The appeal is dismissed.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. Since the crime of death or injury caused by traffic obstruction under Article 188 of the Criminal Act is an aggravated crime, in order to establish the above crime, there should be a proximate causal relation between the traffic obstruction act and the result of the death or injury, and it should be possible to anticipate the occurrence of the result at the time of the act.

In addition, a proximate causal relationship can be acknowledged if the traffic obstruction act is ordinarily foreseeable even if there is another fact, such as negligence of the victim or a third party, between the act and the result, not only if the traffic obstruction act causes the result of the victim's thought, or directly causes the result of the victim's thought.

(See Supreme Court Decision 93Do3612 delivered on March 22, 1994). 2. The first instance court (see Supreme Court Decision 93Do3612 delivered on March 2, 1994) held that “If vehicles are continuously driven at normal speed at the 12-lanes at the time of the instant case and vehicles are cut off on the 12-lanes, the vehicle driving on the 1-lanes cannot avoid it and lead to a large accident. However, although the Defendant is driving on the 12-lanes at the time of the instant case, according to the two-lanes at the speed of 110 to 120km, and immediately stopped on the front of the victim H’s vehicle, and even if it is difficult for the victim to drive the 5-tons at the time of the instant accident to get off the vehicle or to stop the vehicle without being able to get the victim’s duty of care, it is difficult for the victim to get the victim to stop and stop the vehicle in the next order.”