Where the period of prescription of the grounds for disciplinary action has expired, the case does not examine whether there are grounds falling under Articles 73-2 and 73 (1) of the Local Public Officials Act.

Even if a request for a disciplinary resolution is made after the lapse of two years from the date on which the grounds for disciplinary action occurred, the question shall be examined as to whether there are grounds for failing to proceed with the disciplinary procedure under Articles 73-2 (2) and 73 (1) of the Local Public Officials Act, and then whether the removal

Articles 73(1) and 73-2 of the Local Public Officials Act

[Judgment of the court below]

Attorney Seo-gu et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant

Seoul High Court Decision 76Gu588 delivered on July 13, 1977

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.

We examine the Defendant’s agent’s grounds of appeal.

(1) On the first ground for appeal

In light of the provisions of Article 73-2(1) of the Local Public Officials Act, the lower court held that the instant disposition against the Plaintiff is null and void as a matter of course, since two years have elapsed after the date of the instant disciplinary cause against the Plaintiff.

However, according to the provisions of Article 73-2 (2) of the Local Public Officials Act, if a disciplinary procedure is not conducted under the provisions of Article 73-2 (1) of the same Act, even after the expiration of the above two-year period, the case is being investigated by the Board of Audit and Inspection, as stipulated in Article 73 (1) of the same Act.

Therefore, the court below should have examined whether there are grounds falling under Articles 73-2(2) and 73(1) of the Local Public Officials Act with respect to the instant case. The court below erred by failing to do so, and there is a reason to discuss the issue of attacking this point. However, as seen later, even if the instant case does not go through the prescription issue of the grounds for disciplinary action, the court below did not have any influence on the outcome of the judgment below.

(2) On the second ground for appeal:

The guidelines of the Governor of the Gyeonggi-do on January 9, 1973 are merely guidelines to refer to the management of river base affairs in light of the door of the evidence No. 5, and thus, the court below's decision is not just and just. This is not only a recommended effect on the defendant (q. 3).

In light of the seven description of evidence, it is thought so.

Therefore, it is difficult to say that the Plaintiff permitted the occupation and use of the river base of this case to exceed 3,00 square meters, and the period of permission was one year or more, and that the Plaintiff did not have the duty of good faith to obey the instructions of his superior. In particular, as recognized by the lower court, 75 persons such as the Gangwonwon, etc. already permitted occupation and use of the river of this case two times or more on the summary of the relationship to remove the long-term medicinal trees, etc. from the river base of this case, but the Gyeonggi-do governor did not hold new occupation and use permission for the river of this case, and the Defendant did not legally respond to the Plaintiff’s opinion on February 12, 1974 to properly process the occupancy and use permission of the river of this case, and the Governor of Gyeonggi-do did not have any special authority to recognize the occupancy and use permission of the river of this case to continue to be in accordance with the construction permit of this case by taking into account the fact that the Plaintiff had received new occupation permission and use permission of the river of this case.

The lower court’s judgment that held to the same effect as party members is justifiable and did not err by misapprehending the principle of proportionality or the legal doctrine on discretionary power in the disciplinary action against public officials.

Therefore, this appeal is dismissed as it is without merit, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges.

Justices Kim Yong-chul (Presiding Justice)