2. The Plaintiff’s respective claims against the Defendant Bohovahovah C&C and Defendant 2 (Defendant 2) are dismissed in entirety.

3. Of the costs of lawsuit, the part arising between the Plaintiff and Defendant 3, Defendant 4, Defendant 5, Defendant 6, Defendant 7, Defendant 8, Defendant 9, Defendant 10, Defendant 11, Defendant 12, Defendant 13, Defendant 14, Defendant 15, Defendant 16, Defendant 17, Defendant 18, Defendant 19, Defendant 20, and Defendant 21 shall be borne by the Plaintiff, respectively.

Preliminary purport of claim: The transfer of ownership to the plaintiff, non-party 3, non-party 4, and non-party 5, the defendant 3, the defendant 4, the defendant 6, the defendant 7, the defendant 9, the defendant 10, the defendant 11, the defendant 12, the defendant 13, the defendant 15, the defendant 16, the defendant 17, the defendant 18, the defendant 19, the defendant 20, the defendant 21, the defendant 21, the defendant 3's share in the attachment No. 4746, April 17, 1931, and the execution of the transfer of ownership to the land indicated in the attachment No. 2 "No. 296, the transfer of ownership on the land indicated in the attachment No. 2 "No. 966, the transfer of ownership on the land indicated in the attachment No. 2 "No. 966, the defendant Bohovah Cir Cine Association" that completed the attachment No. 2 "No 196. 296.

(a) Land assessment, preservation of ownership, etc.;

1) According to the Land Survey Book drawn up under the Land Survey Order during the Japanese Occupation Period, it is written that ○○○ was subject to the 1,190 square meters prior to △△△-gun, Gyeonggi-gun, △△△-gun (number 4 omitted), 194 square meters prior to (number 6 omitted), 174 square meters prior to (number 1 omitted), 312 square meters prior to (number 9 omitted), and 488 square meters (number 8 omitted).

2) The registration of ownership preservation was completed on April 13, 1931 in the name of Nonparty 26 and 6, and the registration of ownership transfer was completed on April 17, 1931 in the name of Suwon-gun △△△△△△ (number 4 omitted). Of the above land, the registration of ownership transfer was completed in the name of Nonparty 27, Nonparty 28, and Nonparty 29 on March 10, 1931 in the name of the Suwon-gun District Court No. 4746 on April 17, 1931.

3) On December 31, 1962, the land indicated in paragraph (1) of the attached Table No. 1 (hereinafter “instant land”, and the remaining land indicated in the attached Table No. 1 was also specified by the sequence) and the land No. 2 of this case was divided from Suwon-gun, Suwon-gun, △△△△ (number No. 4 omitted).

4) As to the land No. 2 of this case, the registration of ownership transfer was completed in the name of the Suwon District Court's Ansan Branch's 92046 received on December 5, 1994, as to the land No. 2 of this case (hereinafter "Defendant clan"), which was based on the sale on April 1, 1980.

5) As to the land No. 3 of this case, the registration of ownership transfer under Defendant 2 was completed due to the completion of repayment on September 21, 1964, No. 19764, Dec. 30, 1957 (Article 2 of the former Act on Special Measures for the Registration of Ownership of Distributed Farmland (amended by Act No. 1671, Dec. 31, 1964; hereinafter "Distribution Farmland Act").

6) On August 26, 2002, the 174 square meters prior to Suwon-gun △△△△△ (number 1 omitted) was merged with the Silsan-si (number 2 omitted) Special Metropolitan City on August 4, 201. On August 4, 201, the land of this case was registered as the fourth land of this case. As to the land of this case, on June 10, 1971, the registration of the preservation of the ownership in the name of Nonparty 2, which was attached by Defendant 2, was completed on June 186, 1981, by the receipt of the Suwon District Court's Ansan Branch Branch's support on June 2, 1981, and the registration of the ownership transfer in the name of Defendant 2 was completed on December 5, 1973.

7) On June 10, 1971, the registration of ownership transfer of Nonparty 2 was completed with respect to the land No. 5, and on June 2, 1981, the registration of ownership transfer of Defendant 2 was completed due to the sale on December 5, 1973, the receipt of the Suwon District Court’s Ansan Branch Branch Branch No. 16839, Jun. 2, 1981.

(b) Inheritance relationship;

1) Death and inheritance of Nonparty 1

A) On March 21, 1926, Non-party 1 (Yulhovasck’s ▽△△△) died. Non-party 36, the head of Non-party 1, died on June 28, 1912 before Non-party 1, and Non-party 35, the ex post facto mother of Non-party 36, solely inherited Non-party 1’s inherited property.

B) Nonparty 35 died on January 19, 1993, and Nonparty 35 inherited the inherited property of Nonparty 35 to Nonparty 3/9 and Nonparty 3, Nonparty 4, and Nonparty 5 inherited the inherited property at the ratio of 2/9, respectively.

2) Death and inheritance of Nonparty 27

A) Nonparty 27 died on May 22, 1943, and Nonparty 37, an infant of Nonparty 27, solely inherited Nonparty 27’s inherited property.

B) Nonparty 37 died on December 20, 1967, and Defendant 3, a child of Nonparty 37, solely inherited Nonparty 37’s inherited property.

3) Death and inheritance of Nonparty 29

A) The non-party 29 died on October 18, 1969, and the non-party 38 who succeeded to the family head of family jointly inherited the non-party 38, the other children, the non-party 39, the defendant 20, and the defendant 21 respectively, 4/21, and the non-party 40, the non-party 1/21 and the non-party 18, who is a grandchild within the same family register, jointly inherited the non-party 18 at the ratio of 2/21.

B) The non-party 38 died on February 14, 1989, and the defendant 5 who succeeded to Australia was 6/13, and the defendant 7, who was a child, was 4/13, and the defendant 4, the defendant 6, and the defendant 8, who was a father who did not have the same family register, jointly inherited at the ratio of 1/13, respectively.

C) On June 27, 1998, the non-party 39 died, and the non-party 9, his spouse, was jointly inherited at the ratio of 2/13, respectively. The non-party 41 died after June 27, 1998, and the non-party 11, the non-party 12, and the defendant 13 inherited at the ratio of 2/9, respectively.

D) Nonparty 40 died on December 16, 1997, and Defendant 19, a child, was solely inherited.

[Ground of recognition] In the absence of dispute, Gap evidence Nos. 1 through 22, Eul evidence Nos. 1, 5, 6, Eul evidence Nos. 12, Eul evidence Nos. 12 (including each number, if any, the same; hereinafter the same shall apply), the result of the fact inquiry to women's interest groups of this court, the chairperson of the National Archives of the Republic of Korea, the Mayor of the National Archives of Ansan-si, and the head of Ansan-si, the whole purport

2. Whether the identity of the Plaintiff’s fleet and the ○○○, an assessment title, is recognized

First, we examine whether ○○○ and Nonparty 1, the Plaintiff’s fleet, who is the name of each land of this case, are the same person.

○○○ and Nonparty 1’s Chinese name, the Plaintiff’s fleet as the name name of each land of this case, are consistent with this. The Land Investigation Board is in the blank space with the address of ○○○○, the name of each land of this case, and the address of the owner, if the land location and the address of the owner are identical, it appears to be in accordance with the guidelines for the preparation of the Land Investigation Board at the time of the preparation of the Land Investigation Board (see Supreme Court Decision 80Da2327, Jul. 27, 1982). Meanwhile, according to the results of the fact-finding on the president of the WOE, Nonparty 1, the Plaintiff’s fleet, was residing in Suwon on November 14, 1852, and died on March 21, 1926, and it appears that the address of Nonparty 1, the name of each land of this case, and the address of Nonparty 1, the name of the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff of the land of this case, had a very adjacent adjacent address.

In light of the identity of each land of this case and the similarity of address between the person who is the title of assessment and the plaintiff, it is reasonable to deem that ○○, the title of assessment of each land of this case, is the same person as Nonparty 1, the plaintiff’s title of assessment.

3. Judgment on the claim against the defendant clan (the second land part of this case)

A. Determination on the cause of the claim

1) If it is found that a title holder of a registration of initial ownership has been presumed to have been the owner, but there is another person to whom the relevant land was assessed, such presumption is broken, so the registration is void as long as the title holder does not specifically assert or prove the acquisition by succession (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 70Da444, 445, Mar. 23, 1971; 94Da23524, Apr. 28, 1995).

Meanwhile, although ownership transfer registration under the Act on Special Measures for the Registration of Real Estate Ownership is presumed to be a registration that conforms to the substantive legal relationship, the registration of ownership transfer is based on the succession of ownership from the former registered titleholder, and guarantee or confirmation of the fact of succession. Therefore, if the former registered titleholder is an unentitled person, and the registration of ownership transfer in the name should be cancelled as the invalidation of the cause, the presumption power of registration is reversed (see Supreme Court Decision 2013Da44171, Sept. 12, 2013, etc.).

2) According to the above facts, inasmuch as Nonparty 1 was subject to the assessment of the land No. 2 in this case, there is no evidence to prove that Nonparty 26 and 6, who is the title holder of the registration of ownership preservation, were the owners of the land No. 2 in this case, and that Nonparty 26 and 6 succeeded to the land No. 2 in this case from Nonparty 1 and his heir. Therefore, the registration of ownership preservation on the land No. 2 in this case is a registration of invalidity of cause, and the registration of ownership transfer, which was completed in the name of Nonparty 2 in the name of Nonparty 27, Nonparty 28, and Nonparty 29, based on the invalid registration of ownership preservation, should be cancelled as the registration of invalidity of cause. The registration of ownership invalidation based on such registration, should also be cancelled as the registration of invalidation of cause.

B. Determination as to the defense of the completion of the prescriptive acquisition by the defendant clan

1) As to this, the defendant clan, from April 1, 1980 on which the agreement with the non-party 27, the non-party 28, the non-party 29 on the transfer of ownership on the land of this case was reached, occupied the land of this case 2 by peace and public performance for the intention of possession for 20 years from April 1, 1980, and therefore the prescription period for possession was completed on or around April 1, 200, and the above transfer of ownership is a valid registration in accordance with the substantive relation. However, there is insufficient evidence to acknowledge that the defendant clan occupied the land of this case 2 from April 1, 1980, and there is no other evidence to prove otherwise.

2) Furthermore, even if the acquisition by prescription was not completed, the defendant clan, even if the acquisition by prescription was not completed, is a valid registration that conforms to the substantive relationship, since the defendant clan, which was peace and openly held with intent to own the land of this case for 10 years from December 5, 1994, which completed the registration of ownership transfer as to the land of this case, and acquired ownership by occupying the land of this case without negligence.

Where a building site is transferred due to sale, etc. and the registration of ownership transfer is completed accordingly, a person who has registered as a site owner shall be deemed to have obtained possession by taking over the land, unless there are special circumstances (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2012Da201410, Jul. 11, 2013); and the possessor is presumed to have occupied in good faith, peace, and public performance with his/her intent (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 197Da197(1) of the Civil Act); and a person who has purchased the real estate by believing that a title holder on the registry is the owner and, barring special circumstances, shall be deemed to have been a possessor without negligence (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 95Da22481, Oct. 12, 195; 96Da888, Feb. 24, 1998).

As a result of the fact-finding conducted by Eul and Eul's evidence set forth in the above legal principles, the fact-finding conducted on May 8, 2015, each of the fact-finding conducted on September 4, 2015, as well as the overall purport of the arguments, it is recognized that Eul registered and occupied the land No. 2 of this case for 10 years in good faith, and that ten years have passed since December 5, 1994, which was the starting date of occupation of the defendant clan, and that the acquisition by prescription of the defendant's clan No. 2 of this case was completed around December 5, 2004, since it was obvious that Eul et al. had passed since December 5, 2004.

① On December 5, 1994, Defendant clan completed the registration of ownership transfer on the land of this case on the ground of sale on April 1, 1980 pursuant to the former Act on Special Measures for the Registration, etc. of Ownership of Real Estate (No. 4502, Nov. 30, 1992).

② Defendant paid the property tax, etc. on the instant land No. 2 from around 1995 to 2014.

③ From November 17, 2002, the Defendant clan leased the land of this case to the △△ Agricultural Co., Ltd. for use as the place of conference for the sale rice farming team and agricultural products collection center.

④ Defendant clans organized the rules of the clan and enforced February 4, 2012, and registered as a non-profit corporation on April 9, 2012.

Therefore, since the ownership transfer registration for the land No. 2 of the defendant clan was registered in accordance with the substantive legal relationship according to the prescriptive prescription of the registry, there is reason for the defense of prescription for the acquisition of the registry (in this regard, the plaintiff did not have the substance as a clan at the time when the registration of ownership transfer for the land No. 2 of this case was completed, and even thereafter there was no activity record as a clan. However, although it is difficult to conclude that the result of fact inquiry on the chairperson of the clan No. 2 of this court's clan was not a real organization at the time of the registration of ownership transfer, it is difficult to conclude

4. Determination as to the claim against Defendant 2

A. Part on the third land of this case

1) Determination as to the cause of claim

A) The plaintiff's assertion

Although the land No. 3 does not fall under the land subject to the application of the former Farmland Act because the Government does not fall under the land which was originally acquired as the land under the circumstances of Nonparty 1 (wholly amended by Act No. 561 of Oct. 13, 1960), Defendant 2 completed the registration of transfer of ownership in its name due to the completion of repayment on September 21, 1964 under the Distribution Farmland Act on December 30, 1957, since it does not fall under the land subject to the application of the former Farmland Act (wholly amended by Act No. 561 of Oct. 13, 1960), the ownership transfer registration in Defendant 2 should be cancelled as the registration invalidation of the cause.

B) Determination

Since the repayment ledger is a document prepared to record matters necessary for repayment after the completion of the procedure for confirmation of distribution farmland, if any land is entered in the repayment ledger as farmland subject to distribution, it can be presumed that the procedure for confirmation of distribution farmland was lawfully completed for such land, and therefore, unless there are other special documents (see Supreme Court Decision 2005Da68622, Feb. 24, 2006, etc.). If the registration of ownership transfer is completed directly by the government pursuant to the Distribution Farmland Act, the above registration shall be presumed to have been completed through legitimate procedure under the above Act. Thus, in order for the plaintiff to bring a lawsuit for cancellation of this registration, the above registration shall be presumed to have been completed through legitimate procedure under this Act, regardless of whether the underlying document or certification of this registration was false or forged or otherwise, or for any other reason, it shall be proved that the registration was not lawfully made under this Act (see Supreme Court Decision 77Da741, Sept. 13, 1977, etc.).

In full view of the following facts: Gap evidence Nos. 22 and Eul evidence Nos. 4; fact-finding with respect to the third land of this case by the Director of the Seoul Record Office of this Court; the fact-finding results and the purport of the whole pleadings, it is acknowledged that the former owner is the non-party 3; the number of times is the non-party 2; and the redemption certificate is recorded as the non-party 2 as the completion of repayment on December 30, 1957. If the third land of this case is stated in the repayment ledger as farmland subject to distribution, unless the third land of this case is stated in the repayment ledger, it is presumed that the above distribution procedure for the above land was lawful; and since the ownership transfer registration was completed on the ground of the completion of repayment pursuant to Article 2 of the Farmland Act after the non-party 2's rights were followed, it is presumed that the above farmland transfer registration was completed by the legitimate procedure of the above law; otherwise, the plaintiff's assertion that the above repayment certificate was not duly issued due to the above non-party 2's claim 91 and 4.

B. Part of the fourth and fifth land in this case

1) Determination as to the cause of claim

According to the above 3. A. (1) in light of the legal principles as seen earlier, inasmuch as Nonparty 1 was assessed against the land Nos. 4 and 5, Nonparty 2, the title holder of the registration of ownership preservation on the land Nos. 4 and 5 of this case, did not have any evidence to prove that Nonparty 2 succeeded to and acquired the land Nos. 4 and 5 of this case from Nonparty 1 or his heir. Accordingly, each registration of ownership preservation on the land Nos. 4 and 5 of this case is a registration invalidation, and each registration of ownership transfer on the land Nos. 4 and 5 of this case, which was completed in Defendant 2’s name, should be cancelled as a registration of invalidity of the cause.

2) Determination on Defendant 2’s defense of completion of prescriptive acquisition

A) As to this, Defendant 2, after completing the registration of transfer of ownership on the land Nos. 4 and 5 of this case, was the intention of possession for twenty (20) years, and acquired ownership by occupying the land Nos. 4 and 5 of this case without negligence, the above transfer of ownership is a valid registration consistent with the substantive relationship.

Comprehensively taking account of the evidence Nos. 1-1 through 6, Eul-Ma No. 2, Eul-Ma No. 13, Eul-Ma's testimony and the purport of the whole pleadings by non-party 34, it is recognized that the defendant 2 had taken possession of the land No. 4 and 5 of this case on June 2, 1981 before the completion of each registration of transfer of ownership on the land No. 4 of this case, and now he had taken possession of the farmland No. 5 of this case on the land No. 5 of this case on June 2, 1981. According to the above facts, since the defendant 2 occupied the land No. 4 and 5 of this case in peace and openly with the intention of owning the land No. 4 and 5 of this case on June 2, 1981, it was apparent that the acquisition by prescription against the land No. 4 and 5 of this case on June 2, 2001. The ownership transfer registration in accordance with each of the registrations of ownership is valid.

Therefore, the defendant 2's defense is justified.

B) As to this, the Plaintiff, who is well aware of the above area, such as Defendant 2’s residing in the Gansan-si △△△△dong-gu, Simsan-si, where the land Nos. 4 and 5 of this case is located, and works as this Chapter, was aware that he did not have the right to acquire ownership, and thus, the presumption that Defendant 2 was an occupant with the intent to hold ownership was broken up.

In a case where it is proved that the possessor occupied the real estate owned by another person without permission, even though it is well aware that the possessor did not meet the legal requirements such as juristic act which may cause the acquisition of ownership at the time of commencement of possession without permission, barring special circumstances, the possessor shall be deemed not to have the intention to reject the ownership of another person and not to possess it. Thus, the presumption of possession with the intention to own is broken (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 95Da28625 delivered on August 21, 1997, etc.).

However, under the former Act on Special Measures for the Registration, etc. of Ownership of Real Estate on June 2, 1981, Defendant 2 completed the registration of ownership transfer based on the sale from Nonparty 2, his father, or held office as the head of a residential area, it is difficult to recognize that Defendant 2 occupied without permission, knowing that he did not have the title at the time of commencement of possession. Thus, the Plaintiff’s re-

5. Determination as to claims against the remaining Defendants (the part on land No. 1 of this case)

A. Determination on the cause of the claim

1) If it is found that a title holder of a registration of initial ownership has been presumed to have been the owner, but there is another person to whom the relevant land was assessed, such presumption is broken, so the registration is void as long as the title holder does not specifically assert or prove the acquisition by succession (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 70Da444, 445, Mar. 23, 1971; 94Da23524, Apr. 28, 1995).

2) According to the above facts, inasmuch as Nonparty 1 was subject to the assessment of the land No. 1 of this case, there is no evidence to prove that Nonparty 26 and 6, the title holder of the registration of ownership preservation on the land No. 1 of this case, were the owner, and that Nonparty 26 and 6 succeeded to and acquired the land No. 1 of this case from Nonparty 1 and his heir. Therefore, the registration of ownership preservation on the land No. 1 of this case is an invalid cause registration, and the registration of ownership transfer completed in the name of Nonparty 27, Nonparty 28 and Nonparty 29 on the land of this case based on the invalid registration of ownership preservation should also be cancelled as the registration of invalidity of cause.

B. Determination on Defendant 3 to 21’s defense

1) The above defendants are the land of this case for the defendant clan, with respect to the 1/3 share of the non-party 27's 1/3 share of the non-party 27's family, possession of the above land in peace and public performance for twenty years from December 20, 1967 by the defendant 3 who succeeded to possession through inheritance, and the acquisition by prescription was completed on December 20, 1987. As to the non-party 29's 1/3 share of the non-party 29's name, the non-party 29 had occupied the above land in peace and public performance for twenty years from April 17, 1931 to the will of the non-party 20 years from April 17, 1951 and occupied the above land in public performance with the intention of the non-party 29's heir, the non-party 18, the non-party 21, the non-party 4, the non-party 5, the defendant 6, and the non-party 297's defense.

2) Furthermore, with respect to the shares of Nonparty 27 and Nonparty 29 in each of the non-party 27 and the non-party 29 with respect to the land in this case, the Defendants occupied the land in good faith and openly held with intent to own it for ten years from April 17, 1931, and without negligence, and on April 17, 1941, the prescriptive acquisition of the registry was completed. Defendant 3 succeeded to the possession and registration period of the non-party 27 and the possession and registration period of the non-party 18, the non-party 20, the non-party 21, the non-party 4, the non-party 5, the non-party 7, the non-party 7, and the non-party 29 respectively, and the registration period of the non-party 27 and the non-party 29 are valid. However, there is no evidence to acknowledge that the non-party 27 and the non-party 29 occupy the land in this case for ten years.

C. Sub-committee

Ultimately, the land No. 1 of this case was originally acquired by Nonparty 1, the Plaintiff’s fleet, and the Plaintiff inherited 3/9 shares out of the above land. As such, the Plaintiff may solely seek for the registration of ownership transfer based on the restoration of real name by shares in question against the Defendants, each co-owner, as to the registration of invalidation of cause as an act of preservation of jointly owned property (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2003Da40651, Sept. 29, 2005; Supreme Court en banc Decision 9Da37894, Sept. 20, 201).

Therefore, Defendant 3, Defendant 4, Defendant 5, Defendant 6, Defendant 7, Defendant 8, Defendant 9, Defendant 10, Defendant 11, Defendant 12, Defendant 13, Defendant 14, Defendant 15, Defendant 16, Defendant 17, Defendant 18, Defendant 19, Defendant 20, and Defendant 21 are liable to implement the procedure for the registration of ownership transfer on the ground of the restoration of the authentic name as indicated in attached Form 3’s “the indication of real estate” as indicated in paragraph 1.

6. Conclusion

If so, the plaintiff's respective claims against the defendant 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21 are accepted for the reason that they are reasonable, and all claims against the defendant clan and the defendant 2 are dismissed for the reason that they are reasonable. It is so decided as per Disposition.

[Attachment Omission]

Judges Shin Jae-in (Presiding Judge)