Whether the provisions of Article 3(2) and (4) of the Safety Control and Business Regulation of Liquefied Petroleum Gas Act are unconstitutional (negative)

Since it is intended to ensure the safety management and safety of supply and demand of liquefied petroleum gas to obtain permission for a liquefied petroleum gas sales business in accordance with Articles 3(2) and 3(4) of the Safety Control and Business Regulation of Liquefied Petroleum Gas Act, this provision does not violate the constitutional freedom of occupation or the principle of equality.

Articles 3(2) and 3(4) of the Safety Control and Business Regulation of Liquefied Petroleum Gas Act, Article 11 and 15 of the Constitution

Supreme Court Decision 89Nu2820 Decided September 12, 1989

Plaintiff

Jeju Market

Gwangju High Court Decision 88Gu611 delivered on May 9, 1989

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

As determined by the court below, the defendant's rejection of the plaintiff's application for permission of this case under Article 3 (2) and (4) of the Safety Control and Business Regulation of Liquefied Petroleum Gas Act and Article 3 (1) of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act is just if liquefied petroleum gas in Jeju is supplied in excess as determined by the court below, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as pointed out

Article 3(2) of the same Act provides that a person who intends to operate a liquefied petroleum gas sales business shall obtain permission from the head of the Si/Gun/Gu, and Article 3(4) of the same Act delegates the criteria and scope of the above permission to the Presidential Decree. However, it is intended to promote the safety control of liquefied petroleum gas and the stability of supply and demand of liquefied petroleum gas. Thus, this provision does not violate the constitutional freedom of occupation or the principle of equality.

In addition, as long as the application for permission of this case was rejected for the above reasons, it cannot be justified for the judgment on the ground that the defendant did not give the plaintiff an opportunity to correct the matters to be satisfied with the application.

In addition, even after examining the record, the defendant's return of the application for permission of this case to another person is not considered to have obtained permission. The arguments are without merit.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Ansan-man (Presiding Justice)