[부당이득금][공1994.12.15.(982),3235]
(a) the meaning of the fact that refers to the argument principle;
B. Existence of binding force of confessions during the period of commencement of possession in the acquisition by prescription of real estate
(a) The phrase “the fact that it refers to the pleading principle” refers to only the principal facts directly necessary to determine the legal effect of the extinguishment of a right, and does not include any indirect facts that help confirm the existence of the right.
B. As to the prescriptive acquisition of real estate, the starting time of possession, which is the basis for the period of possession, is merely an indirect fact that makes the indirect and means room to determine the period of possession, which is the requirement for prescriptive acquisition, and thus, the confession is not binding upon the court or the party.
A. Article 188 of the Civil Procedure Act: Article 261 of the Universal History Litigation Act; Article 245 of the Civil Act
A. (B) Supreme Court Decision 86Meu1625 delivered on February 24, 1987 (Gong1987,522). Supreme Court Decision 81Da38 delivered on December 14, 1982 (Gong1983,271) 93Da26496 delivered on September 30, 1994 (Gong1994Ha, 2820) B. Supreme Court Decision 92Da21135 delivered on November 24, 1992 (Gong193Sang, 226)
[Defendant-Appellee-Appellee-Appellee-Appellee-Appellant (Attorney Kim Dai-ju et al., Counsel for defendant-appellee-appellee-appellant-appellee-appellant)
Busan Special Metropolitan City, Busan Special Metropolitan City, Attorneys Kim Tae-tae, Counsel for defendant-appellee
Busan High Court Decision 94Na2176 delivered on June 24, 1994
The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.
The defendant's attorney's grounds of appeal are examined.
The facts that refer to the doctrine of pleading refers to only the main facts that are directly necessary to determine the legal effect of the extinction of a right, and does not include any indirect facts that help to confirm its existence. In the prescriptive acquisition of real estate, the starting time of possession, which is the basis for calculating the period of possession, is merely an indirect fact that makes an indirect and means means to determine the period of possession, which is the requirement for prescriptive acquisition, and thus, the confession is not bound by the court or the party (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 86Meu1625, Feb. 24, 1987; 92Da21135, Nov. 24, 1992).
According to the records, the defendant's assertion that Busan City occupied the land in this case and acquired prescription for at least 20 years from March 17, 1947, and that the defendant succeeded to it by the enforcement of the Local Autonomy Act is identical to the plaintiff's assertion that the period of commencement of possession on the part of the defendant was March 17, 1947 (the plaintiff changed to the plaintiff's assertion that he occupied the land in Busan City since January 1986). However, the court below's assertion that the land in this case was changed to a road site under the city planning of Busan City on March 17, 1947, and the land category was changed to a road, but it was not sufficient to recognize that the Busan City occupied the land in this case since it was changed to a road site under the city planning of Busan City on March 17, 1947, but it was not possible to recognize that the land in this case was occupied by nearby residents and vehicles on January 1, 1986, and rejected the defendant's defense.
As long as such determination by the court below is justified, it is against the judgment of the court below on the additional determination that the Defendant’s acquisition of land by prescription and transfer of ownership is merely a termination of title trust and cannot be said to be a change in the landowner after the completion of prescriptive acquisition, and it is without merit without any need to determine the legitimacy thereof.
Therefore, the appeal is dismissed and all costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.
Justices Chocheon-sung (Presiding Justice)