Whether the effective land is valid

The case holding that the removal of a ground structure after the acquisition of the land shall not be deemed the idle land for one year.

The contents of the decision shall be the same as attached.

1. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed. 2. The costs of lawsuit are assessed against the plaintiff.

1. Details of the disposition;

갑제1호증, 갑제8호증의 1, 2, 갑제9호증의 1 내지 3, 갑제10, 11호증, 을제1호증의 1, 2, 을제5호증, 을제6호증의 1 내지 5, 을제7호증의 1 내지 4, 을제8호증의 1 내지 3의 각 기재와 증인 김ㅇ래의 증언에 변론의 전취지를 종합하면, ① 원고가 1989. 12. 18. 사옥 신축을 위하여 ㅇㅇ시 ㅇㅇ구 ㅇㅇ동 ㅇㅇ번지의 2 대 608.4㎡(이하 이 사건 토지라고 한다)와 그 지상의 근린생활시설 건물 166.32㎡를 취득한 후 인접한 원고 소유의 같은 동 ㅇㅇ번지 및 ㅇㅇ번지의 1 대지상의 자동차전시장에서 판매하는 부품보관 등을 위하여 위 지상건물(이하 이 사건 건물이라고 한다)을 일시 사용하면서 보유하여 온 사실, ② 그런데 이 사건 토지에 대한 이 사건 건물 가액의 비율이 위 같은 동 ㅇㅇ번지 및 ㅇㅇ번지의 1 대지와 그 지상의 자동차전시장 건물의 가액비율과 마찬가지로 1990. 12. 31. 현재 100분의 10에 미달하여 이 사건 토지가 위 2필지의 다른 대지와 함께 같은 해 1. 1.부터 같은 해 12. 31.까지의 예정결정기간 동안 토지초과이득세법 제9조 제3항 제2호 나.목 소정의 유휴토지에 해당하는 것으로 본 피고가 이 사건 토지에 대하여 별지목록 ⑵항 기재와 같이 금113,341,878원의 세액을 산출한 다음, 위 2필지의 다른 대지에 대한 금671,762,073원(위 ㅇㅇ번지 대지에 대한 금91,620,612원 + 위 ㅇㅇ번지의 1 대지에 대한 금580,141,461원)의 산출세액과 합산하여 1991. 11. 1.자로 원고에게 도합 금785,103,950원의 토지초과이득세를 부과하였다가, 1996. 12. 16. 1차로 위 ㅇㅇ번지 대지를 부과대상에서 제외하여 위 당초부과세액을 금723,483,338원(금785,103,950원 - 금91,620,612원)을 감액경정한 후, 1997. 8. 19.에 이르러 위 ㅇㅇ번지의 1 대지도 부과대상에서 제외함과 아울러 이 사건 토지에 대하여도 헌법재판소의 1994. 7. 29.자 헌법불합치결정에 따라 같은 해 12. 22. 법률 제4803호로 개정된 토지초과이득세법 제11조의2 소정의 기본공제와 제12조 소정의 세율을 적용하여 위 1차 감액경정세액을 별지목록 ⑶항 기재와 같이 다시 금110,341,878원으로 감액경정한 사실을 인정할 수 있다. (이하 위 1991. 11. 1.자 토지초과이득세 부과처분 중 최종 감액경정 후의 세액에 대한 부분을 이 사건 처분이라고 한다)

2. Whether the instant disposition is lawful

A. Whether Article 23 subparagraph 14 of the Enforcement Decree of the Land Excess Profits Tax Act is applied

(1) First, under the premise that the ratio of the value of the instant building to the instant land was more than 10/100 at the time of its acquisition, but the subsequent change in the standard market value of the instant land did not reach the above ratio as of the end of the scheduled period of determination of the instant disposition, the Plaintiff asserts that the instant land during the regular taxable period of the land excess profit tax, which was revised by Presidential Decree No. 13805 on December 31, 192 under Article 23 subparag. 14 of the Enforcement Decree of the Land Excess Profit Tax Act and Article 4 of its Addenda, does not fall under the category of the object of regular taxation because it does not fall under the idle land under Article 9(3)2(b) of the Land Excess Profit Tax Act, and thus, the instant disposition, which partially set the scheduled period of taxation, cannot be subject to regular taxation, is unlawful in that it is an estimated taxation, and it does not in itself constitute a land excess profit-making under the above provision of the Act.

(2) The Enforcement Decree of the Land Excess Profit Tax Act (hereinafter only referred to as the "Enforcement Decree") shall be amended on December 31, 1992 by Presidential Decree No. 13805, Dec. 31, 1992; (1) new Article 23(14) of the Enforcement Decree shall not be less than 10/100 of the land appurtenant to a building at the time of its acquisition, but the standard market price of the above land under Article 24 subparag. 1 (proviso) and subparag. 2 of the Enforcement Decree of the Local Tax Act, which serves as the basis of the value ratio, shall be changed to 10/100 or more at the time of its acquisition; and (2) the above provision of Article 9(3) subparag. 2 (b) of the Enforcement Decree of the above Act shall be deemed to be the date of its first acquisition for 3 years from the date of its completion; and (3) the above provision of Article 9(1) of the Enforcement Decree of the above Act shall be deemed to be the date of its enforcement 19.

However, Article 21(2)3 of the Framework Act on National Taxes (amended by Act No. 4672 of Dec. 31, 1993); Articles 23(1) and 24(1) of the Land Excess Gains Tax Act (amended by Act No. 4807 of Dec. 22, 1994); taxation on the scheduled period of taxation under the provisions of Article 23(1) and Article 24(1) of the said Act is a very independent taxation disposition with taxation on the scheduled period of taxation for three years even if the period of taxation is in some taxable periods (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 93Nu1012, May 10, 1994; 96Nu13910, Dec. 23, 1996). Thus, the determination of whether the land excess of the tax imposed on the land of this case constitutes an taxation disposition on the scheduled period of taxation on the land of this case, not on the scheduled period of taxation on the land of this case 13 years prior to its expiration.

However, the Constitutional Court rendered a ruling of inconsistency with the Constitution of 92Hun-Ba49 and 52 on July 29, 1994 as to the above excessive acquisition of the land before and after the amendment by Act No. 4807 of Dec. 2, 1994. Accordingly, Article 9(6) and Article 8(4) of the above Enforcement Decree were amended as of December 22, 1994; Article 23 subparag. 14 of the above Enforcement Decree No. 1470 of Dec. 31, 1994; the above provision of the Enforcement Decree after the amendment provides that if the above excessive acquisition of the land exceeds 10/100 of the value of the above land at the time of acquisition, the value of the land is below 10/10 of the above 9-17th of the Enforcement Decree of the above Act, and the above provision of the 9-17th of the Enforcement Decree of the above Act shall not be deemed to be the whole value of the land before and after the amendment of 197th of the above Act.

B. Whether Article 9(3)2(b) of the Land Excess Profit Tax Act is null and void as a provision of unconstitutionality

(1) In addition, the Plaintiff asserts that Article 9(3)2(b) of the Land Excess Profit Tax Act provides that the government, regardless of whether the land owned by a corporation is used directly for its unique business, shall consider it as idle land subject to taxation of the land excess profit tax only by the value ratio based on the standard market price of taxation unilaterally adjusted by the government, the tax authority, regardless of whether it is used directly for its unique business. However, this argues that the instant disposition is unlawful since it is contrary to the substance over form principle and the principle

(2) However, the above provision of the Land Excess Profit Tax Act provides that the land owned by a corporation and not used directly for its unique duties without any justifiable reason is premised on the provision of paragraph (1) of the same Article, which provides that the land is subject to the land excess profit tax, and even if the land is the land annexed to a building, if the value of the building is too small compared to the value of the land annexed to the building, it shall not be deemed that the land is used efficiently. Thus, if the land is used as the land annexed to a building which is not directly used for its unique duties under paragraph (1) of the same Article, the provision itself is merely a nominal ground, and it cannot be deemed that the land is used for its unique duties. Further, even if the standard market price, which serves as the basis for calculating the value ratio, is determined by the tax authorities, the calculation of the value ratio is based on the price ratio at the same time, and thus, it cannot be deemed that the above provision does not violate the above provision of Article 2 of the Tax Act or the principle of equality, and thus, it cannot be deemed that it goes against the above principle of equality.

C. Whether the land of this case is not subject to the land excess profit tax due to justifiable grounds for not using the land for its acquisition purpose

(1) In addition, the Plaintiff’s acquisition of the instant land was intended to use it as a site for new construction of a rooftop. However, the Plaintiff asserted that the instant disposition was unlawful on a different premise, even though the Plaintiff did not impose the land excess profit tax on the ground that there was justifiable grounds for not being used by the Plaintiff until December 27, 1990 by the lessee of the building on the instant land and the neighboring land acquired as a rooftop site after its acquisition, and the lessee of the building on the building on the adjacent land acquired as a rooftop site, could complete the construction by completing the surrender execution on December 27, 190.

(2) However, each statement in Gap evidence Nos. 4 through 7 alone is insufficient to recognize that the plaintiff could not commence new construction of a private house for the original purpose of acquisition due to the plaintiff's refusal to acquire the land of this case by the end of the scheduled scheduled period for the disposition of this case after the plaintiff acquired the land of this case as alleged above, and there is no other evidence to support this point. Moreover, the circumstance that the plaintiff was unable to use due to the illegal possession by a third party does not constitute a ground for exclusion from idle land (Supreme Court Decision 93Nu1241 delivered on November 14, 195), and there is no ground for the plaintiff's above assertion contrary to this.

(d) Whether Article 23 subparagraphs 2 and 3 of the Enforcement Decree applies

(1) 원고는 또, ① 원고가 이 사건 토지를 취득한 후 그 지상의 이 사건 건물을 철거하고자 하였으나, 그 임차인들의 명도거부로 소송을 통하여 1990. 12. 27.에야 비로소 명도집행을 완료한 후 같은 달 29일 건축허가신청을 하여 건축허가를 받았으나 그 후 ㅇㅇ시장의 건축착공금지조치로 이 사건 건물의 철거에 이르지 못한 것이므로, 이 사건 토지에 대하여는 시행령 제23조 제2호를 준용하여 위 건축허가시에 이 사건 건물이 철거된 것으로 보아 그로부터 1년간은 이 사건 토지가 유휴토지에 해당하지 아니한 것으로 보아야 하고, ② 또 이 사건 토지와 같이 지상건물이 있는 토지를 취득한 경우에도 건물신축을 목적으로 하고 기존 지상건물은 철거할 계획이었던 경우에는 시행령 제23조 제3호의 규정을 적용 내지 준용하여 그 취득시로부터 1년간은 그 토지를 유휴토지에서 제외하여야 하고, 따라서 원고가 사옥 신축을 목적으로 그 지상의 이 사건 건물을 철거할 계획아래 취득한 이 사건 토지도 그 취득일로부터 1년간은 유휴토지에서 제외되어야 함에도, 이 사건 처분은 위 각 시행령 규정의 적용 내지 준용을 배제한 것이어서 위법하다고 주장한다.

(2) However, Article 23 subparagraph 2 of the Enforcement Decree after the amendment of the above Constitutional Court's ruling of inconsistency with the Constitution on December 31, 1994, which applies to the disposition of this case, provides that the land shall not be deemed idle land for one year if it is voluntarily removed after the acquisition of the land. However, according to the statement of subparagraphs 4 through 6, it can be recognized that the date when the plaintiff received the construction permit for new construction of private houses on this case's land has already passed on March 7, 1991. Thus, one year from the date of the above construction permit is one year after the date of the above new construction permit, and the above provision of Article 23 subparagraph 2 of the Enforcement Decree of the above Decree does not apply to the above new construction of the above land for one year since the date of the above new construction of the above land is not applicable to the above new construction of the land, and it shall not be deemed that the above new construction of the land is not applicable to the above new construction of the land for one year or more, and it shall not be applied to the above new construction.

3. Conclusion

Thus, the plaintiff's claim of this case seeking its revocation on the ground of the illegality of the disposition of this case is dismissed without merit, and the costs of lawsuit are assessed against the plaintiff who has lost. It is so decided as per Disposition.