In case where the land on which a building is settled exceeds the standards for recognition of idle land under Article 8 (1) 4 of the Land Excess Profit Tax Act, whether the portion of the land which belongs within the standard scope and is deemed to be used as the site for the building is also deemed to be the idle land.

With respect to the land on which a building is settled, the provisions of Article 8 (1) 4 of the Land Excess Profit Tax Act concerning the area or value of the land annexed to a building which is deemed to be used as the site of the building in accordance with the area or value of the building, the standard Eup prescribed by the Presidential Decree shall be deemed to be used as the site of the building. The part of the land which is not deemed to be used as the site of the building in excess of the standard shall be deemed to be used as the site of the building, and at the same time, the portion of the land which is deemed to be used as the site of the building shall be interpreted to be excluded

Article 8 (1) 4 of the Land Excess Profits Tax Act, Articles 11 (1) and 11 (2) of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act

Han-seok et al.

Samsung Head of Samsung Tax Office

1. The Defendant’s imposition of KRW 67,292,580 on November 15, 1991, of the land excess profit tax against the Plaintiff Han-seok, and the Defendant’s imposition of KRW 65,682,190 on November 15, 1991, of the land excess profit tax as to the Plaintiff Han-young, respectively, shall be revoked.

2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the defendant.

As set forth in the text.

1. Details of the imposition;

(1) On December 29, 1982, the following facts are as follows: (a) the number of 19 square meters and 19.3 square meters and 186.3 square meters and 18.4 square meters and 18.2 square meters and 422 square meters and 19.4 square meters and 19.4 square meters and 19.3 square meters and 19.4 square meters and 19.4 square meters and 19.4 square meters and 19.4 square meters and 19.4 square meters and 19.4 square meters and 19.4 square meters and 200 square meters and 19.4 square meters and 19.4 square meters and 19.4 square meters and 19.4 square meters and 19.4 square meters and 19.4 square meters and 19.4 square meters and 19.1 square meters and 20.4 square meters and 19.3 square meters and 201 square meters and 19.3

2. Whether the disposition is lawful;

A. The parties' assertion

As to the assertion that the above disposal of the idle land is legitimate, the plaintiffs were 10 years after the date of the initial determination of the remaining land under the provisions of Article 11 (1) of the Enforcement Decree of the Act. This Decree provides that the price of the remaining land shall be 10 years after the date of the initial determination of the 10th anniversary of the acquisition of the remaining land under the provisions of Article 11 (1) of the same Act and Article 3 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act. The defendant's disposal of the remaining land shall be 10 years after the date of the initial determination of the 19th anniversary of the acquisition of the remaining land under the provision of Article 10 of the Public Notice of Values and Appraisal of Lands, etc. 2 of the same Act. This Decree provides that the 10th anniversary of the acquisition of the remaining land under the provision of Article 11 (1) of the same Act shall be less than 9th of the acquisition of the remaining land under the provision of Article 11 (2) of the same Act. This Decree provides that the value of the land shall be 10.

(b) Provisions of relevant Acts and subordinate statutes (as of December 31, 1990);

Article 3 (1) of the Land Excess Profit Tax Act provides that the land excess profit tax shall be imposed on the land excess profit generated from such idle land, etc.; Article 3 (2) of the Enforcement Decree of the Public Notice of Values and Appraisal of Lands Act provides that the determination of idle land, etc. shall be based on de facto status as of the end of the taxable period, except as otherwise provided for in this Act; Article 8 (1) 4 of the same Act provides that the land which is subject to taxation of the land excess profit tax falling under any of the following items is one of the land on which the standard market price of the year is fixed, and item (b) provides that the ratio of the value of the land exceeding the standard market price of the building (referring to the amount appraised by the standard market price as prescribed by the Presidential Decree; hereafter the same shall apply in this Chapter) to the first taxable period of the land excess profit tax, and Article 11 (2) of the Enforcement Decree of the Public Notice of Values and Appraisal of Lands and Appraisal of Lands shall be imposed on the land price of the same year after the end of the taxable period.

(c) Markets:

As to the plaintiffs' first argument, Article 24 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act defines the term "land price for individual lots calculated on the basis of the officially announced land price pursuant to Article 10 of the Land Price Disclosure Act" as the standard market price for individual lots. Article 33 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act provides that the standard market price pursuant to Article 11 (2) of the Act shall be the standard market price for individual lots. Thus, it is clear that the land price for individual lots calculated on the basis of the officially announced land price determined by Article 10 of the Land Price Disclosure Act by the head of the Si/Gun/Gu is the standard market price for individual lots. Thus, the first argument by the plaintiffs on the premise that it is not clear.

Second, the plaintiffs' assertion that the land excess profit tax is established to recover the land excess profit acquired by the owner due to the increase of land prices, such as idle land due to various development projects or other social and economic factors, thereby contributing to the equity of tax burden, stability of land prices, and efficient use of land, and further contributing to the sound development of the national economy. While individual land prices calculated by the head of the Si/Gun/Gu under Article 10 of the Public Notice of Land Price Act and Article 5 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act are all 1.1, the land price calculated by the head of the Gun/Gu as the base date is not the same as the starting date of the taxable period. However, the individual land price of 12.31, which is the end of the taxable period, cannot be said to be the same as the individual land price of 12.31, which is the starting date of the taxable period. However, in the calculation of the non-taxation period of the land excess profit, the land price of 2.1, which is the date of application of the individual land price calculated by the 9.

Third, except as otherwise provided in this Act, the determination of idle land, etc. is based on the actual status as of the end of the taxable period, except as otherwise provided in Article 3 (2) of the Land Excess Profit Tax Act. Thus, the value of the land is also included in the actual status stipulated in Article 3 (2) of the Act as one of the data for the determination of idle land, etc., so long as Article 3 (2) of the Act does not become null and void even if there are unreasonable points as claimed by the plaintiffs, the determination of idle land on the land in this case should be based on December 31, 1990, which is the end of the taxable period, so the above argument by the plaintiffs is without merit.

As to the plaintiffs' assertion, Article 23 (1) of the same Act provides that when the land price increase for the first year or for the next one year (hereinafter referred to as "predetermined period") exceeds the aggregate of the amount equivalent to 150/100 of the increase in the land price in the scheduled period of time and the improvement expenses, the land excess profit tax shall be imposed on the excess amount. Since the taxable period for the land of this case is not less than 3 years under Article 6 of the same Act, but until December 31, 190 under Article 23 (1) of the same Act, since the land price increase or is likely to increase rapidly, such as the surrounding area where the development project is implemented, etc., and the land price increase for the first year or for the next one year (hereinafter referred to as "predetermined period") is in excess of the total amount of the increase in land price increase in the scheduled period of time during the scheduled period of time and the land of this case is not necessary to review the above scheduled period of time from January 1, 1990 to December 31.

Fifth, I will examine the plaintiffs' argument.

The land fixed by a building is used by the owner of the land, as it is, in principle, not deemed idle land. However, under the Land Excess Profit Tax Act, if such land is anticipated to be excessively larger than a building, the land is deemed idle land by setting a certain period and deeming it as a idle land. In other words, as seen earlier, the land on which a building is settled, other than Article 8(1)4 through 3 of the Land Excess Profit Tax Act, is one of the idle land subject to the taxation of the land excess profit tax, and the item (a) provides that the land exceeding the basic area prescribed by the Presidential Decree, and item (b) provides that the ratio of the value of the building to the value of the attached land is less than the ratio prescribed by the Presidential Decree:

The portion of land exceeding the basic area of item (a) of the above provision is clearly excluded from idle land by clearly stipulating that it does not exceed the basic area, and unlike this, item (b) of the above provision provides that the value ratio of the building to the value of the land annexed to a building is less than the ratio as prescribed by the Presidential Decree, it is apparent that the whole of the land is excluded from idle land if the value of the land attached to a grammatic building satisfies the ratio as prescribed by the Presidential Decree to the value of the annexed building. However, if the value of the land falls short of the ratio, it is unclear that the whole of the land is deemed idle land or only the portion exceeding the ratio prescribed by the Presidential Decree is deemed idle land. If the defendant falls short of the above ratio, the defendant takes the disposition of this case by interpreting that all of the land is deemed idle land.

However, in light of the purpose of enacting the Land Excess Profit Tax Act, the concept of land excess profit and idle land under the Land Excess Profit Tax Act, which is to impose on the income accrued from the land which is not used according to the purpose of use of the land, the scope of such land excess profit and the concept of idle land cannot be accurately stated as long as there is a building on the land, but as a part of such land is used as a building site unlike the land, it cannot be viewed as idle land, so the part of the land which is used as a site for the building cannot be seen as a site for the building. Therefore, the above provision provides the criteria for the area or value of the land to be used as a site for the building according to the size or value of the building, and the part of the land which is not deemed to be used as a site for the building shall not be deemed as a site for the building, and at the same time, the part of the land which is deemed to be used as a site for the building shall be interpreted to be excluded from idle land.

Ultimately, the defendant's disposition of this case is deemed to be used within ten times the value of the building of this case among the land of this case as the site for the building of this case, and it constitutes idle land up to the portion excluded from idle land. Thus, the part is unlawful and its remainder is lawful.

However, since there is no proof by the defendant on the part of each specific part of the building of this case, which is located on each of the lands of this case, or the taxation market price standard under the Local Tax Act, among the buildings of this case on each of the lands of this case, the legitimate part of the disposition of this case cannot be specified, and thus the entire disposition of this case shall be revoked.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiffs' claim of this case seeking its revocation on the ground of the illegality of the disposition of this case is justified, and the costs of lawsuit are assessed against the losing defendant. It is so decided as per Disposition.

Judges Yu Tae-tae (Presiding Judge)