Whether the presiding judge's restriction of overlapping and unreasonable examinations of defense counsel in criminal trial proceedings falls under the jurisdiction of the jurisdiction of the court (affirmative)

Article 279 of the Criminal Procedure Act

Defendant

Defendant

Attorney Jeong So-young

Suwon District Court Decision 2006No1770 decided May 4, 2007

The appeal is dismissed.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. As to the assertion of procedural illegality

Ordering restrictions by the presiding judge on the duplicate and unreasonable examination of a defense counsel in the criminal trial proceedings is belonging to the jurisdiction of the presiding judge, and measures taken by the presiding judge restricting examination cannot be deemed unlawful unless such restrictions are significantly unreasonable or inappropriate.

Examining the record, it can be seen that the examination of the defendant by the defense counsel conducted on the first trial date of the court below of this case has changed to make the examination of the defendant in the same manner as the trial of the court of first instance, and if so, the examination of the defendant did not proceed any longer. The examination of the defendant does not have any evidence to be submitted by the defense counsel even in the course of the examination of evidence conducted, and there is no opinion about the completion of the examination and the examination of evidence. In light of the above legal principles, the court below did not err by violating the principle of oral pleading, the defendant's defense right, and the defense

2. On the assertion of violation of the rules of evidence

According to the records, even though the defendant and his defense counsel have consistently asserted to the effect that they denies the facts charged in this case from the beginning, there is no room to regard the statement of the non-indicted 1 in the first instance trial as a clerical error because it is stated that the counsel or the defendant consented to the admissibility of evidence in respect of the non-indicted 1's statement among the evidence list. However, even though the related witness appeared and testified related to the contents of the non-indicted 1's statement (which is disadvantageous to the defendant) on several trial days thereafter, the defense counsel did not raise any objection to the statement of the non-indicted 1's written consent, and both the prosecutor and the defense counsel did not request as witness. The summary of the first instance trial proceedings submitted by the defense counsel, without any admissibility of the non-indicted 1's written statement or any assertion that the non-indicted 1's statement was not admissible without any defense that the non-indicted 1's written consent was omitted, the defense counsel of the court of first instance pointed out the problems of the non-indicted 1's summary after the pleading in the first instance trial proceedings.

In full view of the above facts, the entry of Nonindicted 1’s written consent to the evidence shall not be deemed to have been mistakenly recorded, but shall be deemed to have been dealt with as having agreed upon by the defense counsel or the Defendant’s will. There is no evidence to deem that the above entry was erroneous by mistake.

3. As to the remaining grounds of appeal

The remaining arguments in the grounds of appeal are the purport that the evidence preparation and fact-finding, which are the matters of exclusive authority of the court below, are trees, and there is no violation of the rules of evidence in the court below which found the defendant guilty as to the facts of this case and the court below which sentenced the compensation order, and the court of first instance which did not reach the rules of evidence, and there is no violation of the rules of evidence in the court below'

4. Conclusion

The grounds of appeal are without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Kim Nung-hwan (Presiding Justice)