Whether the insurance premium receipt can be viewed as a document evidencing the fact of being insured under Article 4 (3) of the Act on Special Cases concerning the Settlement of Traffic Accidents (negative)

The insurance premium receipt (payment certificate) evidencing the fact of the payment of insurance premiums is different from the insurance policy that proves the fact of being insured for a specific contract through an insurance contract and its nature, and also does not state the purport of Article 4 (2) of the Act on Special Cases concerning the Settlement of Traffic Accidents. Therefore, the above receipt alone cannot be viewed as a document that verifies the fact of being insured under Article 4 (3) of the Act on Special Cases concerning the Settlement of Traffic Accidents, since it cannot be viewed as a document that verifies the fact of being insured under Article 4 (2) of the aforesaid Act.

Article 4 of the Act on Special Cases concerning Traffic Accident Settlement

Defendant

Defendant

Attorney Ohhee-si

Busan District Court Decision 84No785 delivered on July 26, 1984

The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to Busan District Court Panel Division.

The defendant's defense counsel's grounds of appeal are examined.

1. As to the first ground for appeal:

The term "documents subject to punishment for false preparation under Article 5 (1) of the Act on Special Cases concerning the Settlement of Traffic Accidents" means, in the case of traffic accidents, the full amount of ordinary expenses for the treatment of victims in lieu of the insured or members of mutual aid associations in accordance with the insurance policy or the approved terms and conditions of mutual aid, and the payment standard amount prescribed in the above terms and conditions for other damages shall be paid first under the conditions as prescribed by the Presidential Decree in preference of the insured or members of mutual aid associations, and ultimately, the insurer or mutual aid operator shall state his intent in writing, in the case of traffic accidents, in accordance with the insurance policy or the approved terms and conditions of mutual aid.

However, the defendant's sulfur agency received 128,060 won from the insurance premium of a general insurance contract which is equivalent to the amount set forth in the terms and conditions of the contract from the policyholder Lee Jong-chul, and 20 million won as the insurance premium of a comprehensive insurance contract which is equivalent to 20 million won, and this insurance premium is an insurance subject to income deduction pursuant to the provisions of Article 116-2 (2) and (3) of the Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act, which stated that the insurance premium shall be deducted at the end of the year, in writing (in case of investigation record 25), the fact that the insurance was insured if it is proved that the policyholder paid the insurance premium, but the insurance premium receipt (in case of the insurance premium receipt) which proves the fact that the insurance premium was insured through an agreement between the parties to the insurance contract which proves the payment of the insurance premium and the insurance premium receipt (in case of the above receipt, it cannot be acknowledged that the above fact that the above insurance was a traffic accident under the provisions of Article 4 of the Act.

Therefore, the judgment of the court below which convicted the defendant on the ground that the act of preparing the above receipt of insurance premium constitutes a crime of false preparation of a document under Article 4 (3) of the same Act as stipulated in Article 5 (1) of the same Act. The judgment below is erroneous in the misapprehension of the legal principle of an insurance policy certificate under Article 4 of the same Act or by misunderstanding facts without evidence, and thereby affecting the conclusion of the judgment. Thus, without any need to determine other grounds of appeal, the judgment of the court below is not reversed. The grounds for appeal

2. Therefore, the lower judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the lower court. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Jeong Jong-tae (Presiding Justice)