[1] Whether the liability insurer, who is directly liable for damages to the victim under Article 724(2) of the Commercial Act, is included in the "third party" under Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act (affirmative)

[2] Standard for recognizing the maximum working age for an injured party who has exceeded the generally recognized maximum working age as to the pertinent occupation at the time of the accident

[3] Whether Article 3(2)2 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act, which provides for the method of calculating the liability insurance amount in the case of a person who sustained an injury with the same accident, should be interpreted to mean that the sum of the injury insurance amount calculated under Article 3(1)2 of the Enforcement Decree of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act and the subsequent disability insurance amount calculated under Article 3(1)3 of the same Enforcement Decree shall be paid as the liability insurance

[1] Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act, Article 724(2) of the Commercial Act / [2] Articles 393 and 763 of the Civil Act / [3] Article 3(1)2 and 3 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 24065, Aug. 22, 2012)

[1] Supreme Court Decision 2006Da60793 Decided January 25, 2007 (Gong2007Sang, 340), Supreme Court Decision 2012Da119092 Decided December 26, 2013 (Gong2014Sang, 309) / [2] Supreme Court Decision 97Da449 Decided April 11, 1997 (Gong197Sang, 147), Supreme Court Decision 99Da3167 Decided September 21, 199 (Gong199Ha, 2205) / [3] Supreme Court Decision 2012Da67177 decided October 30, 2014 (Gong2014Ha, 22253)

Korea Labor Welfare Corporation

Samsung Fire and Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. (Law Firm Gyeongpyeong, Attorneys Jeon Sung-jin et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Busan District Court Decision 2013Na44000 Decided July 17, 2014

The part of the judgment of the court below concerning KRW 32,518,322 and damages for delay thereof shall be reversed, and this part of the case shall be remanded to the Busan District Court Panel Division. The remaining appeals shall be dismissed.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. Regarding ground of appeal No. 1

The term "third party" under Article 87 (1) of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act refers to a person who is not an insurer, a policyholder, and a beneficiary, and is not an industrial accident compensation worker, directly or indirectly, with the business owner who is the insured, and is liable for damages under the tort liability, the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act, or the Civil Act or the State Compensation Act for the victimized Workers. In the event of an accident attributable to the insured under liability insurance, a direct claim against the liability insurer recognized under Article 724 (2) of the Commercial Act is a claim for damages against the victim, which is separate from a claim for damages against the insured, and thus, the insurer liable for direct compensation against the victim under Article 87 (1) of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act is included in the third party regardless of whether the insured is a third party under Article 87 (1) of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act (see Supreme Court Decisions 2006Da60793, Jan. 25, 2007; 2012Da12929, Dec. 129, 2012

The lower court determined to the effect that, even if Nonparty 1, the insured of liability insurance, did not constitute a third party under Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act, as a volunteer worker belonging to the same company as Nonparty 2, who is the victimized employee, the Plaintiff, who paid the insurance benefits to Nonparty 2 under the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act, may exercise the right of reimbursement against the Defendant, the obligor of the liability insurance under the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the evidence duly admitted, the lower court’s determination is based on the legal doctrine as seen earlier. In so doing, it did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the scope of a third party under Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act, contrary

2. As to grounds of appeal Nos. 3 and 4

In a claim for damages arising from a tort, the fact-finding or determination of the ratio thereof with respect to the grounds for offsetting negligence is a matter belonging to the exclusive jurisdiction of a fact-finding court unless it is deemed that such determination is considerably unreasonable in light of the principle of equity (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 96Da6240, Sept. 4, 1998; 2005Da16713, Jun. 24, 2005). In addition, with respect to a victim whose age exceeds the generally accepted maximum working age for the pertinent occupation at the time of the accident, the court may recognize his maximum working age by taking into account the following surrounding circumstances, such as the victim’s age, career, health, and working conditions, awareness of the relevant sector, and the standard for recognizing the operating period of an insurance company for that age (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 97Da4449, Apr. 11, 197; 9Da3167, Sept. 21, 1999>

On the grounds indicated in its reasoning, the lower court recognized the negligence of Nonparty 2 who contributed to the occurrence and expansion of damage caused by the instant accident as 20%, and recognized the income for 24 months from the actual income of Nonparty 2 who is over 60 years old at the time of the instant accident.

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the aforementioned legal doctrine and the evidence duly admitted, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine on offsetting negligence and maximum working age of the aged, thereby failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations or exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules.

3. Regarding ground of appeal No. 2

A. Article 3(1) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 24065, Aug. 22, 2012; hereinafter “former Enforcement Decree”) provides for the amount of insurance money or mutual aid money (hereinafter “liability insurance money”) to be paid per victim by liability insurance or liability mutual aid to be purchased by a motor vehicle owner under the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act, as the amount of damages incurred by the victim within the scope of the amount prescribed in [Attachment Table 1] in the case of the victim’s injury (Article 2). If any further treatment effect cannot be expected after the treatment of the injury was completed, and the physical disability (hereinafter “aftermath disability”) is caused by the occurrence of the injury under the fixed symptoms, the sum of the amounts prescribed in subparagraphs 2 and 3 of the attached Table 2 shall be paid within the scope of the amount prescribed in Article 3(2)2.

In light of the general principles of statutory interpretation, comprehensively considering the circumstances where the language and text of Article 3(2)2 of the former Enforcement Decree consists of relatively clear concepts, as well as various circumstances such as the purport of the liability insurance system under the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act, the principle of limited liability liability, and the possibility of calculating the damages caused by the injury and the classification of damages caused by the injury, it is reasonable to interpret that Article 3(2)2 of the former Enforcement Decree, which provides for the calculation method of liability insurance in the case of the injury inflicted on the injured person due to the same accident, not the amount of damage inflicted on the injured person within the scope of the total sum of the maximum amount under Article 3(1)2 and 3, rather than the amount of damage inflicted on the injured person under Article 3(1)3 (see Supreme Court Decision 201Da67177, Oct. 30, 2014).

B. According to the facts established by the court below, the following facts are revealed: ① Nonparty 1 caused the instant accident while driving a vehicle covered by the Defendant’s liability insurance and caused injury to Nonparty 2, who was accompanied by Nonparty 2; ② Nonparty 2’s injury, reflecting the negligence that Nonparty 2 contributed to the occurrence and expansion of the damage caused by the instant accident, shall be KRW 73,083,335 (the damage amount caused by Nonparty 2’s injury during the medical care period plus the amount of actual profit and medical expenses); the amount of damage caused by the subsequent disability is 7,481,678; ③ the Plaintiff paid the medical care benefits 75,990,110, temporary disability benefits 15,07,910, temporary disability benefits 15,07,910, and disability benefits 44,779,640, respectively; ④ the amount of the insurance benefit corresponding to Nonparty 2’s injury as set forth in the former Enforcement Decree [Attachment 1], 200,000.

C. Examining the above facts in light of the legal principles as seen earlier, (1) while the amount of damage caused by injury among Nonparty 2’s damages exceeds the amount set forth in [Attachment Table 1], the amount of damage caused by the subsequent disability falls short of the amount set forth in [Attachment Table 2], the amount of liability insurance for the injury calculated pursuant to Article 3(1)2 of the former Enforcement Decree shall be the maximum amount set forth in [Attachment Table 1] out of the amount of damage caused by the said injury, the amount of liability insurance for the subsequent disability calculated pursuant to subparagraph 3 of the same paragraph shall be KRW 10 million, and the amount of liability insurance for the subsequent disability calculated pursuant to subparagraph 3 of the same paragraph shall be KRW 7,481,678, which is the amount of damage caused by the subsequent disability within the maximum amount set forth in [Attachment Table 2], and (3) ultimately, the amount of liability insurance paid by the Defendant, who is the person liable to pay the insurance proceeds, to the Plaintiff under the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act, shall be KRW 17,481,678.

D. Nevertheless, the lower court erred by misapprehending the purport that the sum of the actual amount of damages is determined as the liability insurance amount, within the scope of the sum of the maximum amount of the liability insurance amount for injury under Article 3(2)2(a)2(2) of the former Enforcement Decree and the maximum amount of the liability insurance amount for the aftermath disability under Article 3(1)3(1)3 of the former Enforcement Decree, and determined otherwise that the amount of KRW 50 million equivalent to the sum of the total amount of actual damages due to Nonparty 2’s injury and aftermath disability is the liability insurance amount to be paid by the Defendant.

Therefore, the judgment of the court below is erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the calculation of the liability insurance amount where a person injured under Article 3 (2) 2 of the former Enforcement Decree is disabled, which affected the conclusion of the judgment, as well as the portion of KRW 32,518,32, which exceeds KRW 17,481,678, as seen in the above legal principles, is included in the liability insurance amount to be paid by the defendant, and thus ordered the payment of such amount and delay damages. The ground of appeal assigning this error is with merit within the scope

Supreme Court Decision 2003Da67755 Decided April 16, 2004 cited by the court below is different from this case, and it is inappropriate to invoke this case.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the part of the judgment of the court below regarding KRW 32,518,322 and damages for delay thereof shall be reversed, and that part of the case shall be remanded to the court below for a new trial and determination. The remaining appeals shall be dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Kim So-young (Presiding Justice)