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(영문) 대법원 2008. 11. 13. 선고 2006도755 판결
[일반교통방해·노동쟁의조정법위반·폭력행위등처벌에관한법률위반][공2008하,1695]
Main Issues

[1] The degree of explanation of the conspiracy in the co-principal

[2] The case holding that an act of entering a university to hold a competition by a representative of the Korean Trade Union or a representative of the Korean Workers' Union requested the president of a specific university to permit the use of a place to hold a national workers' competition, etc., but explicitly received notification of non-permission constitutes an act of entering

[3] The meaning of a trade union which permits intervention in an industrial action under Article 13-2 of the former Trade Dispute Mediation Act and is a union federation

[4] The case holding that even if the representative council of the National Trade Union and the National Committee for Preparation of the National Federation of Labor Unions consisting of unit trade unions have the substance of a union federation, the act of visiting and supporting and encouraging a strike and a trade union in collective bargaining is an act prohibited by Article 13-2 of the former Trade Union Mediation Act, since the report on establishment as prescribed by the former Trade Union Act was not completed or a certificate of report was not issued

[5] Where an assembly or demonstration constitutes a crime of interference with traffic under the Criminal Act

[6] The case holding that general traffic obstruction constitutes a crime of interference in traffic, in a case where a road-related demonstration organized by the Korean Democratic Trade Union Preparatory Committee for the Korean Union Federation completed an outdoor assembly report in advance pursuant to the old Assembly and Demonstration Act, and where the scope of the report and the limitation under Article 12 of the above Act considerably deviates from the scope of the report and occupied the front line to the main roads, thereby causing a significant obstacle to traffic flow by occupying the front line

[7] Whether Article 13-2 of the former Labor Dispute Mediation Act, which prohibits third party intervention, violates Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Article 8 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, etc. (negative)

Summary of Judgment

[1] In relation to the conspiracy of co-principals, it is not necessary to provide detailed statements about the mother's specific date, time, place, contents, etc., and it is sufficient to explain that the intent has been satisfied with regard to the crime.

[2] The case holding that the act of a representative of the Korean Trade Union or a representative of the Korean Workers' Union requested a specific university president to permit the use of a place to hold a national Workers' Races, etc. but explicitly received notification of non-permission constitutes the act of entering each university to hold a competition, which constitutes the crime of

[3] A trade union which is a union federation permitted to intervene in an industrial action under Article 13-2 of the former Trade Union Adjustment Act (repealed by Article 3 of the Addenda of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (Act No. 5244 of Dec. 31, 1996) refers only to a trade union which meets the formal requirements, such as the provision of Article 14 of the same Act and the report of establishment under Article 13(1) of the same Act, in light of Article 13(2) of the former Trade Union Act (repealed by Article 3 of the Addenda of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (Act No. 5244 of Dec. 31, 1996).

[4] The case holding that even if the representative council of the National Trade Union and the National Committee for Preparation of the National Union Federation of Labor Unions consisting of unit trade unions have the substance, it constitutes an act of third party intervention prohibited under Article 13-2 of the former Trade Union Mediation Act (repealed by Article 3 of the Addenda of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (repealed by Act No. 5244 of Dec. 31, 1996) since the report on establishment under the former Trade Union Act (repealed by Article 3 of the Addenda of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (Act No. 5244 of Dec. 31, 1996) was not completed or a certificate of report was not issued, and therefore, it constitutes an act of support and encouragement by visiting a trade union belonging to

[5] In light of the legislative intent of Article 6(1) and Article 6(1) of the former Assembly and Demonstration Act (amended by Act No. 8424 of May 11, 2007), in a case where an assembly or demonstration is conducted on the road after completing lawful reports, the traffic of the road may be restricted to a certain degree. Thus, in a case where the assembly or demonstration conducted within the reported scope or conducted differently from the reported contents, and where such assembly or demonstration considerably does not deviate from the reported scope, barring any special circumstance, it cannot be deemed that the general traffic obstruction under Article 185 of the Criminal Act is established, even if the assembly or demonstration interfered with the traffic of the road, barring any special circumstance. However, if the assembly or demonstration considerably deviates from the reported scope, or if it substantially interferes with the traffic, thereby making it impossible or remarkably difficult to pass through the road due to serious violation of the conditions under Article 12 of the former Assembly and Demonstration Act (amended by Act No. 8424 of May 11, 2007).

[6] The case holding that general traffic obstruction is constituted, in case where a road-related demonstration organized by the National Federation of Democratic Trade Unions by the Preparatory Committee for the National Assembly of Korea completed the report of an outdoor assembly in advance pursuant to the former Assembly and Demonstration Act (amended by Act No. 8424 of May 11, 2007), and where the scope of the report and the limitation pursuant to Article 12 of the above Act are considerably deviates from the scope of the report and it causes significant hindrance to traffic by occupying the train along the main roads, etc., and thus, it causes substantial hindrance to traffic flow

[7] Article 13-2 of the former Labor Dispute Mediation Act (repealed by Article 3 of the Addenda to the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, Act No. 5244, Dec. 31, 1996) only prohibits a third party, except those who have legitimate authority under the statutes, from engaging in industrial action for the purpose of controlling, instigating, or interfering with the parties concerned or for the purpose of affecting them, and does not restrict the formation of a trade union and the freedom of joining a trade union. Therefore, the foregoing provision does not violate the Charter of the International Labor Organization and its Annex, which declares the freedom of association or association under Article 8(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, Cultural and Cultural Rights, which guarantee the establishment and freedom of joining a trade union, and declares the freedom of association. Meanwhile, Article 13-2 of the former Labor Dispute Mediation Act limits the freedom of expression guaranteed by the Charter of the International Labor Organization or the Annex to the International Labor Organization. However, the foregoing restriction cannot be deemed as violating the legislative intent of the above restriction and the freedom of expression under Article 19(3) of international labor law.

[Reference Provisions]

[1] Article 30 of the Criminal Act / [2] Article 319 (1) of the Criminal Act / [3] Article 13-2 of the former Trade Dispute Mediation Act (repealed by Article 3 of the Addenda to the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (Act No. 5244 of December 31, 1996) (see current Article 40 (2) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act), Article 13 of the former Trade Union Act (repealed by Article 3 of the Addenda to the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (Act No. 524 of December 31, 1996), Article 14 (see current Article 11 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act) / [4] Article 13-2 (see current Article 40 (2) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, Article 13 (1) of the former Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (amended by Act No. 5241 of Dec. 31, 1996), Article 14 of the former Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act / [4

Reference Cases

[1] Supreme Court Decision 94Do1832 delivered on October 11, 1994 (Gong1994Ha, 3031) Supreme Court Decision 95Do2930 delivered on March 8, 1996 (Gong1996Sang, 1311) Supreme Court Decision 2003Do3516 delivered on October 10, 2003

Escopics

Defendant

upper and high-ranking persons

Defendant

Defense Counsel

Law Firm Chang-chul, Attorneys Lee Young-woo et al.

Judgment of the lower court

Seoul Central District Court Decision 2001No1474 Delivered on January 11, 2006

Text

The appeal is dismissed.

Reasons

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. Regarding ground of appeal No. 1

A. As to general traffic obstruction

The conspiracy, which is a subjective element of the co-principal, is sufficient if there is a combination of the intent to jointly commit the crime between the accomplices. The combination of the doctors is established even if all the accomplices do not gather at the same time, at the same place, in order and implicitly, and even if they are made in secret. As long as such conspiracy has been made, the other accomplices are held liable for criminal liability even if they did not participate in the conduct. In addition, in the conspiracy of co-principal, it is not necessary to decide in detail the detailed date, time, place, contents, etc. of the conspiracy, and it is only necessary to decide that the agreement with the intention to commit the crime has been reached (see Supreme Court Decision 95Do2930 delivered on March 8, 196, etc.).

In light of the above legal principles and records, the court below was justified in finding facts as stated in its reasoning based on the adopted evidence. Furthermore, even if the defendant did not decide on the time, location, contents, etc. of the general traffic obstruction between the defendant and the above public, it is sufficient that the court below erred in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the crime of traffic obstruction as alleged in the ground of appeal, as long as it did not err in the misapprehension of legal principles or in the misapprehension of legal principles as alleged in the ground of appeal by the defendant as to the crime of traffic obstruction as alleged in the ground of appeal.

B. As to the intrusion of a structure

Examining the evidence duly admitted by the lower court in light of the record, the crime of intrusion upon a building is established when entering a building managed by a person against the explicit or implied will of the manager. In so doing, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding the prohibition of the use of the building by the representative of the National Workers’ Union on November 1, 1994 and requesting the president of the National University to permit the use of the building at 94-year Workers’ Meeting. However, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding the prohibition of the use of the building at each of the above universities or by misapprehending the legal doctrine as otherwise alleged in the grounds of appeal, on October 1995, since the first instance court’s request was made to the president of the National University to permit the use of the building at each of the above universities, and thus, did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding the prohibition of the use of the building at each of the above universities or by misapprehending the legal doctrine as alleged in the ground of appeal by the lower court.

C. As to the violation of the Labor Dispute Adjustment Act

(1) Article 13-2 of the former Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (repealed by Article 3 of the Addenda of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, Act No. 5244, Dec. 31, 1996; hereinafter the same) provides that no person, except a worker who has a direct labor relationship, or a person who has a legitimate authority under the pertinent trade union, employer, or other statutes, shall operate, instigate, obstruct, or interfere with the parties concerned with respect to an industrial action or engage in any other activity for the purpose of affecting it. However, a trade union which is a union federation or an industrial associated organization in which the said trade union is a member

In light of the provisions of Article 13(2) of the former Trade Union Act (repealed by Article 3 of the Addenda to the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, Act No. 524 of December 31, 1996; hereinafter the same shall apply), a trade union which permits intervention in industrial action under Article 13-2 of the former Trade Union Adjustment Act refers only to a trade union which meets the formal requirements such as the provision of Article 14 of the former Trade Union Act and the report of establishment under Article 13(1) of the same Act to the Minister of Labor. Thus, even if a trade union is a trade union consisting of an industrial associated organization or a nation-wide industrial unit trade union, it cannot be deemed to be a third party permitted to intervene in industrial action under Article 13-2 of the former Trade Union Act, even if a trade union is not issued with a certificate of establishment by the Minister of Labor under Article 15 of the same Act, it cannot be deemed that the report of establishment of a trade union under Article 13-2 of the former Trade Union Adjustment Act is a three-party union.

(2) On the other hand, Article 13-2 of the former Trade Dispute Mediation Act aims to prevent any third party, not a party to a labor-management relationship, from impeding autonomous resolution between the parties, such as inducing, expanding, overworking, suppressing, suppressing, or suspending industrial action. As such, if there is an objective and specific inter-party activity to the extent that it interferes with autonomous decision-making by the parties to a labor-management relationship, it constitutes an act of intervention prohibited by

Examining the evidence duly admitted by the court below in light of the records, it is reasonable that the defendant's act does not constitute an act of intervention in industrial action prohibited by Article 13-2 of the former Labor Dispute Mediation Act by holding a meeting of the former Labor Relations Adjustment Act or a steering committee of the court of first instance, as stated in the facts constituting 1 and 2 of the judgment of the court of first instance, which the court below admitted by the defendant as a joint representative of the former Labor Relations or the former Labor Relations Act, and delivering or distributing it to the former labor union as an objective and specific intercompeting act to the extent that it would impede the independent decision-making of the parties to labor relations. Furthermore, even if the defendant's act was done as a representative of the former Labor Relations Adjustment Act or the former Labor Relations Adjustment Act, such an act does not constitute an act of interference in industrial action prohibited by Article 13-2 of the former Labor Relations Adjustment Act, as alleged in the ground of appeal by the court below. The judgment below is justifiable, and there is no error in the misapprehension of the legal principles as to the act of intervention of Article 13-2 of the former Labor Dispute Mediation Act.

2. Regarding ground of appeal No. 2

A. Article 21(1) of the Constitution provides that the freedom of assembly or demonstration shall be guaranteed under the conditions as provided by Article 21(1). In particular, since an assembly or demonstration on the road may seriously conflict with the public interest, such as traffic rights or smooth traffic flow, it is necessary to ensure an adequate balance so as not to infringe upon public traffic rights or smooth traffic flow. Accordingly, Article 6(1) of the former Assembly and Demonstration Act (amended by Act No. 8424, May 11, 2007; hereinafter “former Assembly and Demonstration Act”) provides that a person who intends to hold an assembly or demonstration shall submit a report stating the purpose, date, time, place, number of participants and methods of the assembly or demonstration to the chief of the competent police station, and Article 12(1) of the former Assembly and Demonstration Act provides that if he/she deems it necessary to ensure traffic flow on the main roads of major cities, he/she shall be deemed to have clearly obstructed the assembly or demonstration within the scope of the reported assembly or demonstration in light of the purport of Article 14 of the former Assembly and Demonstration Act.

According to the facts established by the court below, the Seoul Local Police Agency, upon receipt of the report on the progress of the demonstration of this case from the public-private partnership on November 12, 1995, notified the public-private partnership of the fact that the demonstration of this case constitutes the progress on the main roads stipulated by Article 12 (1) of the former Assembly and Demonstration Act at least 08:0 on November 12, 1995, "it shall not pass only the right side of the road at the time of the demonstration of this case, and it shall not interfere with traffic flow by the use of the vehicle, and it shall not stop until the arrival of the road, and it shall not interfere with the passage of the public-private partnership or the passage of the public-private partnership or the public-private partnership, and it is considerably difficult for the public-private partnership or the public-private partnership or the public-private partnership or the public-private partnership or the public-private partnership or the public-private partnership or the public-private partnership or the public-private partnership or the public-private partnership or the public-private partnership or public-private partnership.

The judgment of the court below to the same purport is just, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to general traffic obstruction as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal. The Supreme Court precedent cited in the ground of appeal differs from this case, and it is not appropriate to invoke this case

B. Article 8(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights to which Korea is a member of the said Covenant provides that the exercise of the said rights may be limited to cases where necessary under the conditions as prescribed by the Act for the protection of national security, public order, and other people’s rights and freedom of expression. Article 19(2) of the said Covenant provides that all persons shall have the right to freedom of expression. Article 8(3) of the said Covenant provides that the exercise of said rights may be limited to cases where necessary to respect others’ rights and credit or to protect national security, public order, public health, and public morals, etc. Meanwhile, the preamble and its annexes to the International Labor Organization Charter of which Korea is a member of the said Covenant are declared as to the freedom of expression and association.

However, Article 13-2 of the former Trade Dispute Mediation Act only prohibits a third party, excluding those who have legitimate authority under statutes, from engaging in the act of operating, instigating, or interfering with the parties concerned in relation to industrial action or of interfering with other matters, and does not restrict the formation of a trade union and the freedom of joining or joining a trade union. Thus, the foregoing provision cannot be deemed to violate Article 8(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, which declares the freedom of formation and joining a trade union, or Article 8(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and its Annex.

Furthermore, Article 13-2 of the former Labor Dispute Mediation Act limits the freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 19(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or Annex to the Charter of the International Labor Organization. However, the risk of damages incurred by industrial action is that the parties to industrial action voluntarily bear the burden of labor relations, so whether or not to conduct industrial action, its method, its choice, and its degree should not be independently carried out under the responsibility of the parties to the labor relations. If an industrial action between the parties to the labor relations interferes with the autonomous resolution of the dispute between the parties to the industrial action to the extent that it creates, instigate, or interferes with the decision-making of the parties to the labor dispute, such as expanding, suppressing, or suppressing, or suspending, an industrial action may not interfere with the purpose of improving wages and working conditions of workers even when the parties to the labor relations are proceeding under the risk of causing danger to the parties to the labor relations, and such distorted industrial action may not be deemed to have been in violation of the legislative purpose of Article 19(1) of the International Labor Dispute Mediation Act and other Acts and subordinate statutes concerning industrial peace, etc.

The judgment of the court below to the same purport is just, and there is no error of law as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal.

C. Article 13-2 of the former Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (amended by Act No. 5244 of Dec. 31, 1997) provides that a person who violates the provisions of Article 13-2 through Article 13-2 shall not engage in any act involving an industrial action by a third party shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than five years or by a fine not exceeding 10 million won. The former Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (amended by Act No. 5244 of Dec. 31, 1996) enacted on March 1, 1997 provided that a person, other than each subparagraph of Article 40(2), shall not be limited to collective bargaining or industrial action, nor shall he be allowed to operate or instigate such act. Article 89 subparag. 1 through Article 40(2) of the former Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (amended by Act No. 5244 of Dec. 31, 197).

Meanwhile, Article 40(2) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act was enacted and enforced again by Act No. 5310 on March 13, 1997. Article 40(2) provides that any person other than each subparagraph of Article 40(1), such as an industrial associated organization or a federation of associated organizations, in which the trade union was a member, shall not participate in collective bargaining or industrial action, or shall not operate or instigate such action. Article 89 Subparag. 1 provides that any person who violates the provisions of Articles 40(2) through 40(2) shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than three years or by a fine not exceeding 30 million won. Article 10 of the Addenda of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act provides that “The provisions of the former Act shall govern in the application of penal provisions to any act before this Act enters into force.” Article 40 of the Addenda of the Act was repealed by Act No. 8158 on December 30, 206.

As above, while the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act was enacted and implemented, the former Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act was repealed, but the provisions that prohibit third party intervention were amended by the new Act, and the provisions that punish the violation were maintained as well as the provisions that punish the violation. The same name of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act was enacted and enforced again after the repeal of the above Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, and the provisions that prohibit third party intervention were subsequently repealed. However, in applying the penal provisions on acts conducted before the enforcement of each Act in the supplementary provisions at the time of the enactment and amendment of each of the above Acts, Articles 45-2 and 13-2 of the former Trade Dispute Mediation Act are still applied to acts involving industrial action by a third party before March 1, 197. As such, the provisions that prohibit party intervention in industrial action under Article 45-2 and Article 13-2 of the former Labor Dispute Mediation Act are still applicable to crimes committed before the enforcement of the Act as well as the provisions that apply the previous penal provisions to crimes before the repeal or amendment by the supplementary provisions to the Act.

The judgment of the court below to the same purport is just, and there is no violation of law as to the principle of no punishment without law.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Kim Ji-hyung (Presiding Justice)

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심급 사건
-서울중앙지방법원 2001.1.31.선고 95고단10975
본문참조조문