[1] Whether the legal relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant can be the subject of a lawsuit for confirmation (affirmative), and in a case where the benefit of confirmation is recognized, whether such legal relationship applies to a case where one of the plaintiff and the defendant entered into a contract or agreement with a third party, but a dispute arises over the cancellation or termination of the contract or agreement (affirmative)

[2] The case holding that it is difficult to readily conclude that Gap school has a benefit to seek confirmation of validity of an agreement against Byung local government, etc., in a case where Gap school sought confirmation of validity of an agreement against Byung local government, etc., where Eul et al. entered into an agreement on the establishment and operation of a school with Byung local government, etc., Byung local government, etc.

[3] Whether a school is recognized as a party's ability in a civil lawsuit (negative in principle)

[1] A lawsuit for confirmation requires the benefit of confirmation as a requirement for the protection of rights, and the benefit of confirmation is recognized when a judgment is rendered at the time of most effective and appropriate means to remove any apprehension and danger existing in the Plaintiff’s rights or legal status. A lawsuit for confirmation of confirmation may be subject to the legal relationship between the Plaintiff and the Defendant without necessarily limited to the legal relationship between the Plaintiff and the Defendant, but the legal relationship between either the Plaintiff and a third party or a third party may also be subject to the legal relationship between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. However, in order to remove the risks or apprehensions caused by the Plaintiff’s rights or legal status, it is necessary to immediately determine the legal relationship by the confirmation judgment between the Plaintiff and the Defendant, and the benefit of confirmation is the most effective and appropriate means. This legal principle also applies to cases where one of the Plaintiff and the Defendant entered into a contract or agreement with a third party, but a dispute arising

[2] The case holding that in a case where Gap's general superintendent of Eul's school Eul entered into an agreement on the establishment and operation of Byung's school with Byung's local government, and Byung's local government notified Eul of the termination of the agreement, and Byung's local government claimed confirmation of validity of the agreement against Byung's local government, etc., the party who entered into the agreement with Byung's local government, etc. is obviously Eul, not Eul's school, and thus, it cannot be viewed that Gap's right or legal status is not an unstable or dangerous, and even if the termination of the agreement affects Gap's right or legal status, it is unclear whether Gap's determination of validity of the agreement can be deemed necessary and most appropriate to eliminate anxiety and risk in the legal status of Gap's school, and it is difficult to conclude that Gap's school has a

[3] In principle, a school is not a juristic person, but an unincorporated association or foundation which is not a juristic person but a representative, and is only the name of an educational facility, so it is not recognized as a party's ability in civil litigation.

[1] Article 250 of the Civil Procedure Act / [2] Article 250 of the Civil Procedure Act / [3] Article 51 of the Civil Procedure Act

[1] Supreme Court Decision 94Da23388 delivered on November 8, 1994 (Gong1994Ha, 3240) Supreme Court Decision 2006Da68650 Delivered on February 9, 2007 (Gong2007Sang, 435) / [3] Supreme Court Decision 76Da1478 Delivered on August 23, 197, 2001Da21991 Delivered on June 29, 2001 (Gong2001Ha, 1737)

Plaintiff (Law Firm, Kim & Lee LLC, Attorneys Lee Jae-in et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Gyeonggi-do et al. (Law Firm Lee & Lee LLC, Attorneys Park Jae-chul et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Defendant 1 and six others

Seoul High Court Decision 2013Na2005068 decided March 21, 2014

The judgment below is reversed and the case is remanded to Seoul High Court.

Judgment ex officio is made.

1. A lawsuit for confirmation requires the benefit of confirmation as a requirement for the protection of rights, and the benefit of confirmation is recognized when a judgment for confirmation is rendered is the most effective and appropriate means to remove the Plaintiff’s right or legal status’s apprehension and danger (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2006Da68650, Feb. 9, 2007). A lawsuit for confirmation does not necessarily have a legal relationship between the original and the Defendant, but may be subject to the legal relationship between the third party or a third party. However, in relation to such legal relationship, it is necessary to immediately confirm the legal relationship with the original and the Defendant by taking the legal relationship as the object of confirmation in order to remove the danger or apprehension existing in the Plaintiff’s right or legal status, and there is a benefit of confirmation that it should be the most effective and appropriate means (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 94Da2388, Nov. 8, 199). Such legal doctrine applies even where one of the original and the Defendant entered into a contract or agreement with a third party, but its cancellation or termination.

2. The record reveals the following facts.

A. On December 7, 1978, pursuant to Article 44 of the former Immigration Control Act (wholly amended by Act No. 3694, Dec. 31, 1983), the Plaintiff completed the registration of a foreign organization with the name of the organization as “○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○,” and changed the name in 1993 to “△△△△△△△△○,” the name of 1993. On March 15, 199, the Plaintiff changed the name from the Superintendent of the Daejeon Metropolitan Office of Education to the “△△△△△△△,” the name of the organization to the former Elementary and Secondary Education Act (amended by Act No. 11384, Mar. 21, 2012; hereinafter the same) and Article 12 of the former Rules on Various Schools (amended by Ordinance of the Ministry of Education, Mar. 5, 2015; hereinafter the same).

B. The Nonparty, from September 1996, was in office as the Plaintiff’s total superintendent.

다. 피고들과 소외인은 2005. 1. 27. ◇◇◇◇◇◇◇학교(이하 ‘◇◇학교’라 한다)를 설립하기 위해 ◇◇학교의 설립·운영에 관한 협약(이하 ‘이 사건 협약’이라 한다)을 체결하였다.

According to the instant agreement, where the establishing and operating entity of △△ School is a foreigner prescribed in Article 12 of the Regulations on Various Kinds of Schools (Article 2(2)), and the Nonparty during the period of the agreement loses the status (referring to a position equivalent to the overall superintendent of △△△△ School) as a party to the agreement, a person who succeeds to the position of the general senior position of △△△ School (including any equivalent position) shall succeed to the status, authority, and duties of the Nonparty as stipulated in the instant agreement (Article 2(3)1), and the Nonparty shall take charge of all matters concerning the establishment and operation of the school by utilizing the personal and material resources of a foreign school owned by the Nonparty (Article 3(3)1 main text of the instant agreement). In addition, Article 7(3) of the instant Convention provides that “Where it is deemed that the foreign party is deemed that the establishment and operation of the school may not be continued due to violating the obligations under the instant agreement or the relevant statutes, or by intention or gross negligence, the

The end of the instant agreement was signed by the Gyeonggi-do Governor on behalf of the defendant Gyeonggi-do, the head of the Suwon-si, and the non-party individual.

D. On June 12, 2006, △△ school obtained authorization for establishment from the superintendent of the Gyeonggi-do Office of Education, and opened the school around September 2006. The Nonparty, from the time of the establishment of △△ school, concurrently held the office of general superintendent of △△ school and resigned from the office of general superintendent of △△ school around August 31, 201.

E. On February 9, 2012, the Defendants notified the Nonparty of the fact that “The Plaintiff unlawfully diverted the school expenses of △△△ school during 2011, and thus, the agreement is terminated in accordance with Article 7(3) of the instant Convention.”

3. Examining the above facts in light of the legal principles as seen earlier, since it is apparent that the Defendants and the parties to the instant agreement were not the Nonparty, the termination of the instant agreement does not immediately mean that the Defendants’ termination of the instant agreement has any apprehension or risk in the Plaintiff’s rights or legal status. Moreover, even if the Plaintiff’s rights or legal status was affected by the termination of the instant agreement, it is unclear whether it is necessary and most appropriate to determine the validity of the instant agreement by a judgment instead of demanding the performance pursuant to the instant agreement to eliminate anxiety and risk as to the legal status of the Plaintiff. Therefore, it is difficult to readily conclude that the Plaintiff has interest in seeking confirmation against the Defendants that “the instant agreement is valid.”

4. If so, the lower court should have deliberated and determined whether there was a benefit in the confirmation of the Plaintiff’s filing of the instant lawsuit, but maintained the first instance judgment which dismissed the Plaintiff’s claim by deliberating and determining the Plaintiff’s claim on the merits after failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations. In so doing, the lower court erred by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules, or by failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the benefit of confirmation in the lawsuit for confirmation. Therefore, the lower court

In addition, schools are names of educational facilities which are not juristic persons but juristic persons and are not juristic persons but juristic persons which are not juristic persons and juristic persons which are not juristic persons, so in principle, they are not admitted to the party ability in civil litigation (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 76Da1478, Aug. 23, 197; 2001Da21991, Jun. 29, 2001). Therefore, after remanding the case, the court below points out that it is necessary to examine and determine whether the plaintiff is deemed to have the party ability in civil litigation.

5. The lower judgment is reversed ex officio without examining the grounds of appeal, and the case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Park Poe-young (Presiding Justice)