(a) Whether the receipt of money under the pretext of solicitation by relevant public officials should be deemed as receiving money and valuables under the pretext of solicitation by public officials dealing with relevant affairs, even if the public officials to be solicited are not specified;

B. The meaning of "cases or affairs dealt with by public officials" under Item 1 of Article 78 of the former Attorney-at-Law Act

(c) The case holding that where the defendant used the position of directors and vice-chairpersons of the corporation formally for the convenience of street activities and received money as a solicitation to related public officials, a solicitation on the affairs that the corporation promoted cannot be deemed as the defendant's own business

(a) Where receiving money under the pretext of solicitation for relevant public officials, even if not specifying the public officials to be solicited, it should be deemed that receiving money and valuables under the pretext of solicitation for public officials in charge of relevant affairs;

B. It is reasonable to interpret that the case or affairs dealt with by a public official under subparagraph 1 of Article 78 of the former Attorney-at-Law Act (amended by Act No. 4544 of Mar. 10, 1993) refer to all the cases or affairs of a person except him.

C. In the event that the Defendant received money from the representative director of a nonprofit incorporated association on the pretext of soliciting relevant public officials and was engaged in the street activity, the Defendant’s business cannot be deemed to be a defendant’s own business, even if he was in the position of a director of a nonprofit incorporated association, if he completed registration as a director of the corporation formally without involvement in the company’s ordinary business for the convenience of its activities, and used the company’s position as a director and vice-chairperson, and received money in the pretext of solicitation for the pertinent public officials thereafter.

Article 78 subparagraph 1 of the former Attorney-at-Law Act (amended by Act No. 4544 of March 10, 1993) (see Article 90 subparagraph 1 of the current Act)

A. Supreme Court Decision 90Do489 delivered on May 8, 1990 (Gong1990, 1300). Supreme Court Decision 84Do1044 delivered on August 21, 198 (Gong1984, 1587) 86Do1425 delivered on January 19, 198 (Gong198, 465) 94Do1964 delivered on October 14, 1994 (Gong194Ha, 3037)

Defendant 1 and two others

Prosecutor General and the Defendants

Attorney Ji-chul et al.

Seoul High Court Decision 93No602 delivered on February 25, 1994

All appeals are dismissed.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. Examining the grounds of appeal by the prosecutor against the defendant 1 and 2 in light of the records, the court below rejected the evidence that corresponds to the facts charged in the violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Economic Crimes (Fraud) against the defendants, and found the defendants not guilty on the ground that there is no proof of the crime, and there is no error in the violation of the rules of evidence by judging evidence that deviates from the limit of the free evaluation of evidence as pointed out in the grounds of appeal. The grounds of appeal

2. Examining the reasoning of the judgment below as to Defendant 1 and 2’s attempted fraud against Defendant 1 and 2’s attorney-at-law’s attorney-at-law, attorney-at-law’s truth-finding, and Defendant 1’s ground of appeal, in light of the records, the court below is justified in finding Defendant 1 and 2 guilty of the crime of attempted fraud of this case as to Defendant 1 and 2’s deception, by combining the evidence as stated in the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance cited in the judgment of the court below, that Defendant 1 and 2 conspireded to deceiving Defendant 1 and 2 into a victim’s prostitution, and attempted to commit an attempted crime without achieving the purpose, and there is no violation of the rules of evidence as pointed out in the ground of appeal, or there is no error of law in the misapprehension of the law of fraud, or in the misapprehension of the law

3. As to the grounds of appeal by Defendant 1’s limited attorney-at-law as to the fraud against Defendant 1’s transfer of the victim

Examining the reasoning of the judgment of the court below in light of the records, it is justified that the court below found Defendant 1 guilty of the crime of fraud of this case committed by Defendant 1 against the victim's moving-in, taking full account of the evidence stated in the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance as cited in the judgment, and there is no violation of the rules of evidence or misunderstanding the legal principles of fraud. The grounds for

4. As to Defendant 3’s ground of appeal

A. Examining the reasoning of the judgment of the court below in light of the records, the court below is justified in finding that the defendant received money from the above defendant 2 under the pretext of solicitation of the related public officials, not the expenses for the scargout or the expenses for arranging the existing business, and it is not erroneous in the misapprehension of the rules of evidence as pointed out in the ground of appeal. The ground of appeal pointing this out shall not be accepted.

B. In a case where the Defendant received 240,000 square meters of the Park Cemetery created within a unified movable from the Land Development Corporation in favor of the relevant public officials, such as the Uniform House, the Ministry of Construction, Gyeonggi-do, and the Land Development Corporation, under the pretext of solicitation for a negotiated contract, even if the public official was not specified, the Defendant should be deemed to have received money and valuables in favor of the public officials in charge of the affairs unreshing the Park Cemetery to the private sector or public officials in charge of the affairs concerning authorization and permission of the Park Cemetery (see Supreme Court Decision 90Do489 delivered on May 8, 190).

In addition, it is reasonable to interpret that the case or affairs handled by a public official under Article 78 subparagraph 1 of the former Attorney-at-law Act (amended by Act No. 4544 of Mar. 10, 1993; hereinafter the same applies) and Article 78 subparagraph 1 of the former Attorney-at-law Act should refer to all the cases or affairs except for himself. Thus, the defendant is not in violation of the legal principles as to the above affairs under Article 78 subparagraph 1 of the former Attorney-at-law Act, although he received 130 million won or more from the above non-profit incorporated association on two occasions under the pretext of solicitation from the relevant public officials, while he was engaged in the part of the non-profit incorporated association's ordinary affairs of the non-indicted incorporated association on September 20, 1991 for the convenience of its activities, and received money from the above non-indicted incorporated association as a director of the above non-indicted incorporated association on ten occasions after using it as a solicitation.

5. Therefore, the prosecutor and the defendants' appeals are all dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition with the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Park Jong-chul (Presiding Justice)