[1] In a case where Party A, a Myanmar nationality, entered the Republic of Korea with a passport issued under the name of Party B, and applied for refugee status under the name of Party B, but the Minister of Justice had directly interviewed Party A using the name of Party B and investigated Party B, and then rendered a disposition for refugee non-recognition, the case holding that Party A has a legal interest in seeking revocation of the disposition

[2] Whether a failure by the court of original judgment to determine whether a party's assertion that there is a legal interest in dispute over a disposition constitutes grounds for appeal for denial of judgment (negative)

[3] Whether a refugee may be recognized in the event of “a well-founded fear of persecution” by expressing a political opinion in a country of residence after leaving the country of nationality (affirmative), and whether the case where a person provided a cause of persecution to be protected as a refugee is different (negative)

[1] In a case where Party A, a Myanmar’s nationality, entered the Republic of Korea with a passport issued under the name of Party B, and applied for refugee status under the name of Party B, but the Minister of Justice had directly interviewed Party A using the name of Party B and investigated Party B, and thereafter rendered a disposition for refugee non-recognition, the case holding that Party A has a legal interest in seeking revocation of the disposition on the ground that Party A was a person who used the name of Party B, not a person without permission

[2] Whether there is a legal interest in dispute over the pertinent disposition is a matter of ex officio investigation, and the party's assertion on it is only the meaning of demanding an ex officio action. Thus, the court below's failure to determine it cannot be deemed as a ground for appeal for omission of judgment.

[3] A refugee may be recognized even in the event of occurrence of “a well-founded fear of persecution” as a result of an act such as expressing a political opinion in the country of residence after leaving his/her country of nationality, and it does not change on the ground that he/she provided a cause of persecution to be protected as a refugee.

[1] Article 76-2(1) of the former Immigration Control Act (amended by Act No. 11298, Feb. 10, 2012; see current Article 18(1) of the Refugee Act); Article 1 of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees; Article 1 of the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees; Article 1 of the Administrative Litigation Act / [2] Article 8(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act; Article 423 of the Civil Procedure Act / [3] Article 76-2(1) of the Immigration Control Act (see current Article 18(1) of the Refugee Act); Article 1 of the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees;

[2] Supreme Court Decision 96Da32706 delivered on January 24, 1997 (Gong1997Sang, 635) / [3] Supreme Court Decision 2007Du19539 Delivered on July 24, 2008

○○○ (Law Firm aiming at Law, Attorneys Southern-chul et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

The Minister of Justice

Seoul High Court Decision 2012Nu25745 decided July 19, 2013

The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. Regarding ground of appeal No. 1

According to the records, the Plaintiff’s principal name and date of birth are “△△△△△△△ (date of birth 1 omitted).” On May 29, 2001, the Plaintiff entered the Republic of Korea using a passport under the name of “○○○○ (date of birth 2 omitted)” and on August 28, 2009, filed an application for refugee status under the above “○○○○○” name. The Defendant directly interviewed and investigated the Plaintiff using the name of “○○○○” on June 17, 2010, and then issued a disposition to recognize refugee status (hereinafter “instant disposition”) against the Plaintiff on May 25, 201.

Therefore, since the other party to the disposition of this case is not a person without permission, but a plaintiff using the title " ○○○", it is reasonable to deem that the plaintiff has a legal interest in seeking the revocation of the disposition of this case

In addition, the issue of whether there is a legal interest to dispute the pertinent disposition is a matter of ex officio investigation, and the party's assertion on it is only the meaning of demanding an ex officio action. Thus, the court below's failure to determine it cannot be viewed as a ground for appeal for the omission of judgment (see Supreme Court Decision 96Da32706 delivered on January 24, 197, etc.).

Therefore, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding the legal interest in an appeal litigation, or by omitting judgment as to the main defense against it.

2. As to the grounds of appeal Nos. 2 through 4

A refugee may be recognized even in the event of “a well-founded fear of persecution” as a result of an act such as expressing political opinions in a country of residence after leaving his/her country of nationality, and does not change on the ground that he/she provided a cause of persecution to be protected as a refugee (see Supreme Court Decision 2007Du19539, Jul. 24, 2008, etc.).

After finding facts as indicated in its reasoning, the lower court determined that the instant disposition rejecting refugee recognition against the Plaintiff was unlawful on the ground that: (a) the Plaintiff actively engaged in various activities to support the Myanmar and the Republic of Korea as well as to improve human rights; (b) the Plaintiff returned to Myanmar at the time of the instant disposition, in particular, recognized that there was a well-founded fear that the Plaintiff would be persecution by the Myanmar government due to its activities in the Republic of Korea; and (c) the Plaintiff did not appear to have applied for refugee status

This part of the allegation in the grounds of appeal is nothing more than an error of fact-finding, the selection of evidence, and the determination of value, which belong to the free trial of the fact-finding court. In addition, even after examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the record, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine on refugee status or by exceeding the bounds of

3. Conclusion

The appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Kim Yong-deok (Presiding Justice)