[1] In order to exercise opposing power under the Housing Lease Protection Act, whether the delivery of a house and the resident registration should continue to exist (affirmative)

[2] Whether the opposing power under the Housing Lease Protection Act is maintained and the validity of the third party acting in good faith where the resident registration is revoked or the resident registration is restored or re-registered in accordance with the former Resident Registration Act

[1] Article 3 (1) of the Housing Lease Protection Act / [2] Article 3 (1) of the Housing Lease Protection Act, Article 1 (see current Article 1), Article 17-2 (see current Article 20), Article 17-3 (see current Article 21) of the former Resident Registration Act, Article 29 (see current Article 32) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Housing Lease Protection Act (wholly amended by Presidential Decree No. 20615, Feb. 22, 2008)

[1] [2] Supreme Court Decision 2002Da20957 decided Oct. 11, 2002 (Gong2002Ha, 2701) / [1] Supreme Court Decision 97Da43468 decided Jan. 23, 1998 (Gong1998Sang, 609) Supreme Court Decision 2000Da37012 decided Sept. 29, 200 (Gong200Ha, 2223)

Plaintiff

Defendant

Seoul Northern District Court Decision 2007Na1133 Decided June 20, 2007

The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

In light of the purport of Article 3(1) of the Housing Lease Protection Act giving strong opposing power to the housing lessee in real rights registered with the requirements for delivery and resident registration in accordance with Article 3(1) of the Housing Lease Protection Act, the requirements for opposing power of the housing delivery and resident registration should continue to exist for the purpose of maintaining the opposing power, not to satisfy only when acquiring the opposing power at the time of the acquisition of the housing (see Supreme Court Decision 97Da43468 delivered on January 23, 1998). Thus, inasmuch as the aforementioned requirements are deemed to continue to exist, the former Resident Registration Act (amended by Act No. 8422 of May 11, 2007) without the intention of the housing lessee and the Enforcement Decree of the same Act, even if the resident registration is cancelled by the head of a Si/Gun/Gu, it shall be deemed that there is no clear opposing power of the former Resident Registration Act to promote the safety of the housing unit by clearly understanding the residential situation of the population and thus, it shall be deemed that there is no new opposing power in the Housing Lease Act.

First, with respect to the validity of the defendant's resident registration which was re-registered ex officio, the court below is just to determine that the defendant's resident registration which was re-registered ex officio is valid, since the defendant's resident registration was recovered by the method of ex officio re-registration under Article 29 of the Enforcement Decree of the former Resident Registration Act within the scope delegated by the head of Nowon-gu in accordance with Article 2 (2) of the former Resident Registration Act, not by accepting the defendant's objection and correcting the cancellation of the

Next, with respect to whether the plaintiff constitutes a third party acting in good faith, the court of first instance, as cited by the court below, recognized the facts as stated in its reasoning after compiling the adopted evidence, and subsequently re-registers the defendant's resident registration ex officio by raising an objection after the defendant's resident registration was ex officio, and the plaintiff received the decision to permit the sale of the real estate in this case before ex officio revocation. As such, the plaintiff continued to maintain the opposing power in relation to the plaintiff as it did not constitute a third party acting in good faith who entered into a new interest relationship with respect to the leased house after ex officio revocation, the defendant's real estate name of this case and the duty to return the lease deposit of this case as well as the obligation of the plaintiff to return the lease deposit are in relation to the simultaneous performance. In light of the records, the court of first instance, as cited by the court below, is just

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Jeon Soo-ahn (Presiding Justice)