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(영문) 대법원 2000. 4. 7. 선고 99다53742 판결
[물품대금][공2000.6.1.(107),1145]
Main Issues

[1] Whether Article 96 (2) of the Budget and Accounts Act, which provides five-year extinctive prescription of the right to the State for payment of money, is null and void against the constitutional equality principle (negative)

[2] In a case where the plaintiff's main cause of claim is acknowledged as reasonable, and the defendant's partial defense is accepted and the plaintiff's claim as to that part is dismissed, whether it is necessary to determine whether the conjunctive cause of claim is reasonable (negative with qualification)

[3] The meaning of "the provisions of other Acts" under Article 96 (1) of the Budget and Accounts Act and whether Article 766 (2) of the Civil Code shall apply (negative)

[4] Whether it may be dismissed in a case where the actual time-limit attack and defense does not delay the conclusion of a lawsuit (negative)

[5] Whether comparative negligence shall be applied in a case where the performance of the original performance according to the content of the obligation is sought (negative)

Summary of Judgment

[1] Article 96 (2) and (1) of the Budget and Accounts Act provides that the right to payment of money to the State against the State shall be extinguished by prescription, unless otherwise provided by other Acts, unless it is exercised for five years. However, Article 96 (1) of the same Act provides that the statute of limitations for the State's monetary claims shall also expire by five years. In light of the above, Article 96 (2) and (1) of the Budget and Accounts Act, which provides for the extinctive prescription for monetary claims against the State, shall not be deemed null and void by violating the constitutional equality

[2] In a case where the plaintiff's primary cause of action is recognized as well-grounded, and the plaintiff's primary cause of action is accepted as part of the defendant's defense, and the plaintiff's primary claim is dismissed as a condition for rescission that part of the primary claim be accepted as part of the primary claim, barring special circumstances such as the plaintiff's preliminary claim is dismissed as a condition that part of the primary claim be accepted as part of the primary claim, it is not necessary to further determine whether the primary cause of action is justified.

[3] Article 96 of the Budget and Accounts Act (Article 96 of the Budget and Accounts Act) provides that where other Acts stipulate extinctive prescription period shorter than the five-year extinctive prescription period as stipulated in Article 96 of the Budget and Accounts Act, such other Acts shall apply. Article 766 (2) of the Civil Act, which provides for the ten-year extinctive prescription, does not fall under the provisions of other Acts stipulated in Article 9

[4] The court may dismiss an attack or defense which was submitted late at the time of the party's intention or gross negligence when it is deemed that the conclusion of the lawsuit would be delayed. This is not only in the form of independent decision, but also in the form of independent decision, which may be determined by the method of decision. However, even if it is a means of attack or defense, if the continuation of the date is required, and the deliberation of the means of attack or defense can be completed within the scope of the continuance date, or the contents thereof are included within the scope of the litigation materials which have already completed the trial, it shall not be deemed that delay the conclusion of the lawsuit is not possible.

[5] The comparative negligence set-off is recognized as liability for damages caused by nonperformance or tort, and it is not applicable to cases where the performance of the original performance is sought according to the content of the obligation.

[Reference Provisions]

[1] Article 96 (2) of the Budget and Accounts Act, Article 11 of the Constitution / [2] Article 394 of the Civil Procedure Act / [3] Article 96 of the Budget and Accounts Act, Article 766 (2) of the Civil Procedure Act / [4] Article 138 of the Civil Procedure Act / [5]

Reference Cases

[2] Supreme Court Decision 94Da50274 delivered on February 9, 1996 (Gong1996Sang, 880) / [3] Supreme Court Decision 67Da751 delivered on July 4, 196 (No. 15-2, 143) / [4] Supreme Court Decision 93Da47615 delivered on May 10, 1994 (Gong1994Sang, 1650), Supreme Court Decision 95Nu509 delivered on March 22, 1996 (Gong196Sang, 1409), Supreme Court Decision 98Da52469 delivered on February 26, 199 (Gong199 and 615 delivered on July 199) 4, 197 (No. 1998Da49799 delivered on July 26, 197) 194

Plaintiff, Appellant and Appellee

[Defendant-Appellee] Defendant 1 and 3 others (Attorney Kim Won-jin, Counsel for defendant-appellee)

Defendant, Appellee and Appellant

Korea

Judgment of the lower court

Seoul High Court Decision 98Na59370 delivered on August 18, 1999

Text

The appeal shall be dismissed. The costs of appeal shall be assessed against each party.

Reasons

We examine the grounds of appeal.

1. Plaintiff’s ground of appeal

Article 96 (2) and (1) of the Budget and Accounts Act provides that the purpose of the payment of money to the State as the right shall be extinguished by the prescription, unless otherwise provided by other Acts, unless it is exercised for five years. However, Article 96 (1) of the same Act provides that the extinctive prescription of the State's monetary claims shall also expire by five years. In light of Article 96 (2) and (1) of the Budget and Accounts Act, which provides for the extinctive prescription of the monetary claims against the State, cannot be deemed null and void in violation of the principle of equality under the Constitution. Thus, the court below is just in holding that part of the claim of this case was extinguished by the extinctive prescription by applying the above provision of the Act

In addition, according to the records and reasoning of the judgment below, the plaintiff primarily embezzled the proceeds of the sale of the goods in this case on the premise that the non-party embezzled the proceeds of the sale of the goods in this case on behalf of the defendant while being kept in custody. On the premise that the proceeds of the sale in this case were embezzled while being kept in custody for the plaintiff, the plaintiff claims compensation for damages caused by tort, such as neglecting supervision over the defendant's employees, etc., under the premise that the proceeds of the sale in this case were embezzled. The court below recognized that the defendant's primary claim was reasonable, and dismissed the plaintiff's claim based on the premise that part of the above claims were extinguished by the statute of limitations. In such a case, the court below rejected the plaintiff's claim based on the premise that the plaintiff's primary claim was accepted as part of the main claim, and it is not necessary to determine whether the conjunctive claim was based on the order to dismiss part of the main claim, and thus, it cannot be said that the extinctive prescription period of Article 96 of the Budget and Accounts Act is more than 97 years under the provision of other Acts.

In addition, the court may dismiss the method of attack or defense which was submitted late at the time of the party's intention or gross negligence, if it is deemed that such attack or defense would be delayed the conclusion of the lawsuit. This is not only in the form of an independent decision, but also in the form of an independent decision, which may be determined by the method of decision. However, even if the method of attack or defense is a means of attack or defense within the scope of the continuance date, if it is necessary to continue the trial and the deliberation of the method of attack or defense is completed within the scope of the continuance date, or its contents are already included in the scope of the litigation materials which have already completed the trial, it shall not be deemed to delay the completion of the lawsuit, and it shall not be dismissed (see Supreme Court Decision 98Da46167 delivered on July 27, 199). Accordingly, according to the records, the court below's assertion that there was no error in the misapprehension of the right of defense as alleged in the ground of appeal by the defendant against the abuse of rights cannot be accepted.

2. As to the Defendant’s ground of appeal

Contributory negligence is recognized as liability for damages caused by nonperformance or tort, and it does not apply to cases where the plaintiff seeks performance of its original obligation according to its content (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 97Da34822, Feb. 5, 1999; 96Da8468, May 10, 196). As seen earlier, the plaintiff primarily claims the price for the goods under the goods supply contract with the defendant for the goods supply contract of this case, while the plaintiff primarily claims the price for the goods under the goods supply contract of this case with the defendant, and claims for damages arising from the defendant's tort against the defendant's employee, and the court below rendered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff partly because it judged that the plaintiff's primary claim of this case was partly reasonable. Thus, it cannot be said that the court below erred in the omission of judgment as alleged in the grounds for appeal.

3. Therefore, each appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against each party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee Yong-hun (Presiding Justice)

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심급 사건
-서울고등법원 1999.8.18.선고 98나59370
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