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(영문) 대법원 2001. 7. 24. 선고 2001다23669 판결
[부당이득금][공2001.9.15.(138),1923]
Main Issues

[1] The standard for determining whether a sufficient period for using and earning profits under Article 613(2) of the Civil Code has elapsed

[2] The case holding that a sufficient period of time has elapsed since the application of the standard of [1]

Summary of Judgment

[1] According to Article 613(2) of the Civil Code, if the duration of a loan for use is not specified, the borrower shall return the object at the time when the use or profit-making under the nature of the contract or the object is completed, but even if the use or profit-making has not been completed in reality, the lender may terminate the contract at any time and claim the return of the object borrowed when the sufficient period for use or profit-making has elapsed. Thus, whether the sufficient period for use or profit-making under Article 613(2) of the Civil Code has expired shall be determined on the basis of whether it is reasonable to recognize the right to terminate the contract to the lender from an equitable standpoint, comprehensively taking into account the circumstances

[2] The case holding that in a case where the period in which the gratuitous use has been continued has been more than 40 years, and the basis for the relationship between the lender and the borrower was changed due to the death of the lender at the time of the initial loan agreement, and the borrower's right to terminate the loan of use has been recognized from the perspective of fairness in a case where the relationship of mutual trust or friendship between the lender's heir is acknowledged in a case where the borrower's right to terminate the loan of use was acknowledged in a case where the borrower's right to the termination of the civil lawsuit claiming the acquisition of the acquisition by possession and the intention of the inspection on the permit of free

[Reference Provisions]

[1] Article 613(2) of the Civil Act / [2] Article 613(2) of the Civil Act

Reference Cases

[1] Supreme Court Decision 78Da13 decided Nov. 28, 1978 (Gong1979, 11614), Supreme Court Decision 93Da36806 decided Nov. 26, 1993 (Gong1994Sang, 198), Supreme Court Decision 94Da56371 decided Mar. 14, 1995 (Gong195Sang, 1606)

Plaintiff, Appellee

Plaintiff (Attorney Kim Sim-hwan et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Defendant, Appellant

Gwangju Metropolitan City (Attorney Kim Jong-cheon, Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Judgment of the lower court

Gwangju High Court Decision 2000Na5908 delivered on March 23, 2001

Text

The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.

Reasons

According to Article 613(2) of the Civil Act, if the duration of a loan for use is not determined, the borrower shall return the object at the time when use or profit-making under the nature of the contract or the object is completed, but even if use or profit-making has not been completed in reality, the lender may terminate the contract at any time and claim the return of the object of loan when the sufficient period for use or profit-making has elapsed. Whether the sufficient period for use or profit-making has expired or not shall be determined on the basis of whether it is reasonable to recognize the right to terminate the contract to the lender from the equitable standpoint by comprehensively taking into account the circumstances as at the time of the loan for use contract, the borrower’s period of use and use, and the circumstances that the lender needs to return, etc. (see Supreme Court Decisions 93Da36806, Nov. 26, 1993; 94Da563

According to the records, on June 4, 1956, the deceased non-party, who was his father, had lent the land to the Seo-gu Office of Education (former Office of Education at that time) affiliated with the defendant for the purpose of the site of the office of education without fixing the time limit. Since the above office of education newly constructed a building on the above land and owned it as an office building of education at that office of education, the above land has been over 40 years since the beginning to use it as an office building site. The defendant had not paid the price for the use of the above land up to 1985 and had the date on which the district court imposed property tax on the plaintiff for 1985 (the plaintiff had no content-certified mail demanding the payment of the same amount as the usage fee for that year from that date). Rather, on April 16, 1996, the court of final appeal filed a suit against the plaintiff for the removal of the right to use the land for a long period of 9 years or more, and dismissed the first claim for the removal of the ownership by the plaintiff from 96.

In the previous lawsuit, the court below held that the plaintiff's right to terminate the loan was terminated by considering that the loan was terminated by the same view, and it is just to order the return of unjust enrichment equivalent to the rent for the period from September 6, 1996 to April 1, 200, which was after the period of use when the plaintiff claimed for the return of unjust enrichment as a counterclaim and lost after the plaintiff had become final and conclusive, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the grounds for termination of the loan for use, or in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the scope of res judicata effect of the previous judgment or the effect of res judicata effect of the previous judgment. The circumstance that the defendant is friendly, the defendant continues to use the above building site for the office of education as the purpose at the time of the loan for use, namely, it is difficult to easily dismantle the building site as a solid and durable structure, and unless special financial resources are provided, it does not affect the conclusion that the plaintiff should use the above building continuously or have to recover the above land.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition.

Justices Lee Ji-dam (Presiding Justice)

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