2015du49122 The revocation of revocation of non-payment of bereaved family's benefits and funerals

A person shall be appointed.

Korea Labor Welfare Corporation

Seoul High Court Decision 2015Nu31314 Decided July 3, 2015

December 10, 2015

The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to Seoul High Court.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. Occupational accident under the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act refers to an occupational disease caused by the worker's occupational performance while performing his/her duties. Thus, there should be a causal relationship between the occupational disease and the disease. If at least the occupational stress overlaps with the main cause of the disease even though there is no direct relationship between the performance of his/her duties and the performance of his/her duties, and causes or worsens the disease, it should be deemed that there exists a causal relationship among them. Such causal relationship should be proved to the extent that there is a proximate causal relationship between the occupational and the disease, considering various circumstances, unless it is necessarily proved clearly by medical and natural science (see Supreme Court Decision 2005Du13841, Mar. 9, 2006, etc.).

2. The lower court, based on its adopted evidence, found the facts as indicated in its reasoning. ① The deceased’s age is below 29 years, and the deceased’s direct death in fluoral bral bral bral bral bral dysium in relation to the deceased’s direct death, was not found to all of the deceased. ② The head of the office who works together with the deceased and two persons 1 had no choice but to work during the preparation for the architect examination from January 2012 to the increase in work volume. From August 6, 2012 to September 6, 2012, the lower court determined that the construction design work of the deceased was carried out, and that the deceased’s work was conducted sharply, and that the deceased’s work was conducted without work hours, and that the deceased’s work was conducted without work hours until the date of the accident in this case, and that the deceased’s work was conducted with additional stress on the condition that the deceased’s work was conducted, and that the deceased’s work was conducted under the premise that the deceased’s mental pressure on the deceased’s work.

3. However, the lower court’s determination is difficult to accept for the following reasons.

The reasoning of the lower judgment and the evidence duly admitted by the lower court reveal the following circumstances: (i) it is difficult to view the deceased’s duty as a design duty mainly with physical and mental burden in light of the intensity and density of his duty; and (ii) even if the deceased worked without a leave of absence from four weeks prior to the disaster day of the instant case, he could have retired from work to a certain extent; and (iii) the deceased was able to take part in his main design work beyond the previous design support work, which he had been in charge from the preparation for the architect examination to the previous design work; (iv) although the scope of his design work was somewhat wide, it appears that the deceased could have easily adapt to the changed work even if he performed the design work, such as the preparation of a seven-year drawing plan, and it is difficult to readily conclude that the deceased’s duty could not be seen as having been subject to special mental pressure due to changes in his duty and advice; and (iv) it is difficult to readily conclude that the deceased’s duty might have been naturally aggravated due to a sudden shock and tension between the deceased’s president and the work.

Nevertheless, the lower court determined otherwise based on its stated reasoning that there was a proximate causal relationship between the deceased’s death, occupational career, and stress, and thus, determined that the deceased’s death constituted occupational accidents. In so doing, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the proof of proximate causal relationship in occupational accidents, thereby failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations, thereby

4. Therefore, the lower judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee Ki-taik

Justices Lee In-bok

Justices Ko Young-han

Justices Kim Gin-young