal Act (the occupation of occupational injury) and Articles 268 and 30 of the Criminal Act (the occupation of occupational injury by occupational negligence)

- Defendant 5: Articles 268 and 30 of each Criminal Act; Articles 268 and 30 of each Criminal Act; Articles 71, 66-2 and 23(1)2 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act; Articles 71, 67 subparag. 1, and 23(1) and (3) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act; Articles 71, 67-2 and 23(1)2 of each Occupational Safety and Health Act (the use of equipment without safety certification) of each Occupational Safety and Health Act;

- Article 71, Article 67 subparag. 1, Article 23(1) and (3), and Article 24(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (the failure to take safety measures); Article 71, Article 67 subparag. 1, and Article 24(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (the failure to take safety measures); Article 71, Article 67-2 subparag. 1, and Article 34-4(1)1 (the use of an apparatus for which safety certification has not been granted) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act;

- Defendant 13 Company: Articles 71, 66-2, and 23(1)2 (a) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act; Articles 71, 67 subparag. 1, and 23(1) and (3) (a) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act; (b) Articles 71, 67-2 subparag. 1, and 34-4(1)1 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (the use of an apparatus which did not obtain safety certification)

1. Commercial competition;

- Defendants 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11: Articles 40 and 50 of the Criminal Act (each of the crimes of occupational death and bodily injury by occupational negligence)

- Defendant 5: Articles 40 and 50 of the Criminal Act [Punishments imposed on the violation of the Occupational Safety and Health Act with the largest punishment]

1. Selection of punishment;

- Defendant 1: Determination of imprisonment without prison labor for the crime of occupational injury and death, and imprisonment for the crime of violation of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, respectively.

- Defendant 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10: Selection of imprisonment without prison labor

- Defendant 5: Selection of each imprisonment

- Defendant 11: Selection of a fine

1. Aggravation for concurrent crimes;

- Defendant 1: the former part of Article 37, Article 38(1)2, Article 38(2), and Article 50 of the Criminal Act

- Defendant 5: the former part of Article 37, Article 38(1)2, and Article 50 of the Criminal Act

1. Detention in a workhouse;

Defendant 11: Articles 70 and 69(2) of the Criminal Act

1. Suspension of execution;

Defendant 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10: Article 62(1) of the Criminal Act (The conditions favorable to the reasons for sentencing below)

1. Order of provisional payment;

Defendant 11, Defendant 12, and Defendant 13: Article 334(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act

The instant accident caused the death of 6 workers, 10 workers, and 10 workers were killed, and 3 of them were suffering from severe images and continuously requiring treatment so far, and thus, the damage caused by the Defendants’ breach of safety measures. Although, after the accident, Defendant 12 paid KRW 39 million to the bereaved family members of the victims who died in Defendant 12 after the accident, KRW 40 million to KRW 39 million, and Defendant 13 paid KRW 278 million to the victims who suffered the injury for each medical fee and accident compensation, the physical and mental impulse and the family suffering from the victims cannot be recovered only by monetary compensation.

2. Responsibility and possibility of criticism for the occurrence of an accident;

The instant accident cannot be seen as only human resources where the industrial site’s typical risk of accidents has been realized due to the negligence of on-site personnel, in that the heat source generated in the field work was discharged into a shooting day from which dust was discharged, and explosion took place, by conducting fire work and vibration generation work without completely removing inflammable substances in a high density polyethyl ethyl interim product storage and a shooting day.

In addition, the Defendants, as employees of Defendant 12 or Defendant 13, have been engaged in the business of manufacturing and storing petrochemicalss or the maintenance and repair of their facilities for a long time in the chemical factory within the ○ Industrial Complex. Moreover, Defendant 12’s plant at the ○○○○○○ company, which caused a fire by putting in the 2nd in June, 2012 due to the luscing of the luscing of the luscing of the luscing of the lusc inscing of the luscing of the lusc inscing of the lusc inscing of the lusc inscing of the lusc inscing of the lusc inscing of the lusc inscing of the lusc inscing of the lusc inscinsc inscins and the possibility of remaining inscinscins as well as due care.

3. Individual reasons for sentencing

A. Defendant 1

The Defendant is a person in charge of safety and health management in charge of the employees of ○○○ Factory and its partner company’s safety and health management. The Defendant graduated from the chemical engineering department at knex University, and worked for about 30 years only in the field of flexibility of Defendant 12, and appears to have been equipped with considerable knowledge about the nature of polyethylene and the risk of explosion of chemical dusts. In particular, the Defendant was aware of the need to take safety measures for polyethyl storage facilities in the process of processing blren explosive accidents in around June 2012, which occurred after the completion of the factory site, and formulating follow-up measures. In light of the fact that: (a) the inside of ○○ Factory and its partner company’s safety management and supervision over the safety of ethyl products is more unstable than that of the final product storage, and that the risk of explosion is considerably high when the number of accidents and contact work is performed; and (b) the Defendant was unable to easily expect the safety inspection and supervision of 20 years during which it was performed through on-site surveillance of employees.

However, in the accident of this case, the defendant's primary and reflects the fact that the defendant had been performing his duties in his business area, as a general manager for safety and health in the factory, should have ordered workers to take measures to clean the inside in full so as not to cause fire or explosion in the course of performing fire work on the shooting day. It seems that any department in charge of performing repair work of the shooting day equipment did not present the defendant's opinion that there is a need to take measures to remove frout dust such as water cleaning in advance. The accident of this case is an accident that occurred while the defendant installed a man at the bottom for the purpose of enhancing the safety and convenience of internal management work as part of safety measures for explosion in 2012, and the defendant has no choice but to delegate supervision over the site as a factory of ○○ factory up to 306 workers, and the defendant has no choice but to have performed supervision over the construction site of this case on the day of the accident that he did not have a relatively small number of employees in charge of installation and supervision on the day of the accident (the construction site of this case).

B. Defendant 2, 3, and 4

Defendant 2: (a) as a supervisor of the instant accident, who permitted the instant accident’s cutting-out and vision work, and issued a safety work permit, issued a work permit without checking the work site despite the primary responsibility to remove the risk factors in the work site; (b) Defendant 3, as a field supervisor, did not stop work and did not confirm that a considerable amount of plugs fall from the work site; (c) instead, Defendant 4, as a field supervisor, requested the production team to permit the installation of the last stop work on the date of the instant accident without properly grasping the risk of the accident; and (d) Defendant 4, as a field supervisor, did not leave the site and did not actually supervise the work site when the accident was performed with the highest risk. In other words, Defendants should be held liable for the most direct negligence of employees at the site by permitting work and supervising the work site while neglecting the work site.

Nevertheless, Defendant 2 asserted that the instant accident occurred while Defendant 13, a subcontractor, took care of the phrase “the prohibition of vertical work” of Defendant 13’s work permit without any entry into the police after the accident occurred. Defendant 3, Defendant 4, and Defendant 13 had the attitude to transfer the responsibility to the employees of the said company. However, due to the attitude of the Defendants, most of the victims and their bereaved family members, who were the employees of the subcontractor, were suffering from the mind of the subcontractor’s workplace, and the ability of the investigative agencies to pay attention to public opinion and conduct the follow-up operation of the work permit, and the discussion on measures to prevent the recurrence of the accident occurred for a long time by concentrating Defendant 12 and the employees of Defendant 13, who were the subcontractor, on the part of the subcontractor’s company, on the part of Defendant 13, on the part of Defendant 13, on the part of Defendant 13, about whether the latter operation of the work permit was carried out.

However, if the defendants are detained for more than 4 months, it is against the wrong fact that the defendants neglected on-site inspection and management, and if they return to the industrial site in the future, more thorough safety management will be advanced, due to the lack of safety management personnel due to the restructuring within the ○○ factory for a long time, the defendants do not have any aspect of making it difficult for them to properly monitor and supervise the individual working sites. It is difficult to view that the superior officers who are to direct and supervise the defendants who are the representatives or directors of the 12 company to properly exercise their authority. While the promotion of the distribution of the distribution of the distribution of the distribution, they contributed to the occurrence of the accident by the negligence of the on-site managers of the 13 company, who were compelled to perform the work without question as to the risk or the necessity of safety measures. The defendants are at the latest following the final stage of the trial, and the defendants are at the age of the 13 company's meeting, and the defendants are at the age of the 12 company's first and the 3 company's order and the order of the case.

C. Defendant 5, 11

Even in cases where a subcontractor performs the alteration and repair work for the production facilities under specific instructions at the industrial site of the original contractor, the subcontractor, who directly employs workers and makes economic profits, is obligated to verify whether the working environment and the working method are in conformity with the direction of the original contractor, as a matter of course.

Nevertheless, the Defendants, as the on-site agent and safety manager of Defendant 13 Company, who is the most directly responsible for securing the safety of the workers who were put in the installation and the non-generation work, was responsible in that the Defendants conducted the fire-fighting work in an unreasonable manner while investigating the risk factors in the accident site in advance or making inquiries to Defendant 12 Company, which is the prime contractor, requested the workers to take appropriate measures, or without notifying the workers of the risk of spreading within the shooting day at night without notifying the workers of the risk. As a result, the Defendants suffered a big accident while performing the work without recognizing the risk of the daily workers.

However, at the time of the instant accident, the work site including the facilities and equipment seems to have been mainly under the management of Defendant 12, and the Defendants appear to have been under the direction of gas measurement in the absence of specific notification from Defendant 12’s employees on the risk of fluoring, and have been engaged in the fire work. Defendant 5 was the first offender and was detained for a considerable period of time due to the instant accident. Defendant 11 is currently under the period of suspension of execution due to the violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes (Death and Injury Caused by Dangerous Driving) and is under the period of suspension of execution due to the violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes, equity with the punishment against other Defendants, and all the circumstances in the instant case, such as age, character and conduct, home environment

D. Defendant 6, 7, 8, 9, 10

Defendant 12’s position as an intermediary manager in the company’s ○○ Factory, and thus reporting to the head of the factory or failing to establish appropriate safety measures, and failing to properly direct and supervise the employees in charge of the field management. Provided, That the Defendants are against the Defendants, the duties of issuing a work permit and monitoring and supervising the work site are in fact entrusted to the representatives and directors of the production team and the public service team, and the Defendants’ efforts are deemed to have been difficult to complete safety management solely due to the shortage of human resources in the factory. Defendant 6, 8, and 9 are the first offender, Defendant 7, and 10 are only subject to fines from 1 to 2 times, and all other circumstances indicated in the instant case, including the Defendants’ age, character and conduct, home environment, and circumstances after crimes, etc., shall be determined as per the order.

(1) The business owner shall take measures, such as ventilation, ventilation, and removal of pots, in order to prevent explosion or fire, at a place where there is an inflammable steam, inflammable gas or inflammable substance, and (2) No fire, machine, apparatus, tool, tool, etc. shall be used at a place where explosion or fire is likely to occur due to hazardous substances or at the upper part thereof, or at a place where there is a danger of explosion or fire is likely to occur, or where there is a high temperature; and (3) No hazardous substances, such as pipes, tanks, or drums which are likely to be inflammable or inflammable in addition to hazardous substances, shall be used at a place where electricity, tools, or other dangerous objects may be used, such as removal of inflammable, inflammable or inflammable objects or dangerous objects; and (4) No dangerous work shall be conducted at a place where electricity, explosion or explosion is used at a place where electricity, explosion or explosion is likely to occur or at an appropriate gas-proof structure, equipment, equipment, etc. other than hazardous substances, shall be established at a place where electricity, explosion or explosion is used.

Nevertheless, Defendant 1, as the safety and health manager of Defendant 12, as the business owner of Defendant 12’s ○○ Factory, did not take the above harmful and dangerous measures in the course of the establishment of the scheduled repair plan for Defendant 12’s ○ Factory and the installation of the last place of installation on March 14, 2013, and had his employees observe and supervise Defendant 13’s work using an apparatus that may cause flame to the employees of Defendant 13, without taking the above harmful and dangerous measures. Defendant 12, as its employees, committed the above violation in relation to the Defendant’s work.

B. Determination

Article 67 subparagraph 1 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act and Article 23 (1) of the same Act are established when a business owner orders his/her employees to take safety-risk work under each subparagraph of Article 23 (1) of the same Act without taking safety measures, or fails to take such measures despite being aware of the fact that the above work is being conducted without taking such measures, and the business owner does not allow his/her employees to take the safety measures, but only allows the employees to direct and supervise the work conducted by his/her subcontractor after giving a contract for the above work, it cannot be deemed that the said employees have the duty to take safety measures under the above provision (if the employees of the headquarters have suffered life due to an accident in the course of the subcontractor's work, the representative of the headquarters or the employees of the subcontractor who are in charge of directing and supervising the work of the subcontractor shall be punished as a crime of occupational negligence under the Criminal Act).

The prosecutor charged Defendant 12’s employees, without taking safety measures, with Defendant 12’s employees working for Defendant 12’s company’s company monitoring and supervising the installation of manle on a shooting day. The records show that the employees of Defendant 12, including Defendant 3, were in charge of monitoring and supervising the installation of manle on the shooting day prior to the accident of this case. The employees of Defendant 12, including Defendant 3, were in charge of monitoring and supervising the installation of manle-day gas, checking the state of melting, etc., and that the employees of Defendant 13, who are the subcontractor, were in charge of fire and explosion due to inflammable substances, including the contact work. Thus, if the employees of Defendant 12 did not directly perform the dangerous work of industrial accident, and do so, the employees of Defendant 12 did not perform the duty to take safety measures under Article 23(1) of the Industrial Safety and Health Act against the above employees, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge otherwise.

Therefore, since this part of the facts charged constitutes a case where there is no proof of a crime, the defendant 12 company should be acquitted under the latter part of Article 325 of the Criminal Procedure Act, and the defendant 1 should be acquitted under the latter part of Article 325 of the Criminal Procedure Act. However, as long as the defendant 1 is found guilty of the death by occupational negligence and the injury by occupational negligence, which are in the relation of a crime as a commercial concurrent relation, the order of

[Attachment]

judges as such.

1) To the extent that there is no risk of actual disadvantage to the Defendants’ exercise of their defense rights, the Defendants corrected clerical errors and recognized facts constituting a crime by routing the facts charged.

2) In addition to the above occupational breach of the duty of care, the prosecutor indicted Defendant on February 2, 2013, who was the supervisor of the public service team, and neglected the necessity of the internal washing during the last day of the installation of the Mandoman. However, the Defendant consistently rejected Defendant 4’s recommendation from the police to the court of this Court, and Defendant 4 also stated that Defendant 4 was punished by the police and the prosecution, even though the Defendant did not make such remarks, and there was no other evidence than Defendant 4’s statement in the investigative agency. Accordingly, this part of the facts charged does not recognize Defendant’s negligence on duty.

Note 3) The prosecutor filed a prosecution by including the fact that the Defendant did not perform gas measurement on the shooting day after around 13:00 on the day of the instant accident in violation of duty of care. However, as seen below in the “Determination on the Grounds of explosion” among the “Determination on the Grounds of Dispute”, it is difficult to view that the instant accident occurred due to the remaining gas from the shooting day, as seen below, it is difficult to view that this part of the facts charged is not recognized as the fault of the Defendant.

4) However, Defendant 3’s occupational injury is recognized as co-principal by the rest of the Defendants except the above Defendant.

5) In addition to the fact that the Defendants did not take measures to prevent the above danger, the employer should prohibit the use of fire at a place in danger of fire or explosion. In the event that there is an imminent danger of an industrial accident caused by explosion or fire, the Defendants immediately ceased work and have workers evacuated to a safe place, but the Defendants were indicted even if they failed to perform such measures and caused workers to die. However, Article 242 of the Rules on the Standards for Industrial Safety and Health did not stipulate specific measures to be taken by the business owner in order to prevent the occurrence of the accident, but rather declared the business owner’s general duty of care. As such, inasmuch as the Defendants were found guilty of having engaged in the fire work without completely removing explosive dangerous substances, it does not constitute a separate breach of duty, and according to the records, the instant accident did not constitute a sudden danger of explosion by Defendant 5, etc. from the date of death, and thus, it is difficult to recognize that the Defendants were in violation of the duty of care to prevent the danger of explosion before the accident.