Where an electronic document was sent by a person whose identity was confirmed by an authorized certificate issued by the licensed certification authority in the transaction by electronic document, whether it constitutes Article 7(2)2 of the Framework Act on Electronic Documents and Transactions even if it was written and transmitted against his/her will (affirmative in principle), and whether, in such case, the addressee of the electronic document may regard the expression of intent contained in the electronic document as the originator’s own act without going through additional procedures, such as telephone calls and interviews (affirmative) / Whether such legal principle applies to the loan agreement (affirmative)

In full view of the contents of Articles 7(2)2 and 11 of the Framework Act on Electronic Documents and Transactions (hereinafter “Electronic Documents Act”), Articles 3(2) and 18-2 of the Digital Signature Act, and the legislative purpose to ensure the security and reliability of electronic documents and electronic transactions, etc., an electronic document transmitted by a person verified by an authorized certificate issued by a licensed certification authority in transactions by electronic documents, even if it was prepared and transmitted against his/her will, barring any special circumstance, constitutes “where the received electronic document was sent by a person who has justifiable grounds to believe that it was based on the will of the originator or his/her agent,” as provided in Article 7(2)2 of the Electronic Documents Act, barring any special circumstance, it is reasonable to view that the addressee of the electronic document, in such cases, is the originator’s expression of intent contained in the electronic document without undergoing additional identification procedures, such as telephone call, interview, etc.

Furthermore, in addition to the provisions under the Act on Registration of Credit Business, etc. and Protection of Finance Users (hereinafter “Credit Business Act”), the aforementioned legal doctrine also applies to loan agreements. In other words, the Credit Business Act does not limit the identification of the person using an authorized certificate, and Article 6-2(3)1 provides that “In entering into a loan agreement or guarantee agreement related thereto, the identification of the opposite contractual party or guarantor is confirmed using an authorized certificate under Article 2 subparag. 8 of the Digital Signature Act, and if the opposite contractual party or guarantor is allowed to enter the important matters to be stated in writing on a loan agreement or guarantee agreement by means of the Internet, the credit service provider shall be deemed to have entered the said important matters in the opposite contractual party or guarantor’s own pen.”

Articles 1, 7(2)2, and 11 of the Framework Act on Electronic Documents and Transactions; Article 1, Article 2 subparag. 8, Article 3(2), and Article 18-2 of the Digital Signature Act; Article 6-2(3)1 of the Act on Registration of Credit Business, etc. and Protection of Finance Users

See Attached List of Plaintiffs (Law Firm Woo, Attorneys Shin Si-hwan et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Apropy Social Loan Co., Ltd. and two others (Attorneys Lee Chang-sik et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant-appellee)

Seoul Central District Court Decision 2016Na80085 Decided August 9, 2017

The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Seoul Central District Court Panel Division.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. Article 7(2)2 of the Framework Act on Electronic Documents and Transactions (hereinafter “Electronic Document Act”) provides that “Where an electronic document received has been sent by a person who has justifiable grounds to believe that it was based on the will of the originator or his/her agent by virtue of his/her relationship with the originator or his/her agent, the addressee of the electronic document may regard the expression of intent contained in the electronic document as the originator’s act.” Article 11 of the Electronic Document Act provides that matters concerning digital signature in electronic commerce shall be governed by the Digital Signature Act. Article 3(2) of the Digital Signature Act provides that “Where a certified digital signature exists, the digital signature concerned shall be signed, sealed, or sealed by the Signatory, and its contents shall be presumed not to have been modified after the digital signature has been affixed.” Article 18-2 provides that “Where other Acts do not restrict or exclude the identification of the principal by using an authorized certificate, the addressee of the electronic document may verify the person himself/herself by an authorized certification authority issued pursuant to the provisions of this Act.”

In full view of the contents of these provisions and the legislative purpose of ensuring the safety and reliability of electronic documents and electronic transactions, an electronic document transmitted by a person who is confirmed to be the principal by an authorized certificate issued by a licensed certification authority in an electronic document transaction against his/her will, even if it was prepared and transmitted against his/her will, barring any special circumstance, it is reasonable to deem that the electronic document sent by the addressee constitutes “where the received electronic document was sent by a person who has justifiable grounds to believe that it was based on the will of the originator or his/her agent by virtue of the relationship with the originator or his/her agent,” as provided in Article 7(2)2 of the Electronic Document Act, barring any special circumstance. Therefore, in such a case, the addressee of the electronic document shall be deemed to have been the originator’s intent

Furthermore, in addition to the provisions under the Act on Registration of Credit Business, etc. and Protection of Finance Users (hereinafter “Credit Business Act”), the aforementioned legal doctrine also applies to the loan agreement. In other words, the Credit Business Act does not restrict the identification of the principal using an authorized certificate. In addition, Article 6-2(3)1 provides that “In entering into a loan agreement or a guarantee agreement related thereto, the identification of the principal is confirmed by using an authorized certificate under Article 2 subparag. 8 of the Digital Signature Act, and if an opposite contractual party or guarantor enters the important matters to be stated in the form of a loan agreement or guarantee agreement directly into the opposite contractual party or guarantor, the credit service provider shall be deemed to have entered the said important matters in the form of the opposite contractual party or guarantor’s own pen.”

2. According to the reasoning of the judgment below, each of the instant loan contracts between the Defendants, a credit service provider, and the Plaintiffs, can be seen as being concluded through the procedure for verifying the identity through an authorized certificate. Therefore, even if an application for a loan was filed against the intent of the Plaintiffs, barring any special circumstance, it is reasonable to view that “the received electronic document was sent by the addressee by a person who has a justifiable reason to believe that it was based on the will of the originator or his/her agent, according to the relationship with the originator or his/her agent, barring any special circumstance.”

Article 2-4(1) of the Special Act on the Prevention of Loss Caused by Telecommunications-based Financial Fraud and the Refund of Damages, Etc., which requires identification by means of a mobile phone, cannot be seen as denying the above “justifiable cause” solely based on the circumstances cited by the lower court (i.e., “authorized certificate used to conclude each of the instant loan agreements”) that the Plaintiff acquired the Plaintiffs’ personal information by deceiving the Plaintiffs, and then re-issuance thereof. In addition, in the case of a loan application, the provision of Article 2-4(1) of the same Act that requires identification using a mobile phone is not applicable to a

Nevertheless, solely based on its stated reasoning, the lower court determined that each of the instant loan contracts cannot be deemed valid against the Plaintiffs, as Article 7(2)2 of the Electronic Documents Act does not apply. In so determining, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on “justifiable cause” as provided by Article 7(2)2 of the Electronic Documents Act, thereby adversely affecting the conclusion of the judgment. The allegation contained in the grounds of appeal on this point is with merit.

3. Therefore, the lower judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

[Attachment] List of Plaintiffs: Omitted

Justices Park Jung-hwa (Presiding Justice)