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(영문) 대법원 1984. 7. 24. 선고 84도832 판결
[특정범죄가중처벌등에관한법률(관세)ㆍ관세법위반ㆍ방위세법위반ㆍ외환관리법위반][집32(3)형,851;공1984.10.1.(737),1512]
Main Issues

(a) the time to commence the enforcement of a tariff evasion;

(b) Acts applicable to the act of smuggling and other precious metals (=Foreign Exchange Management Act).

Summary of Judgment

A. In the event that the goods are carried into the territorial sea using a ship with the criminal intent to evade customs duties, it shall be deemed that there was a commencement of the crime of evading customs duties, and it shall not be necessary that there was an act of fostering the goods loaded on the ship or an act closely related thereto.

B. Article 137 and Article 181 of the Customs Act should be applied to the so-called "gold and other precious metals" imported in accordance with the Foreign Exchange Control Act, and Article 137 and Article 181 of the Customs Act shall not apply.

[Reference Provisions]

(a) Article 180, Article 182(2) of the Customs Act, Article 25(1)(b) of the Criminal Act, Article 27, Article 4 subparag. 6, Article 35 of the Foreign Exchange Control Act, Article 34 of the Enforcement Decree of the Foreign Exchange Control Act, Article 137 and Article 181 of the Customs Act;

Reference Cases

Supreme Court Decision 76Do582 delivered on June 22, 1976, 78Do925 delivered on June 27, 1978, and 83Do1942 delivered on October 11, 1983

Escopics

Defendant 1 and one other

upper and high-ranking persons

Defendants

Defense Counsel

Attorney Kim Dong-hwan, private housing

Judgment of the lower court

Daegu High Court Decision 83No69 delivered on March 23, 1984

Text

The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Daegu High Court.

Reasons

1. Defendant 1 and his state appointed defense counsel’s grounds of appeal are examined.

Examining the evidence admitted by the judgment of the court of first instance, it is not difficult to acknowledge the defendant's criminal facts as stated in its holding, and there is no circumstance to suspect that the confession of the suspect interrogation protocol against the defendant and the co-defendants of the court below does not have been made voluntarily as an adviser, etc. Therefore, it cannot be said that there is an error of law by misunderstanding facts against the rules of evidence and misunderstanding the legal principles of the public offering, such as the theory

2. We examine the grounds of appeal by Defendant 2 and his defense counsel (the grounds of appeal by defense counsel’s supplementary statement in the grounds of appeal shall not be determined since it was submitted later than the submission period).

According to the evidence adopted by the court of first instance that the court below maintained, there is no circumstance to suspect that the confession of the suspect interrogation protocol against the defendant prepared by the public prosecutor is not a voluntary statement as an adviser. Thus, there is no error of law by misunderstanding facts against the rules of evidence or failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations, as in the theory of lawsuit, or by failing to meet the reasons for the judgment.

In addition, since the first instance judgment maintained by the lower court is justifiable in that the defendant's decision was based on the defendant's crime of evading customs duties in the event that the goods were carried in by using the ship with the criminal intent to evade customs duties and the goods were brought in the territorial sea, the court below's independent opinion that the act of fostering the goods loaded with the ship or the act of closely related to such act should be deemed to exist in order to recognize the commencement of enforcement of customs duties, it cannot be accepted in the lower court's holding that there is a misapprehension of the legal principle as to the commencement of enforcement in relation to the crime of evading customs duties.

3. Following ex officio, the judgment of the court of first instance on Defendant 1, and on Defendant 2, which the court below maintained against the defendants 2: (a) the defendants attempted to import gold ingot; and (b) each so-called so-called attempted to import gold ingot; (c) Articles 6(6) and (4)2 of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes; (d) Articles 182(2) and the former part of Article 181 of the Customs Act; (d) Articles 182(2) and 180(1) of the Customs Act; (d) Articles 13(1) of the Defense Tax Act; (e) Articles 182(2) and 180(1) of the Customs Act; (e) Articles 180(1) and 180(2) of the Customs Act; and (e) Articles 187(2) and 68(2)4 of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes.

However, Article 27 and Article 4 subparagraph 6 of the Foreign Exchange Control Act and Article 34 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act provide that a person who obtains the permission under the conditions as prescribed by the Minister of Finance and Economy may export or import gold or other precious metals, and the person who exports or imports gold or other precious metals in violation thereof shall be subject to punishment under Article 35 of the same Act. Article 137 and Article 181 of the Customs Act are not applicable (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 76Do582, Jun. 22, 1976; 78Do925, Jun. 27, 1978). Since Article 6 (6) and (4) 2 of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Economic Crimes and Article 181 of the Customs Act provide that a person who imports or exports gold or other precious metals shall be subject to the attempted import of gold or other precious metals, the judgment below which clearly affected the crime of violation of Article 6 (1) and the first sentence of Article 18 of the Customs Act.

Therefore, without examining the grounds of appeal on unfair sentencing by Defendant 2 and the grounds of appeal on the misapprehension of legal principles as to the commencement time of the crime of non-licensed import by his counsel, the lower judgment against the Defendants is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Daegu High Court which is the lower court. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of

Justices O Sung-sung(Presiding Justice)

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심급 사건
-대구고등법원 1984.3.23.선고 83노69
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