[1] In a case where the victim of the primary accident dies of another secondary accident with a conditional causal relationship with the said accident, the scope of damages suffered by the perpetrator of the primary accident

[2] In a case where a victim who has an existing right-hand plane dies beyond a bath in a state where physical strength is deteriorated due to drinking alcohol every day because he/she was unable to take two legs due to a traffic accident, whether there exists a conditional causal relationship between the traffic accident and the death accident (affirmative), and in such a case, the scope of compensation by the traffic accident offender (affirmative)

[1] In a case where a victim injured by an accident dies of another accident, the perpetrator of the first accident shall compensate for lost income until the victim reaches the maximum working age, without considering the victim’s death due to the second accident, in the event where there exist such conditions as deeming that the second accident would not have occurred if the second accident had not occurred between the two accidents.

[2] In a case where a victim, who has an existing right-hand plane, was unable to meet all the two legs due to a traffic accident, and died beyond a bath in a state where physical strength is deteriorated due to drinking alcohol every day and it is difficult to move, etc., there is a contractual causal relationship between the traffic accident and the death accident, and therefore, the perpetrator of the traffic accident is obliged to compensate for the lost income until he/she reaches the maximum working age within the life expectancy.

[1] Articles 393 and 763 of the Civil Act / [2] Articles 393, 750, and 763 of the Civil Act

[1] Supreme Court Decision 79Da156 delivered on April 24, 1979 (Gong1979, 11943), Supreme Court Decision 90Meu12790 delivered on October 30, 1990 (Gong1990, 2409), Supreme Court Decision 94Da51895 delivered on February 10, 1995 (Gong195Sang, 1320), Supreme Court Decision 98Da1552 delivered on July 24, 1998

Plaintiff 1 et al. (Attorney Han-ho et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Defendant (Attorney Lee Dong-soo, Counsel for defendant-appellant)

Daegu District Court Decision 95Na2539 delivered on September 5, 1997

The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

1. On the first ground for appeal

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below, based on the adopted evidence, found the point of accident of this case as follows. The point of accident of this case is the upper left side in the defendant's proceeding direction, and in the progress of the proceedings of the non-party (the non-party (the non-party who died during the original trial lawsuit) of the plaintiffs' predecessor, the whole width of the road of one lane, the whole width of which is about 6 meters, a strong sobrole length, is continuous, and the vehicle traffic is not high at night. The defendant was at the point of accident during the accident at around 21:30 on the day of the accident, which led to the non-party's driver's traffic close to the central line, while driving the vehicle in close vicinity to the central line, and recognized the fact that the front part of the plaintiff's driver's driver's license in front of the left side of the vehicle, and rejected the exemption defense without fault by the defendant. In light of the records, the court below's finding of facts and the judgment below did not err by misapprehending the facts.

In addition, the fact-finding or determination of the ratio of comparative negligence in a claim for damages caused by tort is within the exclusive authority of a fact-finding court unless it is deemed considerably unreasonable in light of the principle of equity (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 85Meu1191, Nov. 26, 1985). In light of the records, it is appropriate for the lower court to determine the Nonparty’s fault as 60% in light of the circumstances surrounding the accident as stated in its holding. In so doing, it cannot be said that the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on comparative negligence, as otherwise alleged

2. On the second ground for appeal

In light of the records, the court below is justified in calculating the rate of loss of labor ability due to the accident in this case in consideration of the existing rate of loss of labor ability due to the Nonparty’s aftermathy, and the argument that the court below should compensate only the amount of damage equivalent to the cost of correction, instead of excluding the lost income due to the loss of labor ability, on the premise that the correction of the pelf's illegal milk will be successful.

3. On the third ground for appeal

In a case where a victim injured by an accident dies due to another accident, and there is a conditional relationship such as deeming that the second accident would have not occurred even if the second accident had not occurred between the two accidents, the perpetrator of the first accident shall, without considering the victim’s death caused by the second accident, compensate for lost income until the victim reaches the maximum working age (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 98Da1552, Jul. 24, 1998; 94Da51895, Feb. 10, 1995).

According to the records, the non-party, who is obstructive to the right upper corner due to the aftermathy in the accident of this case, was aware that he was unable to take two legs by drinking alcohol every day on the left upper frame of the accident of this case, and was killed in excess of a bath located at the house on January 10, 1997 under the condition that he was unable to drive. Thus, there is a conditional causal relationship between the traffic accident of this case and the death accident of this case, and therefore, the defendant, who is the perpetrator of the first accident, has a duty to compensate for the lost income until the victim reaches the maximum working age. The reasoning of the judgment below is just in rejecting the defendant's argument that it is sufficient to compensate for the lost income until the death, and there is no violation of the misapprehension of the legal principles as to the calculation of lost income as otherwise alleged in the grounds for appeal. The grounds for appeal on this point also cannot be accepted.

4. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and all costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Cho Chang-hun (Presiding Justice)